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1.  BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 The fact  
 
On a few occasions Miss Finland has opted to appear in the evening gown event of the Miss 
Universe pageant wearing the traditional dress of the Saami people1, indigenous to northern 
Fenno-Scandinavia and the Kola Peninsula in the Russian Federation.  Presumably, it never 
crossed the beauty misses’ mind that their choice of clothing may raise legal issues.  They 
merely wished to add an exotic touch to their appearance.  A few of them sought the 
assistance of young Saami women, wanting to wear the dress properly.  Still, the traditional 
Saami dress does not represent Miss Finland’s tradition or culture.  Even if Finland is one of 
the countries within which the Saami reside, Miss Finland did not proclaim to be of Saami 
origin.  In that sense, she held no stronger ties to the Saami culture than the other hopeful 
beauty princesses.   
 
The above is just one example of use of elements of indigenous peoples’ cultures by non-
members.  Other examples include indigenous peoples’ knowledge about flora and fauna 
being patented by multinationals and utilized without consent or remuneration.2  Indigenous 
arts are being copied onto carpets, clothes and greeting cards and are also otherwise utilized 
by the tourist industry,3 again most often without compensation being paid.4  Often, the 
appropriator does not make the user aware of whose culture is being exploited.  Indigenous 
handicrafts are copied and sold as authentic.5  Music producers fuse native songs with techno-
rhythms resulting in million selling “world-music” albums, without the listener knowing who 
is the real “composer” of the tune, or compensation being awarded.6  Indigenous signs, 
symbols and words are being trade-marketed for commercial purposes.7  Their traditional 
patterns are being used in tattoo-shops, including by famous rock-star Robbie Williams.     
 
                                                 
1  E.g. in 2007, 2005 and 1996.  See e.g. www.missuniverse.com/delegates/2007/files/FI-photo-costume.html 
(visited last 20 July 2008).  
2  Chander and Sunder, the Romance of the Public Domain, p. 1348, and von Lewinski, Indigenous Heritage and 
Intellectual Property II, pp. 1-2 
3  Carpenter, Intellectual Property Law and Indigenous Peoples, pp. 64-66 
4  Lucas-Schloetter, Folklore, p. 341 
5  von Lewinski , Indigenous Heritage and Intellectual Property II, p. 1 
6  Brown, Can Culture Be Copyrighted?, p. 203, and Lucas-Schloetter, Folklore, p. 342 
7  Mezey, The Paradox of Cultural Property, and Lucas-Schloetter, Folklore, p. 341 
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1.2 Does the appropriation of indigenous peoples’ cultures constitute a 
problem?  
 
1.2.1 Indigenous peoples’ perspective 
 
Indigenous peoples have objected to the unauthorized utilization of elements of their cultures 
by non-members.  They protest against these practices for several reasons.  To provide an 
overview of the arguments, it is helpful to divide these into assertions based on (i) cultural, 
and (ii) economic rationales.   
 
If starting with the economic justifications, indigenous peoples point to that whatever 
monetary value vests in elements springing from their respective cultures, such value is a 
result of the creativity and efforts of them.  Consequently, the proceeds from utilization 
should benefit the indigenous people from which the element origins, and not someone who 
had little to do with the creation.  It is not fair that pharmaceutical corporations, 
bioprospectors, the tourist industry etc. free-ride on indigenous peoples’ creativity, they 
submit.  This argument gains increased strength, indigenous peoples assert, from the fact that 
many indigenous peoples are financially disadvantaged, and live in poverty and 
marginalization.  Increased control over the proceeds from commercialization of their cultures 
could contribute to alleviating indigenous peoples from poverty.8 
 
Still, improved standard of living is normally not the principal reason for indigenous peoples 
calling for increased protection over elements of their cultures.  Rather, the rationale behind 
them demanding increased control over their collective creativity is more often a desire to 
protect their distinct cultures, societies, and ways of life.  Indigenous peoples’ concern is in 
most instances their cultural identities, rather than money.9  For this reason, they react 
particularly strongly against unauthorized use of their cultural elements that are offensive, 
derogatory or in other ways culturally insensitive or inappropriate.  In addition, indigenous 
                                                 
8  The proceeds from utilization of indigenous cultures are huge.  In 2004, it was estimated that artisan handicraft 
only generated global profits of around USD 30 billion.  See Fowler, Preventing Counterfeit Craft Design.  
Compare also Correa, Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property, p. 3.  Not all of these handicrafts of 
course spring from indigenous cultures, but a vast majority presumably do.  Only in Australia, aboriginal art is 
estimated to generate incomes of AUD 200 million annually.  See Lucas-Schloetter, Folklore, p. 340.  In 1999, 
calculations had the world market for traditional/herbal medicines at USD 43 billion.  As Carpenter, Katyal and 
Riley have noted, for many indigenous peoples their intangible property may be the greatest commodifiable 
good they still possess.  See In Defence of Property, p. 1103.   
9  Taubman and Leistner, Analysis of Different Areas of Indigenous Resources, p. 62, and Lucas-Schloetter, 
Folklore, pp. 343-344 
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peoples may find the idea that their cultures vest with humankind as a whole, or equally bad, 
with their host state, offensive as such.  Indigenous peoples underscore that the notion that 
their cultural heritage is free to use by anyone – or to use intellectual property language, is in 
the so called public domain - is a legal precept created by others, and something they have 
never accepted.  They point to that a substantial part of the collective creativity perceived by 
conventional IP-law to be in the public domain has been placed there without the indigenous 
people’s authorization.10  Indigenous peoples maintain that this notion fails to take into 
account private domains established by indigenous peoples’ own legal systems, often 
customary in nature.  In other words, indigenous peoples denounce the idea that their cultures 
are, to use a metaphor borrowed from the sphere of land and natural resource law, terra 
nullius. 
 
Further, the mere concept of claiming property rights over culture is alien to many indigenous 
peoples.  Indigenous peoples normally perceive their cultural heritage to vest in the people as 
such.  The notion that an individual can monopolize culture run counter to their spiritual 
believes and cosmo-visions, and attempts to do so are hence often viewed as inappropriate in 
themselves.  Obviously, that might be particularly so if the appropriator of the right is a non-
member, and the motivation commercial gain.   
 
But sometimes, indigenous peoples’ interest in preventing unauthorized uses of their 
collective creativity is not guided by any particular spiritual or cultural reason.  Many 
indigenous peoples are engaged in a constant battle not to be engulfed by the majority culture.  
Members of fragile cultures are often wrestling with their cultural identity.  They do not 
always find it easy to be proud of, or even secure in, their distinct cultural identities.  In such a 
sensitive environment, derogatory use of the indigenous people’s culture might not only be 
offensive.  It can constitute a direct threat to the cultural identity of the members of the 
indigenous community, and, indirectly, to the identity of the group as such, indigenous 
peoples posit.  Insensitive uses of elements of indigenous culture by non-members can spur 
members of the indigenous group to hide their cultural background, and give up their 
traditional way of life.  With time, this might result in assimilation.   
 
                                                 
10  Dutfield and Suthersanen, Global Intellectual Property Law, p. 337 
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But indigenous representatives further maintain that utilization of the creativity of an 
indigenous people need not necessarily be derogatory to negatively impact on the cultural 
identity of the people.  In present society, the border between the majority culture and the 
indigenous culture is often not as clear-cut as it used to be.  Populations have often mixed by 
migration, inter-marriages and by indigenous persons taking up “ordinary” jobs.  Indigenous 
peoples’ representatives admit that in these instances, they have to a certain degree voluntarily 
exposed themselves to other cultures.  Yet they maintain that by doing so, they have not 
surrendered their right to their distinct cultural identity.  On the contrary, they posit that in a 
world of blurring cultures, indigenous peoples are in particular need of protection of cultural 
elements remaining distinctly theirs.  It is exactly when populations blend, indigenous peoples 
argue, that the need to shield the core of their cultures is at its greatest.     
 
1.2.2 Arguments for continued access to indigenous peoples’ cultures 
 
The outlined arguments submitted by indigenous representatives have not been uncontested.  
Both the economic and cultural rationales have been challenged, by different interests and for 
varying reasons.  With regard to the financial rationales, it has been submitted that allowing 
indigenous peoples greater control over their collective creativity has financially negative 
impacts for society as a whole, but also for indigenous peoples themselves.  The arguments 
calling for increased respect for indigenous peoples’ cultural identities, values and practices 
have met resistance essentially for three, broadly defined, reasons.  First, it has been asserted 
that increased protection of indigenous peoples’ cultures hampers cultural life and 
development of humankind as a whole.  Others add that since cultures are generally allowed 
to borrow from and interact with each other, it makes little sense to specifically protect 
indigenous cultures.  Finally, some are concerned that increased shielding of indigenous 
cultures is harmful to vulnerable individual members of the group.  These lines of arguments 
are further outlined below.  
 
If again starting with the economic aspects, some proponents of continued access by non-
members to indigenous peoples’ collective creativity might agree that increased control by 
indigenous peoples over their distinct cultures might be financially advantageous for them.  
But, it is maintained, limited access to indigenous cultures is economically unsound for 
society as a whole.  Subjects ranging from individual artists to multinational conglomerates 
submit that awarding indigenous peoples rights to control access to their cultures hampers the 
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economy.  Allowing pharmaceuticals and bio-prospectors to build on indigenous peoples’ 
traditional knowledge (TK) about flora and fauna benefits humankind, it is pointed to.  In the 
same vein, it is asserted that the wealth generated by allowing artists, corporations etc. to 
incorporate indigenous peoples’ traditional cultural expressions (TCEs) such as songs and 
handicrafts into their products, greatly exceeds the proceeds indigenous peoples could 
generate if exploiting these TCEs themselves.  And, it is further argued, this benefits also the 
indigenous peoples themselves, since parts of the wealth generated will in the end reach also 
the indigenous people that created the cultural element.  As indicated, some bioprospectors, 
pharmaceuticals etc. add to this line of argument that industrial demand for in situ TK is not 
that high anymore.  Rather, the industry is increasingly moving towards utilizing ex situ 
compilations of genetic resources (GR), designed therapeutic modules and synthetic 
chemistry.  For this reason, it is submitted, increased regulation of TK might in fact be 
financially disadvantageous also to the indigenous peoples themselves, since it might push 
industrial demand further towards therapeutic modules and synthetic chemistry, depriving 
indigenous peoples of opportunities for benefit-sharing arrangements that exist today.11 
 
As mentioned, also indigenous peoples’ arguments rooted in respect for their cultures and 
cultural identities have been unconvincing to many.  Some critics posit that not only the 
economical affairs of the society, but also its cultural life is enriched by composers, artists etc. 
being free to be inspired by and borrow from the creativity of all cultures, including those of 
indigenous peoples.  It is argued that awarding indigenous peoples increased rights over their 
collective creativity would remove a very large body of cultural elements from the public 
domain, with a negative impact on the culture of humankind as a result.  This camp maintains 
that a vast public domain is good for everyone, wherefore increased protection would harm 
society.12 
 
Section 1.2.1 described how indigenous peoples argue that their cultures being increasingly 
exposed to foreign cultures and the culture of the majority population warrant increased 
cultural protection.  Others draw the opposite conclusion from indigenous societies blending 
with other cultures.  They point to that cultures have always borrowed from each other, and 
                                                 
11  Systems and National Experiences for Protecting Traditional Knowledge, Innovations and Practices, 
Background Note by the UNCTAD Secretariat (2000).  See also Dutfield and Suthersanen, Global Intellectual 
Property Law, pp. 330 and 337-338. 
12  Dutfield and Suthersanen, Global Intellectual Property Law, pp. 335-336 
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do so at accelerating speed.13  Consequently, it is asserted, in the epoch of globalization, there 
can be no such thing as distinct cultures.  It is increasingly difficult to attribute a particular 
cultural object to a specific culture.14  Benhabib submits that the notion that every human 
group has its own culture rests on the faulty presumptions that cultures are clearly definable 
wholes, a non-controversial definition of a culture of a human group is possible, and even if 
both cultures and groups blur to some degree, this constitutes no problem for law and policy.15  
The conclusion is that if indigenous peoples – as other cultures – find themselves in a blur of 
cultural elements of varying origin, why should their cultures be specifically protected?  The 
posed question is particularly relevant, it is added, when indigenous peoples themselves 
voluntarily approach and benefit from foreign cultures.  Why, it is asserted, should indigenous 
peoples be allowed to “cherry-pick”; enjoying Italian opera, French wine and Japanese sushi, 
at the same time as demanding that their particular cultures be shielded?16 
 
Other critics of increased shielding of indigenous cultures are predominantly concerned with 
the welfare of individual members of indigenous groups.  They argue that protection of 
minority cultures tends to result in a group within the group, typically a male elite, oppressing 
weaker segments of the population.  Therefore, indigenous cultures should not be further 
isolated.  Rather, the claim is, members of indigenous groups shall be encouraged to take part 
in the cultural life of society as a whole.  Indigenous individuals should be given the 
opportunity to freely choose between their own culture and other cultures, or any mix thereof.  
If the result is the disappearance of the indigenous culture, this is the result of individuals 
being free to lead the life they wish, this line of argument concludes. 
                                                 
13  Cohen, referring to a number of other authors, underlines that creativity being inspired by previous works is 
no new phenomenon.  She elaborates that this was true also for classical masters within fields such as music, 
visual arts and literature.  Around the turn of the 20th Century, Paris-based painters were heavily inspired by 
Japanese prints, so called Renaissance painting borrowed its views on perspective from Roman architecture and 
the “African novel” drew from the culture of the Colonial West.  Cohen illustrates by pointing to that the third 
movement of Mahler’s first symphony builds on a French children’s song.  Further, Spanish painter Velasquez 
served as a great source of inspiration for the impressionist school.  And Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream draws heavily from the tragedy Pyramus and Thisbe.  As a more recent example of cultures blending, 
Cohen mentions film director Quentin Tarantino being frank about Kill Bill’s dept to Japanese anime and 
spaghetti westerns.  See Copyright, Commodification, and Culture, pp. 143-145 and 153.  Underlining the time-
span during which cultural exchanges have occurred, Appiah adds that the Silk Road influenced elite dresses in 
Italy and that bagpipes, so identified with Scotland, where actually originally brought there by the Romans from 
Egypt.  See Cosmopolitanism, pp. 112-113.   
14  Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, pp. 113 and 118-122 
15  Benhabib, The Claims of Culture, pp. 7-8 
16  A variation of this line of argument adds that building fences between cultures poses the threat of stifling and 
stagnating them, depriving the cultures of their hybridity.  It is submitted that interaction between cultures keeps 
the cultures living and meaningful.  See e.g. Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, pp. 128-130, Mezey, The Paradox of 
Cultural Property, p. 10, and Carpenter, Katyal and Riley, In Defence of Property, pp. 1042-1043  
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1.3 The aim of the doctoral thesis 
 
1.3.1 The specific aim – surveying what rights indigenous peoples’ hold 
over their collective creativity 
 
The purpose of these sections above has been to introduce and illustrate the topic at hand, as 
well as to underline the need for research in the area.  The doctoral thesis will not further 
concern itself with positions on why indigenous peoples’ collective creativity should or 
should not enjoy protection.  Below, arguments for and against protection are only relevant to 
the extent they are couched in terms of law.  In other words, the thesis is essentially only 
concerned with establishing what constitutes law today.  With one notable exception, the 
thesis is not interested in what the law will look like in the future, i.e. with norms that are 
about to emerge.  As indicated, of even less interest is what the law should look like.   
 
The specific aim of the doctoral thesis is hence to answer which of two counter positions 
outlined above has support in international law.  In other words, the thesis aspires to establish 
to what extent international law awards indigenous peoples the right to own and/or determine 
over their respective distinct collective creativity.  To answer the posed question, the thesis 
analyzes human rights law that broadly speaking can be divided into two sub-categories, 
namely (i) rights to culture/self-determination, and (ii) property rights.  As an underlying 
right, the right to non-discrimination is of relevance, and hence surveyed, in the context of 
both categories of rights. With regard to the right to property, a substantial part of the analysis 
consists of a comparative study of recent developments within the sphere of indigenous 
peoples’ property rights to lands and territories.   
 
In addition, as part of investigating whether indigenous peoples hold rights to their distinct 
collective creativity under the human right to property, the doctoral thesis describes, 
admittedly in very general terms, the applicability of conventional intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) to indigenous cultures.  And, following the conclusions as to what extent indigenous 
peoples hold human rights to their creativity, the thesis also surveys whether these rights have 
been matched by recent developments within the sphere of intellectual property (IP)-
neighbouring rights.  In this context, the thesis also further analyzes the relationship and 
interplay between the human right to property and IPRs, hoping that doing so will offer even 
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greater clarity as to the more precise scope and content of indigenous peoples’ rights to their 
collective creativity.       
 
1.3.2 The general aim – clarifying and systemizing the legal status and 
principal rights of indigenous peoples under international law 
 
As clear from Section 1.3.1, seeking to establish what rights indigenous peoples hold to their 
collective creativity, the doctoral thesis will have to survey essentially all spheres of law most 
central to the indigenous rights discourse.  The Section further indicated how an important 
element of these analyses is a survey of the relevance of the interaction and interplay between 
the various relevant areas of law.  In addition, what specific rights indigenous peoples hold to 
their cultures is to a large degree contingent upon certain underlying criteria, most notably 
what legal status indigenous peoples enjoy under the contemporary international legal system.  
Whether indigenous peoples constitute peoples proper under international law or not is 
obviously of cardinal importance when establishing what rights they hold to their collective 
creativity.  Further, if indigenous peoples do constitute peoples for legal purposes, does it 
follow from this status that they enjoy the general right to self-determination applicable to all 
peoples?  Naturally, the answers to these underlying questions make up central parts of the 
thesis.      
 
The doctoral thesis spanning over areas of law at the core of the indigenous rights discourse, 
and addressing some of the most fundamental underpinning questions to that discourse, offer 
the opportunity to go beyond merely answering the specific question set out in Section 1.3.1.  
Hence, in addition to its specific aim, the thesis also has a more general ambition.  The 
broader aim of the thesis is to establish what legal status indigenous peoples have in the 
international legal system and to describe the general nature of and systemize the most 
fundamental of indigenous peoples’ rights in international law.  In other words, addressing the 
specific question whether indigenous peoples enjoy rights to their creativeness indirectly 
results in an in depth survey of the core of the international legal human rights system, as it 
pertain to indigenous peoples.     
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1.4 Outline of the doctoral thesis 
 
1.4.1 Chapters 2 and 3: Early international law and political philosophy  
 
Chapters 2 and 3 set the stage for subsequent legal analyses.  Chapter 2 describes the origin of 
the international legal system, as well as outlines the philosophical thoughts underpinning the 
basic structure of conventional international law.  The Chapter explains how classical liberal 
theories and the international legal system emerged in tandem in Europe in the wake of the 
Peace of Westphalia.  It outlines how the liberal legal system became funded on the notion 
that the sovereign pre-dates the law and that consequently, no law can exist above the 
sovereign.  The Chapter further describes how these precepts resulted in “peoples” for 
international legal purposes being defined as the aggregate of the population living within the 
sovereign’s sphere of power, and, subsequently, as the population of the “nation-state”.  
Chapter 2 also explains how with time, ideas of rights of the individual vis-à-vis the state 
were formulated, constituting the embryo to the modern human rights system.  In this human 
rights system, there was no room for group rights.  Finally, Chapter 2 demonstrates how the 
United Nations essentially endorsed these basic features of the classical international legal 
system when embarking on crafting a contemporary legal order in the aftermaths of World 
War II.   
 
Chapter 2 serves the main purpose of underlining that some keystones of the international 
legal system evolved early, and have been entrenched during more than 300 years.  It is 
important for the doctoral thesis to be mindful of this background, since it would take a 
considerable effort - a paradigm shift – to change at least some of these fundamental 
principles of the international legal system relevant to the thesis.  Indigenous peoples having 
the right to own and/or determining over their collective creativity might require 
fundamentally new understandings of key legal concepts such as “peoples”, “human rights”, 
“self-determination”, “non-discrimination”, and, possibly, “states”.  To properly evaluate 
what rights, if any, indigenous peoples hold today, one must understand how sceptical 
classical international law was towards peoples’ rights proper.   
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Chapter 3 initially outlines in somewhat more depth the liberal political theory underpinning 
the conventional international legal system.  The Chapter further notes how the more modern 
versions of liberalism incorporated the ideal of democracy, but how – in line with the liberal 
tradition - these theories rested on the assumption that the polity within which democracy is to 
be exercised – i.e. the state – has been created prior to any democratic theory.  Chapter 3 then 
proceeds to describes how some of the key features of conventional individual liberalism have 
recently been challenged.  The Chapter outlines how contemporary political theorists have 
increasingly questioned the classical liberal presumptions that the state pre-dates any political 
theory of justice, can always be neutral between cultures, and that individuals are not 
significantly defined by their cultural background.  Chapter 3 concludes with demonstrating 
how theorists critical of conventional liberalism have become a dominating voice within 
political philosophy and how they have inferred that the society shall award group rights to 
e.g. indigenous peoples.    
 
It is underscored that the doctoral thesis is not concerned with philosophy as such.  At the 
same time, it is mindful of that law does not evolve in isolation.  The law responds to new and 
changed believes, ideals and perceptions of justice in society.  As Koskenniemi has noted, 
“[I]t is neither useful nor ultimately possible to work with international law in abstraction 
from descriptive theories about the character of social life among States and normative views 
about the principles of justice…”17  Similarly, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has 
observed that “Law exists, it is said, to serve a social need”.18  Hence, the doctoral thesis 
outlines recent trends within political philosophy because these pose the question:  If the 
underlying rationale behind key elements of the international legal system has been 
challenged, what does this imply for the law as such? 
 
1.4.2 Chapters 4-6: Survey of relevant international legal sources 
 
Following the introduction provided by Chapters 2 and 3, Chapters 4-6 commence the legal 
analyses of the doctoral thesis.  These Chapters introduce the international legal sources 
relevant to an analysis of to what extent indigenous peoples have the right to own and/or 
determine over their culture.   
 
                                                 
17  Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, pp. 1 and 4 
18  South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgement, I.C.J. Reports 1966 (South West Africa Case), p. 6, at, pp. 34-
35 
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Chapter 4 jointly addresses international legal sources (i) establishing protection for 
indigenous peoples’ cultures, cultural practices and cultural identity, and (ii) awarding 
indigenous peoples rights to determine over their distinct societies, including their cultural 
heritage.  Schematically, these rights could be divided into (i) cultural rights, and (ii) the right 
to self-determination.  But as mentioned, the rights are surveyed together and the Chapter 
makes no clear distinction between the two.  The structure opted for reveals a hypothesis 
holding that the rights to culture and self-determination interlink and overlap, and have 
evolved in tandem.  In other words, it is probable that international law has either 
acknowledged both that indigenous peoples constitutes peoples for the purposes of the right to 
self-determination, and enjoy collective rights to culture, or, alternative, that neither right has 
been recognized.  Combinations are unlikely.     
 
But before embarking on a survey of indigenous peoples’ rights proper, the Chapter initially 
addresses two sets of rights that, albeit not constituting peoples’ rights, are still relevant to the 
doctoral thesis.  First, Sections 4.4 and 4.5 outline the minority rights system developed 
essentially during the 1990s.  The Sections particularly demonstrate how minority rights, 
formally individual in nature, have nonetheless been interpreted as enveloping a collective 
dimension.  That is particularly so when applied in an indigenous context.  The Sections label 
these rights “collectivized individual rights”.  They show how these extend an indirect 
protection also to the culture of the group as such, and not only to the individual members 
thereof.  Second, Section 4.6 addresses rights of indigenous populations, enshrined first and 
foremost in the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Convention No. 169 Concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries19 (ILO 169).20  The Section notes 
that ILO 169 proclaims certain collective rights, including some within the sphere of culture 
rights.  Section 4.6 further notes, however, how ILO 169 explicitly underlines that the rights it 
enshrines do not constitute peoples’ rights.       
 
Chapter 4 takes the collectivized individual rights/rights of indigenous populations as points 
of departure when embarking on its main purpose, namely to survey indigenous peoples rights 
proper.  Section 4.7 outlines a wealth of international legal sources suggesting that indigenous 
peoples constitutes “peoples”, for international legal purposes, enjoying collective rights in 
                                                 
19  Adopted by the ILO’s 76th Conference on June 27, 1989 
20  Section 4.6 should be read in conjunction with Section 4.3, outlining some basic features of the indigenous 
rights discourse, present since its inception. 
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general and the right to self-determination in particular.  Subsequently, Section 4.8 outlines 
recent developments in the context of the right to non-discrimination.  The Section notes how 
the right was – in perfect conformity with classical liberalism – conventionally understood as 
a right of individuals to be treated equally, with no obligations on states to promote equality in 
fact.  Section 4.8 observes how the right to non-discrimination has undoubtedly evolved, 
however, to embrace an obligation on states to actively combat inequalities.  The Chapter 
notes that this aspect of the right corresponds well with the collectivized individual rights 
surveyed in Sections 4.4 and 4.5.  Section 4.8 then proceeds to investigate sources suggesting 
that the right to non-discrimination has entered an additional third phase.  These sources 
submit that the right has evolved to entail not only that equal cases be treated equally, but also 
that different cases be treated differently, and further that the right applies also to indigenous 
peoples as such.  Such an understanding of the right to non-discrimination seems to match the 
collective right to culture surveyed in Section 4.7, obviously provided that the rights have 
crystallized into law.  Chapter 4 draws no definitive conclusions as to whether international 
law has firmly established rights proper of indigenous peoples, albeit Section 4.9 observes 
that international legal sources seem to speak to that effect.  Rather, the final conclusions are 
saved for Chapters 8 and 12.  Section 4.9 further infers that although the doctoral thesis at that 
point cannot definitively conclude what peoples’ rights have been established, if any, it is 
clear that international law on rights to (i) culture, (ii) self-determination, and (iii) non-
discrimination have evolved in parallel.  The conclusions drawn with regard to all three rights 
are hence mutually supportive.  
 
Chapter 5 turns the doctoral thesis’ attention to the human right to property.  Initially, it 
outlines the basic features of the right, underlining the right to property’s close proximity to 
the right to non-discrimination.  This implies that recent developments within the sphere of 
non-discrimination are of direct relevant also for the contemporary understanding of the right 
to property.  With these basic understandings in place, Chapter 5 proceeds to survey how the 
right to property has been applied in the context of indigenous peoples’ rights to lands and 
territories.  Indigenous peoples’ land and resource rights are as such outside the scope of the 
doctoral thesis.  Still, establishing what property rights indigenous peoples hold to their 
traditional territories is highly relevant to the thesis.  That is so, because another hypothesis of 
the thesis is that an analogy can be drawn between property rights to land, on one hand, and to 
collective creativity, on the other.  The thesis assumes that if it can be established that 
indigenous peoples hold property rights to territories traditionally used, it is possible that they 
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also hold property rights to subject matter traditionally created.  Or in IPR-language, the 
thesis wishes to analyze whether the fact that the terra nullius doctrine, previously applied to 
indigenous lands, appears to have been revoked, implies that the same is true with regard to 
the notion of the public domain, applied to indigenous peoples collective creativity.  
Consequently, having surveyed indigenous peoples’ property rights to land, Chapter 5 
investigates whether the conclusions drawn can be readily translated into the sphere of 
collective creativity.  It also outlines some international legal sources specifically addressing 
indigenous peoples’ property rights to their collective creativity.  Similar to Chapter 4, 
Chapter 5 draws no definitive conclusions as to indigenous peoples’ property rights to their 
collective creativity.  These are saved for Chapters 9 and 12.   
 
Chapter 6 analyzes the relevance of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(DRIP), adopted by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2007, to the doctoral 
thesis.  Chapter 6 notes the significance of the DRIP deliberations essentially coinciding with 
the development of the body of law surveyed by Chapters 4 and 5.  This is noteworthy, since 
most of the legal sources Chapters 4 and 5 outline emanate from expert bodies etc.  As 
Chapter 7 elaborates, the legal status of such sources depends largely on how they are 
received by states, as the ultimate creators of international law.  As the DRIP was crafted 
during the same time-period as the body of law surveyed in Chapters 4 and 5 emerged, the 
Declaration offered states an excellent opportunity to lend or not lend their political support to 
this body of law.  Having thus noticed the significance of the DRIP, Chapter 6 turns to 
analyzing DRIP provisions relevant to the doctoral thesis.  The Chapter concludes that the 
material rights DRIP sets forth appear in large parts to be in line with the legal sources 
surveyed in Chapters 4 and 5.     
 
1.4.3 Chapter 7: International law on legal sources – legal method  
 
As Section 1.3 underlined, the aim of the doctoral thesis is to establish positive law pertaining 
to indigenous peoples’ rights to own and/or determine over their collective creativity.  But to 
establish what constitutes law, one must obviously first establish what are relevant legal 
sources, what relative weight they carry vis-à-vis each other, and how these sources should be 
interpreted.  This is the purpose of Chapter 7, which outlines international law on 
international legal sources.  Chapter 7 is an integral – indeed a key - part of the thesis’ legal 
analyses.  At the same time, Chapter 7 serves the additional purpose of picturing the legal 
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method the doctoral thesis uses.  In sum, Section 1.3 described how the aim of the doctoral 
thesis is to determine what constitutes positive law.  Chapter 7 outlines the norms the thesis 
follows in order to determine what makes up relevant law.   
 
As is customary, Chapter 7 takes Article 38.1 of the Statute of the ICJ as point of departure 
for establishing what international legal sources are relevant when establishing what 
constitutes positive law.  The Chapter then proceeds to describe the nature and characteristics 
of these sources.  Doing so, however, the Chapter notes that the primary sources of law are all 
vexed with certain problems.  While customary law, general principles of law and peremptory 
norms all benefit from universal applicability, it is often difficult to objectively  establish the 
content of these sources, or, indeed, whether a norm exist at all.  Treaties, on the other hand, 
are normally clear and objective in their content.  But instead, they lack universal 
applicability.  Different mixes of states being parties to various treaties results in a fragmented 
legal structure, ultimately breaking down to a network of binary state relationships.  Having 
noted that the formal primary international legal sources appear to provide a rather incomplete 
legal system, Chapter 7 turns its attention to what is sometimes labelled “soft law” sources 
and certain other sources not mentioned as primary sources in the ICJ Statute 38.1, such as 
ICJ and treaty body jurisprudence.  The Chapter describes the soft law sources and notes that 
these could constitute helpful compliments to “hard law” sources – if accepted as law.  
Chapter 7 therefore surveys whether international law on international legal sources maintains 
a clear distinction between “hard law” and “soft law” sources, or, if one wish, between legal 
sources and non-legal sources.  The Chapter concludes that such a strict division between 
relevant and non-relevant legal sources appears no longer to be upheld.  Rather, a more 
flexible approach seems to have been adopted.  In other words, sources such as UN 
Declarations and treaty body jurisprudence are also relevant international legal sources when 
determining what constitute positive international law.  That said, Chapter 7 further notes that 
a hierarchy among international legal sources still exist, and that “soft law” sources normally 
need to find support in complementing sources, should they be considered as mirroring law 
proper.       
   
The second part of Chapter 7, Section 7.4, surveys international norms on treaty 
interpretation, as enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties21 (VCLT) 
                                                 
21  Adopted on 23 May 1969 
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Articles 31 and 32.  Section 7.4 notes the prominence these provisions give to subsequent 
practices in treaty interpretation.  This is of specific relevance to the doctoral thesis for two 
interrelated reasons.  First, the relevance of subsequent practice implies that treaty provisions 
that at one point were understood to have a limited and clearly defined applicability can 
nonetheless subsequently have evolved to take on new meanings.  Second, the prominence 
given to subsequent practice is important because of the legal status it bestows UN treaty 
body jurisprudence.  Treaty body jurisprudence, Section 7.4 concludes, constitutes a specific 
form of subsequent practice.  If not contested by states, treaty body jurisprudence is a relevant 
international legal source when determining what constitutes positive law.  Finally, Chapter 7 
concludes that norms for treaty interpretation must reasonably be analogously applicable also 
to formally non-legally binding instruments, such as UN Declarations.   
       
1.4.4 Chapters 8-10: Concluding analyses on indigenous peoples’ rights to 
own and/or determine over their collective creativity 
 
At this point, Chapters 4-6 have outlined and surveyed the content of relevant international 
legal sources.  Further, Chapter 7 has added information on the legal status and relative 
weight of these sources.  With this information at hand, the doctoral thesis is in a position to 
establish the scope and content of indigenous peoples’ right to their collective creativity.  The 
purpose of Chapters 8-9 is to conduct these concluding analyses.  Chapter 8 surveys whether 
indigenous peoples enjoy such rights under the rights to culture/self-determination.  Chapter 9 
subsequently addresses the right to property.  As indicated, the basis for the survey is, 
naturally, the legal sources surveyed in Chapters 4-6, analyzed in accordance with 
international law on international legal sources, as outlined in Chapter 7.      
 
Chapter 8 initially aspires to establish the legal status of indigenous peoples under 
international law, i.e. if indigenous peoples constitute “peoples” for legal purposes.   Based on 
the conclusion with regard to indigenous peoples’ status under international law, the Chapter 
proceeds to address the closely related issue of whether indigenous peoples’ can enjoy the 
right general right to self-determination, enjoyed by all peoples, or whether rather a potential 
right to self-determination of indigenous peoples is a sui generis right, particular to them.  
Having considered these paramount underlying issues, Chapter 8 moves on to establish, as 
detailed as possible based on the legal sources at hand, the scope and content of indigenous 
peoples rights to culture/self-determination, as these rights pertain to collective creativity.  
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Chapter 9 initially seeks to establish to what extent indigenous peoples hold property rights to 
their collective creativity.  It subsequently proceeds to determine whether potential property 
rights might be subject to certain limitations.  The matter of limitations is a serious issue in 
the context of property rights to collective creativity.  That is so because, as Section 1.4.2 
explained, the right to property is essentially an aspect of the right to non-discrimination.  
This poses the question; if property rights are extended to indigenous peoples’ property rights, 
shall such rights, as could be argued should follow from the right to non-discrimination, be 
burdened with the same limitations as IPRs in general?  If so, this would for instance imply 
that the rights are limited in time.      
 
Chapter 10 addresses some outstanding arguments sometimes raised against the notion that 
indigenous peoples hold rights.  Among these are whether it is at all possible to identify a 
collective worthy of rights, and whether recognition of group rights poses threats to the well-
being of individual members of the group.  Finally, Chapter 10 answers whether it makes 
sense, from a legal perspective, that indigenous peoples are free to consume Japanese sushi 
and French wine, at the same time as they may shield their own cultures from Japanese and 
French consumers. 
 
1.4.5 Chapter 11: IP-neighbouring rights 
 
Chapter 10 concludes the human rights analysis.  Chapter 11 subsequently investigates to 
what extent indigenous peoples can hold rights to their collective creativity based on IP-
neighbouring rights.  Initially the Chapter surveys a number of international non-human rights 
processes with the potential of extending IP-similar rights to indigenous peoples over their TK 
and/or TCEs.  International legal instruments with potential such effects have been/are being 
elaborated mainly under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO), the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and, to a lesser degree, the UN Food 
and Agricultural Organization (FAO), and the UN Economic, Social and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO).  
 
Having concluded to what extent these processes have, or are about to, award indigenous 
peoples IP-neighbouring rights to their creativity, Chapter 11 turns to surveying potential 
interfaces between human rights and IPRs.  The purpose of this exercise is the same as when 
the doctoral thesis in previous chapters surveyed if various human rights interlink and 
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overlap.  The hypothesis is that to the extent such is the case, the conclusions within the 
various spheres of law are mutually supportive.  In other words, if interfaces can be 
established between IPRs and the human right to property, the doctoral thesis might be able to 
draw more concrete and certain conclusions as to the scope and content of indigenous 
peoples’ rights to their collective creativity.   
  
1.4.6 Chapter 12: Conclusions – Is Miss Finland legally entitled to wear the 
traditional Saami dress?    
 
Chapter 12 aims to wrap up the legal analyses of the doctoral thesis in two distinct ways.  The 
first half of the Chapter illustrates, as precisely and concretely as possible, to what extent 
indigenous peoples have the right to own and/or determine over their collective creativity.  It 
does so by returning to the illustrative examples provided in the very outset of this Chapter.  
Chapter 12 hence starts of by answering whether Miss Finland entering the evening gown 
event in the Miss Universe competition in a traditional Saami dress raises international legal 
issues.  The Chapter then turns to the questions whether multinational cooperations may 
patent indigenous TK absent consent, whether indigenous art may be used by non-members 
for commercial purposes.  And so on.  Subsequently, the second half of the Chapter offers 
more general concluding remarks on indigenous peoples’ legal status and rights under 
contemporary international.   
 
1.5 The doctoral thesis’ understanding of “culture”, “cultural 
heritage” and “collective creativity” 
 
For the purposes of the doctoral thesis, “cultural heritage” refers to the collected cultural 
elements of an indigenous people created by humans, whether tangible or intangible.  This 
limitation implies that the thesis does not address rights to lands, waters and natural resources 
per se, albeit, as outlined above, such rights are still indirectly of great relevance to the thesis.  
Neither does the doctoral thesis envelope pure spiritual beliefs or thoughts.  Neither does the 
thesis venture into the sensitive areas of what rights indigenous peoples hold to their own 
genome and human remains.22  Throughout, the doctoral thesis uses the terms “indigenous 
                                                 
22  Clearly, the doctoral thesis does not submit that its understanding of “cultural heritage” is in any way 
universal.  On the contrary, it is designed for the specific purposes of the thesis.  Indeed, the term “cultural 
heritage” is probably more often used in a broader sense, and is potentially extremely inclusive.  It can, in its 
broadest understanding, include more or less any element in a people’s society.  For an elaborate discussion on 
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peoples’ cultural heritage” and “indigenous peoples’ collective creativity” interchangeably.  
In both instances, the terms refer to the specific creativity of a specific indigenous people.    
 
Of course, the term “culture” has over the years been given at least as many meanings as 
“cultural heritage”.  Clearly, various understandings of “culture” are plausible, depending on 
from what angle one approaches the topic.  For the purposes of the doctoral thesis, there is no 
need, and probably not possible, to define “culture”.  When the term is used, what is 
understood by “culture” is hopefully clear from the context.  Most often, the thesis uses the 
term “culture” in the context of “rights to culture” or “cultural rights”.  Sometimes, “rights to 
culture” or “cultural rights” refer specifically to indigenous peoples’ rights to their distinct 
collective creativity/cultural heritage.  But in other instances, “rights to culture” or “cultural 
rights” might be referring to a more sweeping understanding of “culture”.  Under such 
circumstances, the broader right embraces the more specific right to cultural 
heritage/collective creativity, but probably offers limited guidance as to what more 
particularly is included in the right.  Again, hopefully it will be clear from the context what 
right is referred to in each instance.            
 
Having in general terms defined the subject matter of concern to the doctoral thesis, it might 
be pertinent already at this point to describe in more concrete terms what “cultural 
heritage”/”collective creativity” embraces.  Principle 1 of the Draft Guidelines on the 
Protection of the Cultural Heritage of Indigenous Peoples23 illustrates well the thesis’ 
understanding of “cultural heritage”/”collective creativity”.  Pursuant to this provision, 
cultural heritage is  
“… tangible and intangible creations, manifestations and productions includ[ing] the practices, 
representations, expressions – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts … that indigenous peoples 
… recognize as part of their cultural heritage. It further includes the knowledge that is the result of 
intellectual activity and insight in a traditional context, and includes the know-how, skills, 
innovations, practices and learning that form part of traditional knowledge systems, as well as 
knowledge that is embodied in the traditional lifestyle of an indigenous people, or is contained in 
codified knowledge systems passed between generations.  Cultural heritage, transmitted from 
generation to generation, is constantly recreated by indigenous peoples in response to changes in 
                                                                                                                                                        
the meaning of the terms “culture”, “cultural heritage” and “cultural identity”, as well as on how these terms 
relate to each other, see Prott, Cultural Rights as Peoples’ Rights, pp 93-106.    
23  The Guidelines can be found in the Annex to UN Doc. (E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2006/5). They were prepared 
under the auspices of the former UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP), in a joint effort by 
WGIP member, Professor Yokota, and the Saami Council, an NGO representing the Saami people.  For a 
background of the Guidelines, see UN Doc. A/HRC/Sub.1/58/22, paras. 23-24.  The Guidelines have limited 
authority as a source of international law.  As stated, they are used here for illustrational purposes.   
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their environment and their interaction with nature and their history, and provides them with a sense 
of identity and continuity.  Cultural heritage … manifests itself, inter alia, in the following domains: 
(a) … medicines …; (b)  Traditional knowledge and practices concerning nature and the universe; (c) 
 Literary works and oral traditions and expressions, such as tales, poetry and riddles, aspects of 
language such as words, signs, names, symbols and other indications; (d) Musical expressions, such 
as songs and instrumental music; (e)  Performances or works such as dances, plays and artistic forms 
or rituals, whether or not reproduced in material form; (f) Art, in particular drawings, designs, 
paintings, carvings, sculptures, pottery, mosaics, woodwork, metalwork, jewellery, musical 
instruments, basket weaving, handicrafts, needlework, textiles, carpets, costumes, architectural forms; 
and (g)  Social practices, rituals and festive events.24 
From this definition follows that most elements of cultural heritage constitute either forms of 
knowledge or various cultural expressions.  In other words, the thesis is essentially concerned 
with rights to what is normally labelled TCEs and TK.  Even though it should be clear from 
the quoted definition above, it is worth particularly underscoring that the reference to 
“traditional” in both TCEs and TK in no way suggests that a cultural element needs to be old 
to constitute TK or TCEs.  TK and TCEs can be highly adaptive, and hence new.25  Rather, 
“tradition” refers to the context in which the element was developed.  In other words, to be 
relevant to the thesis, creativity need not necessarily be old, but must have been created in a 




1.6.1 The doctoral thesis does not address conservation and preservation of 
cultural heritage 
 
The World Community’s interest in TK and TCEs has virtually exploded during the last 
decade or so.  This is exemplified by the fact that today, some ten plus UN system 
organizations are engaged in activities pertaining to TK and TCEs of e.g. indigenous peoples.  
Far from all of these activities, however, aspire to identify rights to cultural heritage.  Rather, 
they aim is to preserve and conserve cultural heritage for the benefit of humankind.  Such 
activities and regulations of cultural heritage lies outside the scope of the doctoral thesis, 
                                                 
24  The quote has deleted language referring to cultural heritage held by individual members of the group, as well 
as non-man created parts of the culture such as lands, natural resources and sites.  The reason is of course that 
such parts of culture fall outside the scope of this doctoral thesis. 
25  Biber-Klemm and Szymura Berglas, Problems and Goals, p. 17, Taubman and Leistner, Analysis of Different 
Areas of Indigenous Resources, pp. 59-60, Dutfield and Suthersanen, Global Intellectual Property Law, p. 327, 
Stoll and von Hahn, Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Knowledge and Indigenous Resources in International Law 
II, p. 20, and Brown, Who Owns Native Culture?, p. 183 
20 
which only aspires to survey to what extent indigenous peoples hold exclusive rights to 
elements springing from their respective cultures.       
 
1.6.2 The doctoral thesis is only concerned with indigenous peoples’ rights  
 
The fact that the doctoral thesis surveys only rights of indigenous peoples embeds two 
limitations.  First, the thesis does not aspire to establish what rights ethnic groups not 
qualifying as “peoples” under international law might have to their creativity.  This limitation 
hence excludes from the scope of the thesis cultural/ethnic groups not fulfilling the objective 
criteria of a people under international law.26  Second, only rights of “indigenous peoples” - 
and not of peoples in general – are explored.27  The doctoral thesis is aware that both 
limitations involve implicit assumptions as to the meaning of the concepts “peoples” and 
“indigenous peoples” under international law.  Given that arriving at a correct understanding 
of these terms is a central part of the thesis, it can be perceived as prejudgemental to spell out 
these assumptions already in the introductory Chapter.  Still, it is probably advantageous for a 
clear understanding of the thesis that these limitations are clear from the outset.     
 
Finally, it is underlined that the fact that the doctoral thesis is only concerned with collective 
rights proper limits the analyses of the thesis to rights to cultural heritage held by indigenous 
peoples as such.  Of course, individual members of an indigenous people, as well as sub-
segments of indigenous peoples’ societies, can also hold rights to various elements of that 
culture.  But these rights too, are beyond the ambit of the thesis.  The thesis only investigates 
what rights indigenous peoples have to their collective creativity vis-à-vis non-members.   
                                                 
26  That is not to say that such groups cannot enjoy rights to their cultural heritage.  But to what extent such is the 
case is beyond the scope of the thesis.  
27  This limitation embeds no presumption that non-indigenous peoples should hold less, or different, rights to 
their cultural heritage than indigenous peoples.  On the contrary, it is probably more likely that indigenous and 
non-indigenous peoples hold similar, perhaps even almost identical, rights to their collective creativity.  But it 
lies outside the scope of the doctoral thesis to survey whether indigenous peoples’ rights to their cultural heritage 
are matched by similar rights of other peoples. 
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2. CLASSICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EARLY 




Chapter 1 underlined that the doctoral thesis has no ambition to comprehensively outline 
classical international law’s position on the rights of peoples.  History of law is as such 
beyond the ambit of this work.  Neither does the thesis aspire to provide a full survey of the 
political philosophical theories emerging roughly at the same time as the embryo to the early 
international legal system, and which exercised influence over the latter.  For the purposes of 
the thesis, it is sufficient to present a general outline of the basic features of classical 
international law and the political theories underpinning the law.  A basic understanding of 
the history of international law, as well as of the interplay between the law and political 
thought, is imperative to any analysis of contemporary international law on indigenous 
peoples’ rights.  That is so because a survey of what rights indigenous peoples possess as 
collectives is intrinsically linked to how international law has conventionally understood the 
concept “peoples”.  The historical understanding of peoples is important since, as this Chapter 
will explain, the contemporary international legal system adopted classical international law’s 
perception of “states, “peoples” and human rights.  Hence, classical international law assists 
us in establishing a correct understanding of what has been contemporary international law’s 
position on peoples’ rights - until at least very recently.     
 
2.2 The period prior to the Peace of Westphalia 
 
Ideas and philosophies that were legal in character, even though blended with theology, 
emerged in Europe during the Renaissance epoch.28  At this time, theology aspired to 
establish the content of a divine order of affairs.  Simultaneously, certain scholars embarked 
on defining a natural legal order held to pre-exist human society, and which was intrinsically 
linked with the rest of God’s creation.29  This school, holding that there exists a law given by 
nature – or God – which hence is independent of human norm-creating, is commonly referred 
                                                 
28  Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law II, pp. 15-16 
29  Orakhelashvili, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public International Law, pp. 61-62, and 
Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, p. 95 
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to as the natural law school.30  To Renaissance legal scholars such as Vittoria (1486-1547), 
issues pertaining to state and nationhood were irrelevant to the question of what rights people 
ultimately possess under law.  These rights can, and should, be deduced from nature/God, 
irrespective of the will and power of the realm, it was held.31    
 
The Renaissance period did not only witness the emergence of the first international legal 
theories in Europe.  During this era European adventurers exploring all directions of the 
compass needle increasingly brought Europeans in contact with other cultures, including 
indigenous populations.  Having only recently commenced thinking in terms of international 
norms, and having simultaneously witnessed the world “increase”, the European legal 
scholars naturally started to develop ideas as to what laws should pertain to Europe’s 
relationship with populations on other continents.  At first, European scholars were at least to 
some extent hospitable to the notion that indigenous populations’ societal structures 
constituted distinct polities possessing rights under international law.  For instance, Vitoria – 
probably the most influential legal scholar of the time32 - developed a natural law theory 
submitting that the indigenous populations of the Americas possessed autonomous rights 
handled down to them by God.  Consequently, Vittoria asserted, the European powers had to 
respect these rights.  Based on this basic principle of respect, Vitoria crafted an elaborate 
system of rules aimed at governing the Europeans’ encounters and relationship with 
indigenous societies.  He held that the indigenous populations of the Americas were owners of 
their land, having dominion in both public and private affairs.  Indigenous lands could only be 
appropriated by the Europeans following procedures prescribed by law.  Further, Vittoria 
posited, indigenous populations’ status as distinct legal and political identities should be 
respected, although Vitoria also asserted that indigenous populations were not full sovereigns 
in the same sense as the European powers.33  Vitoria devoted considerable attention to the 
issue of defining the legal relationship between Europe and the indigenous populations.34  
                                                 
30  Natural law has been defined as rules and principles deducible from nature, reason or ideas of justice.  They 
are hence norms given irrespective of the consent of a law-maker such as a state.  See Orakhelashvili, The 
Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public International Law, pp. 60-61. 
31  Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, p. 101 
32  Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, pp. 13-14 
33  Vittoria seems to have been of the opinion that the Indians were not full sovereigns due to being too pagan, at 
least when it came to the right to wage war.  See Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of 
International Law, pp. 52-60. 
34  Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, p. 30, Crawford, The Creation of 
States, pp. 263-264 
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Mere claims by a European Emperor or the Pope where rejected.  Probably, most of Vitoria’s 
contemporary legal scholars shared his teachings on the rights of indigenous peoples.35 
 
Vitoria exercised considerable influence over Grotius36 (1583-1645), commonly regarded as 
the most prominent of the founding fathers of international law.37  As Vitoria, Grotius came to 
conclude that indigenous populations were owners of their land amd could constitute polities 
with rights.  Further guided by Vitoria, he also submitted, however, that indigenous 
populations’ legal status was not necessarily on par with the European powers.  Grotius and 
other legal scholars of the time held that only European model of political and social 
organization, characterized by exclusivity of territorial domain and hierarchical, centralized, 
authority, qualified as nations proper.  Most indigenous societies were, Grotius and others 
noted, organized in less stringent structures.38  In other words, it was not the fact that the 
indigenous societies were indigenous that disqualified most of them from the status of 
nationhood.  Rather, it was that their societal structures were generally too loose to meet the 
European idea of a nation.39  In addition, some Indian nations in the Americas not recognized 
as nations, were nonetheless perceived as distinct, independent political communities.40  The 
recognition of indigenous populations as subjects of international laws was further highlighted 
by the fact that the European powers regarded treaties and other agreements concluded with 
indigenous populations to have full international legal status.41  In conclusion, notions of 
international norms, when first surfacing in the 1500s, did hold that indigenous populations 
could constitute distinct international legal polities, enjoying rights as such.              
 
                                                 
35  Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law II, pp. 16-19, Crawford, The Creation of States, pp. 263-265, 
Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, pp. 100-101, and Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of 
International Law, pp. 18-29   
36  Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, p. 14 
37  See Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, in which Lauterpacht describes Grotius 
importance for international law at his time and beyond. 
38 That said, certain indigenous communities were perceived as qualifying as nations.  See e.g. the United States 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Cherokee Nation v Georgia (30 US 1 (1831)) and Worchester v Georgia (31 US 350, 
380; 6 Pet 515, 561 (1832)) where the Supreme Court held that “the Indian nations had always been considered 
as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights as the undisputed 
possessors of the soil from time immemorial…”.  Another example was the Maori Confederation in New 
Zealand.  Also Hawaii and Tonga early acquired status as nations under international law.  See Crawford, The 
Creation of States, pp. 260-263 and 300, and Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law II, pp. 15-19.       
39  Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, p. 53 
40 Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Ch 2, and McHugh, Aboriginal 
Societies and the Common Law, pp. 98-108.   
41 For instance, the United States appears at the time to have made no real distinction between treaties entered 
into with indigenous populations and other “nations”.  See Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of 
International Law, Ch 2, and McHugh, Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law, pp. 98-108.           
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2.3 The period between the Peace of Westphalia and the League of 
Nations 
 
Structures with state-similar features had existed in Europe since the 1400s.  Still, it is 
generally held that the nation-state and the embryo to the contemporary law of nations 
surfaced in tandem in Europe following the end of the 30-Year War in 1648.42  The Peace of 
Westphalia entrenched the realm of kingdoms in Europe, and offered the idea of certain 
stability in the relations between the “nations” of Europe.  At Westphalia, the sovereigns of 
Europe agreed that order was to be guaranteed by the sovereigns themselves.  Implicit in this 
notion was also that the right of the sovereigns to provide for order was inherent.  The “state”, 
for international legal purposes, had seen the light.43   
 
The relative stability that followed after the Peace of Westphalia gave room for political 
thought.  In the wake of the 30-Year War, classical liberal theories emerged in Europe.  The 
liberal ideals broke with the previously dominating natural law theories.  Liberals thinkers 
gradually abandoned the idea that there exists an order given by nature or God pre-existing 
human polities dictating the social order of the society.44  Hobbes explains the sentiment of 
the era well.  According to him, ideas of natural law are merely a set of subjective preferences 
and speculations in disguise of a general idea of justice.  Hobbes submitted that  “[g]ood and 
evil are not objective or unchanging qualities of things but the subjective description of the 
apparently beneficial or harmful effect of things.”45  Instead, liberals suggested that the social 
order should be based on the subjective consent of individuals.  Liberals submitted that 
respect for individual decisions results in a social order which represents the will and interests 
of each individual in the best possible way.  Therefore, everyone should agree to such a 
                                                 
42  Cassese, International Law, pp. 23-24, and Barth, Cultural Rights, p. 85  
43  Lenzerini, Sovereignty Revisited, p. 157, Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, pp. 20-21, 
Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, p. 94, Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, p. 17, 
Hudson, Fables of Sovereignty, pp. 28-29, Keal, Indigenous Sovereignty, p. 315, and Kingsbury, Legal 
Positivism as Normative Politics, pp. 413-414 
44  Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, pp. 75-82, 94 and 107.  The succinct outline of the history of 
international law presented here must necessarily oversimplify matters somewhat.  It should be noted that the 
early liberals did not denounce the existence of a divine or natural law at once.  Rather, liberals initially assumed 
that divine and/or natural laws were of a very general nature.  They consequently doubted that these laws would 
allow themselves to be translated into practical circumstances.  Further, to the extent natural law could be 
discerned, liberals gradually came to presume that such law was in conformity with state practice.  
Consequently, liberals abolished searching for the content of a natural order of affairs.  As it was presumed that 
state action represented natural law, it was not necessary to independently deduct the law of nature from other 
sources.  In other words, natural law theories prevailed as theories, but gradually became less relevant for the 
practical understanding of international law.  See The Gentle Civilizer of Nations pp. 92-96 and 100 and From 
Apology to Utopia, p.108 and 131.   
45  Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, pp. 79-80 
25 
system.  The founding fathers of liberal political theory perceived some form of a social 
contract, implicitly introducing assumptions that a group of individuals had self-identified as a 
distinct group, sharing a common culture and a common desire to live together.46  But not 
only had these groups of individuals consented to live together in a distinct society.  They had 
also, according to liberalism, agreed that this society should be governed by a sovereign ruler.  
The group had done so, it was submitted, because a sovereign was paramount to social order 
and only social order could prevent violence and save individuals from constant fear.  In other 
words, the duty to obey the sovereign was based on self-interest.  Hence, according to 
classical liberal theory, each individual has the right to agree to her personal preferences.  But 
in addition, and importantly, once these preferences are in place and can be ascertained, the 
sovereign has the right to enforce such norms.  They can no longer be challenged by the 
individual based on subsequent changes of will.47   
 
The liberal scholars further developed norms governing the relationship between nation-
states, essentially by adapting the theories they had developed regulating the relationship 
between the individual and the state to intra-state relationships.  It is telling that Vattel (1714-
1767), the most influential international legal scholar of the time, viewed states as super-
individuals.48  As sovereigns, states were perceived to be free in a manner comparable to 
individuals.  Consequently, similar to individuals, states were only bound by norms they had 
consented to.  The will of the sovereign created law.  Since all states were sovereign, and 
equally sovereign, no state had the right to impose norms on the other.49  But at the same time, 
once the nation-state had consented, and a norm hence been established, the nation-state could 
no longer opt out of the norm with reference to subsequently changed preferences.  A “law of 
nations” had replaced natural law.50  Clearly, the notion of state sovereignty is incompatible 
with natural law.  As mentioned, natural law holds that there exists a normative code that pre-
dates the sovereign, and which the sovereign has no power to change or nullify.  The new 
                                                 
46 Famous liberal philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, Kant and Rousseau all used the notion of a fictitious 
social contract to justify their respective theories of justice.  See Fassbender, The United Nations Charter As 
Constitution of the International Community, p. 559, and Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, p. 61.  
See also Van Dyke, The Individual, the State and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory, p. 34, and 
Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, pp. 74-75. 
47  Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, pp. 75, 81 and 113  
48  Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, p. 113 
49  Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, p. 29, and Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 
pp. 115-121 
50  Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, p., 42, Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in 
International Law I, pp. 13-14.   
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legal order, on the other hand, submitted that the will of the sovereign was normative.51  
Vattel and his colleagues were not interested in seeking to deduce any divine or natural law.  
Rather, they sought to establish what constituted international norms by observing state 
practice.52 
 
Naturally, Vattel’s and other liberals’ view on international law was an instant success with 
the sovereigns.  This new understanding of international law established the state as the 
international legal subject and legitimized the states’ actions as law.53  In the wake of the 
Peace of Westphalia, the interest of the realm and liberal theory formed a perfect match.  The 
sovereigns wanted to entrench their sovereignty, and the liberals professed that by law, they 
had this right.  Liberalism uncritically accepted the existing European polities.  The 
international legal system professed that military power determines territorial control, and that 
a territory thus defined constitutes a state.  Further – of significant importance to this doctoral 
thesis - international law came to assert that the population of the state – thus defined - 
constitutes a “people”.54  Regardless of whether the state encompassed several ethnicities 
and/or cultures, it was considered a “nation-state”.55   
 
It is critical to note how the liberal theories of justice that emerged and gradually got 
entrenched during this era not only rested on - but presupposed – that nation-states exist that 
pre-dates the law and further that the population of the state constitutes a people for legal 
purposes.  These basic building blocks of the international legal system in turn followed 
indirectly from the principal assumptions that (i) according to a social contract, the individual 
has – previous to the formulation of any theory of justice – agreed to be governed by the 
sovereign, and (ii) the boundaries around the polity where the liberal theories apply – i.e. the 
state - have been settled prior to any theory of justice.56  The state as the principal subject of 
international law could no longer be questioned.  It became self-evident that the world was 
                                                 
51  Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, p. 115-121 and 224  
52  Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, p. 112, and The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, pp. 50-51 
53  Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, p. 120    
54  Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law II, pp. 19-22  
55  Eide has submitted, however, that for a brief period of time, liberalism actually did acknowledge the 
sovereignty of the people, ethnically/culturally understood.  But the role of the people was quickly transformed 
into the fictional idea of a state. See Eide, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, p. 13.  Also, under the Treaty 
of Westphalia, the parties did agree to respect the rights of certain religious minorities.  The Congress of Vienna 
(1815) and the Treaty of Berlin (1878) too, expressed certain concerns for minorities.  See Hannum, Autonomy, 
Sovereignty, and Self-Determination II, pp. 50-51.  But these were odd examples in an era that otherwise created 
and emphasized the role of the nation-state.     
56  Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 1-4, Crawford, The Creation of States, pp. 6-8, Carens, Aliens and 
Citizens, pp. 341-342, and Walzer, Spheres of Justice, p. 138 
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naturally divided into states, possessing rights precisely by the virtue of being states.  The 
international legal system had no opinion on who could form a state, or on states’ rights to 
continuously exist.  To liberals “The formation of a new State [was] … a matter of fact, and 
not of law.”57  This understanding of international law became increasingly entrenched during 
the 1800s.58  
     
In the 1800s, international lawyers became viewed as scientists.  As such, their quest was not, 
in line with the above, to formulate subjective opinions or speculations about the content of a 
law handled down by nature or God.  Rather, the role of the international lawyer was to 
identify the content of the law.  This task could only be carried out by studying state practice.  
Liberals came to hold that the law could be objectively understood by studying state’s 
developments through history.  State practice was perceived as an inevitable historic 
development towards the highest possible degree of freedom, and as such reflective of 
objective law. 59  These studies of the objective law resulted in the conclusion that the 
European powers were the most developed states.  International law, it was held, was based 
on the cultural processes of Europe, processes of civilization in contrast to other cultures who 
were deemed as only half-civilized or even savage.60  In other words, the policies and norms 
proclaimed by the sovereigns of Europe reflected the most developed and correct law.61  The 
notion that the practices of the most “developed” nations also reflected objective law allowed 
the lawyers to legally distinguish between civilized and non-civilized societies.  Only when 
having reached the required need of civilization, i.e. when resembling European states to a 
sufficient degree, could societal structures outside Europe enter the international legal 
                                                 
57  Crawford, The Creation of States, pp. 3-5 and 10.  Territories outside Europe were awarded status as states if 
the European powers deemed them sufficiently “civilian”, or Christian.  Examples of entities accepted as states 
where the United States, the Ottoman Empire, China, Afghanistan, Bukhara, Burma, Ceylon, Japan, Korea, 
Siam, Brunei and the Mogul and Maratha Empires of India.  Nonetheless, the European states, joined by the 
United States in 1783, remained the dominant states and the principal creators of international law.  See 
Crawford, The Creation of States, pp. 14 and 260-261, Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law I, p. 19 
and fn. 102, Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, p. 58, and Cassese, 
International Law, pp. 25-31. 
58  Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, pp. 33 and 43, and Koskenniemi, 
From Apology to Utopia, pp. 122-123, 132 and 141-143.          
59  Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, p. 43, and Koskenniemi, From 
Apology to Utopia, pp. 122-123 and 141-143          
60  Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, p. 72-73  
61  Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, pp. 144-147, 153 and 232, and The Gentle Civilizer of 
Nations, p. 51 and Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, pp. 40-41, 
49 and 61-62 
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community.62  Sovereignty became essentially a European feature.63  Through colonization, 
the rest of the world got assimilated into an international legal system that was essentially 
European.  The “civilized” European nations determined what constituted international law, 
and could therefore unilaterally decide their relationship with the rest of the world.  This 
included their relationship with indigenous populations,64  who naturally were considered 
non-civilized societies.  Consequently, breaking with the teachings of Vittoria and Grotius, 
international law came to hold that indigenous populations did not constitute international 
legal subjects.65 
 
Hence, by the early 1900s, international law had abandoned any remaining consideration of 
indigenous populations as polities with rights.  At the same time, the European powers had 
come to crave indigenous populations’ traditional lands and natural resources. These two 
factors contributed to it being increasingly held that indigenous territories were empty – terra 
nullius – and hence free for colonization.  It did not matter that indigenous populations 
inhabited these areas, since they had not developed an appropriate and sufficient relationship 
with the land, measured against European standards.  The European powers viewed the 
indigenous populations as insufficiently similar to themselves.  The position that the taking of 
indigenous land demanded a treaty was gradually abandoned, and the Western colonizers – 
supported by international law of the time – commenced appropriating indigenous territories, 
placing these under their own hegemony and control.66  Invoking the notion of sovereignty 
and the positive law of the sovereign, the European powers declared that uncivilized 
indigenous populations held no rights under international law, including to land.  The 
European states brought indigenous populations into the realm of their sovereignty.67  It 
                                                 
62  Simpson, Two Liberalisms, pp. 544-548, and Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, pp. 73-
75 and 135   
63  Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, pp. 127-128 
64  Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, pp. 144-147, 153 and 232, and Anghie, Imperialism, 
Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, pp. 32-33, 53-61 and 98-99   
65  Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, pp. 113-115 and 126, and Crawford, The Creation of 
States, p. 29   
66  Oppenheim, International Law, p. 292, Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, p.152 and The 
Gentle Civilizer of Nations, pp. 116 and 140-141, Cassese, International Law, p. 28, Hannum, 
Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination II, p. 93, Crawford, The Creation of States, pp. 263-
267, Macklem, Indigenous Recognition in International Law, p. 184, Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the 
Making of International Law, Ch 2, McHugh, Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law, pp. 98-108, 
Castellino, Conceptual Difficulties and the Right to Indigenous Self-Determination, p. 69, Territorial Integrity 
and the “Right” to Self-Determination, pp. 522 and 529-531 and The Right to Land, International Law & 
Indigenous Peoples, pp. 92-101, Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law I, pp. 19-20, and Anghie, 
Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, p. 8     
67  Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, pp. 30 and 34 
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became increasingly held that indigenous populations were destined to disappear; a 
“prophecy” that was actively promoted by states by denouncing any claim of indigenous 
populations to rights to land and self-government.68  Indeed, it was held that international law 
embraced the right and duty of the European states to promote “civilization”, also by force.69 
 
As seen, the social contract theories embedded in classical liberalism awarded the sovereign 
the right to craft and enforce norms.  Such decisions could not be challenged by the individual 
once she had “consented” to the social contract.  But liberalism is also a school professing the 
freedom of the individual.  Consequently, it was only natural that liberal scholars commenced 
elaborating the first human rights ideas in Europe.  With time, the individual’s rights and 
freedoms vis-à-vis the state became an integral part of liberalism.70  For considerable time, 
however, human rights norms remained mostly ideas.  Classical international law did not 
embrace human rights, even though rights such as the right to personal freedom, civil liberty, 
commerce, property and the freedom of conscience were at times to some extent 
acknowledged.71  Still, a coherent human rights system would be developed much later.72  As 
the doctoral thesis shall return to below, even though certain practices, such as slavery, with 
time became regarded as illegal, it was only with the adoption of the human rights instruments 
in the wake of World War II that human rights genuinely became part of international law.  In 
addition, it is worth noting that the human rights ideas developed during the centuries 
following the Peace of Westphalia were human rights of individuals only.  There were no 
considerations of group rights.73  The state-individual dichotomy had become deeply 
entrenched in, and integral to, classical liberalism.   
 
In conclusion, the nation-state emerged in Europe in the aftermath of the Peace of Westphalia.  
The legal theories that surfaced simultaneously and got entrenched during the following 
centuries took the nation-state for granted as the international legal subject.  It was presumed 
                                                 
68  Tully, The Struggles of Indigenous Peoples for and of Freedoms, p. 40, and Koskenniemi, The Gentle 
Civilizer of Nations, p. 127 
69  Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, pp. 98-99 
70  Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law I, p. 13, and Eide, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, pp. 
12-13     
71  Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, pp. 50 and 55 
72  Cassese, International Law, p. 143.  In the absence of a coherent system of human rights, a number of treaties 
entered into in the era between the Peace of Westphalia and the League of Nations included certain provisions on 
in particular freedom of religion.  However, these treaty provisions were haphazard, incoherent and rarely 
adhered to in practice.  See Lerner, Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law, pp. 7-8.   
73  Johnston, Native Rights as Collective Rights, p. 185, Glazer, Individual Rights against Group Rights, p. 
126, and Mancini and de Witte, Language Rights and Cultural Rights, p. 251 
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that a “people” equalled the aggregate of the population of the territory of the sovereign.  
Further, the dominating political theories of the era gradually held it self-evident that no law 
could pre-exist the sovereign because the sovereign was the sole creator of law.  International 
law came to be synonymous with the will of the state.  Indigenous populations could not be 
state-forming peoples, and hence lacked legal personality.  In addition, the early human rights 
ideas were of no use to indigenous populations either, as they were only concerned with the 
relationship between the individual and the state.  Groups had no place in an international 
legal system based on the state-individual dichotomy.                  
 
2.4 The League of Nations epoch 
   
The early 20th Century witnessed the first trembling steps towards democracy in some 
countries.  But the advent of democracy had no immediate impact on state sovereignty 
theories, or on international law’s understanding of “peoples”.    In 1914-1918, the world was 
hit by the first of the world wars.  In an attempt to avoid further global conflicts, the first 
world organization – The League of Nations – was created in the aftermath of World War I.  
As one of its tasks, the League and its creators set out to craft the first comprehensive 
international legal system.74  The aim was to codify and structure, but to some extent also 
reshape, international law as it had been known since the Peace of Westphalia.   
 
The League of Nation era affirmed classical international law’s position that international 
norms emerge only as a result of state consent.  This position was confirmed e.g. by the ruling 
by the Permanent Court of International Justice’s (PCIJ) – an international tribunal 
established by the League of Nations - in the famous Lotus Case (1927).75  At the same time, 
the League of Nations epoch also saw the first attempt to objectively define what polity 
constitutes a state.  As Section 2.3 described, classical international law held that the state pre-
existed the law, implying that becoming a state was a matter of being accepted as such by 
already existing states.  The attempts to formally define what constitutes a state were not 
successful, but some further non-European polities were accepted as states during this 
                                                 
74  Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, pp. 123-125 
75  The Case of the S.S. “Lotus”, PJIC, Ser. A. No. 10, 1927.  In its judgement, the PCIJ for instance declared 
that “International law governs relations between independent States.  The rules of law binding upon States 
therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally as expressing 
principles of law…” .  See Section III, para. 4. 
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epoch.76  Further, statehood was not a pre-requisite for membership in the League of Nations.  
Also collective entities similar to states, such as dominions and colonies, could become 
members of the League.77  In a similar vein, and more important for the present purposes, the 
League of Nations also concerned itself with the situation of minorities and the principle of 
self-determination. 
 
The general perception was that World War I had to a large degree been sparked by tensions 
between ethnic groups forced to share the same polity when the nation-states were created.  
As a response, the League of Nations actively promulgated an international legal system 
hospitable towards rights of minorities.  The previously haphazard ideas on minority 
protection were now formulated into a system.  Particular consideration was given to ethnic 
groups having been denied the right to independence when the political map of nation-states 
was shaped.  Reflecting this spirit, a number of treaties were entered into explicitly aiming at 
rendering it possible for such minorities to preserve their cultural characteristics and 
traditions.78       
 
As mentioned, the aftermaths of World War I also brought with it the first coherent 
discussions on the principle of self-determination, in particular championed by U.S. President 
Woodrow Wilson.  President Wilson understood self-determination in a democratic context, 
e.g. as a right of the population of a nation-state to freely choose its government and 
sovereign.  But he also explicitly linked the principle of self-determination to rights of 
minorities.  For instance, he proposed a provision to the League Covenant suggesting a fairly 
far-reaching right of racial groups to secession.79  President Wilson was successful to some 
extent.  For instance, the League of Nation Covenant introduced a Mandate System, pursuant 
to which European powers where to support trust territories’ development towards self-
                                                 
76  Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, pp. 137-138   
77  Article 1 (2) of the League Covenant 
78  Crawford, The Right to Self-determination in International Law, pp. 14-15, Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, 
and Self-Determination II, pp. 31 and 51-54, Wheatley, Democracy, Minorities and International Law, pp. 8-9, 
Lerner, Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law, pp. 11-12, Kingsbury, Reconciling Five 
Competing Conceptual Structures, p. 78, Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, pp. 191-192, and 
Shaw, Self-Determination and the Use of Force, p. 37 
79  Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination II, pp. 27-32, Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in 
International Law I, p. 76 and Cassese, Self-determination of Peoples, pp. 18-23.  In the years immediately 
following the Russian revolution, the Soviet Union too, appears to have been of the opinion that the principle of 
self-determination applies to ethnic groups.  However, it clearly did so in a Marxist context, viewing self-
determination as a tool in the struggle for class-liberation.  See Cassese, Self-determination of Peoples, pp. 16-
18, Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination Ii, pp. 32-33 and Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in 
International Law I, p. 76. 
32 
government, in some instances through becoming fully sovereign states.  But the Mandate 
System introduced by the League pertained to territories in their entirety.  It offered little 
support to ethnic and culturally distinct groups.80  In fact, the Mandate System sought to 
extinguish cultural practices viewed as backwards by the Europeans, such as those of “native 
tribes”.81  What is more, even if President Wilson enjoyed certain success in making 
international law embracing the principle of self-determination, the victory was far from 
complete.  Both the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations Covenant fell short of 
proclaiming self-determination as a right.82        
 
Also juridical decisions of the era reflected an increased interest in the situation of minorities 
and the principle of self-determination.  In an advisory opinion in the Minority Schools in 
Albania Case (1935), the PCIJ proclaimed that an ethnic minority in Albania had the right to 
preserve traditions and national characteristics distinguishing it from the majority population.  
The PCIJ stated that “equality in law precludes discrimination of any kind; whereas equality 
in fact may involve the necessity of different treatment in order to attain a result which 
establishes equilibrium between different situations.”  The Court further proclaimed that “The 
idea underlying the treaties for the protection of minorities is to secure for certain elements 
incorporated in a State, the population of which differs from them in race … the possibility of 
… preserving the characteristics which distinguish them from the majority, and satisfying the 
ensuing special needs.”  To achieve this end, the Court further proclaimed that states should 
ensure the minority group “suitable means for the preservation of their racial peculiarities, 
their traditions and their national characteristics.”83  Read today, the PCIJ’s advisory opinion 
in the Minority Schools of Albania Case strikes as remarkably modern.  Notably, the PCIJ did 
not merely hold that children of minority groups had the same rights to schooling as children 
of the majority population, a position that in itself would only be firmly established in 
international law following the establishment of the United Nations more than a decade later.  
                                                 
80  League of Nations Covenant, Article 22.  For an extensive outline of the League of Nations’ Mandate System, 
see Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, pp. 119-190.  Anghie argues that 
even if formally aiding territories outside Europe to become states, the Mandate System in effect still served the 
purpose of maintaining the European powers’ control over these areas. 
81  Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, pp. 168-169.  See also Kingsbury, 
Legal Positivism as Normative Politics, pp. 412-413.  Here Kingsbury discusses the writings of two legal 
scholars that exercised considerable influence on the law during the League of Nation epoch; Oppenheim and 
Westlake.  They both held that native tribes were not legally capable of managing their own affairs, and that their 
treatment should hence be left to the conscience of the state. 
82  Crawford, The Right to Self-determination in International Law, p. 14, Shaw, Self-Determination and the Use 
of Force, p. 37, and Cassese, Self-determination of Peoples, p. 33 
83  Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ Ser. A./B., No. 64, 1935.   
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Of much greater significance is the PCIJ distinguishing between “equality in law” and 
“equality in fact”.  When asserting that minority children’s different cultural background 
awards them a right to be treated differently compared with the majority population, i.e. to 
have a schooling culturally accustomed to them, the PCIJ is well ahead of its time.  Section 
4.8 will elaborate how the non-discrimination discourse has only very recently entertained the 
notion that those that are different have a right to be treated as such.     
 
The Minority Schools in Albania Case hence well illustrates the post-World War I era’s view 
on the rights of minorities.  In the same vein, the opinion of the Commission of Jurists 
appointed by the League of Nations to review the Åland Islands Case84 (1920), illustrates the 
epoch’s understanding of the principle of self-determination.  The Commission of Jurists too, 
placed emphasis on the relationship between the principle of self-determination and the right 
of minorities.  It noted that the two principles had the same object; to assure ethnic groups the 
possibility to maintain and develop their social and ethnical characteristics.  According to the 
Commission, this end should whenever possible be achieved through secession.  But when 
secession was for political reasons not possible, the ethnic group’s right to preserve its 
cultural characteristics should be implemented through an extensive grant of liberty within the 
existing state.  The Commission of Jurists found that the Ålanders did not enjoy a right to 
self-determination, in the sense that they could unilaterally secede from Finland.  The 
Commission motivated its finding with that the principle of self-determination had not 
emerged into a right under international law, chiefly because of not being incorporated into 
the Treaty of Versailles.  Notwithstanding, the Commission held that the Ålanders were 
entitled to preserve their identity through a regime of autonomy, underlining that the principle 
of self-determination must “be brought into line with that of the protection of minorities”.85   
 
As the Minority Schools in Albania Case, the Åland Island Case illustrates the strong 
protection awarded to minority groups during the League of Nations era.  The Åland Island 
                                                 
84  The Åland Islands are a group of islands situated in the Baltic Sea between Finland and Sweden.  
The conflict concerned whether the Åland Islands where free to secede from Finland to become a part 
of Sweden.  Championing their claim, the Ålanders sought to invoke the principle of self-
determination.  See Crawford, The Right to Self-determination in International Law, p. 13. 
85  Report of the International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations with the 
Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Åland Island Question, Official Journal of 
the League of Nations, Special Supplement No. 3, October 1920.  See also Cassese, Self-Determination of 
Peoples, pp. 27-31 and 33, Crawford, The Right to Self-determination in International Law, pp. 13-14 and The 
Creation of States, pp. 111-112, Fromherz, Indigenous Peoples’ Courts, pp. 1355-1356, and Shaw, Self-
Determination and the Use of Force, p. 37.  For an extensive overview of the autonomy arrangements on the 
Åland Islands, see Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination II, pp.28-30 and 370-375. 
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Case further evidences the political force of the principle of self-determination in the inter-
war period, even though the principle had not yet crystallized into a right.  The cases further 
highlight the interrelation between self-determination and protection of minority groups.  It is 
true that the Commission of Jurists in the outset equalled the principle to self-determination 
with a right to independence, and concluded that no such right existed under international law.  
But this did not leave the Ålanders without rights.  Rather, guided by the spirit of self-
determination, the Commission concluded that international law provided minority groups 
with a right to autonomy allowing them to preserve their cultural characteristics.  In other 
words, the Commission of Jurists disentangled the principle of self-determination from a right 
to secession.  Having done so, it noted that the underlying rationales behind the principle of 
self-determination could also be met by an extensive right to cultural autonomy.  As the 
PCIJ’s advisory opinion in the Minority Schools of Albania Case, the Commission of Jurists 
findings in the Åland Islands Case comes across as strikingly contemporary.  Also the logic 
behind the Commission of Jurists’ findings would go unnoticed for several decades in the 
post-World War II era.  But as the doctoral thesis will return to extensively later, international 
law has recently rediscovered the intrinsic link between self-determination and cultural rights.  
The Åland Islands Case illustrates well that in the final analysis, both set of rights have the 
same core common objective; the safeguard of the cultural identity of groups.86  The Case 
further demonstrates that such rights can be operationalized through autonomous 
arrangements rather than through secession.       
 
In conclusion, although legal sources are limited, it appears clear that during the League of 
Nations epoch, one can discern a clear departure from the international legal order reigning 
since the Peace of Westphalia.  States, through the League of Nation, and international legal 
institutions broke with the orthodox understanding of the state-individual dichotomy 
professed by classical liberalism.  The international legal order entertained ideas submitting 
that ethnic and cultural groups can enjoy rights in their own capacity.  These rights aspired to 
award ethnic groups having been denied the right to independence when the nation-states 
were formed a right to autonomy.  But the minority rights recognized during the League of 
Nations era would not be long-lived.  In the 1930s, the minority protection system became 
questioned, and started to implode.  The main reason was a lack of oversight mechanisms and 
                                                 
86  Vrdoljak, Self-Determination and Cultural Rights, pp.44-46 
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a perception that the system discriminated between states.87  But also political unrest, 
including the rise of Nazism and Fascism, contributed to the break-down of the League of 
Nation’s minority rights system.88  Finally, any potential developments towards recognition of 
rights of ethnic groups were soon interrupted by the Second World War.   
 





As mentioned, during the years leading up to World War II, the minority protection system 
established under the auspices of the League of Nations had already collapsed.  In addition, 
Nazi-Germany used an alleged need to protect German minorities in neighbouring countries 
to justify several of its aggressions during World War II, and, it was felt, the German 
minorities had collaborated in this effort.  These two circumstances combined to render the 
International Community adverse to rights of ethnic groups in the aftermath of World War II.  
Simultaneously, a belief emerged in the post-War epoch that effective protection of individual 
civil and political rights would indirectly – yet adequately - also protect the cultural 
characteristics of members of vulnerable minority groups.89  Hence, there was no need for 
specific minority rights.90  Or more correctly, such a belief re-emerged.  Because a position 
that justice can be achieved through accurately formulating the state-individual relationship is 
of course fully in line with the political theories that had been dominating since the advent of 
the nation-state and international law about 300 years earlier.  An additional contributing 
factor to minority rights being abandoned, it has been suggested, was that many post-War 
statesmen viewed the abolishment of minority rights as a way to weaken minority groups’ 
possibilities to challenge state-power.  The individual human rights approach fitted these 
statesmen perfectly.  It protected members of minorities as individuals, but not the national 
groups’ societal institutions.  Thus disempowered, minorities were in a bad position to resist 
                                                 
87  Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination II, pp. 53-55, and Makkonen, Equal in Law, 
Unequal in Fact, p. 82 
88  Lerner, Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law, p. 10-11 
89  Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination II, p. 57, Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys, pp. 
29-30, Crawford, The Right to Self-Determination in International Law, pp. 14-15, and Kingsbury, Reconciling 
Five Competing Conceptual Structures, p. 78 
90  Vrdoljak, Self-Determination and Cultural Rights, p. 56, and Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys, p. 29 
36 
deliberate nation-building processes of the state.91  As a consequence, when the foundations 
for a new world order were created in the wake of World War II, minority rights were 
substituted for universal individual human rights.  As Kunz famously observed in 1954, “[a]t 
the end of the First World War international protection of minorities was the great fashion … 
Today, the well dressed international lawyer wears “human rights”.”92       
 
The debate on self-determination in the post-World War II period followed a similar pattern 
as the shift in focus from minority rights to universal individual rights.  True, a few scholars 
did suggest that the right to self-determination could apply to peoples in the cultural/ethnic 
understanding of the term, rather than to a state (or technically more correct, the aggregate of 
the population of the state).  However, following in the footsteps of the classical liberal 
tradition, most legal scholars frowned at this idea.  They submitted that understanding the 
subject of the right to self-determination in such a manner constituted a contradiction in terms.  
It was maintained that under international law, it is not possible to refer to a polity as a 
political entity if not already constituting one.  Per definition, polities seeking rights to self-
determination have no legal status or any rights under international law, it was submitted.93  In 
an often used quote, Jennings illustrates the position of the time well, submitting that “[o]n 
the surface it seem[s] reasonable: let the people decide.  It [is] in fact ridiculous because the 
people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people.”94  In the same vein, the 
International Law Commission (ILC) expressed the opinion that defining the term state or 
establishing what characteristics a community shall possess to qualify as a state would serve 
no purpose.95  Clearly, the sentiment was fully in line with the position of classical 
international law. As seen, it held that the law should not concern itself with what polities 
make up a state.  This was an issue for power politics only.  The state, it was confirmed, pre-
dates the law.   
                                                 
91  Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys, pp. 30-31 
92  Kunz, The Present Status of the International Law for the Protection of Minorities, p. 282 
93  Crawford, The Creation of States, pp. 124-125 
94  Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government    
95  ILC, Report 1949:A/925, 9 
37 
 
2.5.2 The UN Charter 
 
The UN Charter became the first international legal instrument to refer to human rights, albeit 
in a cautiou and general manner.96  Hence, although human rights ideas had surfaced centuries 
earlier, it was only in the post-World War II period that human rights became a legitimate 
concern of international law.97  Following the classical legal tradition, the UN Charter 
affirmed that only individuals can be beneficiaries of human rights.  Further, the Charter 
reflected the centrality of the state in the international legal order, underlining that 
international law continued to rest on the principle of state sovereignty.98  In the same vein, 
the UN Charter explicitly declared that human rights evolve as a result of acceptance by 
states.99   
 
The UN Charter also came to include references to the principle of self-determination of 
peoples.100  These references could be perceived as contradicting the emphasis on the 
centrality of the state in the international legal order.  And certainly, far from all participants 
at the Conference were in favour of the UN Charter referring to the principle of self-
determination.  These participants objected to this idea exactly because viewing a reference to 
self-determination of peoples as straying away from the state-focused approach perceived to 
be inherent in the world order.  It was feared that emphasis on self-determination could lead to 
national minorities demanding a right to secession.  These concerns were allayed, however, 
by general statements clarifying that references to the principle of self-determination was not 
to be understood as conferring rights to minorities or other sub-segments of society.  When it 
had been thus clarified that the UN Charter did not refer to rights of peoples in the ethno-
cultural meaning of the term - but rather to rights of states through “the agent” the entire 
population of the state – agreement could be reached on these provisions in the UN Charter.  
Thus, understood, these Charter provisions do not award rights to groups vis-à-vis the state, 
                                                 
96  Brownlie, The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law, p. 1.  Brownlie points to that the term “human 
rights” is relatively new, first appearing in the instruments crafted by the young United Nations. 
97  Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination II, p. 104 
98  Articles 2 (4) and 2 (7).  See also Cassese, International Law, p. 336. 
99  Articles 13 (1) and 55 (c).  See also Cassese, International Law, pp. 331-332 and 378. 
100  Articles 1 (2) and 55 
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but rather pertain to state-to-state relationships.101 In conclusion, the UN Charter confirmed 
the primacy of the state in international law and entrenched the state-individual dichotomy.   
 
2.5.3 The Bill of Rights and other human rights instruments of the era 
 
Immediately following its establishment, the United Nations embarked on crafting the first 
universally applicable human rights instrument.  In 1948, the UNGA adopted the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR).102  Reflecting that minority rights were out of 
fashion, the UDHR embraced only individual human rights and acknowledged no rights of 
peoples or other groups.103  Still, at least formally the UDHR manifested a final break with the 
policies of racial supremacy that had underpinned colonization.  Since 1948, the fundamental 
principle of human beings’ equal value has been unquestioned in international law.104  This 
development was of course significant in itself.  But in addition, Kymlicka argues that this 
first step constituted a condition for later developments in international law, of greater 
relevance to the doctoral thesis.105 
 
Two UDHR provisions are of particular relevance to the doctoral thesis.  First, pursuant to 
UDHR Article 27.2, every individual has the right to the protection of the moral and material 
interests resulting from the scientific, literary or artistic production of which she is the author.  
But UDHR Article 27 did not only proclaim rights of those creating culture.  The provision 
reflects a conflicting interest in the right to culture relevant still today.  While Article 27.2 
underscores the right to control and benefit from one’s own creativity, Article 27.1 in the 
same breath proclaims everyone’s right to freely participate in the cultural life of society as a 
whole, to enjoy its arts, and to share in society’s scientific advancement and benefits.  
Evidently, the rights enshrined in Article 27 can at times conflict with each other.  One has to 
strike a balance between the two and in instances when they are incompatible, determine 
                                                 
101  UN GAOR, 6th session, Third Committee, 366th meeting, para. 29, and 397th meeting, paras. 5-6, and UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.625, paras. 77 and 80.  See also Alston, Peoples’ Rights, pp. 260-261, Cassese, Self-
determination of Peoples, pp. 14-23 and 39-42, Crawford, The Creation of States, pp. 112-114, and Vrdoljak, 
Self-Determination and Cultural Rights, p. 62 
102  Adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948 
103  Anaya, The Capacity of International Law to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Rights Claims, p. 326, Scheinin, 
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, p. 4, and Kymlicka, 
Multicultural Odysseys, p. 30 
104  As Fredman points out, it is true that liberal theories for centuries had celebrated the equality of men.  But 
this equality was reserved for men in Europe with means.  See Combating Racism with Human Rights, pp. 14-
15. 
105  Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys, p. 89 
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which right prevails.  Second, UDHR Article 17 proclaims that everyone owning property 
must not be arbitrarily deprived of the same. 
 
A second human rights instrument adopted by the UNGA in 1948 constituted a direct 
response to the atrocities committed during World War II.  The Genocide Convention106 
prohibits genocide in all its forms.  A convention outlawing genocide offered the World 
Community an apparent opportunity to break with the state-individual dichotomy.  
Seemingly, the natural beneficiaries of a right not to be subject to genocide are peoples or 
other groups.  Still, the United Nations and its member states managed to avoid rendering the 
Genocide Convention a human rights instrument establishing collective human rights proper.  
Rather, the Convention was framed in a manner not to proclaim rights.  Instead, it defines 
genocide as acts committed with the intent to destroy groups, and obligates states to punish 
persons guilty of such acts.  As a consequence, in particularly if interpreting the Genocide 
Convention in the context of other human rights instruments adopted during the era, one can 
hardly invoke the Convention as evidence of international law at the time acknowledging 
human rights of peoples.107   
 
At the same time as the United Nations elaborated the universally applicable UDHR, 
European and American states crafted regional human rights instruments, applying to the 
European and American Continents, respectively.  These instruments too, were products of 
their time, proclaiming only individual rights.  Similarly to UDHR Article 27.2, Article 13.2 
of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (ADRDM)108 (1948) 
proclaimed a right of individuals to have their intellectual creations protected.  Further, 
mirroring UDHR Article 17, pursuant to ADRDM Article 23, individuals have a right to 
property.  In 1969, the Organization of American States (OAS) followed up and built on the 
ADRDM when adopting the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR).109  ACHR 
Article 21 affirmed the right to property proclaimed by ADRDM Article 23.110  Unlike its 
                                                 
106  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by UNGA Resolution 260 
(III) on 9 December 1948   
107  Alston, Peoples’ Rights, pp. 261-262, and Fromherz, Indigenous Peoples’ Courts, p. 1352.  See, however, 
also Stavenhagen, Cultural Rights, p. 87, where he, referring to Buergenthal, asserts that the Genocide 
Convention recognizes the right of groups to exist as groups.   
108  Adopted by the Ninth Conference of American States, Bogotá, Mar. 30-May 2, 1948. O.A.S. Res. XXX 
109  Adopted at San José, Costa Rica, at the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights on 22 
November, 1969, OAS Treaty Series No. 36 
110  In 1988 the OAS further agreed on an Additional Protocol to the ACHR, including an Article 14 essentially 
mirroring UDHR Article 27.   
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American counterparts, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHRFF) (1950) did not embrace the right to property.111  But 
Article 1 of a first additional protocol added to the Convention two years later proclaimed – in 
line with UDHR Article 17 – that every person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of her 
property.112     
 
Following the adoption of the UDHR, the UN member states embarked on elaborating and 
concretizing the rights enshrined in the UDHR in two legally binding human rights 
instruments.  In 1966, the UNGA simultaneously adopted the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights113 (CCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights114 (CESCR).  The UDHR, together with the CCPR and the CESCR, are often 
jointly referred to the UN Bill of Rights.   
 
The 1966 Covenants remained true to the notion of the centrality of the state in international 
law, as well as to the perception that human rights apply to individuals only.115  Still, the 
instruments encompassed a couple of provisions of interest to the doctoral thesis.  Essentially 
mirroring UDHR Article 27.2, CESCR Article 15.1 (c) confirmed that the individual116 has 
the right to benefit from protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which she is the author.  But as UDHR Article 27, 
CESCR Article 15.1 also has built into it the tension between the rights of those creating 
culture and those wanting to access the same.  Pursuant to CESCR Article 15.1 (a-b), 
everyone has the right to take part in cultural life as well as to benefit from scientific progress.  
The CCPR contains no provision directly pertaining to rights to human creativity.  Article 27, 
however, elaborates on another aspect of culture, proclaiming that individuals belonging to 
e.g. ethnic minorities shall not be denied the right to enjoy their own culture, in community 
with other members of the group.  Again, the reference to individual members of the group, 
                                                 
111  Concluded at Rome, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5; 213 U.N.T.S. 221  
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rather than to the group as such, renders it evident that the authors of the CCPR understood 
Article 27 to set forth a right that was to be enjoyed by individuals only.  In addition, Article 
27 was framed as a negative right.  The state’s duty was to not interfere with, rather than to 
promote, the right proclaimed.  Notwithstanding, by calling on states to respect communal 
cultural practices of members of ethnic groups, CCPR Article 27 did as much as affirming 
that the right to culture, in order to be applied in any meaningful manner, must in certain 
circumstances be enjoyed in community with other members of the group.  Hence, Article 27 
added an - albeit limited - collective dimension to the right to culture, absent in the UDHR.  
Neither the CCPR nor the CESCR embrace the right to property.  The reason for this omission 
appears to have been that the Western and Eastern blocks could not agree on how the right 
should be formulated.117  The right to property was, however, included in another legally 
binding human rights instrument adopted during this era, namely the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).118  Relevant provisions in 
the CERD Convention are outlined in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
The CCPR and CESCR hence built and elaborated on the UDHR.  But in addition, the 1966 
Covenants also came to embrace the principle of self-determination enshrined in the UN 
Charter, converting it into a legally binding right.119  The common Article 1.1 of the CCPR 
and the CESCR proclaims that “all peoples have the right to self-determination”.  Article 1.2 
proceeds to lay out the so called resource dimension of the right to self-determination, 
stipulating that all peoples have the right to freely dispose of their natural resources and must 
not be deprived of their means of subsistence.  In the same vein, pursuant to the also identical 
CCPR Article 47 and CESCR Article 25, nothing in the Covenants shall be interpreted as 
impairing the right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize their natural resources.    
 
The agreement on the common Article 1 had been preceded by a debate similar to the one 
occurring prior to the adoption of the self-determination provisions in the UN Charter.  The 
proposal to include the right to self-determination in the 1966 Covenants initially met 
resistance.  Again, some states were concerned that the Covenants affirming a right to self-
determination of peoples could be interpreted as the Covenants awarding rights to ethnic 
                                                 
117  Cassese, International Law, p. 382 
118  Adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 2106 A (XX), of 21 December 1965 
119  That said, it should be pointed out that self-determination had for the first time been proclaimed a right by the 
UNGA in the 1960 UN Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (UN 
Resolution 1514 (XV), 14 December, 1960).  The Declaration against Colonization is, however, a formally non-
legally binding instrument.  Regarding the Declaration against Colonization, see further Section 2.5.4. 
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groups.  This, these states feared, could in turn potentially disrupt sovereign states.  
Notwithstanding, in the debate that ensued, the position that the 1966 Covenants should 
embrace the right to self-determination increasingly gained momentum.  And eventually, the 
concerned states agreed that it was sufficient that the same safety measures were applied as 
when the UN Charter was adopted.  Consequently, also in connection with the adoption of the 
1966 Covenants, a large number of states declared that the right to self-determination 
enshrined in the common Article 1 could not be interpreted as awarding rights to sub-
segments of the state.  Rather, with the term “peoples” should be understood the aggregate of 
the population of the state.  Having thus reassured themselves, the UN member states could 
proceed to adopt the CCPR and the CESCR.120     
 
Already prior to the formal adoption of the 1966 Covenants, the UNGA had adopted an 
instrument elaborating on the resource dimension of the right to self-determination set forth in 
the common Article 1.2.  The Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources121 (1962) must reasonably be interpreted in the same light as the common Article 
1.2.  Literally understood, the Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
proclaims a right of peoples to their natural resources.  At the same time, however, the 
Declaration mixes references to state’s right to sovereignty over natural resources with that of 
peoples.122  For instance Crawford therefore concludes that it is doubtful whether the subjects 
of the rights encompassed in the Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources are peoples in the ethnic/cultural meaning of the word.  Rather, he submits, the 
intended beneficiary of the right was probably the entire population of a state.123  Hence, it 
appears that the Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources - at the time 
of its adoption - was understood to imply that natural resources of a state should benefit the 
entire population of the state.  In line with other international legal instruments adopted during 
the era, the Declaration did not, however, proclaim specific rights of groups over particular 
resources.124  
                                                 
120  Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, pp. 242-243, Cassese, Self-determination of Peoples, pp. 
47-52 and 61-62, and Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination II, pp. 41-42   
121  GA Res. 1803 (XVII), adopted on 14 December 1962 
122  For instance, paras. 1 and 5 of the Declaration refer to the rights and sovereignty of peoples over their natural 
resources.  At the same time, the consideranda to the Resolution refers to the inalienable rights of states to 
dispose of their wealth and resources.  See also Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, pp. 515-516.  
123  Crawford, The Right to Self-determination in International Law, p. 22.  In the same vein, see also Cassese, 
Self-Determination of Peoples, pp. 99-100. 
124  One can further note that in 1974, the UNGA adopted the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 
(Res. 3281 XXIX), referring exclusively to states’ permanent sovereignty over natural resources.    
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Through its incorporation into the 1966 Covenants, self-determination had hence evolved 
from a political principle to a right.  Notwithstanding, as understood during the Bill of Rights 
era, the right had little bearing on “peoples” in the ethnic/cultural meaning of the term.  It 
appears evident that at the time, “peoples” were understood as the aggregate of the population 
of the state.  That said, one should note that the crafters of the common Article 1 deliberately 
distinguished between “peoples” and “states”.  The UN member states consciously opted for 
rendering peoples, and not “states”, the subjects of the right to self-determination.  For 
instance, Cassese underlines how the right to self-determination was perceived as geared 
towards peoples, and not to sovereign legal titles.125  And Crawford points to that during the 
negotiations on the CCPR and the CESCR, several proposals for a definition of the term 
“peoples” were put forward, albeit in the end not included in the Covenants.126  Nonetheless, 
the fact that a definition of peoples was considered underscores that the UN member states 
consciously made peoples, and not states, subjects of the right to self-determination.  The 
distinction is not irrelevant.  As Crawford asked rhetorically already more than 20 years ago; 
“If the only rights of peoples are rights against other States, and if there is no change to the 
established position that the government of the State represents “the State” (i.e. the people of 
the State) for all international legal purposes irrespective of its representativeness, then what 
is the point of referring to the rights in question as rights of peoples?”127  True, states and 
peoples formally being viewed as two distinct subjects might have been of limited relevance 
at a time when peoples were defined as the aggregate of the population of the state.  In all but 
formal terms, under such circumstances, peoples exercise the right to self-determination 
essentially as “agents” of the state.  Still, as the doctoral thesis shall return to in subsequent 
chapters, it has certainly been beneficial, perhaps even a pre-requisite, for subsequent 
developments within the self-determination discourse that already at the time when the right 
was formulated, UN member states viewed peoples, and not states, as the beneficiaries of the 
right to self-determination.128  The inclusion of a right to self-determination of peoples in the 
1966 Covenants would come to spur a debate on peoples’ rights, including on who constitute 
a people, for legal purposes.  Cassese submits that “[s]elf-determination] has set in motion a 
                                                 
125  Cassese, Self-determination of Peoples, pp. 143-144, 242 and 285.  In the same vein, see Brownlie, The 
Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law, pp. 3-5. 
126  Crawford, The Creation of States, pp. 125-126.  Similarly,  when crafting the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, the OAU considered, but in the end deliberately omitted, a definition of “peoples” in the 
Charter.  See Rapporteur’s Report, OAU Doc. CM/1149 (XXXVII), Ann. 1, 4, para. 13 (1981).   
127  Crawford, The Rights of Peoples, p. 56 
128  Of certain relevance is also that the right to self-determination was viewed as applying generally to peoples, 
and not only in a colonial situation.  See Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, p. 58. 
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restructuring and redefinition of the world community’s basic “rules of the game”.129  Alston 
too, argues that despite its vagueness and ambiguity, the inclusion of the right to self-
determination in the 1966 Covenants encouraged proponents of peoples’ rights proper and 
instigated an increased inclination to recognize the existence of such rights.130 Similarly, 
Crawford asserts that the recognition of the right to self-determination spurred a development 
towards acceptance of peoples’ rights.131   
 
But setting potential future developments aside, and merely summarizing international law of 
the time, the international legal system the young United Nations set out to craft clearly broke 
with the League of Nations’ interest in group rights inspired by the principle of self-
determination.  Instead, the international legal system again came to rely on classical liberal 
values.  Three of liberal theory’s most profound presumptions were incorporated into the 
international legal system developed in the wake of World War II.  First, it was held self-
evident that international legal standards emerge from the legal subjects themselves, i.e. from 
states.  The United Nations focused on the primacy of the state and, as a consequence, on state 
sovereignty.  It was assumed that states pre-date international law.132  Second, the UN 
member states accepted the notion that once created, the law binds states.  States cannot 
subsequently opt out of the law due to changed will.  Finally, the UN Charter and the Bill of 
Rights came to incorporate the state-individual dichotomy.  The group rights orientation of 
the League of Nations was substituted for a complete belief in universal individual human 
rights.  As Reynolds has put it; “Whereas the League [of Nations] had thought a lot about 
minorities, the United Nations put the emphasis on the rights of individuals on one hand, and 
the rights of states on the other … the emphasis was on assimilation and integration.”133   
 
2.5.4 The decolonization epoch 
 
As self-determination emerged as a right in the midst of the decolonization process, it was 
almost immediately put into action.  The colonies and the United Nations relied heavily on 
                                                 
129  Cassese, Self-determination of Peoples, p. 1 
130  Alston, Peoples’ Rights, p. 1 
131  Crawford, The right to Self-determination in International Law, pp. 21-24   
132  As Friedmann observes, the world during the Bill of Rights era was organized on the basis of states.  
Fundamental changes in international law could occur only based on state action and states were the repositories 
of legitimate authority over peoples and territories.  See The Changing Structure of International Law, p. 213. 
133  Reynolds, Aborigines and the 1967 Referendum, p. 58.  Similarly, Emerson has noted that during the 
Wilsonian period, focus lay on ethnic communities primarily defined by culture, whereas in the post-World War 
II era, ethnicity was essentially irrelevant.  See Self-Determination, p. 463.   
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self-determination arguments when calling for independence of the colonies from the colonial 
states.134  Section 2.5.3 outlined how the common Article 1 of the 1966 Covenants affirmed 
self-determination as a right.  But as further indicated, the decolonization process also 
produced a number of legal sources contributing to the transformation of the principle of self-
determination into a right, one of which actually pre-dated the adoption of the 1966 
Covenants.  As mentioned, self-determination was for the first time formally proclaimed a 
right in the 1960 UNGA Declaration against Colonization, asserting that peoples in colonized 
territories are entitled to the right to self-determination.135  The Declaration against 
Colonization was immediately followed by UN Resolution 1541 (XV)136, awarding the right 
to self-determination also to non-self-governing peoples.  The ICJ too, contributed to 
confirming self-determination as a right, by applying the right in a couple of cases of the 
era.137  It is worth noting that doing so, the ICJ relied heavily on the formally non-binding 
Declaration against Colonization.138  In addition to confirming self-determination as a right, 
the mentioned international legal sources further collaborated to widen the applicability of the 
right.  Now, the right to self-determination was not only discussed in the context of the 
aggregate of the population of a state.  Following the decolonization process, international law 
understood the right to self-determination to apply to peoples in the meaning (i) the aggregate 
of the population of an independent state, (ii) the entire population of a territory that had not 
yet attained independence, and (iii) the population of territories geographically separated from 
the state administering the territory and/or subject to foreign military occupation.139    
 
The decolonization process resulted in territories outside Europe regaining the legal status 
they had been deprived of for centuries.  This further resulted in international law no longer 
being an internal Western affair.  Sovereign states in the Third World could now participate in 
the formulation of international law.  The expansion of the world community did not, 
however, result in any changes in international law’s perception of states and state 
                                                 
134  Cassese, Self-determination of Peoples, pp. 71-74 
135  UNGA Resolution 1514 (XV).  See also Crawford, The Right to Self-determination in International Law, p. 
17. 
136  Resolution 1541 (XV) on Principles Which Should Guide Members in Determining whether or not an 
Obligation Exist to Transmit the Information Called for under Article 73e of the Charter, 15 December 1960, UN 
GAOR, 15th Session, Supplement No. 16 (A/4684).  With non-self governing peoples were understood 
populations in territories geographically separated from the state administering the territory.    
137  Namibia Case, ICJ Reports (1971), p. 31, Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 12.  
138  Fromherz, Indigenous Peoples’ Courts, p. 1359 
139 Crawford, The Right to Self-Determination in International Law, pp. 16-20, Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in 
International Law I, p. 77, Cassese, Self-determination of Peoples, p. 59 and International Law, pp. 61-62, and 
Xanthaki, The Right to Self-Determination, pp. 16- 17 
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sovereignty.  On the contrary, decolonization universalized the European state as the form of 
political organization having equal sovereign rights and status in the international 
community.140  Consequently, the decolonization process had little relevance for indigenous 
peoples’ rights.  As noted, the legal entity being awarded the right to self-determination 
during the decolonization epoch was the entire population of a colonial territory, irrespective 
of pre-colonial political and cultural patterns.  Whether the colony hosted two or more 
culturally and ethnically distinct populations lacked relevance, as did the fact that several of 
the colonies’ borders had been haphazardly defined by the colonizing powers.141  “Territory, 
not “nationhood”, was the determining factor.”142  As a consequence, the regime of 
decolonization the United Nations promoted largely by-passed indigenous peoples’ 
societies.143  During an epoch that otherwise revolutionized the world order, political thought, 
state policy and international law on indigenous peoples remained essentially the same.  The 
dominating view continued to be that the colonization of indigenous territories had been just.  
The newly independent colonies adopted Europe’s position on this issue.144  Ideas that 
“backward” indigenous societies should be assimilated into the dominant political and social 
orders engulfing them were common in many states.145   
 
The assimilatory approach taken towards indigenous peoples during the decolonization era 
was also reflected in the first human rights instrument adopted specifically addressing the 
situation of indigenous populations.  ILO’s Convention (No. 107) Concerning the Protection 
and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal populations in Independent 
Countries (ILO 107)146 (1957) is clearly a child of its time.  As the title suggests, ILO 107 
                                                 
140  Hindess, Sovereignty as Indirect Rule, p. 311, and Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, pp. 174-
175  
141  Emerson, Self-Determination, p. 463, Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, p. 54, 
Castellino, Territorial Integrity and the “Right” to Self-Determination, p. 511, and Lerner, Group Rights and 
Discrimination in International Law, p. 13 
142  Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination II, p. 36 (with reference to Pommerance).  See 
also Weissner, Indigenous Sovereignty, p. 1150, and Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, p. 209. 
143  Stoll and von Hahn, Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Knowledge, and Indigenous Resources in International 
Law I, p. 6, Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys, p. 269, and Anaya Indigenous Peoples in International Law I, pp. 
78-84 
144  Cassese observes that during the negotiations on the UNGA Resolutions outlining the right to self-
determination of the former colonies, geopolitical considerations led developing countries, supported by socialist 
states and with no objections from Western states, to deny the right to self-determination to ethnic groups within 
the colonial territories.  He labels the fact that the right to self-determination emerging during the decolonization 
era did not apply to ethnic groups a “major flaw”.  See Self-Determination of Peoples, pp. 72-74. 
145  Tully, The Struggles of Indigenous Peoples for and of Freedoms, pp. 40, 43-44 and 52, and Anaya, 
Indigenous Peoples in International Law I, pp. 43-44.  This position was backed by a sentiment that indigenous 
populations were destined to slowly die out regardless.  See Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-
Determination II, p. 81.   
146  Adopted at 40th ILO Session on 26 June, 1957 
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focuses on indigenous individuals,147 and aspired to assimilate members of indigenous groups 
into the surrounding (more developed) society, rather than to protect them as distinct ethnic 
and cultural entities.148 
   
But even if the decolonization process at the time did little to promote rights of indigenous 
peoples, it need not have been irrelevant to the indigenous rights discourse.  Section 2.5.3 
pointed to how the UDHR’s confirmation of the equal value of all individuals, despite the 
focus on individual rights, probably paved way for later progressive developments in 
international law.  The decolonization process was surely such a development.149  In the same 
vein, the decolonization process, even though at the time blind to indigenous patterns of 
association, would perhaps decades later spur a belated decolonization process targeting 
indigenous peoples.150      
 
In conclusion, by the end of the decolonization era international law understood “peoples” as 
the aggregate of the population of a state, or of a territory with the right of becoming a state.  
True, a few scholars - such as Falk - already at the time argued for rights of peoples in the 
ethnic/cultural understanding of the term, particularly in the context of indigenous peoples.151  
But this position enjoyed limited support.  Brownlie’s is a more representative view of the era.  
He labelled advocates of the existence of peoples’ rights proper eccentric.  Brownlie asserted 
that such rights would ignore the principle of non-intervention and diminish the right of self-
determination.  He held self-evident that the “people” enjoying the right to self-determination 
was the aggregate of the inhabitants of a state.152  Similarly, Hannum took for granted that 
there are no such things as collective human rights proper, wherefore the right to self-
determination has no relevance in the context of indigenous peoples.153   
                                                 
147  Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards, p. 73.  That said, the ILO 107 did 
incorporate certain provisions that appear to address the collective aspect of indigenous rights, in 
particularly within the area of land and resources. 
148  Stoll and von Hahn, Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Knowledge and Indigenous Resources in 
International law I, p. 7, and Swepston, Indigenous Peoples in International Law and Organizations, 
p. 55 
149  Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys, p. 89, and Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, p. 201   
150  Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys, pp. 89 and 269-270.  He submits that once the World Community had 
accepted the rights of the former colonies, it was difficult to deny indigenous claims for correction of historic 
injustices.  For a similar opinion, see also Gray, The Indigenous Movement in Asia, p. 42.  Compare also al 
Attar, Aylwin and Coombe, Indigenous Cultural Heritage Rights in International Human Rights Law, p. 315. 
151  Falk, The Rights of Peoples, pp. 17-37, in particular pp. 34 and 35 
152  Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, p. 540-541 and 553-555, and The Rights of Peoples 
in Modern International Law, pp. 4-16 
153  Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination II, pp. 95-103   
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Chapter 2 outlined how liberalism not only emerged with the nation-state, but presupposes it.  
It was explained how liberal philosophy constructed social contract theories to explain how a 
group of men had come together to form a state, and agreed to be ruled by a sovereign.  The 
social contract theories, and hence the nation-state, had no room for rights of ethnic and/or 
cultural groups within the state.  As further explained, these theories came to underpin first 
the classical international legal system, and subsequently the contemporary legal system the 
young United Nations embarked on crafting.  The international legal system came to hold that 
for international legal purposes, a people equals the aggregate of population of a state or a 
territory.  Further, it accepted the notion that states pre-date the law and are free to determine 
the content of the same.  And human rights apply to individuals only.       
 
This Chapter aims to provide an overview over more contemporary political philosophy 
theories.  In particular, it describes how recent political theory has increasingly come to 
question the underlying fundaments of classical liberalism, resulting in the emergence of new 
schools of thought more hospitable towards group rights.  Such an overview is relevant to the 
doctoral thesis, since it could be that these political theories have exercised influence over 
recent developments within international law.  In other words, a basic understanding of the 
most recent trends within political philosophy might aid in properly understanding relevant 
spheres of international law.  It is underlined, however, that the Chapter does not purport to 
provide a comprehensive outline of relevant theories within political philosophy.  On the 
contrary, for the purposes of the doctoral thesis, a very general overview over the core 
elements of these theories is sufficient.         
 
3.2 Further on conventional individual liberalism 
 
Liberal philosophers have since the surface of the basic liberal ideas formulated various 
branches of liberal theories, such as utilitarianism, liberal equity and libertarianism.154  Still, 
                                                 
154  Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, pp. x-xi and 10-53.  While liberal thinkers have sought to 
formulate various theories based on the fundaments of liberalism, other philosophers have of course rejected the 
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for centuries no coherent liberal theory was successfully formulated, and attempts to come up 
with a theory under which all liberals could unite had almost been abolished.  However, in 
1971, John Rawls published A Theory of Justice, an elaborate attempt to present a coherent 
liberal theory of justice.  A Theory of Justice revitalized the liberal school, resulting in the 
formulation of various contemporary liberal individualistic theories, almost always presented 
as a response to Rawls.  Rawls’ mayor innovation was that he offered a formula for 
redistributive justice, not previously present in liberalism.  Rawls’ introduced a “veil of 
ignorance”, which he claimed the population of some kind of fictional pre-social state would 
opt for, if allowed to choose the principles that should govern their society.  Rawls submitted 
that the usual account of the state of nature is unfair, since some people have more bargaining 
power than others, due to better natural talents, more initial resources and supreme physical 
strength. This is unjust, since natural advantages are a result of pure chance, and are not 
deserved.  Rawls addressed this perceived flaw in classical liberal theories by hypothetically 
not allowing people to be aware of their personal characteristics, talents and resources when 
formulating their position on what constitutes a just society.  Rather, they had to agree on the 
rules governing the society behind the ”veil of ignorance”.155 
 
Rawls’ theory might be interesting for those studying what constitutes a fair distribution of 
resources in society.  But what is relevant here is how irrelevant A Theory of Justice is if the 
interest is the relationship between the state and groups.  Rawls’ is still a theory resting on the 
fundaments of classical liberalism.  Despite adding the element of a veil of ignorance, he 
follows the old liberal tradition by assuming a hypothetical social contract.156  Rawls too, 
presumes that due to uncertainties and scarcities of social life, individuals in the original 
position would agree to cede decision-making power to a sovereign.  True, the society Rawls 
envisions differs from a state ruled by a despot.  According to Rawls’ theory, the social 
contract is only valid as long as the sovereign uses its powers to guard the individual against 
scarcities and uncertainties.  If the sovereign abuses this trust, the individual is no longer 
                                                                                                                                                        
underlying premises of liberalism in whole or in part, focusing on offering alternative concepts and principles to 
those provided by liberalism.  Some of these theories, e.g. Marxism, have at times enjoyed considerable support.  
Notwithstanding, since these theories have had limited impact on the international legal system, they are not 
dealt with further in this context. 
155  Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 11-12, 18-21, 74-80 and 136-142.  See also Martin, Rawls, pp. 559-564, and 
compare May, Modood and Squires, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Minority Rights, p. 1, and Lea, Property Rights, 
Indigenous People and the Developing World, p. 32. 
156  Indeed, Fassbender notes that A Theory of Justice resulted in a revival of social contract theories.  See The 
United Nations Charter As Constitution of the International Community, p. 559. 
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under duty to honour the contract.157  But A Theory of Justice is a social contract theory 
nonetheless, presupposing the existence of a state and not considering that the state might not 
be ethnically or culturally homogenous.     
 
The attempts to build on Rawls’ comprehensive theory of liberal justice had no greater impact 
on group rights theory.   For instance, Ronald Dworkin aspired to add to Rawls’ veil of 
ignorance by accommodating for individuals that are handicapped or otherwise naturally 
disadvantaged.  Dworkin imagines an auction, where all individuals start with the same share 
of resources to bid, and are at the same time unaware of their natural talents and 
disadvantages.  Each person is fictionally asked how much they would spend on insurance 
against being disadvantaged.  The amount of the society’s resources the society utilizes to 
compensate for natural disadvantages would, provided that the theory works, equal the total 
amount paid by individuals for such insurances in the fictitious auction.158  But albeit fine-
tuning the veil of ignorance, Dworkin too rests on the notion of a social contract, assumes the 
nation-state, and allows no rights of groups.159   
 
As seen, also in the more modern conventional liberal theories of justice, the central building 
blocks of classical liberalism prevailed.  Justice was still to be achieved within a polity – the 
state - whose borders and membership had been determined prior to the formulation of the 
theory of justice.160  Liberalism remained indifferent - and formally neutral - to the 
ethnocultural identities of the citizens of the state.  They acknowledged rights of the 
individuals only, with no room for ethnic and/or cultural groups.  It was not the role of the 
state to promote cultural groups’ possibility to maintain and develop their specific culture, 
they held.161  On the contrary, the state should – and importantly, it was perceived, could – 
remain neutral between various cultures within the state.  In this sense, liberalism claimed to 
                                                 
157  Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 11-12, 21-22 and 75 
158  Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, pp. 206-213.  See also, Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, pp. 
75-82, and Hartney, Some Confusion Concerning Collective Rights, p. 212. 
159  Worth briefly touching upon is also an influential group of contemporary liberal thinkers disagreeing with 
Rawls and Dworkin that redistribution is just.  Libertarians criticize Rawls and Dworkin for rendering certain 
individuals mere resources for the life of others.  They submit that the state has no right to encroach upon 
individuals’ right freely to dispose of their goods and services, even for the purpose of increasing equality.  
Libertarians asserts that a just distribution of resources is simply a distribution follows from people’s free 
choices. See Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, pp. 169-172, and compare Kymlicka, Contemporary Political 
Philosophy, pp. 103-109.  Libertarianism too, is irrelevant in the context of group rights, and not further touched 
upon here.  
160  Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, pp. 254-256 
161  Young, Structural injustices and politics of difference, pp. 61-62, and Kymlicka, Contemporary Political 
Philosophy, pp. 343-345 
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be apolitical, or even hostile to politics.162  To conventional liberals, it does not matter if 
minority groups do not share their believes.  Indeed, to many liberals, local fallacy is the main 
justification for championing an all-embracing theory of justice.  Collective rights are 
regarded as per definition political.163  Many liberals submit that the aim of political 
philosophy is exactly to provide a theory of general applicability – i.e. universal to all 
societies – which can assist in identifying practices that have their roots in various groups’ 
cultures but that are nonetheless unjust and as a consequence should be grinded down.164  To 
the classical liberal, gradual disappearance of cultures constitutes no problem in itself.  On the 
contrary, various forms of liberalism share the assumption that the individual’s interests are 
best promoted by allowing her to decide what live to pursue without the imposition of culture.  
Individuals are not defined by membership in any particular community.  They can always opt 
out of their cultural background.  Hence, community matters only to the extent that it 
contributes to the well-being of the individual member.  It has no value in its own right, and 
therefore no right to exist in perpetuity, conventional individual liberalism holds.165   
 




Having been essentially uncontested for centuries, in the 1980s conventional 
individual liberalism got challenged.  Gradually, political thinkers commenced addressing the 
fact that conventional liberalism pre-supposes a state pre-dating the liberal theories.166  Some 
noted that conventional liberalism seems to support an abstract world, ignoring the realities of 
current societies.167  In the real world, two or more ethnic and/or cultural groups coinhabit 
almost all states.  And conversely, often the territory of one group stretches across national 
borders.  The question is then; if a state is not ethnically homogenous, how plausible is the 
notion that all its citizens have at one point in history come together to form a social contract?  
In reality, all citizens of a state do not feel an equal affinity to all other citizens, nor do they 
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necessarily feel a solidarity vis-à-vis other groups.168  In fact, a marginalized group might be 
adverse to the majority culture.  And if liberalism presupposes a fictitious homogenous state, 
is it at all possible to formulate a coherent, all embracing, liberal theory of justice?    
 
Conventional liberals still answer the posed question in the affirmative.  They retort that 
liberalism has never purported to rely solely on the existence of an ethnically and culturally 
homogenous state.169  Rather, conventional liberals submit, the two essential assertions of 
liberalism are that (i) a state can always be cultural neutral, having the capacity not to promote 
one culture over another, and (ii) individuals are not defined by membership in any particular 
community, but are always free to question all their relationships – including cultural ones.  
The state can, conventional liberalism posits, cater for an environment where all individuals, 
regardless of ethnic/cultural background, have an equal opportunity to lead the life they wish, 
in accordance with the cultural parameters they opt for.  It would seem that if these assertions 
can be substantiated, the claim that the ethnically and culturally homogenous state is a fiction 
would be less of a problem for conventional individual liberalism.  Because everyone would 
then still be free to lead the life she wishes, also within the fictional state.  However, the 
criticism of conventional individual liberalism has challenged also these two presumptions.   
 
If starting with the second presumption, both liberal and non-liberal thinkers have 
increasingly come to hold that individuals are not the atomized, generic, objects that 
individual liberalism might presume.  Rather, it is asserted, many individuals are rooted in, 
and their identity to a large degree defined by, their cultural background.  They are not free – 
as conventional liberalism argues - to question all their relationships, including their cultural 
affinity.  Consequently, many philosophers agree, it is not possible to formulate any relevant 
theory of justice without taking cultural identity into account.  The doctoral thesis shall return 
to this second line of criticism of individual liberalism in Sections 3.4 and 3.5.  But first, it 
shall survey whether the state can remain neutral between cultures. 
 
As indicated, political theorists have increasingly come to argue that even if the liberal state 
remains formally neutral and refrains from actively promote the culture of the majority, the 
                                                 
168  Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, pp. 95-96 
169  Walzer, Spheres of Justice, p. 140, and Tully, Identity Politics, pp. 524-525 
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state is nonetheless incapable of being neutral in practice.170  Because, it is asserted, the 
liberal understanding of being neutral is being passive, but being passive implicitly favours 
the majority culture.  That is so, since members of the dominant culture possess an 
institutional advantage over members of the minority.171  The state is almost inevitably 
implicitly biased towards the needs and interests of the majority group.  As Shachar has put it, 
referring to Spinner; “… minority cultures often come to the game after it has already begun 
and do not define the governing standards of a society’s institutions”.172  Hence, members of 
the majority generally obtain disproportionate representation in the cultural elites.  State 
legislation, norms and policies are in most instances based on the majority culture.173  As 
Miller observes, “majority voting as a way of implementing democratic principles applies 
only once the boundaries of the relevant constituency have been determined.  A majority vote 
cannot be used to fix these boundaries, since the outcome of such a vote will itself depend on 
who is included in … the electorate…”.174  The biased decision-making structures for instance 
tend to result in decisions on what languages can be officially used favouring the language of 
the majority.  Similarly, the majority culture is regularly promoted by the educational system.  
The majority’s views and cultural assumptions are likely to become the norm.175  In 
conclusion, increasingly more political thinkers came to hold the view that conventional 
individual liberalism fails to address entrenched inequalities in society, wherefore in the 
liberal state, all cultures simply do not enjoy the same chance to prosper, or even to survive.     
 
3.3.2 Particularly on nationalism 
 
The criticism of the purportedly neutral liberal state has gone beyond submitting that the state 
involuntary favours the majority culture.  Political philosophy has increasingly noted that the 
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liberal state do not only indirectly support the culture of the dominant group.  Political leaders 
in most liberal states are acutely aware that the state is not ethnically and/or culturally 
homogenous.  They know that not all citizens feel the same solidarity vis-à-vis all other 
segments of the society.  For effective rule and political stability, political leaders tend to try 
to “correct this flaw”.  As a result, in many liberal states conventional individual liberalism 
has become a self-fulfilling prophecy.  Liberalism, it has been observed, often leads to 
nationalism; a calculated way for a state to deal with the shortcomings inherent in classical 
liberalism.176  Liberal states – although purportedly neutral between cultures – have in most 
instances consciously nurtured a national identity defined by the culture of the dominant 
population, an identity to which all citizens of the state – per definition – are deemed to 
belong.177  Citizens are convinced to believe that they do belong to one, homogenous, nation.  
Nationalism seeks to erase cultural difference between various segments of the population of 
the state.  It aims at eliminating any sense among minority groups of togetherness and 
otherness.  Gellner notes, “Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men … are a 
myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, 
sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a reality…”178  If 
successful, nationalism results in assimilation.  
 
An additional observation can be made in the context of nationalism.  Recall how Section 2.5 
explained that many post-World War II statesmen deliberately opted for the individual human 
rights approach, rather than group rights, exactly because the individual rights approach 
creates an environment prone to nationalism.  It fitted liberal nationalisation theories to define 
“peoples” as the aggregate of the inhabitants of the state, and international law followed suit.  
In other words, here one sees a concrete example of political philosophy impacting on 
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international law.  What is interesting for the purposes of the doctoral thesis is; if the winds 
within political philosophy changes direction, resulting in an environment hospitable to group 




Section 3.3 hence demonstrated how questions surrounding whether the liberal state can 
remain cultural neutral, or whether it is in fact prone to nationalism, caused many political 
thinkers to challenge conventional individual liberalism from the 1980s and onwards.  In 
addition, during this period, the second assertion on which conventional individual liberalism 
rests, namely that the individual is not defined by membership in a particular community, but 
is rather free to question her cultural background, also became increasingly contested.  As 
Section 3.3.1 indicated, more and more political philosophers asserted that it is incorrect to 
describe a person’s identity as separate from her cultural background.  A new school within 
political theory - communitarianism – emerged, as a response to conventional individual 
liberalism.  The label “communitarianism”, and its criticism of liberalism, invites one to 
revisit the cry of the French Revolution; “liberté, egalité and fraternité.  The early liberals 
celebrated freedom and equality - but also community.  However, with time, ideas on 
community gradually disappeared from liberal thought, and in modern liberal theories on 
justice, community was no longer part of the discourse.180       
 
Communitarianism calls for community to recover its place alongside liberty and equality in 
theories of justice.  In fact, communitarians argue that community is the most important of the 
three values celebrated by the French Revolution.  They disagree with the basic premises 
underpinning the various liberal theories of justice.  Indeed, communitarians do not even 
share liberalism’s main aspiration, i.e. to formulate one coherent theory of justice, applicable 
to all societies.  Communitarians submit that the search for a universal theory of justice is 
misguided.  They posit that liberals misconstrue the individual’s capacity to decide what life 
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best to pursue.  Communitarianism holds that liberalism greatly underestimates the 
importance of the individual’s cultural background for her capacity to make meaningful 
choices about how to lead a good life.181  They assert that the self is embedded in established 
social practices particular to the community, which one cannot necessarily opt out of.  Hence, 
the attachment an individual has to her distinct culture greatly contributes to what sort of 
person she is, as well as to her understanding of that person.182  As a consequence, one cannot 
develop one single relevant theory of justice, communitarians posit.  They submit that 
conventional individual liberalism neglects that respect for individual rights and freedoms and 
individual well-being is only possible within the context of a particular community.183  
Communitarianism argues that if one wishes to identify what justice is, one must first 
investigate how a particular culture values social goods.  Consequently, what is just cannot be 
measured against one single theory of justice.  Instead, a society acts just if it behaves in 
accordance with the shared values of its particular culture.  All cultures should hence be 
allowed to be self-governing polities.184  In sum, in its purest form communitarianism submits 
that all cultures and societies shall be left to their own devices.185           
 
3.5 Criticism of communitarianism 
 
Liberal thinkers have largely been unconvinced by the communitarian argument.  They 
disagree with the suggestion that an individual is essentially irrevocably defined by her 
cultural background.  Liberals tend to assert that if cultural communities have successfully 
remained homogenous, this is normally not so much due to individual choices of the 
individual members of the group.  More often, the group has maintained its distinctiveness 
because of decision-making power in the group being restricted to men with means.  Liberals 
claim that communities would not maintain such like-mindedness if they were to fully include 
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other segments of society, such as women, in decision-making processes.  Liberals submit 
that communitarianism tends to entrench social practices that marginalize certain groups in 
the community, and that these practices have been designed with the exact intent of keeping a 
small segment of society in power.186  
 
Some liberals – often grouped together under the label “cosmopolitans”187 - completely reject 
communitarianism’s assertion that an individual’s cultural background is of significant 
importance to her.  Cosmopolitans maintain that cultural belonging is of no deciding 
relevance to the individual.  They posit that one can simply not claim that individuals are 
necessarily in need of their cultural roots.  Cosmopolitans argue that the individual is capable 
of thinking of herself as not defined by her cultural background.  They admit that certain 
individuals may enjoy a life heavily influenced by their cultural background.  But the 
individual nonetheless do not need this background, cosmopolitans assert.  Indeed, some 
cosmopolitans submit that it is something artificial about seeking to preserve minority 
cultures.  For instance, Waldron suggests that in a world formed by technology, trade, mass 
immigration and the dispersion of cultural influences, to engage oneself in the traditional 
practices of e.g. an indigenous culture might be a fascinating anthropological experiment, but 
nonetheless entails an artificial dislocation from what is really going on in the world.  He 
submits that engaging in the traditions of an indigenous community in the modern world is 
like living in Disneyland believing that one’s surrounding epitomizes what it is for a culture to 
really exist, at the same time as demanding the funds to live in Disneyland as well as the 
protection from modern society for the boundaries of Disneyland.188   
 
Not all cosmopolitans may have maid their arguments as pointedly as Waldron.  But they do 
agree that from the arguments outlined above, it naturally follows that there is no need to 
support or even protect minority cultures.  Rather, cosmopolitans suggest that cultures live 
and adapt to changes in their geographical and political surroundings.  Sometimes a culture 
withers away.  In other instances, the culture adapts and continues to thrive, or successfully 
blend with another culture.  These are natural processes that the state shall in no way interfere 
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with.  In fact, cosmopolitans maintain, protecting cultures includes an imminent risk of 
artificially entrenching non-desired cultures and cultural practices, restricting individual 
freedom.189   
 
But most liberals have not responded to communitarianism in the cosmopolitan way.  Even if 
remaining unconvinced by the communitarian argument that the individual is ultimately 
defined by her cultural background, they admit that communitarians pose a question which 
cannot be outright dismissed.  Communitarianism identifies a paradox of liberalism; how 
should a theory celebrating the freedom of the individual address individuals that genuinely – 
informed and freely – do view themselves as defined by their culture?  As Carens has noted, 
the individualistic assumption of conventional liberalism makes sense to persons from the 
West because of their traditions.190  In other words, how should liberalism address non-liberal 
cultures with individuals that freely and informed do not value individual autonomy?  By 
pointing to these questions, communitarianism, even though not becoming a dominant school 
in itself, nonetheless came to impact on political philosophy.  Communitarianism sparked a 
trend among liberal thinkers towards considering whether a liberal theory of justice should, 
and can, accommodate also for the interests of groups that wish to continue to remain distinct.  
Communitarians inspired the crafting of liberal theories carving out space for ethnic and racial 






Rather than outright denouncing communitarianism’s assertion that the individual’s cultural 
background is important to her well-being, a group of liberals hence commenced attempting 
to reconcile the tension between conventional individual liberalism and communitarianism.  
Multiculturalism aspires to develop a political theory of justice that rests on the fundamental 
values of liberalism, but at the same time accommodates for cultural diversity.  In other 
words, it aims at bringing together respect for the individual and for the autonomy of the 
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community.192  Multiculturalism asserts that liberalism can embrace the community’s interests 
and rights, without compromising liberalism’s basic individualistic premises.193  It hence 
rejects the classical liberal premise that one single polity must coincide with one single 
culture.194  In that sense, one can say that multiculturalism takes liberalism back to its origin, 
again celebrating not only liberté and egalité, but also fraternité.  At the same time, as 
indicated above, multiculturalism also rejects communitarian arguments that the individual is 
essentially irrevocably defined by her cultural background, wherefore the community should 
be free to manage its own affairs and to establish its own understanding of justice.195  
Multiculturalism seeks to accommodate for group rights, but without sacrificing the freedom 
of the individual. 
 
Multiculturalism tries to reconcile liberalism with group rights through addressing two of the 
serious lines of criticism directed towards conventional individual liberalism identified by 
Section 3.3.1.  Recall that conventional liberalism was predominantly challenged because of 
(i) allegedly ignoring that the identity of the individual is significantly tied to her cultural 
background, and (ii) taking for granted that the state can remain neutral between cultures.196   
 
Contrary to conventional liberals and cosmopolitans, multiculturalists agree that the cultural 
background of the individual is important to her in a manner that must be accounted for in any 
adequate theory of justice.  Humans have, they suggest, a basic yearning to belong.  True, 
individuals want freedom and equality as well, but also community.197    If the group as such 
is not well respected, the dignity and self-respect of its members is also at risk.198  If the 
culture of the community is in decay, or if it is persecuted or discriminated against, the 
options and opportunities open to its members will shrink, and the pursuit of goals and 
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happiness be less successful.  And this, multiculturalists argue, threatens the most basic 
premises of liberalism.  Multiculturalism admits that the individual’s range of options for 
leading a good life is to some extent determined by her cultural heritage.  It is cultural 
structures, multiculturalism submits, that provide us with “a context of choice” for making 
informed decisions.  Individual well-being depends on successful pursuit of goals and 
relationships that are culturally determined, multiculturalism maintains.  Membership in a 
cultural collective may therefore be a relevant criterion for distributing benefits and burdens; 
the core of all liberal theories of justice.199     
 
With regard to the second line of criticism, multiculturalists agree with the arguments outlined 
in Section 3.3, submitting that even though the state may be formally neutral, cultural 
minorities nonetheless in practice suffer from disadvantages.  They face inequalities that are 
not a result of their choice, but by decisions by people outside their society.  Multiculturalists 
concur that behind the veil of formal objectivity, the state is not neutral.  Rather, in reality, the 
state does - consciously or unconsciously - allow the values and practices of the majority 
culture to dominate in legislation and other policies.  The fact that the state is not, and cannot 
be, neutral is another compelling reason to accept rights of groups, multiculturalists agree.  A 
legitimate theory of justice cannot base its principles on the assumption that pre-existing 
societal structures can always provide for justice, they conclude.200     
 
3.6.2 Multiculturalism specifically on indigenous peoples 
 
Based on the outlined premises, multiculturalists submit that rights should be awarded to 
minority groups.  The rights granted shall be accustomed to the characteristics of the group in 
question.  For instance, Kymlicka distinguishes between “national minorities” and “ethnic 
groups”, where the former are territorially concentrated groups that at one point were self-
governing and who wish to remain as distinct cultural and self-governing entities.  Ethnic 
groups, on the other hand, are characterized by looser forms of association.  Members of 
ethnic groups share certain cultural criteria, but the group as such cannot be said to constitute 
a cultural or political entity.  If using Kymlicka’s classification, indigenous peoples clearly 
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constitute typical examples of national minorities, whereas for instance immigrant groups fall 
under the heading ethnic groups. 
 
According to Kymlicka, only national minorities enjoy the full set of group rights, e.g. rights 
to self-government.201  Similarly, Tully agrees that a state can consist of more than one people 
with self-determining rights.202  Indigenous peoples constituting groups with full group rights 
is further underlined by the fact that many multiculturalists have specifically addressed the 
situation of indigenous peoples.  For instance, Kymlicka submits that an implementation of 
the right to self-determination might be necessary for indigenous groups to enjoy the same 
freedom as others, given their particular and distinct cultural, spiritual and institutional 
history. He further posits that if one wants to respect Native Americans as members of a 
distinct cultural community, one must also recognize their claim for protection of their 
collective cultural identity.  Kymlicka hence argues for a right to self-determination of 
indigenous peoples within state borders, submitting that it is erroneous of liberals to simply 
assume that subjecting indigenous governments to state jurisdiction is just.203  Young too, 
asserts that the legitimate interest of indigenous peoples cannot be accommodated for within 
the conventional state-individual dichotomy.204  In the same vein, Buchanan points to that 
achieving a greater degree of self-determination is often the only practical way for indigenous 
peoples to protect their societies and cultures from destruction.205  Commenting on to the 
Quebec Session Case206, Tully too argues for an internal right to self-determination of 
indigenous peoples.  He posits that the effective enjoyment of the right to self-determination 
constitutes a pre-requisite for indigenous peoples being free.207     
 
3.6.3 Limitations of multiculturalism 
 
Multiculturalism hence argues for extensive self-governing rights of indigenous peoples.  
Still, the group rights multiculturalism advocates are in no way unlimited.  On the contrary, 
multiculturalism presupposes that communities, although entitled to certain rights, at the same 
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time accept basic liberal-democratic values.208  Being a liberal theory, multiculturalism does 
emphasize the autonomy of the individual, in turn establishing clear limitations on the scope 
of protection multiculturalism is prepared to extend to groups.  For instance, Kymlicka 
divides group rights into (i) rights of the community vis-à-vis members of the group, and (ii) 
rights protecting the group from the larger society.  He argues that only the latter category is 
worthy of protection.  The state, Kymlicka submits, should prevent indigenous peoples from 
using its self-governing rights to limit the freedom of individual members.  Rights of 
indigenous peoples are compatible with liberalism only if also safeguarding the freedom of 
individual members of the group.  In other words, indigenous peoples are entitled to pursue 
nation-building, but merely to the extent that such endeavours do not encroach upon the rights 
and liberties of the individual members of the group.  In conclusion, individual rights always 
take precedent over group rights.209   
 
3.7 Criticism of multiculturalism  
 
All have not been convinced by the multiculturalist arguments.  Cosmopolitans maintain that 
the state shall remain neutral between cultures and that awarding specific rights to individuals 
based on membership in a particular group is per definition discriminatory.210  They further 
insist that a person’s identity is not tied to her cultural background to the degree 
multiculturalists suggest.  A person can in most instances change her cultural affinity, 
cosmopolitans continue to argue.211  They further argue that extending protection to minority 
cultures is always arbitrary, due to the difficulties associated with (i) defining who constitutes 
groups deserving protection, (ii) determining who constitutes a member of such groups, and 
(iii) deciding who identifies what cultural practices are worthy of protection.  In the same 
vein, some cosmopolitans continue to reject multiculturalism because of concerns that 
recognition of collective rights might result in the collective violating the rights of individual 
members of the group.  They argue that e.g. many indigenous cultures do not place much 
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rights.  He too, stresses the fundamental importance of individual rights.  But Kukathas submits that the 
important thing is that individual members have the right to exit the group.  Provided that a right to exit exits, 
liberalism should accept also illiberal practices of a group, Kukathas posits.  See Are There Any Cultural 
Rights?, pp. 228-256, in particular pp. 238-239.  Section 10.3 will return to the issue of potential conflicts 
between group and individual rights.     
210  Pogge, Group Rights and Ethnicity, pp. 187-193 and 196-215, and Kymlicka, Contemporary Political 
Philosophy, p. 365 
211  Spinner-Halev, Multiculturalism and its Critics, p. 548 
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emphasis on individuals’ freedom of choice, wherefore if freedom is what we desire, cultural 
interference rather than cultural protection should be our choice.212   
 
Communitarians, on the other hand, maintain that multiculturalism, despite its attempts to 
accommodate for the interests of groups, as a liberal theory rooted in the notion of the nation-
state, is still not sufficiently sensitive towards cultural diversity.213  For instance, Kymlicka 
has been criticized for uncritically accepting the concept of the very same state he sets out to 
challenge.214  The criticism has perhaps been particularly vocal in the context of indigenous 
peoples.  It has been pointed out that multiculturalism should be more observant to differences 
between indigenous peoples on hand, and ethnic and cultural minorities, on the other.  For 
instance, Idleman underlines that multiculturalism might work for minorities seeking respect 
for their culture distinctiveness as part of the majority society.  He asserts, however, that 
multicultural does not particularly well match indigenous peoples’ aspirations to remain as 
distinct societies.215   
 
3.8 Conclusions - the success of multiculturalism and its potential 
relevance for international law  
 
Despite the outlined criticism, the success of multiculturalism has been remarkable.  In about 
two decades, it has become the dominant school within political philosophy.  In fact, it has 
been submitted that multiculturalism has almost evolved as a consensus position among 
liberals interested in cultural and community rights.216  Hence, it might be correct as Parekh 
posits that a theory of politics that fails to recognize that people value and feel secure in their 
identity has small chances of success.217  The success of multiculturalism might be of 
significant relevance to the doctoral thesis.  As outlined above, one hypothesis of the thesis is 
that international law does not exist in vacuum.  Rather it is influenced by developments 
                                                 
212  Ivison, Patton and Sanders, Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, p. 8, Spinner-Halev, 
Multiculturalism and its Critics, p. 548, Parekh, Redistribution or recognition, p. 201, and Kukathas, Are There 
any Cultural Rights?, p. 242.  Chapter 10 shall address issues pertaining to the relationship between the group 
and its individual members and what groups deserve protection. 
213  McGoldrick, Multiculturalism and its Discontents, p. 219 
214  Young, Structural injustice and the politics of difference, p. 78 
215  Idleman, Multiculturalism and the Future of Tribal Sovereignty, pp. 589-660, in particular 590-592.  For a 
similar argument, see also Spinner-Halev, Multiculturalism and its Critics, pp. 548-549.  
216  See Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, pp. 335, 340, 365-366 and 373.  Other scholars noting the 
success of multiculturalism include McGoldrick, Multiculturalism and its Discontents, p. 219, Weinstock, 
Liberalism, multiculturalism, and the problem of internal minorities, p. 245, and Gagnon, The moral foundations 
of asymmetrical federalism, p. 320.  
217  Parekh, Redistribution or recognition, p. 207 
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within other fields, including within political theory.218  To the extent this notion is correct it 
is of obvious importance that after 300 years where conventional liberal individualism has 
essentially been the only political philosophical theory exercising influence over international 
law, a new school of thought has become dominant within political philosophy.  If this theory, 
which in sharp contrast to conventional liberalism asserts that it is incorrect to take the state 
for granted as the only self-governing polity and that group rights shall be recognized, would 
come to exercise influence over international law in the manner conventional individual 
liberalism has done until date, this could be of cardinal importance for the indigenous rights 
discourse.  That is not least so, since multiculturalism does identify indigenous peoples as 
particularly strong candidates for self-governing and other group rights.   
 
Of course, Section 3.5 noted that multiculturalism presupposes that ethnic groups share the 
liberal values of the surrounding society.  Further, most multiculturalists hold that group 
rights must yield in conflict with individual rights.  Certainly, it can be argued, as some have 
indeed done, that these limitations, if acted upon, restrict multiculturalism’s usefulness to 
indigenous peoples.  As mentioned above, the doctoral thesis addresses these arguments in 
Chapter 10.  At this point, it is not relevant to discuss the pros and cons and the more precise 
content of the various political philosophical schools.  It is again underlined that the thesis 
does in no way purport to provide a complete outline of relevant philosophical theories.  What 
is relevant for the present purposes is to analyse in depth to what extent the fact that the new 
dominating political theory breaks with some of the most fundamental building blocks of 
conventional liberalism has impacted on international law.  This is the purpose of the 
remainder of the doctoral thesis. 
                                                 
218  See e.g. McCrudden, The New Concept of Equality, p. 24, who argues that multiculturalism has had a 
significant impact on international law. 
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4.  OUTLINE – THE RIGHTS TO CULTURE AND SELF-
DETERMINATION 
 
4.1  Introduction  
 
Chapter 2 outlined how the nation-state and liberalism surfaced together in the aftermath of 
the Peace of Westphalia.  In collaboration, European sovereigns and liberal scholars gradually 
crafted an international legal system simultaneously confirming and justifying the power of 
the state and liberal theories with focus on the individual.  It was decided that the state pre-
dates theories of justice and law.  International law was defined as emerging from state 
practice.  With time, ideas of rights of the individual vis-à-vis the state were formulated, 
constituting the embryo to the modern human rights system.  Hence, the classical international 
legal system (i) viewed the state as the only collective international legal subject, and (ii) 
professed individuals as the only objects of human rights.  There was no room for groups - 
such as indigenous peoples - in this legal order.  Chapter 2 further described how the young 
United Nations accepted these basic features when setting out to craft the contemporary 
international legal system in the wake of World War II.  The League of Nations’ brief interest 
in group rights was quickly rejected. 
 
But Chapter 3 outlined how the foundation for conventional liberal individualism, and the 
nationalism often following in its wake, has recently been, it would appear successfully, 
challenged.  This Chapter surveys to what extent these developments within political 
philosophy have been mirrored in similar developments in international law.  The Chapter 
examines whether it is correct as Crawford asserts that political theory and international law 
have in parallel moved towards acknowledging that mere respect for individual human rights 
are not enough to protect peoples’ cultures.219  Doing so, the Chapter focuses on the basic 
underlying question as to what extent international legal sources submit that indigenous 
peoples enjoy rights as such, more specifically the rights to culture, self-determination and 
non-discrimination.  The doctoral thesis is not at this point particularly concerned with the 
scope and content of these rights.  Naturally, the Chapter spells out relevant legal sources, 
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which is of course indicative of also the material content of the rights.  But the actual analyses 
of the scope and content of the rights are saved for subsequent chapters.   
 
As Chapter 1 indicated, the indigenous rights discourse tends to analyze cultural rights and the 
right to self-determination separately, although acknowledging the interdependence of the two 
rights.220  Due to a presumed interdependence of the rights, this doctoral thesis opts, however, 
to analyze the right to self-determination and collective cultural rights together.  It is a 
hypothesis of the thesis that the two rights have evolved in tandem.  This Chapter hence 
surveys whether increased recognition of peoples’ rights in general has emerged in parallel 
with an acknowledgment of that the right to self-determination applies also to “peoples”, 
understood as distinct cultural and ethnic polities, and not as the aggregate of the population 
of a state or territory.  Or the other way around, the Chapter investigates whether indigenous 
people have achieved status as subjects of international law, and, if so, whether this entail that 
they enjoy both (i) collective human rights in general, and (ii) the right to self-determination.  
It is assumed that if the answer to the question of whether indigenous peoples hold cultural 
rights proper has been answered in the affirmative, so has the question of whether they 
constitute “peoples” for the purposes of the right to self-determination, and vice versa.   
 
Chapter 1 underscored that the doctoral thesis does not address indigenous peoples’ rights to 
lands and natural resources as such.  The Chapter further described, however, how land rights 
are nonetheless relevant to the doctoral thesis.  Also when surveying land rights, the thesis 
uses a disposition that probably differs somewhat from what is common.  The indigenous 
rights discourse tends to treat indigenous peoples’ rights to lands and resources as one set of 
rights.  But at least for the purposes of this thesis, it is more helpful to divide the land rights 
into two categories of rights, where the distinction is based on the justifications underpinning 
the rights.  The thesis hence distinguishes between (i) indigenous peoples’ rights to land and 
resources having as foundation a recognition that indigenous peoples’ having continued 
access to and control over their traditional lands constitutes a prerequisite for them being able 
to preserve and develop their distinct cultural identities, on one hand, and (ii) indigenous 
peoples’ land rights deriving from the general right to property, on the other.  Consequently, 
the doctoral thesis includes no separate land rights chapter.  Rather, this Chapter addresses 
                                                 
220  See e.g. Vrdoljak, Self-Determination and Cultural Rights, pp. 41-78.  
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legal sources on land rights as cultural rights.  Subsequently, Chapter 5 outlines land rights 
rooted in the general right to property.   
 
4.2 Peoples’ rights in general during the 1970s and 1980s 
 
Chapter 2 hence concluded by noting that the international legal system the young United 
Nations crafted was not hospitable towards the notion of peoples’ rights proper.  At the same 
time, however, the Chapter also observed that the inclusion in the common Article 1 of the 
1966 Covenants of a right to self-determination geared towards peoples and not states sparked 
a debate that would intensify during the 1970s and 1980s.  These decades witnessed small, 
sporadic and non-conclusive, but nonetheless discernable signs of acceptance of peoples’ 
rights.    
 
In 1970, the UNGA adopted the Declaration on Friendly Relations among States.221  The 
Friendly Relations Declaration essentially confirmed the understanding of the right to self-
determination established during the decolonization process.  Yet scholars have suggested that 
the Declaration did somewhat broaden the understanding of the right to self-determination, or 
at least signalled that a wider application of the right might be emerging.  It has been 
submitted that the Friendly Relations Declaration added an element to the right to self-
determination, requiring that the central government of the state represent also the interests of 
minority populations.222  It should be noted that even if correct, the assertion is not that the 
Friendly Relations Declaration enshrined a right to self-determination in the meaning self-
governing rights for e.g. indigenous peoples.  What is being considered is still a right where 
power ultimately vests with the majority population’s political institutions.223  Still, the 
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Friendly Relations Declaration seems to have introduced the notion that the right to self-
determination could encompass a duty on states to take into account specific interests of 
minority segments of the state.224  If so, this would imply that the right to self-determination is 
not only formally, but also in practice, vested in peoples and not the state, albeit the 
implications of this practical distinction are still limited. 
 
The Frontier Dispute did not involve a self-determination situation proper.  Yet the ICJ 
declared that it is difficult to see how the principle of territorial integrity can be reconciled 
with that of self-determination.225  The opinion expressed by the ICJ could be understood as 
indicating that the Court contemplated considering the right to self-determination in the 
context of a people in the meaning a segment of the population of the territory.  Because it is 
difficult to see how a right to self-determination applying to the entire population of a territory 
can be difficult to reconcile with the principle of territorial integrity of states.  Only if the 
right to self-determination is deemed applicable to a particular group within the state does it 
seem that the right is capable of contradicting the principle of territorial integrity.  This 
interpretation of the ICJ’s ruling in the Frontier Dispute finds further support in the World 
Community’s response to another dispute of the 1980s; the so called De Gasperi-Gruber 
dispute, concerning the Tyrol/Alto Adige-province in Italy.  According to Cassese, the 
UNGA’s response to the De Gasperi-Gruber issue suggests that UNGA held the position that 
ethnic groups could be entitled to the internal aspect of self-determination, a right not 
encompassing a right to secede, but to autonomy within existing borders.226 
 
The UN Human Rights Committee’s227 (HRC) General Comment No. 12/27 on the right to 
self-determination pointed to the distinct connection between the right to self-determination 
and economic development and confirmed that the right to self-determination applies beyond 
colonial situations.  At the same time, the Committee did not suggest that the right to self-
determination embraces self-governing rights of sub-segments of a state or territory.228  In the 
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same vein, the UNGA Declaration on the Right to Development proclaims a right of peoples 
to economic, social, cultural and political development.229  Proponents of peoples’ rights often 
invoke the Declaration on the Right to Development, arguing that it evidences the existence of 
such rights.  But similarly to other instruments of the time, it appears that the term “peoples” 
in the Declaration did not refer to peoples in the ethnic/cultural meaning of the term.  Rather, 
with “peoples” was again surely understood the aggregate of the population of a state or a 
territory.230   
 
On a regional level, in 1975 the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
adopted the Helsinki Final Act.231  In the Helsinki Final Act, participating states committed to 
respect the equal right of states to self-determination.  Obviously, the reference to “states” 
indicates that the perception remained that the practical difference between states and peoples 
in a self-determination context is negligible.  At the same time, however, the Helsinki Final 
Act reaffirmed that the right to self-determination stretches beyond the colonial context, 
applying also to peoples in independent countries.232  The Act further indicated developments 
within the field of minority rights, proclaiming that states shall respect and protect the rights 
of persons belonging to minorities.  The reference to “protect” seems to suggest a deviation 
away from the notion that the state should remain passive and neutral between cultures.  
Specifically with regard to indigenous peoples, in 1983 the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (IACommHR) affirmed the position that indigenous groups do not constitute 
peoples proper for legal purposes, holding that the right to self-determination did not apply to 
the Miskito People of Nicaragua.233    
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In conclusion, it is clear that by the end of the 1980s, international law still understood 
peoples as either (i) the aggregate of the population of an independent state, (ii) the entire 
population of a territory not yet having attained independence, or (iii) the population of a 
territory geographically separated from the state administering the territory and/or subject to 
foreign military occupation.  Only peoples in this meaning were the beneficiaries of e.g. the 
right to self-determination, albeit there had been certain signs of a possibly enlarged 
understanding of the concept peoples.  That said, there were indications of states and legal 
scholars commencing to think in terms of rights of peoples beyond those of the aggregate of 
the population of the state.  In particular, the Friendly Relations Declaration had suggested 
that the right to self-determination not only formally, but also in practice, vest in peoples and 
not the state.     
 
4.3   The 1970s and 80s: The foundation for indigenous peoples’ rights 
is laid down 
 
The 1970s and 1980s hence witnessed negligible developments with regard to peoples’ rights 
in general.  But these were also these decades when the world community commenced 
seriously contemplating the situation of indigenous populations.  Doing so, the UN and its 
member states soon acknowledged that the situation of indigenous populations differ from 
that of e.g. ethnic and cultural minorities.  It was noted that - despite colonization and 
assimilation policies - indigenous populations had to a large degree managed to preserve their 
own distinct societies and ways of life, deeply rooted in their ancestral lands.  This 
characteristic, it was held, warranted formulation of rights specifically targeted at indigenous 
populations.234  In particular, states recognized the clear connection between loss of 
indigenous lands and marginalization of these populations.  Dispossessed from their lands, 
indigenous populations are particularly vulnerable to pressure from the majority society.  
Continued access to their traditional territories is paramount to indigenous populations’ 
physical and cultural survival, it was concluded.235  Since it was held that indigenous societies 
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had never really been incorporated into the majority society, when the world community 
commenced discussing increased legal recognition of indigenous populations, it concentrated 
on crafting norms targeted at them, with a particular focus on allowing their societies and 
collective cultures to continuously exist.236  This early decision to distinguish indigenous 
populations from minorities and other sub-segments of society for international legal purposes 
would have profound consequences for the indigenous rights discourse.       
 
The United Nations work directed towards indigenous populations commenced in 1971, with 
the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) authorizing the UN Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (the Sub-Commission) to prepare a 
study on the “Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations”.237  The study, 
commonly referred to as the “Cobo Report” after its formal author José Martinez Cobo, 
compiled a large amount of data on the situation of indigenous populations around the globe.  
It consisted of a series of partial reports, submitted between 1981 and 1983, and was finally 
completed in 1986.238  The Report denounced the assimilation approach taken by e.g. the ILO 
107.  It asserted that emphasis should be placed on indigenous populations’ ethno-
development and self-determination, rather than on integration and protection.239  The Cobo 
Report submitted that self-governance is an inherent part of indigenous peoples’ cultural and 
legal heritage, contributing to their cohesion and maintenance of their social and cultural 
traditions.  Martinez Cobo concluded that self-governance is a pre-condition for indigenous 
peoples being able to preserve, develop and pass on to future generations their distinct cultural 
and ethnic identity.  He submitted a series of recommendations on how the United Nations 
could commence rectifying past wrongs and seriously address the situation of indigenous 
peoples.240   
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As indicated, the Cobo Report profoundly impacted on the United Nations’ and its member 
states’ attitude towards and activities directed at indigenous populations.241  The World 
Organization intensified its information gathering on indigenous issues, arranged expert 
seminar and engaged in other activities addressing the situation of indigenous peoples.242  
More importantly, even prior to its completion, the Cobo Report spurred the United Nations 
to act on some of the concrete recommendations in the Report.  In terms of institution-
building, the most important outcome of the Cobo Report was the establishment in 1982 of 
the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP), as a subsidiary body to the Sub-
Commission.243  The WGIP’s mandate was to review developments pertaining to the situation 
of indigenous populations and to develop international standards outlining the rights of such 
groups.  Through reviewing developments on the situation of indigenous populations, the 
WGIP built on the Cobo Report and contributed to increased awareness of and focus on 
indigenous issues in the UN system and beyond.  But even more important was the WGIP’s 
work within standard-setting, and in particular the initiative to craft the Draft DRIP.  
 
In 1985, the Sub-Commission approved the WGIP’s decision to embark on crafting a draft 
DRIP for possible eventual adoption by the UNGA.244  The WGIP worked on the draft until 
1993, when it submitted an agreed draft DRIP to the Sub-Commission.  The Sub-Commission 
adopted the draft and passed it on to the UN Commission on Human Rights (Commission 
HR).  In 1995, the Commission HR decided to establish an ad-hoc working group (WGDD) 
entrusted with the mandate of reaching a political agreement on the DRIP.245  The 
negotiations within the WGDD would go on for more than a decade, resulting in the 
Declaration process in its entirety taking almost a quarter of a century to complete.  The 
process would at times lack momentum or even be in a dead-lock.246  But even if the future of 
the DRIP might at times have appeared uncertain, the fundamental premise that indigenous 
rights should first and foremost aim at allowing indigenous peoples’ to preserve and develop 
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their distinct collective cultures and societies had been established.  And based on this 
cardinal understanding, international law on indigenous peoples’ rights continued to develop 
while the political deliberations on the DRIP were ongoing.  But before turning to rights 
specifically addressing indigenous groups, the doctoral thesis will survey a set of rights 
formally individual in nature, but nonetheless relevant to the indigenous peoples’ rights 
discourse.            
 
4.4 Minority rights – light collectivization of individual rights 
 
Chapter 3 outlined how by the early 1990s multiculturalism had successfully challenged some 
of the basic premises of conventional liberalism.  Philosophers came to question whether 
states can in fact remain neutral between cultures.  Mirroring this development, international 
law makers increasingly came to doubt whether a human rights system solely relying on 
universal human rights applying equally to all individuals regardless of cultural background is 
apt to protect minority cultures.  They started to consider whether not particular legal 
measures might sometimes be necessary to address the situation of minority groups.247  In 
addition, political crises in various parts of the world, not least the Balkan crisis, led many to 
argue that recognition, rather than denial, of minority rights contributes to peace and order.248   
 
As a result, the early 1990s witnessed the adoption of a number of international legal 
instruments pertaining to minorities.  Most notably, in 1992 the UNGA adopted the 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities.  The Minorities Declaration proclaims that persons belonging to 
minorities have the right to enjoy their own culture freely, without discrimination.  This right 
might be exercised individually as well as in community with other members of the group.  
The Minorities Declaration further calls on states to actively promote the realization of these 
rights.249 
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In a regional context, the Council of Europe considered but never adopted an additional 
protocol to the ECHRFF, addressing the situation of national minorities.250  The Council did, 
however, adopt a couple of other instruments aiming at protecting linguistic and other cultural 
rights of members of national and ethnic minorities, most notably the European Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.251  Further, the CSCE declared that 
members of national minorities have the right to maintain and develop their culture, must be 
free of any attempt of assimilation, shall be allowed to preserve their cultural objects, and 
shall be allowed to participate in affairs relating to the protection and promotion of their 
distinct identities.252  As the UN Minorities Declaration, the European instruments too, 
impose obligations on states to actively promote the rights set out in the instruments.         
 
None of the mentioned instruments confer rights to minority groups as such.  The UN 
Declaration is commonly referred to as the “Minorities Declaration”.  But the label is 
misleading.  As the full title (Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities) reveals, the legal subjects enjoying rights under 
the Minorities Declaration are individual members of the group, not the group as such.  In 
other words, the rights the Minorities Declaration proclaims are individual in nature.  The 
same is true for the European instruments.  These too, award the individual members of 
minority groups the right to maintain and develop their cultural identity, but contain no rights 
pertaining to the group as such.  Indeed, the European Framework Convention incorporates an 
explicit rejection of the existence of collective rights.253    
 
Even if the rights enshrined in the minority rights instruments formally are individual in 
nature, it has been suggested that they can only be adequately implemented through the 
establishment of some kind of separate authority of the minority group.254  And at least 
European states have acknowledged the potential value of autonomous administrations for 
national minorities.255  In the same vein, both the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary 
                                                 
250  Recommendation 1201 on an additional protocol on the rights of national minorities to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Text 
251  Council of Europe, Framework Convention for the Protection of Minorities, Strasbourg, November 1994, H 
(94) 10 
252 Concluding Documents of the Vienna Meeting (1989), para. 59, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the 
Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (1990), Art. 32 and 35, Geneva CSCE Meeting of Experts on 
National Minorities (1991), Section 4, and Charter of Paris for a New Europe, CSCE, 30 I.L.M. 193 (1991).  See 
also Packer, The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, p. 253.       
253  Article 3 (2) and Explanatory Report annexed to the Framework Convention, paras. 13, 31 and 37 
254  Packer, The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, p. 265   
255  OSCE Charter for European Security, Istanbul, November 1999, 39 ILM 255 (2000), para. 19 
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Assembly and the UN Working Group on Minorities have submitted that minority rights 
might sometimes be most effectively implemented through the establishment of autonomous 
functions of the group as such.256  Neither body has gone as far as suggesting, however, that 
minority groups have a right to autonomy.  Rather, as noted, the European Framework 
Convention explicitly rejected the idea that national minorities should have a right to 
autonomy.  In fact, Europe seems more recently to have back-tracked, and is no longer even 
considering autonomous arrangements for national minorities in Europe.257   
 
But although minority rights are formally speaking individual, it is critical to further note that 
these rights nonetheless indirectly extend protection also to the cultural identity of the 
minority group as such.  Minority rights do incorporate an implicit recognition of that 
protection of the individual member necessities a certain respect also for the group per se.258  
For instance, while the Minorities Declaration only awards rights to individuals, Articles 1 
and 2.1 positively oblige states to respect not only individual members of the minority group, 
but also the group as such.  Commenting on the Minorities Declaration, the UN Working 
Group on Minorities has underlined that states can only fully implement the rights the 
Declaration enshrines if ensuring adequate conditions for the existence and identity also of the 
group as such.259  Moreover, European Community (EC) law has evolved to call on states to 
positively promote minority rights.  European Union Council Directive 2000/43 allowed 
member states to adopt measures advancing the situation of individuals belonging to 
disadvantaged ethnic groups.260  In addition, the preambular of the European Framework 
Convention proclaims that the Convention should not only ensure rights of persons belonging 
to minorities, but also protect the minority groups as such.  And pursuant to Article 5 (1), 
parties undertake to promote the conditions necessary for persons belonging to national 
minorities to maintain and develop their culture and to preserve the essential elements of their 
identity and cultural heritage.  Further, the Advisory Committee established to assist in the 
implementation of the Framework Convention has held that states shall take positive 
                                                 
256  Recommendation 1201 of the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly (1993), Article 11, and UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2005/2, paras. 14 and 20 
257  Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys, pp. 209-210 
258  For instance, Lerner observes, with references to Thornberry and Estebanez, that the European Framework 
Convention indicated a shift from pure individualism towards recognition also of the collective elements in 
human rights.  See Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law, p. 23.  
259  UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2005/2, paras. 14 and 20 
260  OJ L 180, p. 22, adopted on 19 July 2000.  See also Szyszczak, Protecting Social Rights in the European 
Union, p. 502. 
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measures to overcome structural injustices.261  Already in 2003, McCrudden submitted that 
EC law was about to embrace an obligation on states to positively promote equality, and not 
only prevent discrimination.262  t appears that he has been proven right.  Recently, the ECHR 
has held that states have an obligation to take positive measures to prevent discrimination.263  
As the rulings by the ECHR are binding on EC members264, this position now constitutes 
binding EC law.  In other words, the European minority rights protection system not only 
allows, but obliges, states to take positive measures to ensure equality in practice.  As Section 
4.9 will elaborate further, a positive obligation of states to respect and preserve the cultural 
distinctiveness of individual members of minority group implies an indirect protection also of 
the group as such.  One could say that the minority rights system brought with it an increased 
acceptance of a certain amount of “collectivization” of the formally speaking individual 
rights, or at least added a collective dimension to these rights. 
 
In conclusion, the minority rights instruments broke with the classical liberal tradition and 
rejected the notion that the state could and should remain neutral between cultures.  Instead, 
international law came to hold that the state is obliged to actively intervene to protect and 
promote the cultural distinctiveness of members of minority groups.  This, in turn, extended 
an indirect protection also to the group as such.  Still, the minority rights system stopped short 
of establishing group rights proper.265   
 
                                                 
261  ACFC Document ACFC/31 DOC (2008) 001, 5 May 2008, para. 14 
262  McCrudden, The New Concept of Equality, p. 21 
263  Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], Appl. No. 55707/00, Judgement of 18 February 2009, para. 82.  Similar 
conclusions follows also from Thilmmenos v. Greece, Appl. No. 34369/97, Judgement of 6 April 2000, 
Chapman v. The United Kingdom [GC], Appl. No. 27238/95, Judgement of 18 January 2001, Nachova and 
others v. Bulgaria [GC], Appl. No. 43577/98 and 43579/98, Judgement of 6 July 2005, and Stoica v. Romania, 
Appl. No. 42722/02, Judgement of 4 March 2008. 
264  Revised Treaty on European Union, Article 6 (3)  
265  The distinction between minorities and indigenous peoples in international law has been maintained and 
entrenched since the 1990s.  Kymlicka argues that the distinction is proper when comparing indigenous peoples 
with new minorities, such as immigrant groups.  But he maintains that it makes less sense to legally separate old 
national minorities – i.e. ethnic groups that have lived in states at least as long as the majority population, are 
large in number, culturally distinct and have clear political organizations – from indigenous peoples.  Kymlicka 
submits that international law distinguishes between old national minorities and indigenous peoples due to 
politics, not principles.  Unlike indigenous peoples, old national minorities are often perceived as threats to 
national security, he posits.  For this reason, states fail to recognize such groups.  See Multicultural Odysseys, 
pp. 272-293.  Kymlicka’s observation is interesting, and the doctoral thesis shall return briefly to it in the final 
Chapter.  Still, it is beyond the scope of the thesis to investigate whether the rights analyzed in the thesis should 
reasonably apply also to groups other than indigenous peoples.  For the purposes of the thesis, it is sufficient to 
note that Kymlicka does not criticize the direction the indigenous rights discourse has taken.  On the contrary, he 
supports this development, at least to the point where indigenous peoples’ rights come into conflict with the 
rights of individual members of the group.  With the regard to the latter issue, see Chapter 10.   
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4.5 Collectivization of the right to culture – CCPR Article 27 
 
The “collectivization” of formally individual human rights has not been confined to the 
minority rights instruments.  Also provisions in general human rights treaties proclaiming 
cultural rights of members of minority populations have been interpreted in a progressive 
manner.  Recall that pursuant to CCPR Article 27, “… persons belonging to … minorities 
shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of the group, to enjoy their 
own culture…”.  As Section 2.5.3 outlined, as other human rights provisions adopted during 
the first decades of the United Nations, CCPR Article 27 is a child of its time.  When adopted, 
the provision envisioned only individuals as bearers of the rights proclaimed.  Moreover, 
Article 27 placed no positive obligation on states to protect cultures.  On the contrary, the 
phrase “shall not be denied the right” indicates that the state should remain neutral and not 
actively protect any particular culture within the state.266  
 
Notwithstanding the limited applicability suggested by the wording of CCPR Article 27, the 
HRC has in a series of observations gradually collectivized the individual right the provision 
sets forth, particularly in the context of indigenous populations.  The Committee has not 
disputed that the right to culture enshrined is formally individual.  Still, the HRC has 
nonetheless interpreted CCPR Article 27 as extending an indirect protection also to the 
cultural integrity of indigenous population as such, with a particular focus on their traditional 
land and resource based activities.  Further progressing the understanding of the provision, the 
Committee has in addition repeatedly underlined that states have a positive obligation to 
realize the rights reflected in CCPR Article 27. 
 
In the Kitok Case (1988), the HRC confirmed that reindeer husbandry, as a traditional 
livelihood of the indigenous Saami people, enjoys protection under CCPR Article 27.267  In 
Ominayak v. Canada (1990), the Committee confirmed its finding in the Kitok Case and 
concluded that the exploitation of timber, gas and oil in the aboriginal Lubicon Lake Band’s 
traditional territory amounted to a violation of CCPR Article 27, since these activities 
                                                 
266  Article 30 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (General Assembly Resolution 44/25 of 20 
November 1989) is essentially a clone of CCPR Article 27.  The provision hence proclaims that children of 
ethnic minority origin shall not be denied the right to, in community with other members of the group, enjoy 
their own culture.  Different from CCPR Article 27, CRC Article 30 specifically affirms that this right applies 
also to indigenous children.  But similar to CCPR Article 27, CRC Article 30, as understood at the time of 
adoption, embraced only individual rights, although CRC Article 5 (respect for local customs) flirts with the 
collective dimensions of the right to culture. 
267  Ivan Kitok v. Sweden, Comm. No. 197/1985, views adopted 27 July 1988 
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effectively destroyed the Band’s traditional hunting and fishing grounds.268  In 1994, the HRC 
affirmed that culture manifests itself in many forms, for instance in the particular way of life 
of indigenous populations.  Doing so, the Committee underlined that certain cultural rights, 
even though formally individual, loose all relevance if disconnected form the community as 
such.269  The HRC has subsequently repeatedly affirmed that CCPR Article 27 encompasses a 
dimension that protects indigenous peoples’ collective culture, e.g. in the two Länsman 
Cases270 (1994 and 1996) and in Apirana Mahuika et al v. New Zealand271 (2000).  The 
Committee has further on several occasions confirmed states positive obligation’s to respect 
and positively implement the collectivized rights of indigenous peoples.272   
 
If the progressive interpretation of the minority rights instrument constitutes a collectivization 
of individual rights “light”, the HRC has probably gone as far in collectivizing the right to 
culture as is possible without formally declaring the right a collective human rights proper.  
For instance, in the Lubicon Lake Band Case, the applicant was an individual, but the findings 
of the Committee were clearly in everything but formal terms directed towards the Band as 
such.  The Band had formulation its claim as a violation of the collective right to self-
determination pursuant to CCPR Article 1.  Formally, the HRC had to translate the claim into 
an assertion of as a violation of the individual right to culture set forth by CCPR Article 27.  
Doing so, however, the Committee confirmed the interdependence of the two rights, in the 
context of indigenous peoples.  In Apirana Mahuika the HRC took one step further.  The 
Committee again reaffirmed that the right enshrined in CCPR Article 27 is formally 
individual in nature.  Notwithstanding, the HRC explicitly underlined the interdependence 
between CCPR Articles 27 and 1, submitting that the individual right to culture must be 
understood in light of the collective right to self-determination.  Thus, the Committee 
acknowledged that if not formally so in practice, Article 27 does extend a protection also to 
                                                 
268  Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Comm. No. 167/1984, views adopted 26 
March 1990.  See also Kingsbury, Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures, p. 80. 
269  HRC General Comment No. 23: The rights of minorities (Art. 27) : . 08..04.1994. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5.  
See also Lenzerini, Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural Rights, pp. 124-125. 
270  Ilmari Länsman et al v. Finland, Comm. No. 511/1992, views adopted 26 October 1994, and Jouni E. 
Länsman et al v. Finland Comm. No. 671/1995, views adopted 30 October 1996 
271  Apirana Mahuika et al v. New Zealand, Comm. No. 547/1993, views adopted 27 October 2000 
272  Concluding Observations on Finland,, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 91, para. 10, on New Zealand, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/75/NZL, para. 4, on Guatemala, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/72/GTM, and on the Philippines, UN Doc. 
CCPR/CO/79/PHIL.  See also Scheinin, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights under the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, p. 4. 
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the cultural identify of the indigenous people per se.273  That CCPR Article 27 enshrines a 
collectivized right to culture is hence clear.  But what is the material content of the right?  If 
summarizing the findings in the outlined jurisprudence, the content and scope of the right to 
culture the HRC has formulated can be summarized as states having a positive obligation to 
prevent any activity that renders it impossible or considerably more difficult for the 
indigenous group to continuously pursue its cultural practices.  No proportionality test is 
allowed.  It is irrelevant whether the competing activity would generate significant positive 
effects for the society as a whole.  If the activity seriously harms the culture of the indigenous 
group, it is prohibited.274 
 
The HRC’s progressive interpretation of CCPR Article 27 constitutes the most explicit 
examples of collectivization of individual rights.  Still, it is worth mentioning that the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESC) has, when applying the right to 
health enshrined in CESCR Article 12 in the context of indigenous peoples, opined that “the 
health of the individual is often linked to the society as a whole”.275 
 
States appear essentially to have accepted the HRC’s understanding of CCPR Article 27.  In 
more recent instances when indigenous parties have brought states before the Committee 
claiming a breach of CCPR Article 27, states have argued that the competing activity do not 
seriously harm the indigenous people’s culture.  But they have not denied the right as such.  
Hence, states have indirectly accepted the HRC’s interpretation of the provision.  
Consequently, it has been suggested that this understanding of CCPR Article 27 today forms 
part of customary international law.276  The basic features of CCPR Article 27, as interpreted 
by the HRC, have also been confirmed in other international legal sources.277  Since the 
                                                 
273  Apirana Mahuika et al v. New Zealand, Comm. No. 547/1993, para. 9.2.  See also Scheinin, Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, p. 9.   
274  See also Scheinin, The Right to Self-Determination under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pp. 
193-207. 
275  General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest attainable standard of health : . 11.08.2000. 
E/C.12/2000/4, para. 27.  The CESC is the body entrusted to authoratively interpret the provisions of the 
CESCR.  (The CESC conducts this task under the auspices of the ECOSOC, which is the body formally 
authorized by the CESCR to oversee the implementation of the Convention.)  See CESCR Part IV and Alston, 
The International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, p. 65.  CESC jurisprudence is consequently 
of significant importance when interpreting CESCR provisions.  If accepted by states, one can assume that the 
findings of the CESC reflect a correct understanding of the CESCR.  See further Chapter 7. 
276  Wheatley, Democracy, Minorities and International Law, p. 15, and Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in 
International Law I, p. 100 
277  For instance, Section 4.7.2 will explain how a collective right to culture of indigenous peoples has essentially 
been confirmed by the UN Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD Committee) in General 
Recommendation No. 23: Indigenous Peoples : . 18/08/97.  (The CERD Committee is the body established by 
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collectivized version of the individual right enshrined in CCPR Article 27 still does not 
amount to a peoples’ right, or even a collective right, the doctoral thesis will refer to the right 
as an informal right of indigenous populations, rather than as a right of indigenous peoples. 
 
4.6 The ILO 169 – recognition of collective rights proper of indigenous 
groups 
 
Sections 4.4 and 4.5 described how the adoption of minority rights instruments and 
progressive interpretations of cultural rights provisions in general human rights instruments 
collaborated to create an indirect protection of the cultural identity also of groups as such.  
But these Sections further underlined that formally speaking, minority rights, also when 
applied to indigenous populations, remain individual rights. At the same time, Section 4.3 
explained that when the world community commenced seriously addressing the situation of 
indigenous peoples, it was soon acknowledged that such work should focus on the collective 
aspects of their societies.  One outcome of this recognition was the decision by the ILO to re-
examine ILO 107.   
 
The re-examination of the ILO 107 resulted in the adoption in 1989 of ILO 169.  ILO 169 
broke with the assimilatory and individual rights approach in ILO 107.  In line with has been 
outlined in Section 4.3, in the deliberations on ILO 169 it was early decided that the 
Convention should predominantly focus on promoting respect for the continued existence of 
indigenous groups’ distinct societies, social structures, identities and ways of life.278  The 
approach of ILO 169 has been labelled “ethno political self-government”,279 as the 
Convention certainly foresees self-governing rights of indigenous peoples.280  ILO 169 
                                                                                                                                                        
CERD Part II to authoratively interpret the provisions of the Convention.  CERD Committee jurisprudence is 
consequently highly relevant when interpreting CERD provisions.  If accepted by states, one can assume that the 
findings of the CERD Committee reflect a correct understanding of CERD.  See further Chapter 7.)  In the same 
vein, CESC’s interpretation of the right to culture in General Comments No. 17 (Article 15, paragraph 1 (c)), 
E/C.12/GC/17, 12 January 2006, and No. 21 (Article 15, para. 1 (a)), E/C.12/GC/21, 20 November 2009 further 
supports this conclusion.  As Section 4.6, immediately below, will further elaborate, a similar right follows also 
from ILO 169 Articles 2.2 (b) and 5 (a).  Compare also Lerner, Group Rights and Discrimination in International 
Law, p. 15.  As Section 4.7.3 will outline, the IACHR and IACommHR have reached similar conclusions in their 
jurisprudence pertaining to indigenous peoples, as has the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights 
(AfCommHPR), in Endorois People v Kenya. Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority 
Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya, Comm. 276/2003, para. 235. 
278  Tomei and Swepston, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples: A Guide to ILO 169, Swepston, Indigenous Peoples in 
International Law and Organizations, pp. 53 and 57, and Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys, p. 32 
279  Myntti, National Minorities, Indigenous Peoples and Various Models of Political Participation, p. 24.  For a 
similar position, see Lenzerini, Sovereignty Revisited, p. 178. 
280  Fromherz, Indigenous Peoples’ Courts, p. 1367 
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consequently enshrines a number of rights of indigenous populations pertaining e.g. to their 
cultures, ways of life, traditions and customary laws.   
 
ILO 169 Articles 2 (2) (b) and 5 (a) declare that states have the responsibility to protect the 
cultural values, practices and rights of indigenous peoples.  Pursuant to Article 7, indigenous 
peoples have the right to control, to the largest extent possible, their economic and cultural 
development.  Article 23 underlines that indigenous peoples’ handicrafts are important to the 
maintenance of their cultures.  The Convention, in its Article 13, also affirms that continued 
access to their traditional lands, territories and natural resources constitutes a prerequisite for 
indigenous peoples being able to preserve and develop their distinct cultures.  Pursuant to 
Articles 14, indigenous peoples have the right to own lands they continuously use with some 
degree of exclusivity.  As to lands today shared with the majority population, ILO 169 awards 
indigenous peoples usufruct rights.  Article 15 confirms that to the extent indigenous peoples 
enjoy rights to land pursuant to Article 14, this right also envelopes natural resources situated 
on such land.  The ILO 169 does not specifically address collective creativity, beyond the 
reference to handicrafts in Article 23.  The absence of provisions addressing TK, TCEs etc. 
can most likely be explained by this topic not having been subject to much discussion at the 
time of the adoption of the ILO 169.281  In addition to the rights pertaining directly to culture 
and land, a second facet of the ILO 169 focuses on participatory rights in decision making 
processes.282        
 
ILO 169’s focus on collective rather than individual rights is also highlighted by the 
Convention, unlike its predecessor ILO 107, referring to indigenous groups as “peoples”, 
rather than “populations”.  The ILO’s guide to ILO 169 affirms that the term “peoples” is 
used precisely to denote that indigenous peoples constitute organized societies with an 
identity of their own, rather than mere groupings sharing some racial or cultural 
characteristics”.283  But even if the reference to peoples was conscious, it is clear that states 
were not ready to acknowledge indigenous groups as beneficiaries of peoples’ rights proper.  
Neither were they ready to accept that the ILO 169 could be invoked to argue for the 
existence of collective human rights in general.  For these reasons, the right to self-
                                                 
281  Swepston, Indigenous Peoples in International Law and Organizations, p. 57.  See also al Attar, Aylwin and 
Coombe, Indigenous Cultural Heritage Rights in International Human Rights Law, p. 311, where the authors 
note that indigenous peoples’ rights to cultural heritage have achieved international attention only during the last 
two decades. 
282  See in particular ILO 169 Article 6. 
283  Tomei and Swepston, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples: A Guide to ILO 169, p. 7   
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determination was consciously kept out of the ILO 169.284  Moreover, ILO 169 Article 1 (3) 
underlines that, ”[t]he use of the term ”peoples” in this Convention shall not be construed as 
having any implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under 
international law.”  Having reassured themselves that the ILO 169 could not be used to claim 
the right to self-determination or other peoples’ rights, states felt confident in accepting 
collective rights limited in their application to indigenous populations.  Still, although ILO 
169 fell short of recognizing peoples’ rights, states acknowledging that indigenous 
populations hold collective rights sui generis to them were still significant.  For the first time, 
it was recognized that collectives others than the aggregate of the population of a state or a 
territory could hold rights proper.285  In that sense, the ILO 169 further confirmed the 
particular status of indigenous groups in international law.286   
 
In conclusion, the ILO 169 is important to the doctoral thesis predominantly because of 
furthering the development of collective rights proper in general.  But in addition, the ILO 
169’s affirmation of indigenous populations’ – including indigenous peoples’ – right to a 
collective cultural identity and to control their cultural development, is of relevance to the 
material right the thesis surveys.  Some might point to that the ILO 169’s status as an 
international legal source is weakened by the fact that only 20 states have to date ratified the 
Convention.  Still, the relatively low number of ratifying states need not entail that the 
outlined central features of the ILO 169, the aspects of the Convention of greatest interested 
to the thesis, do not constitute established international law.  As Chapter 7 will elaborate, the 
                                                 
284  Swepston, Indigenous Peoples in International Law and Organizations, p. 57 
285  Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law I, pp. 40 and 48-49.  Notwithstanding, since these rights 
apply to groups not necessarily constituting peoples, the doctoral thesis throughout refers to rights deriving 
specifically from ILO 169 as rights of indigenous populations, rather than of indigenous peoples.   
286  ILO 169 defines its beneficiaries not as “indigenous peoples”, but as “indigenous and tribal peoples”.  As 
Chapter 10 will elaborate, albeit no official definition exists, “indigenous peoples” is today, at least almost, a 
term of art.  At the same time, it remains uncertain what groups constitute “tribal peoples”.  The term appears not 
to be used outside the ILO 169.  In any event, for the present purposes, it is not necessary to probe deeper into 
this issue, as the doctoral thesis only surveys rights of indigenous peoples.  Still, it is worth noting in passing that 
the developments in international law subject to study in the thesis will presumably demand a clearer distinction 
between indigenous “peoples” and other indigenous groups.  International institutions etc. have so far grouped 
indigenous peoples and communities together under the label “indigenous peoples”.  This constitutes less of a 
problem when no indigenous groups is considered as qualifying as peoples.  But if international law was to 
acknowledge peoples defined in terms of culture/ethnicity, there is an immediate need to formally distinguish 
between groups qualifying as indigenous peoples and those that do not.  Under such circumstances, indigenous 
groups not constituting peoples would still benefit from rights enshrined in ILO 169 etc., but not from peoples’ 
rights such as the right to self-determination.  In other words, the ILO 169 would apply to two categories of 
groups; indigenous groups not constituting peoples and indigenous peoples.  See also Kingsbury, Indigenous 
Peoples as an International Legal Concept, pp. 30-31, who notes that ILO 169 applies to a broader set of groups, 
of which those qualifying as indigenous peoples are in addition entitled to rights specific to indigenous peoples 
under e.g. the DRIP.  For a similar conclusion, see further Scheinin, The Right of a People to Enjoy its Culture, 
pp. 154-158.   
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fact that a right is enshrined in a treaty with few ratifying states does not in itself preclude the 
right from constituting international law proper.  To the extent the treaty provision is 
supported by other international legal sources, the right can still be legally binding.  And as 
the remainder of this Chapter and subsequent Chapters will demonstrate, both the basic 
features of the ILO 169 and the specific material rights of interest to the thesis, have been 
confirmed by a number of other international legal sources.287       
    




The Sections above described how by the mid-1990s, international law had seen two 
challenges of the state-individual dichotomy.  Minority rights had been “collectivized” to 
provide indirectly protect also groups as such, not least when applied to indigenous peoples.  
In addition, predominantly through the adoption of ILO 169, international law had recognized 
that indigenous groups can hold collective rights sui generis to them.  But international law 
was yet to recognize indigenous groups as peoples proper, with rights as such.  This Section 
surveys the development in international law beyond mere recognition of collectivized 
individual rights and sui generis indigenous group rights.  Doing so, the Section essentially 
seeks to establish the status of international law on indigenous peoples up to the adoption of 
the DRIP.  That said, a few post-DRIP international legal sources are also outlined. 
 
4.7.2 Universally applicable international legal sources 
 
The first part of the 1990s saw the enactment of a few legal sources confirming the position of 
classical international law.  Both the Political Declaration of the UN World Conference on 
Human Rights288 (1993) and the CERD Committee’s General Recommendation No. 21289 
                                                 
287  With regard to the obligation on states to protect the cultural practices of indigenous peoples, as enshrined in 
ILO 169 Articles 2 (2) and 5 (a), references can particularly be made to the HRC’s interpretation of CCPR 
Article 27, outlined in Section 4.5.  As Section 4.7 will elaborate, this right is also enshrined in CERD General 
Comment No. 23.  As to indigenous peoples’ right to control their cultural development, references can be made 
to all international legal sources proclaiming a right to self-determination of indigenous peoples (to be exercised 
through autonomous and self-governing arrangements), as will be described in Section 4.7 and Chapter 6.  These 
sources, and additional sources outlining cultural rights of indigenous peoples also surveyed in Section 4.7 and 
Chapter 6, further support the general feature of the ILO 169 that indigenous peoples enjoy collective rights.  
288  United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 25 June 
1993, 32 ILM 
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(1996) essentially affirmed international law’s conventional understanding of peoples.  These 
documents underscored that the right to self-determination applies beyond a colonial context.  
At the same time, they borrowed language from the Friendly Relations Declaration and 
declared that the right to self-determination should not be construed as authorizing any action 
impairing the territorial integrity of states possessed with a government representing the 
whole people belonging to the territory.  The reference to “the whole people” in singularises 
confirms that the crafters understood the term “people” to refer to the aggregate of the 
inhabitants of a territory or a state.290  That said, in line with what has been outlined under 
Section 4.2, the reference to government representing the whole population of the state also 
affirmed the Friendly Relations Declaration’s position that the right to self-determination do 
apply to peoples, and not states, albeit with “peoples” were clearly understood the entire 
population of a state.  Moreover, having underscored that international law does not recognize 
a general right for people to secede, the CERD Committee stated that this does not preclude 
political arrangements between different groups within the state.  This seems to indicate that 
the Committee at least foresaw that the implementation of the right to self-determination 
could encompass autonomy arrangements for segments of the population of the state.  Even 
though not phrased as a legal right, the CERD Committee starting to think of self-
determination in terms of autonomy arrangements for groups is indicative.  
 
When the CERD Committee a year later specifically addressed rights of indigenous peoples, 
it confirmed and built on the collective rights the ILO 169 proclaims.  The CERD does not 
contain any provisions specifically referring to indigenous peoples.  Moreover, the rights the 
Convention enshrines, including the right to property in Article 5 (d) (v), are all formulated as 
individual rights.  Notwithstanding, in General Recommendation No. 23, the CERD 
Committee both acknowledged CERD’s relevance to indigenous peoples and interpreted the 
rights in the Convention to have a collective dimension, when applied to such peoples.  The 
Committee encouraged states to recognize and respect indigenous peoples’ distinct cultures, 
ways of life and cultural identities.  It called on states to ensure that indigenous communities 
can exercise their rights to practice and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs.291  The 
CERD Committee especially called on states to recognize and protect the rights of indigenous 
                                                                                                                                                        
289  General Recommendation No. 21 Right to self-determination: . 23/08/96   
290  Crawford, The Right to Self-determination in International Law, pp. 30-31, and Bloch, Minorities and 
Indigenous Peoples, pp. 374-375 
291  Notably, this paragraph of General Comment No. 23 concurs with the HRC’s interpretation of CCPR Article 
27. 
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peoples to own, develop, control and use their communal lands, territories and resources.  In 
this context, the Committee particularly underlined that indigenous peoples hold property 
right over their lands and resources.  Finally, the CERD Committee posited that no decision 
directly relating to indigenous peoples’ rights and interests must be taken without their 
informed consent.  It has been debated what the CERD meant with “consent” in this context.  
According to Thornberry, member of the Committee at the time of the enactment of General 
Recommendation No. 23, one should distinguish between situations that (i) pertain to all 
citizens of the country, and (ii) that concerns the indigenous people directly.  In the former 
situation, Thornberry submits that General Recommendation No. 23 awards indigenous 
peoples a mere participatory right.  But in the latter scenario, he asserts that General 
Recommendation No. 23 suggests that indigenous peoples enjoy a true veto right.292 
 
Section 4.5 described how the HRC when “collectivizing” the right to culture had stopped 
short of formally proclaiming a collective right to culture.  By the late 1990s, however, the 
Committee was ready to conclude that the CCPR do embrace a collective right proper of 
indigenous peoples.  This development did not occur in the context of the right to culture 
pursuant to CCPR Article 27.  Rather, the HRC commenced applying the only peoples’ right 
proper known at the time - the right to self-determination in CCPR Article 1 – to indigenous 
peoples.  Since 1999, the Committee has systematically applied the right to self-determination 
to indigenous peoples in country specific reports on states recognizing the existence of 
indigenous populations within their borders.  The HRC has developed a rather coherent 
jurisprudence on the relevance of the right to self-determination to indigenous peoples.   
 
In certain instances, the Committee has merely referred to the indigenous group in the context 
of CCPR Article 1, often requesting the state party to report on what measures it has taken to 
implement the right to self-determination of the indigenous people.293  By considering 
indigenous peoples in the context of CCPR Article 1, the Committee confirms the position 
that the right to self-determination enshrined in Article 1 applies also to indigenous groups 
qualifying as a people for international legal purposes.  Scheinin, member of the HRC during 
the period when the Committee developed its position on indigenous peoples’ right to self-
determination, affirms that certain indigenous groups do constitute peoples for the purposes of 
                                                 
292  Thornberry, The Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, pp. 33-34 
293  See e.g. CCPR/C/79/Add.112 (Norway), CCPR/CO/82/FIN (Finland), and CCPR/CO/75/NZL (New 
Zealand). 
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the common Article 1 of the 1966 Covenants.294  In some instances, the HRC has explicitly 
applied the right to self-determination to indigenous peoples.295  Doing so, the Committee has 
often placed emphasis on the right to self-determination’s resource dimension.  For instance, 
in 1999 the HRC, with explicit reference to the indigenous peoples in Canada, emphasized 
that “the right to self-determination requires, inter alia, that all peoples must be able to freely 
dispose of their natural wealth and resources and that they may not be deprived of their own 
means of subsistence”.296  The HRC further proclaimed that indigenous peoples have the right 
to control their cultural development.  The Committee has drawn a similar conclusion, also 
referring to Article 1, in concluding observations on Mexico, calling on the state party to 
respect indigenous peoples’ collective right to culture and traditional patterns of living.297  
The HRC’s sister body, the CESC, has been more careful to apply CESCR Article 1 to 
indigenous peoples.  However, it has done so on a few occasions, thus concurring with the 
HRC that the right to self-determination applies to indigenous groups to the extent such 
groups constitute peoples for international legal purposes.298  In conclusion, the two treaty 
bodies that have the opportunity to take a position on the applicability of the right to self-
determination have both held that the right to self-determination applies to indigenous 
peoples.  In doing so, the Committees have particularly underlined that the right to self-
determination, in the context of indigenous peoples, embraces a right of these peoples to 
exercise control over their distinct cultures.   
 
In the context of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination, it is also interesting to note 
the HRC’s conclusions in Gillot et al v. France.299  The provision invoked in Gillot was not 
CCPR Article 1, but Article 25 (b), proclaiming all citizens’ right to e.g. participate in general 
                                                 
294  Scheinin, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, p. 3 and 
What are Indigenous Peoples?, p. 6 
295  In 2006 the HRC concluded that the extinguishment of aboriginal rights in Canada may amount to 
extinguishment of rights pursuant to CCPR Article 1.  See CCPR/C/CAN/CO/5.  Further in 2006, the Committee 
commended Norway for entering into an agreement with the Saami parliament, as well as for enacting legislation 
furthering the Saami people’s right to self-determination pursuant to CCPR Article 1.  See CCPR/C/NOR/CO/5. 
296 CCPR/C/79/Add.105.  Similarly, in 2000, the HRC, with reference to CCPR Article 1 (2), called on Australia 
to allow indigenous peoples a stronger role in decision-making over their traditional lands and natural resources.  
See A/55/40, paras. 498-528.  In the same vein, in 2002, the Committee expressed concern over Sweden not 
allowing the Saami people a significant role in decision-making processes affecting their traditional lands and 
economic activities. See CCPR/CO/74/SWE. 
297  CCPR/C/79/Add.109.  In the same vein, the Committee has called on the United States to take further steps 
to secure the rights of indigenous peoples under CCPR Articles 1 to exercise greater influence in decision-
making affecting e.g. their culture.  See CCPR/C/USA/Q/3/CRP.4. 
298  See e.g. Concluding Observations on the Russian Federation, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.94, paras. 11 and 39. 
299  Marie-Hélèn Gillot et al v. France, Comm. No. 932/2000, views adopted 15 July 2002.  Regarding Gillot, 
see also Scheinin, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pp. 
14-15. 
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elections.  Yet the case has bearing on the question of who constitute a people for legal 
purposes.  The complaint concerned participatory rights in a referendum held in New 
Caledonia, which the Caledonians had decided should be open only to persons with sufficient 
ties to the territory.  Gillot and other ethnic Frenchmen submitted that this limitation 
amounted to a violation of their right to participate in political processes.  The HRC 
interpreted CCPR Article 25 in the light of Article 1, and concluded that due to the fact that 
the referendum was arranged in a process of decolonization and self-determination, it was 
legitimate to restrict participation to persons with sufficient ties to New Caledonia.  The 
opinion taken reaffirms the Committee’s position that a “people” need not be understood as 
the entire population of a territory, since the HRC defined the ethnic Caledonians as a 
people.300       
 
The CESC has recently held the formally individual right to benefit from the moral and 
material interests resulting from one’s scientific and artistic production enshrined in CESCR 
Article 15.1 (c) to apply also to collectives, in particular in the context of indigenous peoples.  
In General Comment No. 17, the CESC declared that Article 15.1 (c), in addition to protecting 
individual rights, also safeguards peoples, communities and other groups collective cultural 
heritage.  Further, the Committee underscored that the provision calls on states to adopt 
measures ensuring the effective protection of the interests of e.g. indigenous peoples relating 
to their cultural heritage.  According to CESC, such measures might include the recognition 
of the collective authorship of indigenous peoples to elements of their culture.  The 
Committee further declared that, when protecting indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage, states 
shall respect the principle of free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous authors 
concerned and, where appropriate, provide for the collective administration by indigenous 
peoples of the benefits derived from their productions.  In addition, the CESC stated that 
authors shall retain a moral right to their work which shall survive even if such works have, 
under conventional IPR-mechanisms, entered the so called the public domain.301  Presenting 
this progressive interpretation of CESCR Article 15.1 (c), CESC recognized that the drafters 
of the CESCR at that time had not foreseen that the provision could apply to collectives.  Still, 
                                                 
300  As in the above mentioned observations on Morocco, the HRC left the question open whether the ethnic 
Caledonians constituted an indigenous people or “just” a people.  Hence, Gillot too offers no guidance as to 
whether the Committee recognizes that also a non-indigenous sub-group of a state can constitute a people for the 
purposes CCPR Article 1. 
301  Regarding the meaning of the concept public domain, see Sections 5.4.3-5.4.5. 
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the Committee concluded, a progressive interpretation of the provision was necessary, given 
recent developments in international law.302     
 
CESC further commented on CESCR Article 15.1’s aspiration to please both creators and 
users of culture.  General Comment No. 17 hence submits that a balance should be struck 
between producers of artistic expressions and knowledge, and users of the same material.  
Further, when implementing CESCR Article 15.1, states shall ensure that protection of the 
moral and material interests resulting from one’s creativity does not impede the state’s ability 
to comply with its obligations towards those wishing to take part in cultural life and benefit 
from the scientific progress of society.  CESC further underlined that the human right to 
benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from one’s scientific, 
literary and artistic productions is motivated by an interest to encourage the active 
contribution of creators to the arts and sciences, and by a wish to promote progress in society 
as a whole.303  As Section 2.5.3 touched upon, and as Section 5.4 and Chapter 11 will 
elaborate further, this juxtaposition in the right to culture is also an underlying feature of 
IPRs.  The CESC also underscored the link between CESCR Article 15.1 and property rights.   
 
Recently, the CESC has adopted another General Comment on CESCR Article 15.  General 
Comment No. 21 addresses everyone’s right to take part in cultural life pursuant to CESCR 
Article 15.1 (a), in other words the right balancing the right to benefit from one’s own 
creativeness enshrined in Article 15.1 (c).  Hence, one could perhaps have expected General 
Comment No. 21 to tune down the right to control specific cultural elements.  Yet, General 
Comment No. 21 does not set forth any rights to access others peoples’ cultures, against their 
will.  True, the CESC calls on states to facilitate the possibility to access other cultures.  But 
General Comment No. 21 contains no language suggesting a right to access elements of other 
peoples’ cultures, if access is denied.304  Rather, as General Comment No. 17, General 
Comment No. 21 too, focuses primarily on e.g. indigenous peoples’ rights to control their 
specific cultures.  
 
                                                 
302  CESC General Comment No. 17, paras. 2, 7, 10, 12 and 32.  Almost a decade before the CESC presented 
General Comment No. 17, O’Keefe had argued for expanding CESCR Article 15.1 (c) to apply also to groups.  
See The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life, pp. 917-918.   
303  CESC General Comment No. 17, paras. 4, 15 and 35 
304  This reading of General Comment No. 21 e.g. finds support in the definitions of “cultural life” and “to 
participate” in paras. 10-15. 
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General Comment No. 21, para. 7, underlines that indigenous peoples have the right of all 
human rights recognized in the UN Charter and the Bill of Rights.  Para. 9 repeats General 
Comment No. 17’s recognition that although at the time of adoption, CESCR Article 15 was 
deemed to apply to individuals only, in light of recent developments the provision must today 
be understood to embrace rights also of groups. Para. 36 calls on states to protect and respect 
the cultural identity of indigenous peoples.  Para. 49 (d) proclaims that states shall respect 
indigenous peoples’ rights to their culture and heritage.  Pursuant to para. 43, states shall take 
measures to prevent signs, symbols and other expressions of a particular culture from being 
taken out of context for the purposes of marketing or for exploitation by the mass media.  
Para. 37 affirms that indigenous peoples hold rights to their collective creativity, including to 
TK and TCEs.  The provision further calls on states to respect the principle of free, prior and 
informed consent of indigenous peoples with regard to such subject matter.  In fact, the CESC 
lists as one of five core elements of General Comment No. 21 states’ obligation to “obtain 
[indigenous peoples’] free and informed consent when the preservation of their cultural 
resources, especially … cultural expressions, are at risk.”305  As General Comment No. 17, 
General Comment No. 21 affirms the moral rights aspects of CESC Article 15.1 (c).306        
 
Not only UN treaty bodies have acknowledged collective rights of indigenous peoples.  In its 
recently adopted Operative Policy on indigenous peoples, OP 4.10, the World Bank too, has 
interpreted international law as awarding rights to indigenous peoples as such.307  Paras. 10 
and 11 of OP 4.10 declare that a borrower might only receive funding from the World Bank 
for projects in indigenous territories provided that there is broad support within the indigenous 
community for the project.  A footnote 4 to OP 4.10 clarifies that paras. 10 and 11 do not 
award any individual member of the people a veto rights.  But the indigenous people as such 
can object to the project. 
 
It is also worth to briefly touch upon the Indigenous Peoples Cultural Heritage Guidelines, 
crafted by the WGIP as one of its last act before being dissolved.308  The Guidelines contain 
                                                 
305  Para. 55 (e) 
306  Stoll and von Hahn, Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Knowledge and Indigenous Resources in International 
Law, p. 22 
307  The World Bank Operational Manual, Bank Procedures BP 4.10 (January 2005) 
308  E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2006.  The Guidelines were crafted in a joint project involving the NGO the Saami 
Council and WGIP member Professor Yokota.  The WGIP Guidelines in turn builds on previous work conducted 
by the then Chairperson-Rapporteur of the WGIP, Mdm. Daes.  Between 1993 and 1995, Mdm Daes undertook 
studies on the protection of the cultural heritage of indigenous peoples.  The final outcome of her work was a set 
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an elaborate set of provisions suggesting an extensive protection of indigenous peoples’ 
cultural heritage.  Worth noting for the purposes of the doctoral thesis, the Guidelines 
proclaim a right of indigenous peoples to own and control elements of their distinct collective 
creativity.  The WGIP did not manage to formally adopt the Guidelines before its abolition.  
Neither has the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP)309 or any 
other UN body so far picked up the Guidelines.  At present, therefore, the Indigenous Peoples 
Cultural Heritage Guidelines have little authority as a legal source.  Notwithstanding, they 
could be viewed as yet an indicator of the general trend in international law. 
 
In conclusion, all the most central human rights treaties the UN has adopted have been 
interpreted - by bodies authoritatively entrusted to do so - as embracing rights of indigenous 
peoples per se.  Most notably, both treaty bodies tasked to interpret the application of the right 
to self-determination have affirmed that the right applies to indigenous peoples.  That is so, 
albeit none of the surveyed instruments were understood to envelope rights of indigenous 
peoples as such at the time of their adoption.  This progressive development in international 
law has also been confirmed by certain sources beyond treaty bodies.  The sources surveyed 
are strikingly coherent.  They assert in chorus that indigenous peoples constitute “peoples” for 
international legal purposes, enjoying the right to self-determination and other collective 
rights, including within the sphere of culture.   
 
4.7.3 Regional legal sources  
 
The development enshrined in the outlined globally applicable international legal sources has 
been matched by similar conclusions in regional processes in Africa, the Americas and 
Europe.  These processes have developed a fairly extensive – and coherent – bulk of legal 
sources relevant to the question of whether indigenous peoples can hold rights under 
international law.  In Asia, regional processes confirming indigenous peoples’ rights are 
lacking.310  This might partly be due to relatively few states in Asia recognizing the existence 
of indigenous peoples within their borders.  But in addition, the Asian region traditionally 
does not cooperate within the field of human rights.  For instance, Asian regional cooperation 
                                                                                                                                                        
of Principles and Guidelines on the Protection of Indigenous Cultural Heritage.  See U.N. Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26 (1995). 
309  Regarding the EMRIP, see further 4.7.4, below. 
310  Some Asian states have, however, recognized indigenous peoples’ rights in their national laws.  Reference 
can here for instance be made to the Philippine Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, Republic Act No. 8371 (1997).   
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bodies such as the ASEAN do not engage in standard-setting activities within the area of 
human rights.311  Lack of documented support from the Asian region need therefore not be 
taken as evidence of the region being adverse to indigenous peoples’ rights.312  Also in 
Oceania, regional standard-setting activities are lacking.  But here, domestic processes in 
relevant countries have confirmed indigenous peoples’ rights.313   
      
On the African Continent, as the title suggests, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (AfCHPR) contains a range of provisions proclaiming peoples’ rights.  As with the 
international instruments, questions have been raised as to what is understood with the term 
“peoples” in AfCHPR.314  And similar to its international counterparts, it appears clear that at 
the time of adoption, the term “peoples” in the AfCHPR referred to the aggregate of the 
population of the state.315  But also the AfCHPR has been subject to progressive 
interpretation.  The AfCommHPR has recently interpreted the term “peoples” in the Charter 
as not necessarily referring to the aggregate of the inhabitants of the state.  The term can also, 
the Commission submits, refer to ethnic/cultural sub-groups of a state.  For instance, the 
AfCommHPR has confirmed that a distinct ethnic group within Zaire, the Katangese, 
constitute a people for the purposes of the right to self-determination, stating that “[t]he issue 
in the case is not self-determination for all Zaireans as a people but specifically for the 
Katangese.” The Commission further clarified that the Katangese should exercise the right to 
self-determination through self-government in conformity with the principle of territorial 
integrity, i.e. within the state of Zaire.316  In the same vein, in Social and Economic Rights 
Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, the AfCommHPR 
held that an ethnically distinct group in Nigeria, the Ogoni people, constituted a people for the 
purposes of the right to self-determination.  And as in the Katangese Case, the Commission 
                                                 
311  Thio, International law and secession in the Asia and Pacific regions, pp. 303 and 345 
312  For instance, as Section 6.2 will demonstrate, the vast majority of the Asean states voted in favour of the 
DRIP.   
313  In New Zealand, this position was confirmed already by the Treaty of Waitangi, entered into by the Crown 
and the Maori in 1840.  The status of the Treaty of Waitangi was subsequently affirmed in the Constitution Act 
of 1852 and the Maori Land Act of 1862.  The Treaty of Waitangi continues to serve as the basis for the 
relationship between New Zealand and the Maori people, and its confirmation of the Maori as a people is hence 
still uncontested.  With regard to Australia, see e.g. the Aboriginal Affairs Act of 1973 (No. 115, 1973), the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Commission Act of 1989 (No. 150, 1989) and the Council for Aboriginal 
Reconciliation Act of 1991 (No. 127, 1991). 
314  Kiwanuka, The Meaning of “People” in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, p. 80-101,  and 
Nobel, The Concept of “Peoples” in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, pp.  9-17    
315  Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, pp. 246-247, and Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty and 
Self-Determination II, pp. 46-47   
316  Katangese Peoples' Congress v. Zaire, Communication No. 75/92 (1995), para. 6.  See also Dugard and 
Raic, The role of recognition in the law and practice of secession, pp. 107-108.        
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held that the Ogoni people’s right to self-determination was to be exercised through 
autonomous arrangements, rather than through secession.317     
 
The AfCommHPR has also explicitly affirmed that the right to self-determination applies to 
indigenous peoples, and encompasses a bundle of rights, including the right to self-
government, the right to recognition of their traditional way of life and freedom to preserve 
and develop their respective cultures.318  Further, Pityana, member of the AfCommHPR has 
observed the striking resemblance between AfCHPR Article 20, addressing the right to self-
determination, and the corresponding provision in the, at the time, draft DRIP.319  In the same 
vein, the AfCommHPR’s Working Group on Indigenous Peoples/Communities has concluded 
that indigenous rights are collective rights, crucial to indigenous peoples’ capacity to survive 
as distinct peoples.320  It appears clear that today, the term “peoples” in the AfCHPR 
encompasses also sub-groups within the state.321  What is more, the African Charter has been 
explicitly authoritatively interpreted to award rights to indigenous peoples, including the right 
to self-determination, to be exercised through autonomous arrangements within the state.      
 
On the American Continent, human rights bodies have particularly been active within the 
field of land and resource rights.  These cases are surveyed in Section 5.3.  With regard to 
indigenous peoples’ rights in general, the IACommHR has explicitly recognized the collective 
aspect of indigenous peoples’ rights, proclaiming that indigenous peoples’ cultures shall in 
part be protected through guaranteeing the people rights as such.322  The Commission has 
further held that states must not engage in acts detrimental to indigenous peoples’ ethnic 
identity.323  The IACommHR has also emphasized the need to continuously guarantee 
indigenous peoples continued access to their traditional lands as a prerequisite to preserve and 
                                                 
317  Ogoni Case. Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. 
Nigeria, Comm. No. 155/96 (2001),  paras. 45 and 58    
318  Advisory Opinion of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the United Nations 
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319  Pityana, The challenge of culture for human rights in Africa, p. 232 
320  Conceptual Framework Paper (2nd draft) by the Working Group on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples/Communities in Africa of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 20 
December, 2002 
321  See also Wheatley, Democracy, Minorities and International Law, pp. 82-83. 
322  IACHR, The Human Rights Situation of Indigenous Peoples of the Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II/108, Doc. 62 
(2000), p. 125  
323  Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Republic of Guatemala OEA/Ser.1/V/II. 67, doc. 9 
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develop their distinct cultures.324  Albeit, as indicated, the recent jurisprudence on indigenous 
rights emanating from the IACHR and IACommHR are predominantly interesting from a 
property rights perspective, many of these cases in addition place emphasis on indigenous 
peoples’ collective rights to their cultural identity, culture and way of life.325  On the 
American continent, the Caribbean Community too has committed to protect the rights of 
indigenous peoples as well as to respect their cultures and way of life.326 
 
For several years, the American states have attempted to codify the rights of the indigenous 
peoples of the Continent, in collaboration with these peoples.  In 1989, the General Assembly 
of the Organization of American States (OAS) decided to commence work on a declaration on 
the rights of the indigenous peoples of the Americas (the OAS Declaration).  In 1995, The 
IACommHR approved a draft OAS Declaration to serve as a basis for these negotiations.  
Since then, American states and indigenous peoples from the American conclave have been 
negotiating a Declaration on the rights of the indigenous peoples residing in North and South 
America.  The process is yet to be completed.  Still, the present draft contains a number of 
interesting provisions.327  For instance, Article 3 proclaims that “Within the States, the right to 
self-determination of the indigenous peoples is recognized, pursuant to which they can … 
promote their … cultural development.”  Article 20.1 elaborates that indigenous peoples have 
the right to autonomy/self-government with respect to e.g. culture and administration of land 
and resources.  Further, pursuant to Article 5, indigenous peoples have the right to full 
enjoyment of all human rights recognized in the UN Charter and the Inter-American human 
rights instruments.  Article 6.2 and 10.1 proclaim that indigenous peoples have the right to 
their own cultures and to develop their cultural identity.  Article 13.1 proclaims that 
indigenous peoples have the right to preserve, use and transmit to future generations their 
histories, oral traditions, system of knowledge and literature.  Pursuant to Article 12.3, 
indigenous peoples have the right to respect for e.g. their traditional dresses.  Article 28.1 
proclaims that indigenous peoples have the right to recognition of property and ownership of 
their tangible and intangible cultural heritage and intellectual property.  And Article 28.2 
                                                 
324  Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96 doc. 10, rev. 1 (1997), at 115, 
Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, Doc. 59 rev., (2000), at Ch. X, 
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325  Moiwana village v. Suriname, Judgement of June 15, 2005, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 145 (2005) and 
Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement on November 28, 2008, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 172 (2008).  
See also Donders, Towards a Right to Cultural Identity?, pp. 232-236. 
326  Article XI of the Caribbean Charter of Civil Society (1997) 
327  OEA/Ser.K/XVI, GT/DADIN/doc.334/08 rev. 3, 30 December 2008 
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clarifies that the intellectual property of indigenous peoples includes e.g. TK, designs and 
tangible and intangible cultural heritage.  Pursuant to Article 24.1 and 2, indigenous peoples 
have right to recognition of property and ownership rights over lands they have traditionally 
occupied or used.  Finally, Article 12.2 proclaims that indigenous peoples have right to 
restitution with regard to such parts of their cultural heritage of which they have been 
dispossessed.        
 
The “Eleventh Meeting of Negotiations in the Quest for Points of Consensus”, held by the 
Working Group to Prepare the OAS Declaration, identified what parts of the OAS Declaration 
on which there is consensus.328  The status document records that of the provisions listed 
above, agreement has been reached on Articles 5 (indigenous peoples collective rights), 6.2 
(collective rights to culture; on the parts of the provision relevant to the doctoral thesis), 10.1 
(cultural identity), 12.3 (traditional dresses), 13.1 (cultural elements) and 20 (autonomy/self-
government; on the parts of the provision relevant to the thesis).  The status document further 
records that no agreement has yet been reached on Articles 3 (self-determination), 12.2 
(restitution), 24.1 and 2 (property rights to land) and 28.1 and 2 (property rights to cultural 
heritage).   A vast majority of the participants in The Working Group on the OAS Declaration 
has agreed that in a situation that no agreement can be reached on a certain provision, the 
DRIP shall be used as the baseline for further negotiations. Such deliberations shall result in 
an outcome where the OAS Declaration is consistent with the DRIP.329  
 
From the American Continent, it is further worth mentioning a Supreme Court case of interest 
to the doctoral thesis.  For obvious reasons, it is uncommon that domestic courts get the 
opportunity to consider on the applicability of the right to self-determination.  A notable 
exception arose, however, when the Supreme Court of Canada was asked to rule on whether 
the province of Quebec could unilaterally secede from Canada.  Deciding under what 
circumstances, if at all, Quebec had a right to secession, the Court also got the opportunity to 
indirectly touch upon whether this right could also apply to sub-groups within the province.  
After a thorough analysis, the Supreme Court concluded that a people, for international legal 
purposes, may make up only a portion of the total population of the state.  In other words, the 
                                                 
328  “Record of the Current Status of the Draft American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”, 
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Supreme Court denounced the notion that a people necessarily equals the aggregate of the 
population of a state.  According to the Supreme Court, to restrict the definition of “peoples” 
in such a manner would render the right to self-determination largely duplicative.330  In other 
words, the Supreme Court supported the view that also non-state forming peoples can be the 
beneficiaries of the right to self-determination.  The Court underlined, however, that such 
peoples need to fulfil the right to self-determination through the internal aspect of the right, 
i.e. through autonomous arrangements within existing state borders.331 
 
Compared with its Inter-American counterpart, the ECHR has had few opportunities to 
consider rights of indigenous peoples.  As Europe hosts few indigenous populations, the 
indigenous rights discourse is not in forefront in Europe in the same was at it is in the 
Americas.  On the rare occasions the Court has been challenged with indigenous issues, it has 
taken a fairly conservative approach, as the European human rights institutions have in 
general taken a rather cautious stand on minority rights.332  Still, in G and E v. Norway, , the 
European Commission on Human Rights (ECommHR) opined that Article 8 of the ECHR in 
principle entitles indigenous peoples a right to respect for their particular lifestyle.333  
Moreover, in a political context, the EU Northern Dimension Action Plan, adopted by the EU 
Council of Ministers, underlines that indigenous peoples of the Arctic are the beneficiaries of 
the “inherent right to self-determination” as well as of a right to their culture.334   
 
                                                 
330  In the same vein, it is worth noting that when repeating the safeguard clause from the Friendly Relations 
Declaration, the Supreme Court referred not to a government representing “the whole of the people of the state”, 
but to a government representing the whole of “the people or peoples” residing within its territory. 
331  [1998] 1 SCR 217, at 536 and 582 (para. 123-126).  See also Crawford, The Right to Self-determination in 
International Law, pp. 47-50 and 59-60, and Durnberry, Lessons Learned, pp 416-452, in particular pp. 436 and 
443-446.  Durnberry concurs with the interpretation that the Supreme Court opined that the native people of 
Quebec constitute peoples for international legal purposes, with the same legal status as other peoples in Quebec.  
He further adds that he shares this position.   
332  Estébanez, Council of Europe Policies Concerning the Protection of Linguistic Minorities and the 
Justiciability of Minority Rights, p. 279, and Alston, Peoples’ Rights, pp. 275-276  
333  G and E v. Norway, Appl. No. 9278/81 and 9415/81, Decision on 3 October 1983.  A similar position by the 
ECHR can also be inferred from the recent Handölsdalen Sami Village and Others v. Sweden, Appl. No. 
39013/04, Judgement of 30 March 2010, also concerning Saami communities.  Regarding this case, see further 
Section 5.3.3. 
334  Commission of the European Communities COM (2003) 343 final, adopted on 10 June 2003.  Already in 
1994, the European Parliament had pronounced that indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own 
destinies as well as a right to their separate culture, including a right to have the tangible and intangible features 
of their cultures protected.  See Resolution on Action Required Internationally to Provide Effective Protection 
for Indigenous Peoples, adopted by the European Parliament in its plenary session, Strasbourg, Feb. 9, 1994, 
Eur. Parl. Doc. PV 58(II) (1994).  Further, when Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 2004, the EU accepted an 
exception to the Union’s general competition rules, allowing Finland and Sweden to render reindeer husbandry 
as a sole right of the Saami people.  The exception was justified by reindeer husbandry’s fundamental 
importance to the Saami culture.  See Article 1 of Protocol 3 to Finland’s and Sweden’s ascending treaty to the 
EU.   
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Given the small number of European states hosting indigenous peoples, Europe has naturally 
not embarked on crafting a European indigenous rights instrument.  But Finland, Norway and 
Sweden have engaged in a process specifically addressing the rights of the Saami people.  In 
2002, these countries tasked an Expert Group with crafting a draft Nordic Saami Convention, 
which was subsequently presented in 2005.  The draft Convention contains a number of 
provisions underlining that the Saami people enjoy rights as a people, including the right to 
self-determination, ownership rights to lands and resources and cultural rights.335  The Saami 
Convention remains a draft.  When presenting the draft, the experts did, however, underline 
that they had crafted the Saami Convention in a manner reflecting relevant international 
norms.  The Nordic states have also confirmed the Saami people’s right to self-determination 
in action, by establishing Saami parliaments as tool for the implementation of Saami self-
determination.336  As to the other indigenous people of the European Arctic, the Inuit, 
Denmark has also posited that the Inuit constitute a people with rights as such, including the 
right to self-determination.  Most recently, Denmark has affirmed this position in the Act on 
Greenland Self-Government.337 
 
In conclusion, four continents have seen developments that closely mirror the outlined trend 
in globally applicable international legal sources.  Both African and American human rights 
institutions have affirmed that indigenous peoples are beneficiaries of collective rights, 
including the right to self-determination and cultural rights.  The AfCommHPR has 
underlined that the right to self-determination shall be exercised through autonomous and 
self-governing arrangements, and not through secession.  American bodies and processes have 
reached similar conclusions.  The OAS Declaration process is yet to be completed.  Still, the 
deliberations have resulted in agreements on issues such as that indigenous peoples are 
bearers of collective rights, including to culture and cultural identity, and that they are entitled 
to autonomy/self-government arrangements.  Even though a formal recognition of the right to 
self-determination is lacking, for practical purposes, the Americas seem to have taken a 
                                                 
335  Article 3 proclaims that the Saami people – as a people – have the right to self-determination, pursuant to 
which they e.g. have the right to determine their cultural development.  The Expert Group explicitly affirms that 
the right to self-determination the Saami Convention proclaims is the general right of peoples enshrined e.g. in 
the common Article 1 of the 1966 Covenants.  Pursuant to Article 31 (1), the Saami people has the right to 
manage their TK and TCEs, and pursuant to 31 (2) states shall see to that the Saami people can exercise 
influence over activities that utilize the Saami culture for commercial purposes as well as receive a fair share of 
the profits arising from such activities.  Further, the Saami culture shall be protected from utilization of cultural 
elements that in a deceptive fashion pretends to be of Saami origin.             
336  Finnish Constitution (731/1999), Article 17.3 and Act on the Saami Parliament (974/1995), Norwegian 
Saami Act (12. juni 1987 nr. 56), and Swedish Saami Parliament Act (1992:1433) 
337  Act no. 473 of 12 June 2009 
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similar position as Africa, emphasizing indigenous peoples’ right to autonomy.  The Canadian 
Supreme Court has confirmed this position.  Europe has been less active in the indigenous 
rights discourse.  Yet the European Union too, has confirmed that indigenous peoples are 
entitled to the right to self-determination.  It is further significant that all countries in Europe 
with recognized indigenous peoples have affirmed that these peoples are entitled to the right 
to self-determination, to be exercised through autonomy/self-government.  Similar rights are 
recognized, in principle, in Oceania.  The only Continent having largely omitted to address 
peoples’ rights is Asia.  However, the Section has noted there are natural reasons for this 
inactivity, which need not be interpreted as an aversion against indigenous peoples’ rights per 
se.  In sum, there appears to be regional support for the progressive development seen in 
globally applicable international legal sources.        
 
4.7.4 Recognition of the status of indigenous peoples in UN institution 
building and processes 
 
The outlined recent developments within the indigenous rights discourse have been mirrored 
in UN processes and institution building.  In this context, one can first note the DRIP process.  
As Section 6.2 will outline further, the DRIP is the only international legal instrument that has 
been negotiated between states and the beneficiaries of the instrument.  Albeit formal UN 
rules of procedures demanded that states own the process, in practice, indigenous peoples’ 
representatives participated in the negotiations on par with state representatives.  What is 
more, it was understood from the outset that the DRIP could not be adopted absent the support 
also of indigenous peoples.  This feature of the DRIP process underlines indigenous peoples’ 
unique status in the international legal order.338   
 
As to institution building, in 2000 the United Nations established the Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues (Permanent Forum), as a subsidiary body to the ECOSOC.339  The 
composition of the Permanent Forum underlines the particular status of indigenous peoples 
within the international legal system.  The Permanent Forum has 16 members, of which eight 
are appointed by states and eight appointed among candidates nominated by indigenous 
peoples.  This feature of the Permanent Forum renders it unique in the UN system.  It is the 
                                                 
338  Barellli, The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System, p. 970, and Åhrén, The UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, p. 86 
339  Res. E/RES/2000/22 
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only UN body where member states share decision making power with non-state actors.340  
Hence, the Permanent Forum structure seems to affirm indigenous peoples’ status as self-
determining entities under international law.341  Further, in 2007 the UN Human Rights 
Council established the EMRIP,342 a body that also highlights the special status of indigenous 
peoples in the world community.  The Human Rights Council has established only two 
advisory bodies.  The Advisory Committee is tasked with advising the Human Rights Council 
on all sorts of human rights issues.343  The only other advisory body established by the 
Council - EMRIP - advices the Council specifically on indigenous issues.  Furthermore, as the 
Permanent Forum, the EMRIP underlines the trend towards allowing indigenous peoples to 
represent themselves, also in the UN system.  The resolution creating the EMRIP declares that 
when appointing members to the five seats in the EMRIP, preference shall be given to 
qualified indigenous persons.  When the first set of members was appointed to the EMRIP, 
almost all of them were picked among indigenous candidates.344   
 
In conclusion, UN processes and institution building pertaining to indigenous peoples confirm 
the outlined trend within material rights.  But in addition, the way in which the DRIP was 
negotiated and the structure of the Permanent Forum and the EMRIP, might in fact also 
contribute to the creation of material law.  Boyle and Chinkin observe that indigenous 
peoples’ participation in the DRIP process and their representation on the Permanent Forum 
on par with state representatives, seem to establish a principle, backed by state practice.  
These practices underscore, they submit, that today, rights of indigenous peoples cannot be 
determined without their participation and consent345 
                                                 
340  Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, p. 50 
341  Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law II, pp. 219-220, IWGIA-Handbook, The Permanent Forum 
on Indigenous Issues, and Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards, p. 175 
342  Human Rights Council Res. 6/36 
343  Human Rights Council Res. 5/1 
344  Worth mentioning in the context of institution building within the UN system pertaining to indigenous issues 
is also the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people.  
(Human Rights Council Resolution 6/12.)  The Special Rapporetur institute might not underline indigenous 
peoples’ status as peoples.  But it underscores international law’s distinction between indigenous peoples and 
minorities, as the latter category have their own independent expert.   
345  Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, p. 50 
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Chapter 2 described how the conventional international legal system was not hospitable to 
rights of indigenous peoples.  On the contrary, it promoted only universally applicable 
individual human rights, and called on states to remain neutral between cultures.  This 
Chapter has, however, explained how this position has been increasingly challenged during 
the last three decades or so.  The Chapter has outlined how this progression has occurred in 
three separate – but interlinked - processes, whereof the two first have occurred around the 
same time, whereas the third, even though there are overlaps, can be said to be more recent.  
The Chapter has described how the first two developments in international law consisted of (i) 
a “collectivization” of formally individual human rights, amounting to an indirect protection 
also of the group as such, and (ii) recognition of collective rights proper sui generis to 
indigenous groups, first and foremost illustrated by the adoption of ILO 169.  Subsequently, 
the Chapter surveyed legal sources – both globally applicable and regional – asserting that 
indigenous groups, to the extent they qualify as peoples under international law, enjoy rights 
as such, including the right to self-determination.  
 
This Section of the Chapter now turns to the right to non-discrimination.  This is essentially a 
right to have all other human rights applied to one on an equal basis.346  Consequently, it is 
reasonable to assume that if international law has evolved in the manner the Chapter above 
suggests, these developments have been echoed within the rubric of non-discrimination.  In 
other words, if international law awards indigenous peoples rights as collectives, one can 
expect the right to non-discrimination too, to have acquired a collective dimension.   
        
4.8.2 The conventional understanding of the right to non-discrimination 
 
Already UDHR Articles 2 and 7 enshrine the right to non-discrimination, and the right has 
subsequently been incorporated into a number of human rights instruments, including the 
CCPR (Articles 2.2 and 26) and the CESCR (Article 2.2).  Most notably, the adoption of the 
CERD in 1965 implied that an entire international treaty was devoted to the issue of 
                                                 
346  CERD Convention Article 1.1, CESCR and CCPR Articles 2.2, and Tomasevski, Indicators, p. 533 
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discrimination.  Today the right to non-discrimination is generally held to form part of 
international customary law, and possibly even to constitute a peremptory norm.347     
 
Pursuant to the CERD Article 2.1 (a), states undertake not to engage in any act discriminating 
not only individuals, but also racial groups.  Further, Article 2.2 proclaims that states shall, 
when the circumstances so warrant, take special measures to ensure the protection not only of 
individuals belonging to a group, but also of the racial group as such.  The provision goes on 
to underline, however, that such measures must not result in maintenance of separate rights 
for the group.  In the same vein, pursuant to Article 1.4, special measures shall not be deemed 
discriminatory, provided that the measures do not result in lasting group rights.  At first 
glance, Articles 1.4 and 2.2 might be perceived as proclaiming at least light collective rights 
to non-discrimination.  It is generally held, however, that at the time of the adoption, these 
provisions were not interpreted as establishing rights of groups.348  In fact, they were rather 
understood as prohibiting group rights, only allowing temporary special treatment of 
groups.349  Further, special measures could only be undertaken to bring members of minority 
cultures to the same level as the majority population.  Measures aiming at preserving the 
group’s cultural distinctiveness were not foreseen.350  CERD Committee member Thornberry 
has observed that at the time of adoption, the CERD was “dedicated to eliminating 
discrimination rather than positively recognizing diversity.”351  Similarly, Makkonen notes 
that the CERD was a child of its time, enveloping no explicit references to e.g. cultural 
rights.352  That during this era, the CERD was not understood as supporting group rights also 
follows from Article 2 only placing obligations on states, rather than proclaiming rights of 
groups.  The central material provision of the CERD Convention, Article 5, only speaks of 
“everyone’s” right to non-discrimination, clearly indicating its applicability to individuals 
only.   
 
                                                 
347  See further Sections 7.2.2 and 7.2.4. 
348  Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples, p. 329, Fredman, Combating Racism with Human Rights, p. 23, and 
Lerner, The U.N. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, p. 57 
349  Thornberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities, pp. 266-268, and Makkonen, Equal in Law, 
Unequal in Fact, p. 95 
350  Still, Makkonen notes that Articles 1.4 and 2.2 were perceived as rather radical at the time, when calling on 
states to take special measures – albeit temporary such – to combat discrimination.  But as Makkonen further 
observes, perhaps due to the provisions being somewhat ahead of their time, states seem initially not to have 
adhered to them in any significant manner.  See Equal in Law, Unequal in Fact, pp. 102-103.   
351  Thornberry, the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, p. 18 
352  Makkonen, Equal in Law, Unequal in Fact, p. 92 
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Notably, the outlined conventional understanding of the right to non-discrimination 
corresponds well with the traditional interpretation of the right to culture.  Both sets of rights 
were perceived as rights of individuals only, and states were in both instances supposed to 
remain neutral, and not positively promote the rights.  As seen, CCPR Article 27 was 
understood in accordance with its wording, i.e. as a negatively formulated right, merely 
calling on states not to interfere with individuals exercising their culture.  Similarly, under the 
CERD Convention, only such special measures were accepted that aimed at bringing minority 
cultures to the level of the majority culture.  No measures promoting cultures were 
envisioned.353  At the time, “special” rights for particular segments of the population of the 
state were deemed inherently discriminatory.   
 
4.8.3 Acceptance of special measures promoting cultural diversity 
 
Sections 4.4 and 4.5 described how, subsequent to the adoption of the CERD, international 
law on minorities’ rights and the right to culture broke with the conventional individual 
liberalism tradition.  Instead, international law came to hold that the state is obliged to 
actively intervene to protect and promote the cultural distinctiveness of members of minority 
groups, extending an indirect protection also to the group as such.  The HRC’s interpretation 
of CCPR Article 27 was identified as particularly important for this development.  Section 
4.5’s analysis was limited to the HRC’s view on the right to culture.  But the Committee has 
progressively interpreted the non-discrimination provisions in the CCPR too.  In General 
Comment No. 31 (2004), the Committee opined that CCPR Article 26 embraces a positive 
duty on states to prevent discrimination354  This position was applied around the same time in 
Jacobs v. Belgium355, where the HRC also interpreted CCPR Article 26 as encouraging 
relatively far-reaching positive measures by the state to prevent discrimination.  In the same 
vein, the CESC has recently held that CESCR Article 2.2 obliges states to take measures to 
prevent discrimination.356       
 
                                                 
353  Kymlicka too, has noted that the right enshrined in CCPR 27, as understood at the time of its adoption, 
essentially equalled the conventional understanding of the right to non-discrimination.  See Multicultural 
Odysseys, p. 35. 
354  General Comment No. 31 Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant: 
. 26.05.2004. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para. 8 
355  Jacobs v. Belgium, Comm. No. 943/2000, views adopted on 7 July 2004 
356  General Comment No. 20, (Article 2, para. 2), E/C.12/GC/20, 10 June 2009 paras. 9 and 36.  See also 
Makkonen, Equal in Law, Unequal in Fact, p. 120.  
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Simultaneous with its sister-bodies, the CERD Committee has progressively interpreted the 
right to non-discrimination enshrined in the main international legal instrument aiming at 
preventing discrimination.  In General Recommendation No. 14357, the Committee first 
observed that differentiation in treatment does not constitute discrimination provided that the 
criteria for differentiation are legitimate.  Subsequently, the CERD Committee held that the 
CERD Article 2.2 embraces an obligation on states to take affirmative action when the 
circumstances so warrant.358  Similarly, in General Recommendation No. 20, the Committee 
opined that states are positively obliged to prevent discrimination caused by private entities.359  
In 2009, the CERD Committee summarized its previous findings, and firmly underlined that 
the CERD includes a positive obligation on states to take special measures to ensure non-
discrimination in practice.360  In other words, the Committee has come to interpret CERD as 
demanding quite different positive measures compared with those envisioned at the time of 
the adoption of the Convention.  The CERD Committee now interprets the right to non-
discrimination as calling on states to take positive measures promoting the cultural 
particularities of members of minority groups, on a permanent basis.  Such measures stand out 
in stark contrast, compared with temporary measures aiming at bringing members of minority 
groups to the same level as the majority population, as CERD was previously understood to 
promote.      
 
In conclusion, the right to non-discrimination has evolved to call on states to take positive 
measures to positively protect members’ of minority populations’ possibility to preserve their 
cultural distinctiveness.361  Interpreted in such a manner, the understanding of the right to 
non-discrimination appears to – for all practical purposes – essentially match the 
“collectivized” minority rights and right to culture as outlined in Sections 4.4 and 4.5.  The 
doctoral thesis shall return to this comparison in Section 4.9 
 
                                                 
357  General Recommendation No. 14: Definition of discrimination (Art. 1, par. 1) : . 22.03.1993 
358  Concluding Observations on the United States, A/56/18, para. 299, on Uruguay, CERD/C/304/Add. 78, para. 
13, and on Fiji, CERD/C/62/CO/3, para. 15 
359  General Recommendation No. 20: Non-discriminatory implementation of rights and freedoms (Art. 5), 
A/51/18 (Annex VIII, A) 15 March, 1996.  See also Thornberry, The Convention on Racial Discrimination, pp. 
25-26. 
360  General Recommendation No. 32: The meaning and scope of special measures in the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, CERD/C/GC/32, 24 September 2009 
361  Makkonen, Equal in Law, Unequal in Fact, pp. 172-173.  That said, Makkonen further notes that the more 
precise content of this obligation remains ambiguous.  But this does not nullify the existence of the general 
principle, which is what is relevant for the present purposes.   
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4.8.4 The contemporary understanding of the right to non-discrimination - 
protection of group rights 
 
The doctoral thesis has hence concluded that the CERD Committee and other relevant bodies 
have more recently interpreted the right to non-discrimination as including a positive 
obligation on states to prevent discrimination in a manner respecting cultural differences.  In 
the context of indigenous peoples, the Committee appears to have been ready to take this 
development one step further.  In the previously discussed General Recommendation No. 23, 
the CERD Committee interprets the right to non-discrimination enshrined in the CERD as 
applying - also formally - to indigenous peoples.  The opening paragraph of the General 
Recommendation proclaims that “discrimination against indigenous peoples falls under the 
scope of the [CERD] Convention…”.  In subsequent paragraphs, the Committee proceeds to 
elaborate on the more precise scope and content of, what would then be, a right to non-
discrimination of indigenous peoples.  Paragraph 4 (e) declares that states shall ensure that 
indigenous communities can exercise their cultural rights and revitalize their cultural 
traditions and customs.  Paragraph 5 calls on states to especially recognize and protect 
indigenous peoples’ right to own and control their communal lands and resources.  The CERD 
Committee has reaffirmed these positions in subsequent observations and decisions.  In doing 
so, the Committee has underscored that indigenous peoples’ collective right to non-
discrimination also embraces a right to protection of their culture and way of life.362  Thus 
understood, the right to non-discrimination is not only a right of indigenous individuals to 
have all human rights applied to them equally with other individuals.  It is also a right of 
indigenous peoples to enjoy peoples’ rights on an equal basis with other peoples.363   
 
In the previously referred to General Recommendation No. 32, the CERD Committee also 
gets the opportunity to return to the question of CERD’s relevance to groups.  Doing so, the 
Committee reiterates that the application of the principle of non-discrimination demands that 
the characteristics of groups are taken into account.  It further underlines that special measures 
might be one tool to accommodate for the particular situation of groups.364  General 
Recommendation No. 32 further addresses the relationship between collective human rights 
and the right to non-discrimination, in general, and the relationship between collective human 
rights and special measures, in particular.  The CERD Committee clarifies that CERD Article 
                                                 
362  Early Warning & Urgent Action Procedure initiated against New Zealand, Decision 1 (66), 
CERD/C/DEC/NZL/1.27/04/2005/ and the United States of America, DECISION 1 (68), CERD/USA/DEC/1  
363  Compare Tomasevski, Indicators, p. 533 and Eide, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, p. 549.   
364  General Recommendation No. 32, paras. 8 and 11 
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1.4 stipulating that special measures “should not lead to the maintenance of separate rights” 
must not, in a contemporary understanding of the right to non-discrimination, lead to the 
conclusion that this right is incompatible with group rights.  On the contrary, the Committee 
underscores that special measures normally being time-limited, does not imply that collective 
human rights are not permanent.  Special measures, the CERD Committee emphasizes, might 
be necessary to realize group rights, but must not be confused with such.  The Committee 
makes similar comments with regard to CERD Article 2.2.  Albeit specifically referring to 
“indigenous peoples”, the General Recommendation No. 32 does not echo General 
Recommendation No. 23’s proclamation that the right to non-discrimination applies directly 
to such peoples.365  Explaining the CERD’s relevance to groups, the CERD has further 
observed that the Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted and understood 
in the circumstances of contemporary society.366          
 
As seen above, also treaty bodies others than the CERD have contributed to the understanding 
of the right to non-discrimination.  In addition to affirming that the right to non-discrimination 
embraces a positive duty on states to prevent discrimination, the HRC already in 1989 
concluded that the right to non-discrimination need not necessarily mean identical treatment 
in every instance.  It has repeated this position in subsequent jurisprudence.  The Committee 
has stressed that different treatment does not amount to discrimination as long as the criteria 
for differentiation are reasonable and objective.367  In other words, the HRC has not called for 
different treatment of situations that are notably different, but has legitimized such action.  In 
the same vein, the CESC has in the previously referred to General Comments No. 20 stated 
that combating discrimination requires paying sufficient attention to, and eliminating, 
systematic discrimination of groups.368 
 
On a regional level, European institutions, in particular the ECHR, have been active in 
interpreting the right to non-discrimination.  The ECHR has noted an emerging consensus 
                                                 
365  See in particular General Recommendation No. 32 paras. 15, 26 and 35.  See also Makkonen, Equal in Law, 
Unequal in Fact, p. 95. 
366  Communication (Hagan v Australia), A/58/18, Annex IIIA, 26/2002, para. 7.2 
367  General Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination, A/45/40, Annex VI/A, paras. 7 and 8, Süsser v. Czech 
Republic, Comm. No. 1488/2006, views adopted 25 March 2008, Vjateslav Tsarjov v. Estonia, Comm. No. 
1223/2003, views adopted on 26 October 2007, and X v. Colombia, Comm. No. 1361/2005, views adopted on 30 
March 2007 
368  CESC General Comment No. 20, Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (art. 2, para. 2, 
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2009), UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/20, paras. 8, 
12 and 39 
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among European states that minorities are entitled to protection of their distinct identities and 
lifestyles.369  The EC court, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has, as the HRC, 
acknowledged that treating instances different that are significantly different need not amount 
to discrimination.370  The ECHR has, however, taken the ECJ/HRC recognition that treating 
different cases differently need not constitute discrimination one step further.  In the 
Thilmmenos Case, the ECHR held that the right to non-discrimination does not only entail 
that equal cases be treated equally, but also that different cases be treated differently.  Having 
initially noted that “The Court has so far considered the right [to non-discrimination] … 
violated when States treat differently persons in analogous situations without providing an 
objective and reasonable justification”, the ECHR proceeded to declare that it ”… considers 
that this is not the only facet of the [right to non-discrimination].  The right not to be 
discriminated against… is also violated when States without an objective and reasonable 
justification fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different”.371  
Since, as Section 4.4 explained, rulings of the ECHR have direct effect on EC law, one can 
expect the EC institutions to also accept the ruling in Thilmmenos.  Recent interpretations of 
the European Social Charter confirm that European law embraces the facet of the right to non-
discrimination asserting that different situations call for different treatment.372         
 
The Section has hence described how CERD General Recommendation No. 23 submits that 
the right to non-discrimination not only indirectly, but formally, applies to indigenous peoples 
as such.  The Committee has subsequently, for instance in General Recommendation No. 32, 
affirmed that the right to non-discrimination do have relevance also for groups per se.  The 
CERD Committee has added that special measures can be one tool through which to address 
the situation of groups, catering for their cultural distinctiveness.  At the same time, however 
                                                 
369  Chapman v. the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 27238/95, paras. 90-93 
370  The ECJ has repeatedly held that the principle of equal treatment includes that “different situations must not 
be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified.”  See e.g. Case C-210/03, Swedish 
Match (2004) ECR I-11893, para. 70.  See also Stavenhagen, Cultural Rights, pp., 91-92, and McCrudden, The 
New Concept of Equality, p. 20. 
371  Thilmmenos v. Greece, Appl. No. 34369/97.  The ECHR has in principle confirmed this position in 
subsequent case-law, but has at the same time in practice been careful to apply this facet of the right to non-
discrimination.  See Chapman v. The United Kingdom, Appl. No. 27238/95, Nachova and others v. Bulgaria, 
Appl. No. 43577/98 and 43579/98, and Stoica v. Romania, Appl. No. 42722/02.  See also Makkonen, Equal in 
Law, Unequal in Fact, pp. 127-128, and Arnardóttir, Equality and non-discrimination under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, pp. 10-11.  Arnardóttir argues that Thilmmenos shall be interpreted to imply that 
while relevant equalities demands equal treatment, only “highly” relevant inequalities requires unequal 
treatment.   
372  The European Committee on Social Rights, tasked with interpreting and implementing the Social Charter has 
noted that discrimination occurs also when states fail, without objective and reasonable justification, to treat 
differently persons whose situation is different.  See ECSR, ERRC v. Italy, decision of 7 December 2005, para. 
36, and Autisme-Europe v. France, decision of 4 November 2003, para. 52. 
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the Committee has also, with the sole exception of General Recommendation No. 23, 
distinguished between collective human rights in general and the right to non-discrimination.  
The CERD Committee has affirmed that the right to non-discrimination should be applied in a 
manner supporting the realization of group rights in general.  But it has stopped short of 
repeating its suggesting that the right to non-discrimination as such formally constitute a 
collective right proper.  Neither does the notion that the right to non-discrimination applies 
formally to peoples find support in the other legal sources surveyed.  The legal doctrine 
concurs with this assessment.373  In sum, evidence suggests that the right to non-
discrimination has not yet evolved to formally apply to groups as such.       
 
That said, the right to non-discrimination might still have acquired a facet rendering it 
indirectly applicable also to groups, and, perhaps, in particular to indigenous peoples.  We 
have seen that the ECHR has proclaimed that the right to non-discrimination embraces a right 
of those that are significantly different to be treated as such.  The HRC has not explicitly 
called for differential treatment.  But it has affirmed that treating those individuals different 
whose situation is significantly different is a legitimate aspect of the right to non-
discrimination.  In the same vein, CESC has opined that states must take measures to 
eliminate systematic discrimination of groups, in a manner recognizing their cultural 
differences.  It would appear that for all practical purposes, an obligation to undertake such 
measures is very similar to an obligation to treat individuals different that have different 
cultural identities.  Both measures presumably imply particular rights of individual members 
of minority groups to continuously pursue their cultural practices, resulting in indirect 
protection also of the group as such.  Further, the CERD Committee too, has held that the 
right to non-discrimination must be applied in a manner protecting collective cultural rights in 
general.  Clearly, this understanding of the right to non-discrimination demands that different 
cases be treated differently.  On an individual level, protection of the cultural rights of the 
group as such boils down to a right of the individual member to practice the cultural traditions 
specific to the group, i.e. a right to be different compared with members of the majority 
population.   
 
                                                 
373  For instance, Makkonen, having studied the right to non-discrimination in depth, concludes that the right to 
non-discrimination, despite recent developments, formally remains individual in nature.  Makkonen further 
infers, however, that this has not prevented the right from responding to recent trends within political 
philosophy, such as welfare liberalism and communitarianism.  See Equal in Law, Unequal in Fact, pp. 178-179. 
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In sum, all relevant UN treaty bodies and the ECHR concur that the right to non-
discrimination no longer only demands that equal cases be treated equally.  In addition, the 
right to non-discrimination envelopes a right of members of minority cultures to be different, 
in a manner respecting their cultural distinctiveness.  As Hannum has noted; “A fundamental 
state obligation under international human rights norm is to eliminate discrimination, not to 
destroy all differences.”374  Importantly for the purposes of the doctoral thesis, as is further 
clear from the above, the second facet of the individual right to non-discrimination further 
implies that the right has evolved to apply, not formally, but in practice, also to groups.  A 
right of individuals to be treated differently for all practical purposes protects also the cultural 
distinctiveness of the group as such.375  The conclusion that the right to non-discrimination 
protects also groups as such finds support in the legal doctrine.376  This conclusion is also in 
line with Petrova’s and Parekh’s observations that it is a fact that racial discrimination - per 
definition - presupposes the existence of ethnic and/or racial groups in society.  Even if an 
individual might be the victim of racial discrimination, she is so not because of her own 
characteristics, but because of association with a particular group.  Consequently, racial 
discrimination cannot be tackled in individual terms.377  As a final observation in this context, 
one can note that the right to non-discrimination demanding not only that equal cases be 
treated equally, but also that different cases be treated differently, implies conformity in 
                                                 
374  Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination II, p. 476  
375  For instance, hunting might constitute a traditional livelihood with a specific cultural significance to an 
indigenous people, but not to the majority population.  Under such circumstances, a contemporary understanding 
of the right to non-discrimination calls for differentiation in treatment between members of the indigenous and 
the majority populations when it come to e.g. hunting quota, securing continuous possibilities to hunt for the 
indigenous population.  Such differential treatment directly protects the cultural identity of the individual 
member of the group.  But in addition, securing hunting quota for the individual member of the group, also 
secures hunting as a traditional cultural-based livelihood of the people as such.   
376  The 2008 Declaration of Principles of Equality (www.equalrightstrust.org, 25 April, 2010), signed by 128 
prominent human rights experts, submits that the right to non-discrimination applies also to groups.  See in 
particular principles 5 and 9.  McCrudden concurs that the aspect of the right to non-discrimination calling for 
different cases to be treated differently is in effect a group right.  See The New Concept of Equality, pp. 22-23.  
For similar observations with regard to the similarity between a collective right to culture and an individual right 
to be treated differently, see Thornberry, The Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, p. 23, 
Wheatley, Democracy, Minorities and International Law, p. 22, Lea, Property Rights, Indigenous People and the 
Developing World, p. 20,  Castellino, Conceptual Difficulties and the Right to Indigenous Self-Determination, p. 
61, Tomasevski, Indicators, p. 533, Hartney, Some Confusion Concerning Collective Rights, p. 220, Packer, On 
the Content on Minority Rights, p. 122, Stavenhagen, Cultural Rights, p. 98, and Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in 
International Law II, p. 139.  Makkonen agrees that such a right is starting to take shape.  See Equal in Law, 
Unequal in Fact, pp. 180-181. 
377  Petrova, Racial Discrimination and the Rights of Minority Cultures, p. 67, and Parekh, Redistribution or 
recognition, p. 210.  In the same vein, Fredman has noted, having studied jurisprudence from the Canadian 
Supreme Court, that in order to determine whether an individual has been discriminated against, one must often 
first determine whether the group she belongs to has historically been disadvantaged.  See Providing Equality, 
pp. 177-179.  Fredman’s observations are made in the context of equality within the sphere of social welfare.  
Still, they support the argument that it is not possible to craft adequate non-discrimination law if not also 
addressing the situation of the group as such.   
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practice with, if not a formal recognition of, CERD General Recommendation No. 23’s 
assertion that the right to non-discrimination applies directly to indigenous peoples.        
 
The described development suggests that the rights to culture and non-discrimination have 
continued to evolve in tandem.  Section 4.8.3 noted that the right to non-discrimination 
progressing to include a positive obligation on states to prevent discrimination appears to have 
been matched by the right to culture acquiring a collective dimension rendering it indirectly 
applicable also to groups.  Obviously, the further evolved understanding of the right to non-
discrimination outlined above, implying that also this right indirectly benefits groups, 
corresponds even better to the mentioned aspect of the right to culture.  But the progressed 
implication of the right to non-discrimination also brings this aspect of the right closer to the 
understanding of indigenous peoples’ cultural rights proper.  As Section 4.7 described, 
indigenous peoples cultural rights imply, in general terms, that indigenous peoples are entitled 
to protection of their cultural identity and practices.  The parallel of this right to a right to non-
discrimination entailing a positive right of indigenous individuals to preserve and pursue their 
distinct cultural practices, resulting in a protection of the cultural identity also of the group as 
such, is apparent.  In sum, again we see how the conclusions within different spheres of law 
are mutually supportive.  What has been inferred above with regard to the contemporary 
understanding of the right to non-discrimination supports the conclusions drawn in the 
contexts of the rights to culture and self-determination, and vice versa.378 
 
As a final observation in this context, it is interesting to recall the PCIJ’s interpretation of the 
right to non-discrimination 75 years ago in the Minority Schools in Albania Case.379  Clearly, 
the PCIJ’s opinion that “equality in fact may involve the necessity of different treatment in 
order to attain a result which establishes equilibrium between different situations”, presents a 
striking resemblance to the position international law has again taken some seven decades 
later.  Similarly, the PCIJ’s comparison between the right to non-discrimination and cultural 
rights of groups could have been cut out of a legal source of yesterday.  Recall how the Court 
proclaimed that “[t]he idea underlying the treaties for the protection of minorities is to secure 
                                                 
378  Makkonen notes that group oriented rights are emerging in other spheres of law, including within the area of 
cultural rights.  He maintains, however, that the relationship between non-discrimination law, on one hand, and 
such other spheres of law, on the other, “is by no means clear or resolved”.  See Equal in Law, Unequal in Fact, 
p. 171.  Petrova concurs that norms of equality and human rights in general are not sufficiently integrated.  See A 
Right to Equality Integral to Universal Human Rights, p. 4.  One aspiration of the doctoral thesis is of course to 
shed some light on the relationship between these areas of law.   
379  See Section 2.4. 
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for certain elements incorporated in a State, the population of which differs from them in race 
… the possibility of … preserving the characteristics which distinguish them from the 
majority, and satisfying the ensuing special needs.”  It would appear that after three quarters 
of a century, international law is back at the position taken by the PCIJ in the Minority 
Schools in Albania Case. 
 
4.8.5 Briefly on the relationship between the right to non-discrimination 
and the universality of human rights 
 
Section 2.5 explained how it has been an underlining principle in the modern international 
human rights system since it emerged that human rights are individual and universal; i.e. they 
apply equally to all individuals.  Not surprisingly therefore, it has been argued that the recent 
developments in international law towards recognition of group rights and that the right to 
non-discrimination embracing also a right to differential treatment, violate the keystone 
principle of the universality of human rights.  If human rights are indeed universal, is it not a 
paradox to suggest that they apply differently depending on cultural context?  As McGoldrick 
puts it, “while international human rights is a universal doctrine, multiculturalism can appear 
to be a localising doctrine”.380  Given the centrality of the notion of the universality of human 
rights in the conventional human rights system, it appears pertinent that the doctoral thesis 
briefly responds to these assertions.   
 
Anaya answers the posed question simply by noting that if universal rights protecting cultural 
differences is a paradox, then contemporary human rights law has embraced this paradox.381  
As already pointed to several times, and as Chapter 7 will elaborate further, international law 
is not caste in stone.  It is constantly evolving, including the understanding of its underlying 
principles.  This Chapter has surveyed such developments within the field of cultural rights 
and the right to non-discrimination.  Provided that the conclusions in the Chapter are correct, 
it is of little use to point at the principle of universality of human rights.  As Anaya has 
observed, if it should be correct that the notion of universality of human rights cannot be 
reconciled with group rights and differential treatment, then international law has opted for 
the latter.  And, as this and the previous Chapter have outlined, international law has done so 
exactly because of an increased acknowledgment that a human rights system focusing solely 
                                                 
380  McGoldrick, Multiculturalism and its Discontents, p. 233 
381  Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law II, p. 133 
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on universal individual rights fails to adequately protect the interest of ethnic and cultural 
groups – as well as of their members - and can potentially erase cultural diversity.  As 
Crawford has noted, accepting the universality of human rights without accommodating for 
cultural differences can be viewed as akin to accepting that human rights do not protect 
against assimilation.382  In the same vein, Fredman has observed that the conventional 
understanding of the right to non-discrimination “is based on an assumption of conformity to 
a given norm, and therefore of assimilation.”  Equal cases be treated equally implies, she 
points to, that she who seeks non-discrimination protection must agree to be considered to be 
“like” the standard model.383   
 
It is true that the idea of universality of human rights - in the sense that human rights are 
individual only, and applies equally to all individuals - is incompatible with group rights.  
Section 2.5 described how, in the wake of World War II, states deliberately opted for the 
former alternative.  Now, this Chapter has demonstrated that states have simply changed their 
position, and accepts a group oriented aspect of international law, particularly in the context 
of indigenous peoples.  That said, the contemporary understanding of the rights to culture and 
non-discrimination is not incompatible with the principle of universal human rights – in the 
sense that human rights apply equally to all on a global level.. The rights to culture and non-
discrimination still have universal applicability.  The only difference is an acknowledgement 
of that when the universally applicable right is being implemented, this need not result in 
mainstreaming, i.e. equality in law.  Rather, implementing a right taking into consideration 
different cultural contexts could result in differentiated treatment, allowing for the 
preservation of distinct cultural identities, i.e. equality in fact.  In other words, the right to 
preserve one’s particular identity applies universally.  But implementing these right demands 
difference in treatment, exactly because of these cultural differences.   
                                                 
382  Crawford, The Right to Self-Determination in International Law, p. 24 
383  Fredman, Combating Racism with Human Rights, p. 16.  Compare also Otto, Rethinking the 







The Chapter has surveyed international legal sources pertaining to indigenous peoples’ right 
to preserve, develop and determine over their cultural identities, practices and societies.  It 
identified three general spheres of law as relevant to this analysis; the right to culture, the 
right to self-determination and the right to non-discrimination.  Still, throughout, the Chapter 
has noted how the rights to culture, self-determination and non-discrimination overlap, 
interlink and are mutually supportive.  This is rather natural.  In the final analysis, the 
applicability of each of the three rights to indigenous groups depends largely on the same 
question; can indigenous groups constitute “peoples” for international legal purposes?  If so, it 
makes sense that they enjoy both the right to self-determination and a collective right to 
culture.  An analysis concluding that indigenous peoples, as peoples, enjoy the right to 
culture, but not the right to self-determination, or vice versa, is improbable.  It is further 
rationale that if indigenous peoples have been held to be beneficiaries of human rights, that 
the right to non-discrimination, being one of the most fundamental of human rights, is also 
entertained in this context.       
 
It is repeated that the focus of this Chapter has been, and continuous to be, on the identified 
underlying general question, i.e. whether indigenous peoples constitute peoples with rights as 
such under international law.  The material scope and content of potential rights are subject to 
analyses in Chapters 8 and 12.  So the question is then, to what extent do indigenous peoples 
enjoy rights proper under international law.  To answer the posed question, the Section will 
first briefly recap the two set of rights outlined above not constituting indigenous peoples’ 
rights proper, namely (i) collectivized minority rights, and (ii) rights sui generis to indigenous 
populations under ILO 169.  These conclusions will then serve as a stepping-stone when the 
Section turns to indigenous peoples’ rights proper.            
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4.9.2 Collectivized individual rights and rights sui generis to indigenous 
populations 
    
Section 4.5 described how both novel minority rights instruments and evolved understandings 
of existing treaty provisions have rejected the notion that the state shall remain neutral 
between cultures.  On the contrary, the state has a positive duty to ensure that members of 
minority groups can preserve their cultural distinctiveness.  They must not be treated as a 
member of the majority culture against their wish.  Importantly, this evolved understanding of 
minority rights/the right to culture extends, in all but formal sense, a protection also to the 
collective culture and cultural identity of the group as such; so called “collectivized individual 
rights”.     
 
Sections 4.8.3 and 4.8.4 surveyed the right to non-discrimination, discovering that this right 
has evolved to match the development within the right to culture.  Simultaneously with the 
right to culture evolving to take on the “collectivized” aspect, the right to non-discrimination 
progressed to embrace a positive obligation on states to protect members of minority groups’ 
possibility to preserve their cultural distinctiveness.  It was concluded that this facet of the 
right to non-discrimination corresponds almost exactly with collectivized individual rights to 
culture.384  As the collectivized right to culture, this aspect of the right to non-discrimination 
also indirectly protects the group as such.   
 
In sum, during the 1990s and into the early 2000s the rights to culture and to non-
discrimination evolved in tandem.  Analyzing the two rights in conjunction, the doctoral 
thesis does not hesitate already at this point to conclude that international law firmly 
establishes that states have a positive duty to ensure that indigenous groups can continuously 
pursue their culture practices and preserve and develop their collective cultural identity.385  
The right is not formal, but indirect.  But that does not impact on the content or effect of the 
right.       
 
Turning to rights sui generis to indigenous populations, Section 4.3 described how the UN, 
when starting to consider indigenous rights, distinguished between indigenous populations 
                                                 
384  Section 4.9.3 will draw some final conclusions with regard to how both the right to non-discrimination and 
the right to culture/self-determination has continued to progress to take on a third facet 
385  As seen, the minorities’ rights instruments further support this conclusion. 
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and minorities.  The importance of the distinction became apparent when the Chapter, having 
concluded the analyses of minority rights, turned its attention to rights of indigenous 
populations. Differing from minority rights, the indigenous rights discourse focused, also 
formally, on the collective aspects of indigenous societies.  Sections 4.3 and 4-6 demonstrated 
how the distinction between minority and indigenous rights became apparent in two draft 
Declarations developed in two parallel processes at approximately the same time.  While the 
draft Minority Declaration focused on equal treatment between individuals, the draft DRIP 
enshrined collective rights proper of indigenous peoples to e.g. self-determination and culture.  
In the same vein, the ILO 169 focuses on collective rights too.  
 
Section 4.6 outlined how the ILO 169 proclaims that indigenous groups hold collective rights 
proper, including to culture and to “ethno-political self-government”.  The Section concluded 
that despite the relatively limited number of states having ratified the ILO 169, these core 
aspects of the Convention reflects crystallized international law.  It is reiterated that the 
doctoral thesis does not hesitate to draw this conclusion already at this point.  That is 
particularly so if interpreting the ILO 169 in light of the parallel developments within cultural 
rights and the right to non-discrimination.  At the same, Section 4.6 further inferred that 
although ILO 169 refers to the beneficiaries of the rights of the Convention as “peoples”, it is 
evident that the Convention does not enshrine peoples’ rights proper.  Notwithstanding - 
together with the collectivized right to culture/the evolved understanding of the right to non-
discrimination - the ILO 169 proclaiming collective rights of indigenous populations to rights 
to “ethno-political self-government” and culture served as a stepping-stone for indigenous 
peoples’ rights proper.  And it is to these rights the doctoral thesis now turns.      
 
4.9.3 Indigenous peoples’ rights proper 
 
Section 4.7 observed that the most central UN treaty bodies have all recently held that 
indigenous peoples do enjoy rights as such.  In particular, the two treaty bodies that have the 
opportunity to address the applicability of the right to self-determination have concurred that 
indigenous groups can constitute peoples for international legal purposes, then being the 
beneficiaries of the right to self-determination.  The Section further noted that these findings 
have been supported by regional sources from all but one continent.          
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Section 4.8.4 noted that the parallel development between the right to culture and the right to 
non-discrimination did not end with the latter right confirming the collectivized right to 
culture.  Rather, as legal sources evolved suggesting that the right to culture applies also 
formally to indigenous peoples, the right to non-discrimination too, continued to progress.  
Section 4.8.4 concluded that the right to non-discrimination has taken on a third facet, 
implying that it applies also to groups as such, albeit indirectly.  Hence, although the 
comparison limps in the sense that there is limited support for the right to non-discrimination 
constituting a right proper of indigenous peoples, for all practical purposes the right to non-
discrimination offers support also for the conclusion that indigenous peoples enjoy rights 
proper to culture/self-determination.386 
 
Above, the doctoral thesis did not hesitate to conclude that collectivized human rights and sui 
generis collective rights of indigenous populations have crystallized into law.  Here, a joint 
analysis of the rights to self-determination/culture and non-discrimination supports a 
conclusion that international law has also recognized that indigenous peoples do enjoy 
peoples’ rights proper.  Still, as indicated above, such recognition constitutes a much more 
dramatic step for international law to take, compared with acknowledging collectivized 
individual rights/rights sui generis to indigenous populations.  States had also had relatively 
little time to react to the sources submitting that indigenous peoples constitute peoples proper, 
with rights as such, including the right to self-determination, prior to September 2007.387  
These two factors create a certain degree of uncertainty as to what extent the sources Section 
4.7 has surveyed reflect established international law.  This uncertainty is also reflected in the 
legal doctrine of the time.  
 
Based on the outlined legal sources, several legal scholars argued that international law had 
recognized rights proper of indigenous peoples.  For instance, Johnston asserted that 
international law at least recognizes a right of ethnic/cultural groups to self-preservation.388  
Lenzerini agreed that indigenous peoples have emerged as distinct subjects of international 
                                                 
386  As Section 4.9.2 noted, this conclusion follows from differently framed but yet concurring jurisprudence 
from the ECHR, the HRC, the CERD Committee and the CESC.  The conclusion also enjoys broad support in 
the legal doctrine. 
387  Recall that this Section focuses on international legal sources pre-dating the adoption of the DRIP.  Hence 
the reference to September 2007. 
388  Johnston, Native Rights as Collective Rights, pp. 186-187 
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law.389  More concretely, Weller asserted that indigenous peoples enjoy a right to self-
determination, as did Xanthaki.390  Tomuschat submitted that indigenous peoples undoubtedly 
constitute “peoples” in the ethnic meaning of the term, enjoying the right to self-
determination (but not the right to secession).391  Anaya elaborated that the human rights 
character of self-determination must no longer be obscured by a state-centred world.  He 
underscored that self-governance is the key feature of indigenous peoples’ right to self-
determination, exercised through political institutions allowing them to exist and develop 
according to their distinct characteristics.392  Similarly, Castellino underscored that 
international law has come to hold that self-determination applies to peoples in the ethnic 
meaning of the word, and that in this context, the right shall be exercised through constructive 
arrangements within the state.393  In the same vein, Stavenhagen noted that international law 
has found it more fruitful to move towards redefining the concepts of the nation than to stick 
firmly to the classical state-individual dichotomy.394  Koskenniemi added that the internal 
aspect of self-determination encompasses a right of e.g. indigenous peoples to have their 
distinct identity respected by the majority society.395 
 
Other legal scholars noted that international law was about to embrace rights of indigenous 
peoples, but where not ready to conclude that the development had been completed.  
Kingsbury posited that in order to adequately address the needs and aspirations of groups, 
there is a need to reinvent international law and add additional concepts that go beyond the 
state-individual dichotomy.396  In the same vein, Crawford asserted that it had become 
increasingly acknowledged that conventional human rights are inadequately defined to protect 
those that want to be different, and further that there is an apparent risk that a complete focus 
on individual human rights can serve as a vehicle for assimilation.  He further noted that 
acknowledging that “peoples” are entitled to self-determination at the same time as submitting 
that the right applies solely to the aggregate of the inhabitants of the state renders the concept 
of self-determination a “cruel deception”.  In line therewith, Crawford recognized the trend in 
                                                 
389  Lenzerini, Sovereignty Revisited, p. 181.  Durnberry drew the same conclusion with regard to the indigenous 
peoples of North America.  See Lessons Learned pp 431-435. 
390  Weller, Towards a General Comment on Self-Determination and Autonomy, pp. 12 and 16, and Xanthaki, 
The Right to Self-Determination, pp. 22-23.      
391  Tomuschat, Secession and Self-Determination, pp. 23-45 
392  Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law I, p. 78, Indigenous Peoples in International Law II, p. 150, 
and The Capacity of International Law to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Rights Claims, pp. 325-326 
393  Castellino, Conceptual Difficulties and the Right to Indigenous Self-Determination, pp. 67-68 
394  Stavenhagen, Cultural Rights, pp. 96 and 108 
395  Koskenniemi, National Self-Determination Today, p. 267  
396  Kingsbury, Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures, p. 78 
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international law towards recognizing a right to self-determination of peoples in the 
ethnic/cultural understanding of the term, particularly in the context of indigenous peoples.397  
Similarly, noting that the internal aspect of self-determination has conventionally been 
exercised through participation in the general decision-making processes of the state, Raic 
added that one can envision other ways of exercising this right, including through autonomy 
arrangements.  He further asserted that the application of the right to self-determination to 
sub-groups of the state appears to follow from the raison d’être of the right.398   
   
A third category of legal scholars, on the other hand, continuously rejected the notion that 
indigenous peoples can enjoy rights proper.  Section 2.5.4 has already mentioned the positions 
taken by Brownlie399 and Hannum.400  In addition, Kohen asserted that international law 
acknowledges only one people where there exists a state.401  Similarly, Cassese submitted that 
the right to self-determination does not apply to ethnic groups.402  Alfredsson equated the 
internal aspect of self-determination with democratic governance, e.g. with a right to a 
government representing the entire population of the territory, without considerations of 
ethnic and cultural differences.403  In the same vein, Shaw and Raic agreed that the right to 
self-determination formally apply to indigenous peoples, but in the same breath rendered this 
recognition essentially meaningless when suggesting that from this general recognition, it 
does not necessarily follow that the right implies a right to autonomy/self-government.404     
 
                                                 
397 Crawford, The Right to Self-Determination in International Law, pp. 24, 26, 39-40, 64, 99 and 121, and The 
Creation of States, pp. 99 and 120-121 
398  Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, pp. 239 and 248 
399  Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, p. 540-541 and 553, and The Rights of Peoples in Modern 
International Law, pp. 4-16 
400  Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination II, pp. 95-103   
401  It should be noted, however, that it might be that Kohen took this position because of equating the right to 
self-determination with a right to secession   See Secession, pp., 9 and 16.   
402  Cassese, International Law, pp. 63-64, and Self-Determination of Peoples, pp. 53-54, 64, 101, 124, 131 and 
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403  Alfredsson, The Right to Self-determination and Indigenous Peoples, pp. 41-54     
404  Shaw, Self-Determination and the Use of Force, pp. 41-43, and Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-
Determination, pp. 146, 255-257, 283-285 and 446.  Raic position is somewhat complex.  As indicated, he first 
noted that the right to self-determination has moved beyond the colonial context, and applies, in addition to the 
entire population of a state, also to ethnic/cultural sub-groups.  At the same time though, Raic submitted that 
international law has yet to recognize a right to self-determination to be exercised through autonomy.  This 
addition seems to suggest that Raic did not foresee a right to self-determination in any meaningful understanding 
of the term.  Raic further suggested, however, somewhat contradictory, that a state agreeing to autonomous 
arrangements for an ethnic group indicates that the group qualifies for the internal aspect of the right to self-
determination.  And, as mentioned above, he finally added that applying the right to self-determination to 
ethnic/cultural groups, ensuring protection for their collective identity, is in line with the raison d’être of the 
right to self-determination. 
117 
As indicated, by 2007, the doctrine was split on whether international law had confirmed that 
indigenous peoples constituted peoples proper, enjoying rights as such.  At the same time, the 
surveyed international legal sources in chorus suggested that such was the case.  But even if 
the sources were strikingly coherent, they also mainly originated from expert bodies and 
international tribunals.  State reactions were largely absent.  For this reason, and since, as 
mentioned, affirming that indigenous peoples constitute “peoples” proper would constitute a 
paradigm shift in international law, the doctoral thesis refrains, at this point, from drawing a 
definitive conclusion on whether the position reflected in the international legal sources 
outlined in Section 4.7 had crystallized into law.  Rather, the thesis shall return to this issue in 
Chapters 6 and 8.  To end this Chapter, Section 4.10 instead briefly touches upon the 
compatibility of a potential right of indigenous peoples to self-determination with the (i) 
external and (ii) internal aspect of sovereignty, i.e. with the principles of (i) the territorial 
integrity of state and (ii) state jurisdiction.405  Some might submit that these two principles in 
fact preclude the development in international law suggested in Section 4.7.  
 
4.10 Implications of a right to self-determination of indigenous peoples 
on state sovereignty  
 
4.10.1  The external aspect - territorial integrity of the state 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 explained that the state is a fictitious, legal, concept.  Man must decide what 
polity constitutes a state.  As Chapter 2 described, traditionally, international law included no 
definition of states.  A polity became a state if the already existing sovereigns accepted it as 
such.  Following the failed attempt by the League of Nations to objectively define states, 
lawyers debated whether states shall continuously come into existence through recognition by 
other states, or whether rather a state shall be defined by objective criteria.  With time, the 
latter alternative prevailed, and it is now settled that international law objectively defines what 
territorial entities constitute states.406  States being objectively defined does not change, 
                                                 
405  Sovereignty has been defined as (i) jurisdiction over its territory and permanent population, (ii) a duty of 
non-intervention in the area of exclusive jurisdictions of other states, and (iii) the dependence of obligations 
arising from international law on the consent of the obligator.  See Brownlie, Principles of Public International 
Law, pp. 106-107, 119 and 287, and Cassese, International Law, pp. 49-51.  In other words, sovereignty is 
essentially about independence, or territorial integrity, externally, and of self-determination, or jurisdiction, 
internally.  See Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, p. 240 
406  Arbitration Commission of the Hague Conference on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 1 [Disintegration of the 
SFRY] (1991) 92 ILR 162, pp 164-165, Cassese, International Law, pp. 73-77, and Raic, Statehood and the Law 
of Self-Determination, pp. 29-37  
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however, the fact that they remain artificial entities.407  Notwithstanding, states remain the 
only legal persons under international law, and the sole creators of such law.  They are also 
perceived as the only international legal subjects that can preserve peace and stability.408  
Consequently, out of pure self-interest, but also motivated by maintenance of peace and order, 
states are highly sceptical towards developments in international law that threatens the 
existence or position of states.  Hence, the principle of territorial integrity of states has been, 
and continuous to be, a cornerstone in the international legal system.  It appears that it has 
exercised certain influence also on the indigenous peoples’ rights discourse.       
 
Section 4.9, immediately above, concluded that there might have been some reluctance 
against acknowledging a right to self-determination of indigenous peoples.  As further 
indicated, contributing to states’ hesitance to accept a right to self-determination applying also 
to sub-segments of the state appears to a have been a concern that such recognition would 
result in, or at least encourage, separatist movements.  In other words, states’ reluctance might 
largely have been motivated by an assumption that the right to self-determination is, or at 
least encompasses, a right to statehood.409  The concern is to some extent understandable.  
Section 2.5 described how the right to self-determination has most effectively, and visibly, 
been invoked and implemented in the context of decolonization.  As a consequence, the right 
to self-determination come to be equalled with a right to independence.  Against this 
background, it is reasonable if states initially feared that a right to self-determination of 
indigenous peoples would result in a second wave of secessionist movements.   
 
But albeit politically understandable, states’ concerns are from a legal perspective unfounded.  
It is generally agreed that under international law, the right to self-determination does not 
encompass a right to secede, save in extreme circumstances.  If the state is guilty of gross 
human rights violations rendering it impossibility to exercise the right to self-determination 
                                                 
407  For the present purposes, it is not necessary to probe deep into the criteria for statehood.  In passing, it can be 
mentioned that the constitutive elements of statehood are generally perceived to follow from Article 1 of the so 
called Montevideo Convention (LNTS, Vol. 165); a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, 
and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.  See further Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-
Determination, pp. 24-25 and Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, pp. 70-72 and 86.  That said, 
these criteria have at times been applied with certain a certain amount of pragmatism.  See Crawford, The 
Creation of States, pp. 175-220 and 252, Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, pp. 63-65,  and 
Koskenniemi, from Apology to Utopia, pp. 272-282.     
408  Cassese, International Law, pp. 71-72 and 134, Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, pp. 17 
and 41, Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, pp. 18 and 26, and Crawford, The Creation of 
States, p. 252   
409  Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law II, pp. 7 and 80, Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-
Determination, pp. 242-243, and Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination II, pp. 96 and 473 
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within the state’s borders, and secession constitutes a remedy for the oppressed people, it is 
allowed.410  Consequently, indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination, with the exception 
of abnormal circumstances, must be effectuated through autonomy arrangements within 
existing state borders.  Hence, recognition of a right to self-determination of indigenous 
peoples is in full compatibility with the cardinal principle territorial integrity of states. 
 
4.10.2 The internal aspect - jurisdiction 
 
Section 4.10.1 mentioned that states are the only legal persons international law recognizes.  
But albeit the only legal persons, states need not be the sole legal subjects of international 
law.  Already at the advent of the contemporary international legal system, Lauterpacht 
observed that “[t]here is no rule in international law which precludes … bodies other than 
states acquiring directly rights under … international law, and, to that extent, becoming 
subjects of [international law]”.411  Since then, international law has positively recognized a 
number of entities as legal subjects, beyond states.  In the Reparation for Injuries Case, the 
ICJ proclaimed that the United Nations, as an international organization, enjoys status as an 
international legal subject.412  Subsequently, and more relevant for the present purposes, in the 
more recent East Timor Case, the ICJ held that the people of East Timor, at a time when East 
Timor formed part of Indonesia, constituted an international legal subject, albeit not an 
international legal person.  The Court underlined that even though international law primarily 
regulates state behaviour, it also recognizes rights of other entities, such as peoples.413   
 
Also the legal doctrine affirms that states being international law’s sole legal persons do not 
prevent other entities from becoming subjects of international law.  Cheng observes that the 
                                                 
410    Crawford, The Right to Self-determination in International Law, pp. 39 and 49-60, and The Creation of 
States, pp. 383-418, Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples p. 124, 167, 283, 334 and 349, Buchanan, The 
Morality in Session, p. 352, Tomuschat, Secession and self-determination, pp. 35-36 and 84-86, Dugard and 
Raic, The role of recognition in the law and practice of secession, pp. 102-107, Tancredi, A normative “due 
process” in the creation of States through secession, pp. 175-184, Alfredsson, Minorities, Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples, and Peoples, p. 164, Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, pp. 321-329, and Thornberry, 
Self-Determination and Indigenous Peoples, p. 49.  See also the Quebec Session Case, [1998] 1 SCR 217, paras. 
123-124 and 130.    For a different opinion, see, however, Kohen, Secession, pp. 10 and 19-20, where he argues 
that international law does not recognize a remedial right to secession.  Instead, he offers some examples where 
international law might regulate secession.       
411  Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, p. 444 
412  Reparation for Injuries Case. Reparation for injuries suffered in the services of the United Nations, Advisory 
Opinion: I.C.J. Reports . 1949, p. 174 
413  East Timor Case. Portugal v. Australia, Judgement, I.C.J. Report: 1995, p. 90.  See in particular p. 102.  
Compare also the Western Sahara Case, para. 63, and see Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, p. 
169, and Tully, The Struggles of Indigenous Peoples for and of Freedoms, pp. 55-56.  
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capacity to hold rights and duties under a legal system is not caste in stone.  States are free to 
endow other entities with the status of subjects of international law.414  Similarly, Brownlie 
notes that the world community should be, and historically has been, ready to demonstrate 
flexibility when it comes to awarding political entities status as subjects of international law.  
International law opens up for, indeed foresees, situations where other legal entities than 
states perform tasks normally associated with the state.415  Crawford too, posits that the fact 
that states remain the principal international legal subjects does not prevent other distinct 
territorial communities from being international legal subjects too.  Nor does, he observes, 
respect for the principle of territorial integrity of states demand that distinct ethnic groups 
within the state be subjugated to the rule of the majority society.  They can still hold rights to 
diverse arrangements of “secession less sovereignty”.416  It is hence beyond doubt that 
international law has the capacity to accept other polities than states as legal subjects.  And it 
is equally clear that this general principle applies also in the specific context of indigenous 
peoples.417  In principle nothing prevents indigenous peoples from qualifying as international 
legal subjects, as long as this does not threaten the external aspect of state sovereignty, i.e. the 
territorial integrity of states.  But is the potential status of indigenous peoples as international 
legal subjects also compatible with the internal aspect of state sovereignty, i.e. the state’s right 
to manage its internal affairs?418    
 
The notion that states are sovereign follows from liberalism’s assumption that there can exist 
no pre-fixed laws governing the society pre-dating the emergence of man and the state.  Since 
no law can derive from an authority above states, law that binds states must emanate from 
states.419  In that sense, the principle of state sovereignty represents the basic constitutional 
doctrine of international law.420  The principal understanding of sovereignty is hence straight-
forward.  The state is free to run its internal affairs without outside interference, and to 
determine its relationship with the international community, including to agree/not agree to 
                                                 
414  Cheng, Introduction to Subjects of International Law, pp. 24-25 
415  Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, pp. 59, 63, 77 and 107   
416  Crawford, The Creation of States, pp. 197 and 253, and The right to Self-determination in 
International Law, p. 65.  For a similar opinion, see also Ivison, Patton and Sanders, Political Theory 
and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, p. 14. 
417  Macklem, Indigenous Recognition in International Law, pp. 178-179 
418  Compare Hudson, Fables of Sovereignty, pp. 24-25 and 28-29.   
419  Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, pp. 94-95 and 224, and Raic, Statehood and the Law of 
Self-Determination, p. 26 
420  Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination II, p. 26, and Young, Hybrid 
Democracy, p. 247 
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international legal obligations.  But from this understanding of sovereignty further follows 
that albeit the concept of sovereignty is clear, what more precise powers are included in the 
sovereignty of a particular state vary.  Sovereignty has the capacity to respond to needs and 
interests of the society, and to limit its own applicability.  It is in the process of constant 
erosion, as international law places more and more obligations on states.  Indeed, placing 
limitations on what actions a state can undertake with reference to its sovereignty is the exact 
purpose of international law, not least in the context of human rights.421  In other words, 
sovereignty implies nothing more than that a state shall be free from such outside interference 
in its territory that does not follow from international law.422  Hence, if international law has 
concluded that indigenous peoples hold rights as such, including the right to self-
determination, this does not in any way contradict the internal aspect of state sovereignty – 
jurisdiction.  It simply constitutes another example of state jurisdiction having been limited by 
international law.  At the same time it implies, in the context of self-determination, that the 
self-determining mandate - or the jurisdiction if one wants - of the indigenous people has 
simultaneously expanded.423     
                                                 
421  Cassese, International Law, pp. 98 and 123, Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, pp. 291-293, 
Bianchi, Immunity versus Human Rights, pp. 261 and 265, Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, 
pp. 25-26, Fassbender, The United Nations Charter As Constitution of The International Community, p. 582, 
Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty, pp. 1146-1149, Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of 
Foreign States, p. 394, Hinsley, Sovereignty, p. 219, and Anaya, The Capacity of International Law to Advance 
Ethnic or Nationality Rights Claims, pp. 326-327 
422  Lenzerini, Sovereignty Revisited, pp. 158-160 
423  It has hence been established that indigenous peoples’ rights do not conflict with the liberal principle of state 
sovereignty.  In fact, one could argue that indigenous peoples’ rights conform to the liberal theories 
underpinning the international legal system.  Chapter 2 outlined how social contract theories hold that a state is 
formed by an agreement among any group of men.  But Chapter 3 demonstrated that the notion that a random 
group of men - without uniting ethnic or cultural ties - somehow at some point came together to form a state 
obviously is a fiction.  In fact, it appears more likely that a group of men with some kind of ethnic and cultural 
kinship would enter into a social contract.  Certainly, an ethnic/cultural group knowing that it would constitute a 
vulnerable minority in a state appears to be an unlikely candidate to sign a social contract.  (See Petit, Minority 
Claims under Two Conceptions of Democracy, p. 205, and compare Van Dyke, The Individual, the State and 
Ethnic Communities in Political Theory, p. 45.)  To randomly allow the present order to remain makes little 
sense from a liberal point of view as well.  (Parekh, The Rushdie Affair, p. 310, Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in 
International Law I, p. 183, and Packer, The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, p. 265)   
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Chapter 4 indicated that during the first two decades or so of the indigenous rights discourse, 
indigenous rights were essentially couched in terms of cultural rights and participatory rights.  
Indigenous rights were defined as rights needed to allow indigenous populations to preserve 
and develop their distinct societies and cultures.424  Clearly, when indigenous peoples’ right to 
lands, territories and natural resources are solely thought of in terms of cultural rights, to 
claim rights to such subject matter, indigenous peoples have to demonstrate that lands etc. are 
important to them, should they be able to exercise their culture and/or preserve their cultural 
identity.    
 
More recently, however, indigenous peoples’ rights have increasingly come to be viewed 
through the prism of property rights, particularly in the context of land and recourse rights.  
Claiming property rights to land, the indigenous people need not necessarily show that the 
land is vital to its culture, although that is of course often the case.  Rather, the property rights 
argument is essentially based on the right to non-discrimination.  It asserts that if domestic 
law acknowledges property rights in general to land, having resulted in private title to land of 
the non-indigenous population in non-indigenous territories, then the indigenous peoples shall 
be awarded property rights to its traditional territory too.  It is irrelevant whether the land is 
culturally important or not.  The only criterion having to be met is that the land has been 
traditionally used.  But property rights of indigenous peoples need not necessarily be confined 
to the area of land rights.  As the right to culture applies to both lands and creativity, it 
appears possible to draw an analogy between land rights and rights to collective creativity, 
also in the context of property rights.       
 
The reason why conventional real estate law has denied indigenous peoples rights to land and 
conventional IPRs denied indigenous peoples right to their collective creativity is essentially 
the same.  Both the land rights system and the IPR-system were designed so to fit another 
                                                 
424  As Section 4.6 mentioned, and as the below will elaborate further, ILO 169 Article 14 do operate with 
language seemingly suggesting that indigenous peoples hold property rights to land.  Nonetheless, it appears that 
until at least recently, ILO 169 Article 14 has not been considered in a property rights context. 
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culture, and not apply to indigenous collective land-use/creativity.  In the land rights context, 
this feature of the land rights system can be summarized in the term terra nullius.  Terra 
nullius’ counterpart within the sphere of IPRs is the notion of the public domain.  Section 5.3 
outlines how the doctrine of terra nullius has recently been revoked and indigenous peoples 
hence increasingly awarded property rights to their traditional lands and natural resources.  
Section 5.4 subsequently analyzes whether an analogy can be drawn between these recent 
developments within the sphere of land rights, and the area of collective creativity.  But prior 
to embarking on these analyses, Section 5.2, immediately below, provides a brief overview 
over the basic characteristics of property rights. 
 
5.2 The conventional understanding of the human right to property  
 
5.2.1 Property rights theory 
 
For the present purposes, it is not necessary to embark on a lengthy exposé over the extensive 
discussions within property rights theory.  Still, it is pertinent to briefly touch upon the 
theoretical background, since it has relevance for a proper understanding of the legal right to 
property.  Put simply, property rights can be described as norms that govern access to and 
control of material resources.425  The term “property right” is generally understood as 
embracing a catalogue of rights.426  For the purposes of the doctoral thesis, Waldron’s 
dissection of the right into certain broad categories can serve as a useful illustration of the 
various elements philosophy generally ascribes to the right to property.  Waldron divides the 
right to property into the categories “Immunities against Expropriation”, “Natural property 
rights”, “Eligibility to hold property” and “The general right to have private property”.427  
The two first categories are of less relevance here.  But a comparison of the two latter – which 
are the property rights elements that have attracted by far the most attention – describes well 
the most important dividing line within property rights philosophy.   
 
One school of liberal thinkers argue that individuals should be awarded a positive right to 
have property.  This submission is based on a belief that holding property has a moralizing 
effect on the owner.  It is suggested that having property is necessary for the individual’s 
                                                 
425  Waldron, The Right to Private Property, p. 34 
426  Munzer, A Theory of Property, p. 23 
427  Waldron, The Right to Private Property, pp. 17-24 
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development of a complete identity and personality.  The individual needs certain property to 
be a full person, this school argue.  Proponents of a general right to property hence place 
property rights on an equal footing with other civil rights, holding that property too, is critical 
to the freedom of the individual.428  
 
But far from all political thinkers believe that the right to property should amount to a positive 
right to be provided with property.  A competing property rights theory focuses on the third of 
Waldron’s elements, i.e. “Eligibility to hold property”.  Clearly, this element suggests a 
considerably more modest form of property right, compared with the category “The general 
right to have private property”.  “Eligibility to hold property” merely implies that everyone 
shall have an equal right to acquire property, and that once a property right has been thus 
acquired, it shall be recognized and protected.  If the equal opportunity to acquire property 
results in some individuals holding no property, this does not constitute a problem for 
proponents of this theory.  Thinkers such as Locke and Nozick are commonly associated with 
this school.  They maintain that property rights are special rights occurring as a result of 
special relationships based on contingent events such as original acquisition.429  Put simply, 
two basic schools of theory hence argue about what the right to property should be.  What is 
important for the purposes of the doctoral thesis is, however, what is the right to property 
under international law? 
 
5.2.2 The legal right to property under international law 
 
The right to property was integrated into the contemporary human rights system already at its 
inception.  UDHR Article 17.1 proclaimed that everyone has the right to own property.  
Further, pursuant to Article 17.2, no one must be arbitrarily deprived of property rights she 
has come to hold.  The right to property was also included in the regional human rights 
instruments adopted during this era.  ACHR Article 21.1 recognizes a right to property which 
can only be encroached upon subject to payment of just compensation.  In the same vein, 
Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHRFF proclaims everybody’s right to peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions.  The ECHR has clarified that the phrase “right to peaceful enjoyment of 
                                                 
428  Waldron, The Right to Private Property, pp. 15-56.  Clearly, here one recognizes the basic liberal arguments 
in general, and Rawls’ and Dworkin’s theories on redistribute justice, in particular.  See Chapter 3 and also Lea, 
Property Rights, Indigenous People and the Developing World, pp. 14-15. 
429  Lea, Property Rights, Indigenous People and the Developing World, p. 15, and Waldron, The Right to 
Private Property, pp. 131, 136 and 138   
125 
possessions” shall be understood as a right to property.430  As Section 2.5.3 and 4.8 touched 
upon, the right to property was subsequently codified as a legally binding right through its 
inclusion in the CERD Convention Article 5 (d) (v), pursuant to which states undertake to 
eliminate discrimination e.g. by guaranteeing everyone’s right to own property.  The right to 
property has subsequently been included in a number of international legal instruments  On a 
regional level, in addition to the mentioned American and European instruments, Article 14 of 
the AfCHPR proclaims the right to property, as does the Arab Charter on Human Rights, 
adopted in 1994 (yet to enter into force)431.  The right to property is today generally 
considered to form part of customary international law.432   
 
The definition of the right to property in the above mentioned instruments answers which of 
the two position submitted on the nature of the right to property within political philosophy 
has prevailed in international law.  The right to property recognized in international law is the 
right to acquire property on an equal basis, and, once property has been thus acquired, a right 
not to be arbitrarily deprived of the same.433  The right to property encompasses no right to be 
provided with property.  In other words, if returning to Waldron’s vocabulary, international 
law on property rights embraces the element “eligibility to Hold Property” but not a “general 
right to have property”.434  International law takes a positivist approach towards property 
rights, as long as domestic law is not discriminatory.   Consequently, a domestic legal system 
need not recognize private property rights.  But if it does so, the property right must apply 
without discrimination.  In other words, the right to property is essentially a particular aspect 
of the right to non-discrimination.     
                                                 
430  Marckx v. Belgium, Appl. No. 6833/74, Judgement of 13 June 1979 
431  International Human Rights Reporter, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1997), pp. 850-857, Article 25 
432  Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law II, p. 105 
433  See also Krause, the Right to Property, pp. 191-192.   
434  Surprisingly little is written on the meaning of the right to property under international law in the legal 
doctrine.  It appears that it is simply taken for granted that the right to property is merely a right to protection of 
acquired, and not a right to have, property.  For instance, Lillich has pointed out that during the drafting of 
UDHR Article 17, it was held self-evident that decisions on ownership of property are subject to national law.  
Hence, there was no need to explicitly affirm this fact in UDHR Article 17.  See Global Protection of Human 
Rights, p. 157.  Similarly, Waldron observes that probably no state constitution has embraced a positive right to 
hold property and that the UDHR protects merely the right to acquire property on an equal basis with other 
citizens.  See The Right to Private Property, pp. 21-24.  
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5.3 Particularly on property rights pertaining to indigenous lands 
 
5.3.1 The rejection of the terra nullius doctrine 
 
The above concluded that the right to property embraces no positive obligations on states to 
recognize property rights.  But this limitation does not render the right to property irrelevant 
to the indigenous rights discourse.  Section 4.8 described how the right to non-discrimination 
has recently evolved to take on additional understandings.  And as seen, the right to property 
is essentially an aspect of the right to non-discrimination.     
 
Section 4.8 explained how the right to non-discrimination has gradually evolved to demand 
respect for cultural differences of groups.  Similarly, the terra nullius regime – and more 
importantly its effects - has been denounced in steps.  First, international law rejected the 
terra nullius doctrine as scientifically false.  For instance, in the Western Sahara Case, the 
ICJ held that occupation is not a valid manner to acquire title to land if the land area in 
question is indeed inhabited.  Consent is needed.  Notably, the Court underlined that an area is 
not inhabited for legal purposes simply because its inhabitants are being perceived by some as 
primitive, or in wanting of a governmental structure.  Some form of social and political 
organization is sufficient, the ICJ held.  The ICJ’s ruling was significant because it clarified 
that the land area in dispute was not terra nullius because of “only” being used by nomadic 
Saharan tribes upon the arrival of the Spaniards.  At the same time, the Western Sahara Case 
did not as such contribute to the indigenous rights discourse.  Having concluded that the land 
did not constitute terra nullius, the ICJ did not hold that the Saharan tribes who had used the 
land could claim right to the area in question.  Rather, the Court found that there existed a link 
between the tribes and the Sherifian State, the predecessor to modern Morocco, wherefore 
Morocco could rely on the tribes’ land use to claim the area.435       
 
Subsequently, however, the terra nullius doctrine has been rejected also in the explicit context 
of indigenous peoples.  In fact, the Supreme Court of Canada denounced the doctrine already 
in the 1973 Cader Case,436 and has since repeated its position on numerous occasions.437  
                                                 
435  Western Sahara Case, 1975 I.C.J. 12.  Regarding these aspects of the Western Sahara Case, see also 
Castellino, Territorial Integrity and the “Right” to Self-Determination, pp. 517, 535-536.  
436  Cader v. AG BC [1973] SCR 313 
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Similarly, in the famous Mabo Case438, the High Court of Australia also broke with the terra 
nullius doctrine, and courts in the United States too have delivered judgements denouncing 
the doctrine.439  On the African Continent, the Constitutional Court of South Africa has 
expressed the general sentiment well.  The Court concluded that given that the indigenous 
populations had occupied their traditional land since time immemorial, failing to recognize 
their ownership to the land “was racially discriminatory against … indigenous land owners”.  
The Court further elaborated that “the racial discrimination lay in the failure to recognize … 
indigenous … ownership while, on the other hand, according protection to registered title[s]” 
of the non-indigenous population.440  Also the legal doctrine has concluded that international 
law has firmly rejected the terra nullius doctrine.441    
 
5.3.2 Indigenous peoples’ property rights to lands continuously used 
 
But even if the terra nullius doctrine has formally been rejected, states have in most instances 
in practice continued to rely on the historical legacy of the doctrine.  State laws and policies 
still tend to treat indigenous peoples’ traditional territories as the property of the state. Often 
the state offers no justification for this position and opts to ignore the questionable legal basis 
on which it claims rights to indigenous territories.442  Alternatively, it relies on formal 
positivism.  The state may concede that as a theory, the terra nullius doctrine is difficult to 
justify.  But the state still maintains that be that as it may, the doctrine nonetheless resulted in 
law, and that law is valid until substituted by a new law.  Hence, it concludes, whatever 
ownership rights indigenous peoples might historically have possessed over their traditional 
land, those rights have been erased.443  Recent developments in international law, however, 
suggest that the state can no longer rely on the legacy of the terra nullius doctrine to deny 
indigenous peoples’ rights to their traditional territories.  
                                                                                                                                                        
437  See e.g. Guerin v. The Queen, 13 D.I.R (4th) 321 (1984), R. v. Sparrow, 70 D.I.R. (4th) 385 (1990), and 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 3 Supreme Court Reports (1997).  See also Allen, The Right to Property in 
Commonwealth Constitutions, pp. 24-26.     
438  Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 C.L.R.  The Mabo Case was followed by a similar ruling n Wik. V. 
Queensland (1996) 187 C.L.R. 1.  
439  See e.g. United States v. Lara, 19 April 2004, 541, U.S. 193 (2004). 
440  Alexkor Ltd. & Another v. Richtersveld Cmty. & Others, 2003 (5) SA 460 (CC) (S. Afr.), in particular paras. 
96, 99 and 103. 
441  Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty, p. 1154, Lenzerini, Sovereignty Revisited, p. 167, Macklem, Indigenous 
Recognition in International Law, pp. 184-185, Tully, The Struggles of Indigenous Peoples for and of Freedoms, 
p. 54, Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, p. 111, and Castellino, The Right 
to Land, International Law & Indigenous Peoples, pp. 92-101 
442  Ivison, Patton and Sanders, Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, p. 12 
443  Anaya, Divergent Discourses About International Law, pp. 244-245.   
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Already the ILO 169 indicated a development towards recognition of indigenous peoples’ 
property rights to land.  Pursuant to ILO 169 Article 14.1, “The right to ownership and 
possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be 
recognized.  In addition, measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the right 
of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they 
have traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional activities.”  The wording of 
Article 14.1 clearly suggests that indigenous peoples hold ownership rights to lands 
continuously used exclusively, or almost exclusively, by them and usufruct rights to lands 
they today share with the majority population.  Still, states appear to have been reluctant to 
acknowledge that indigenous peoples could invoke Article 14.1 to claim ownership rights to 
land.  It has been submitted that despite that Article 14.1 unambiguously refers to “right to 
ownership”, it is sufficient that the indigenous people enjoy secured continued use to the land 
in question for the state to be in conformity with the provision.  Formal recognition of 
ownership rights is not necessary, it has been asserted.444  In other words, despite formulated 
as a property rights provision, states preferred to view the Article 14.1 as enshrining “only” a 
cultural right.  With such an interpretation, Article 14.1 obliges states to ensure that 
indigenous peoples can continuously pursue traditional livelihoods and other culturally 
significant land and resource based activities in general.  But they need not necessarily 
recognize property rights to any specific land area.  ILO 169 Article 14.1 conventionally 
being viewed through the prism of cultural rights should come as no surprise.  As mentioned 
above, at the time of the adoption of the ILO 169, indigenous land rights were essentially 
solely couched in terms of cultural rights.  Hence, despite the adoption of ILO 169, the notion 
that indigenous peoples hold property rights to their traditional territories continued to meet 
resistance.  But, as indicated above, the land rights discourse has evolved since the adoption 
of ILO 169.   
 
Sections 4.8 and 4.9 concluded that it is probably premature to infer that the CERD 
Committee’s submission that the right to non-discrimination formally applies to indigenous 
peoples as peoples have been firmly established in international law.  These Sections further 
concluded, however, that for all practical purposes, the right to non-discrimination has 
evolved to take on an aspect implying that indigenous peoples have a positive right to respect 
                                                 
444  Tomei and Swepston, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples: a guide to the ILO Convention No. 169 
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for their cultural distinctiveness.  The right to non-discrimination has evolved to provide for 
more than formal equality.  There must also be equality in practice.   
 
The evolved understanding of the right to non-discrimination should have direct implications 
for the right to property, since, as noted, the right to property is essentially a right to non-
discrimination. Consequently, viewed through the prism of a contemporary understanding of 
the right to non-discrimination, it should no longer be sufficient that domestic real estate law 
is formally non-discriminatory.  There should be equal treatment in fact.  Under the 
conventional understanding of the right to non-discrimination, domestic land rights policies 
awarding all individuals an equal opportunity to acquire property rights to land based on 
individual land use common to the majority population complied with the law.  But today, to 
the extent domestic law and policies recognizes property rights to land in general, such law 
must, it would seem to follow from the evolved understanding of the right to non-
discrimination, provide for equal treatment also in practice, taking cultural differences 
between different spheres of society into account.  Also property rights laws and policies that 
are formally neutral might be regarded as discriminatory, if favouring the regular behaviour of 
one segment of society.  For instance, it would seem to be discriminatory to design a domestic 
legal system awarding property rights to land based on stationary use common to the non-
indigenous population, but not to the more fluctuating land use common to the indigenous 
people.  In conclusion, it logically follows from the evolved understanding of the right to non-
discrimination that indigenous peoples hold property rights to lands, territories and natural 
resources traditionally used and/or occupied.  And this conclusion has also been firmly 
confirmed in international legal sources on property rights. 
 
First, one can again recall CERD Committee’s General Recommendation No. 23’s 
proclamation that indigenous peoples being deprived of their traditional lands constitutes a 
specific form of discrimination directed against them.  Further, the General Recommendation 
calls on states to “recognize and protect the rights of indigenous peoples to own, develop 
[and] control” their lands and natural resources.  In other words, the Committee underlined 
that general right to property enshrined in CERD Article 5 (d) (v) apply also to indigenous 
peoples’ collective land use.  The CERD Committee has repeated this interpretation of Article 
5 (d) (v) in various country specific observations.  For instance, the Committee has with 
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reference to General Recommendation No. 23 called on Sri Lanka to recognize and protect 
the Veddas people’s right to own their communal lands and natural resources.445   
 
Further, the CESC has recently interpreted the CESCR to embrace a right of indigenous 
peoples to deny access to natural resources situated on their traditional territory.446  A right to 
deny access is of course a central element of the right to property.  Highlighting that it was a 
property right it proclaimed, the Committee underlined that the natural resources need not be 
culturally significant for the right to free, prior and informed consent to apply.  Further, in 
2009, the CESC explicitly declared that indigenous peoples have rights to lands and natural 
resources traditionally occupied and/or used and called on states to respect the rights of 
indigenous peoples to own and control such lands and resources.447 
 
These findings of UN treaty bodies have been affirmed by regional international legal 
sources.  The IACHR and the IACommHR have recently interpreted the property rights 
provisions in the ADRDM and the ACHR as enveloping a right of indigenous peoples’ to 
lands and resources traditionally used.448  In the ground-breaking Awas Tingni Case, the 
IACHR articulated that the right to property enshrined in the Inter-America human rights 
instruments – albeit formulated as an individual right - embraces also indigenous peoples’ 
right to communal property.  The Court observed that in indigenous cultures, ownership is not 
centred in the individual, but rather vest in the community.  The IACHR underlined that such 
rights arise from the indigenous people’s traditional communal occupation and use of the land 
area in question.  Thus, the Court concluded, indigenous peoples enjoy property rights to 
lands and natural resources traditionally used.  The IACHR underlined that the right applies 
                                                 
445    Concluding Observations A/56/18(SUPP), para 335.  See also Concluding observations on Suriname, 
CERD/C/64/CO/9, para. 11, on Mexico, CERD/C/MEX/CO 15), and on Botswana, A/51/18/ (SUPP), in 
particular paras. 304-305.  
446  Concluding Observations on Ecuador, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/add.100, para. 12, and Concluding 
Observations on Columbia, UN Doc. E/EC.12/Add.74, para. 12 
447  CESC General Comment No. 21, para. 36 
448  In fact, the IACommHR already in 1985 recognized that the indigenous Yanomami people in Brazil 
hold collective rights to their traditional territories.  It is doubtful, however, whether the Commission 
had property rights proper in mind when ruling in the Yanomami Case.  In line with the general 
understanding of indigenous peoples’ land rights during this era, the IACommHR’s focus seems 
rather to have been on the importance of continued access to traditional lands as a pre-requisite for 
indigenous peoples being able to preserve and develop their cultural identity.  See Yanomami 
Community v. Brazil, Case 7615, decision of 5 March 1985, p. 31.   
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irrespective of whether the state has recognized that the indigenous people hold formal title to 
the area in dispute.449   
 
The Inter-American Human Rights institutions have subsequently confirmed and elaborated 
on the ruling in the Awas Tingni Case in numerous cases.  The IACommHR has concluded 
that under international human rights law, the Maya communities in the Toledo District in 
Belize hold property rights to lands and natural resources traditionally used.450  Similarly, in 
the Dann Sisters Case, the IACommHR held that “general international legal principles 
applicable to indigenous human rights encompass a right for indigenous peoples of 
recognition of their property and ownership right with respect to lands, territories and 
resources they have traditionally occupied”.451  The IACHR has subsequently confirmed this 
position in a number of cases, most recently in a very clear and concrete manner in Saramaka 
People v. Suriname.452       
 
The extensive jurisprudence on indigenous peoples’ property rights to land emanating from 
the Inter-American system has not been matched by equally many cases in other regions.  
This is only natural since, the American Continent is unique in that the vast majority of 
America states both host indigenous populations and recognize these as indigenous peoples.  
But although the case law is less numerous, it is clear that other regional human rights 
institutions share the Inter-American human rights institutions’ position on indigenous 
peoples’ property rights to land.  Recently, the AfCommHPR got the opportunity to address 
indigenous peoples’ property rights to land in Endorois People v. Kenya.  Doing so, the 
AfCommHPR took the position of its American counterpart and - with explicit reference to 
the IACHR’s ruling in the Saramaka Case - held that the Endorois people have property 
rights to its traditional land.453  Already prior to the ruling in the Endorois Case, the 
AfCommHPR’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities had 
interpreted the AfCPHR as protecting indigenous peoples’ property rights to lands and natural 
resources traditionally occupied.  The Working Group concluded that the land alienation and 
dispossession of indigenous peoples from their traditional lands and natural resources 
                                                 
449  Awas Tingni Case, para. 149.  Regarding the Awas Tingni Case, see further Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in 
International Law II, pp. 145-146, and Binder, The Case of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua, pp. 249-251.    
450  Maya indigenous communities of the Toledo District. v. Belize, Case 12.053, decision on October 12, 2004 
451  Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States, Case No. 11.140, decision on December 27, 2002, para. 130    
452  Saramaka People v. Suriname, Ser. C, No. 172.  See also e.g. Moiwana village v. Suriname, Ser. C, No. 145.  
453  Endorois People v Kenya, Case 276/2003, in particular paras. 214-215.  It is worth noting that the 
AfCommHPR explicitly referred to the Endorois as an indigenous people.  See e.g. para. 226 
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constitutes a serious violation of the African Charter’s provisions proclaiming all peoples’ 
right to their natural resources and property.454  In Europe, in a recent finding the ECommHR 
held that in principle, traditional communal Saami land use is protected as a property right 
under Additional Protocol 1, albeit on the merits finding the particular claim inadmissible.455  
International legal sources on indigenous peoples’ property rights to land have in the recent 
years also been reflected in domestic jurisprudence.  In addition to the cases referred to in 
Section 5.3.1, reference can in particular be made to cases emanating out of Belize, Botswana 
and New Zealand.456      
 
In conclusion, international law has firmly embraced that indigenous peoples hold property 
rights to territories traditionally and continuously used.  The right is not an outcome of what 
Waldron labels a “General right to hold property”.  Property rights to land have not been 
awarded because of being deemed important to indigenous peoples’ cultural identity.  Rather, 
UN bodies and courts have interpreted property rights in the meaning “Eligibility to hold 
property” in a contemporary manner.   The property right endorsed by international law is still 
a theory of historical entitlement, only with a contemporary view on who are historically 
entitled.457   
 
Notably, the evolved understanding of the right to property deviates significantly from the 
wording of CERD Convention Article 5 (d) (v), which seems to proclaim a property right for 
individuals only.  Hence, also with regard to property rights, we see how international law has 
progressed to recognize a collective dimension in a right that was traditionally understood to 
be purely individual.  As noted above, this development is natural, given that the right to 
property is essentially a right to non-discrimination.  Still, the right to property having 
                                                 
454 Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities, 
adopted by the AfCommHPR at its 28th ordinary session (2005), paras. 20-22 
455  Case of Handölsdalen Sami Village and Others v. Sweden, Appl. No. 39013/04   
456  Aurelio Cal v. Attorney General of Belize, Supreme Court, Claim 121/2007, Judgement of 18 October 
2007, para. 127, The Kalahari Game Reserve Case.  High Court of Botswana, Misca. No. 52 of 2002, of 13 
December 2006, New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General [1987] 1 N.Z.L.R. 641 and Te Runaga o 
Wharekuari Rekkohu Inc. v. Attorney-General [1993] 2 N.Z.L.R.  Particularly noteworthy is the Supreme 
Court in Belize’s observation that customary international law requires Belize to respect the rights of its 
indigenous peoples to lands and natural resources traditionally used. 
457  See also Anaya, The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination in the Post-Declaration Era, p. 193, 
where he observes that the recent developments acknowledging property rights to land of indigenous peoples can 
be seen as deriving from the general right to property.  The recent developments in international law also imply 
that one should now probably reinterpret the understanding of ILO 169 Article 14.1 to give the provision a 
meaning that is more in line with its wording.  See also Lenzerini, Sovereignty Revisited, p. 179, where he 
argues that the ILO 169 proclaims property rights to land. 
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evolved in parallel with the right to self-determination, the right to culture and the right to 
non-discrimination supports Chapter 4’s conclusions that these developments are mutually 
supportive in favour of the existence of collective rights of indigenous peoples.     
 
5.3.3 The right to restitution – including benefit-sharing 
 
International law has hence confirmed that indigenous peoples hold property rights to lands 
traditionally and continuously used.  But what about lands traditionally used by indigenous 
peoples, but which have been deprived in colonization processes or through other means?  
Does the evolved understanding of the right to property also embrace a right of indigenous 
peoples to have those lands retuned? 
 
The ILO 169 encompasses no provision proclaiming a right of indigenous peoples to 
restitution with regard to lands taken without consent.  ILO 169 Articles 13-15 speak only of 
lands and natural resources indigenous peoples continuously use.458  Still, the ILO Secretariat 
has, in its guide to the ILO 169, asserted that the Convention’s land-rights provisions should 
be understood as entailing at least a limited right to restitution, provided that the present day 
indigenous society maintain some connection to the land area in question, for instance when 
an indigenous group has relatively recent been expelled from the territory in dispute.459  It is 
uncertain, however, to what extent states have accepted this assertion by the ILO Secretariat.  
In any event, the right to restitution the ILO Secretariat reads into ILO 169 is clearly a very 
limited one.  Some other international legal sources do, however, proclaim a more general 
right to restitution.   
 
The HRC has, in the context of indigenous peoples, interpreted CCPR Article 27 to under 
certain circumstances embrace a right to restitution with regard to lands taken from 
                                                 
458  ILO 169 Article 16.3 might at first glance be understood as setting forth a right to restitution.  Pursuant to 
this provision, indigenous peoples have a right to return to lands taken without their consent. Article 16.4 adds 
that when this is not possible, indigenous peoples should – if at all feasible - be provided with lands equal in size 
and quality as a compensation for their loss.  On a closer reading, however, it is clear that Articles 16.3-4 are 
limited to apply to situations when indigenous peoples have been forcefully removed from their traditional 
territories pursuant to Article 16.2, as an exception to the general prohibition of forceful reallocation put forward 
by Article 16.1.  In other words, the right to restitution enshrined in Articles 16.3-4 applies only to situations 
when lands have been taken in accordance with Articles 16.2, subsequent to the state’s ratification of ILO 169.  
Thus understood, the provision lacks retroactive effect. 
459  Tomei and Swepston, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples: a guide to the ILO Convention No. 169, p. 31   
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indigenous peoples without their consent.460  The CERD Committee has in General 
Recommendation No. 23, explicitly opined that indigenous peoples’ property rights to land 
envelope a right to restitution.  The Committee calls on states to “where [indigenous peoples] 
have been deprived of their lands and territories traditionally owned or otherwise inhabited 
or used without their free and informed consent, to take steps to return those lands and 
territories”.  Further, the Committee asserts, when restitution is not feasible, compensation 
should be awarded, if possible in the form of lands and territories.461  The CERD Committee’s 
confirmation that the implementation of the right to non-discrimination might demand action 
that addresses past injustices is significant.  As outlined above, indigenous peoples’ property 
rights to lands and natural resources are founded precisely on the right to non-discrimination.  
The CESC has recently echoed the observations of the CERD Committee, proclaiming that 
when indigenous lands have become inhabited or otherwise used by the non-indigenous 
population without the free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous people, states shall 
“take steps to return these lands and territories”.462   
 
Section 5.3 described how UN treaty bodies’ findings that indigenous peoples hold property 
rights to lands continuously occupied and/or used by them have been matched by a broad 
body of jurisprudence from regional and domestic courts.  The same has not been the case 
with regard to the right to restitution.  There seems to be essentially no instance where a 
regional court has called on states to return land to indigenous peoples taken without their 
consent.463  Neither is there any other evidence of that a right to restitution has been accepted 
as law.  Despite the treaty bodies’ coherent position, the doctoral thesis therefore refrains 
from – at this point - concluding that indigenous peoples’ right to restitution of lands, 
territories and natural resources have been firmly established in international law.        
 
In the context of restitution, one must also note the issue of benefit-sharing in the context of 
extraction of natural resources by non-members on indigenous peoples’ traditional territories.  
                                                 
460 Concluding observations on Guatemala, CCPR/CO/72/GTM, para. 29.  Article 27 is of course a cultural 
rights provision.  Notwithstanding, it is noteworthy that the HRC has recognized the principle of a right to 
restitution of indigenous peoples. 
461  General Recommendation No. 23, para. 5 
462  CESC General Comment No. 21, para. 36.  On a regional level, the right to restitution is also enshrined in 
ACHPR Article 21.2.  However, similarly to the ILO 169 Article 16, it appears that AfCHPR Article 21 provides 
for a right to restitution only when lands have been taken subsequent to the ratification of the Convention.  The 
AfCHPR too, hence seems to lack retroactive effect. 
463  One can note, however, that AfCommHPR member Pityana has noted that the wording of AfCHPR Article 
21 pertaining to natural resources bears a striking resemblance with the corresponding provision of the [then 
draft] DRIP (i.e. Article 28).  See Pityana, The challenge of culture for human rights in Africa, p. 232. 
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Benefit-sharing does of course not constitute restitution in the full meaning of the right.  It 
embraces no right of indigenous peoples to regain control over lost territories.   But benefit-
sharing could be labelled partial restitution, since it implies that a certain amount of the 
proceeds from natural resource extraction from territories no longer fully controlled by 
indigenous peoples, but that still are traditionally theirs, shall be returned to those peoples.   
 
A right of indigenous peoples to share in profits from resource extraction does not follow 
from any international legal instrument, and is not enshrined in many other international legal 
sources either.  However, regional human rights institutions addressing indigenous peoples’ 
property rights to land have recently held that indigenous peoples have a right to share in the 
benefits from extraction of natural resource emanating from lands traditionally used by them, 
but no longer under their control.464  In addition, in essentially all Western countries with 
recognized indigenous peoples, a practice has been established or is emerging that indigenous 
peoples are entitled to benefit sharing when resources are extracted for industrial purposes 
from their territories.465    Clearly, based on these limited legal sources, one cannot conclude 
that a right to benefit-sharing has been established in international law.  Notwithstanding, the 
trend towards acceptance of such a right is evident.     
 




Section 5.3 hence concluded that contemporary international law – viewed in the light of an 
emerged understanding of the right to non-discrimination - embraces a right to property of 
indigenous peoples to lands and natural resources traditionally and continuously used.  The 
Section further inferred that a right to restitution with regard to lands traditionally used, but 
subsequently unjustly taken is at least emerging.  This Section now surveys to what extent 
international law has progressed in a similar manner within the sphere of collective creativity.  
On one hand, it would not be surprising if international law on collective creativity lags 
behind that pertaining to land.  After all, land rights have been in the forefront since the 
inception of the indigenous rights discourse.  In contrast, the international community has at a 
                                                 
464  See e.g. the Saramaka Case, Ser. C No. 172 and Endorois People v Kenya, Case 276/2003, para. 294 
465  ADHR (Arctic Human Development Report) 2004, Akureyri: Stefansson Arctic Institute, pp.132-134, and 
Apirana Mahuika et al v. New Zealand, Comm. No. 547/1993  
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much later stage begun to focus on TK, TCEs etc.  But on the other hand, Section 5.3 has 
demonstrated how the terra nullius doctrine has recently been rejected.  As indicated, it 
appears that the terra nullius doctrine traditionally has had a similar impact on indigenous 
peoples’ lands as the notion of the public domain has had on their collective creativity.  
Perhaps this poses the question of whether the notion of the public domain - as applied to 
indigenous peoples’ collective creativity - should be rejected too?   
 
In order to survey whether international law recognizes a property right of indigenous peoples 
over their collective creativity, this Section first offers a very brief and generalizing overview 
over the structure of the IP-system.  It is underlined that the doctoral thesis does not purport to 
provide any detailed insight into the complex IPR-mechanisms.  For the present purposes, a 
general understanding of the most basic features of the IP-system is sufficient.  Particular 
attention is given to copyrights, patents and trademarks, as the most central IPRs.466  These 
rights are also the IPRs most often mentioned in the context of protection of indigenous 
peoples’ collective creativity.  Once the basic features of the IP-system have been outlined, 
the Section turns to investigating how well these features correspond with the general 
characteristics of indigenous peoples’ collective creativity.  The Section subsequently 
analyzes whether there are any differences between land, on one hand, and collective 
creativity, on the other, suggesting that international law should not extend property right 
protection also to collective creativity.  Finally, the Section surveys whether international 
legal sources suggest that indigenous peoples hold property rights to their collective 
creativity.    
           
5.4.2 The basic features of conventional IPRs 
 
IPRs has been described as a bundle of interests vested in the owner of the IPR, who has the 
capacity to authorize or prevent others from acting in a specific manner with regard to the 
IPR.467  That said, IPRs are rarely absolute or indefinite.  Most IPRs are designed with an aim 
                                                 
466  Dutfield and Suthersanen, Global Intellectual Property Law, p. 13 
467  Cullet et al, Intellectual Property Rights, Plant Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge, p. 113.  For 
instance, Carpenter defines copyrights as the granting of an exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, perform and 
display the work publicly.  See Intellectual Property Law and Indigenous Peoples, pp. 57-58.  And patents have 
been described as exclusionary rights over an invention which can be converted into a market monopoly.  Once 
established, the patent prevents others from using, producing or selling the invention.  See Dutfield and 
Suthersanen, Global Intellectual Property Law, pp.110-111.  Trademarks serve essentially two purposes.  First, a 
trademark identifies a product to buyers and users, assuring them that the origin of the product is what they 
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to maximize creativity.  The legislator seeks to achieve this end by awarding a creator 
sufficient, but not more, remuneration from her work.  Once the creator has been duly 
compensated, others shall be allowed to build on her work.468  In other words, law and 
economics aspects underpin the structure of the IP-system.469  As a result of this basic 
rationale behind the IPR-system, with few exceptions, IPRs eventually expire and the work 
end up in the so called public domain.470  In other words, the public domain is designed and 
defined with the intention to promote efficient economic growth.471  
 
In addition to the limited term of protection, in particular two other basic features of IPRs are 
particularly relevant for the purposes of the doctoral thesis.  First, generally speaking, for a 
work to be eligible for IP-protection, it must be sufficiently new.  In other words, the creator 
must add some kind of “value” to the bulk of previously existing creativity.472  Second, a 
                                                                                                                                                        
expect it to be.  Second, trademarks protect the creator of a product from illicit reproducing by others.  See 
Dutfield and Suthersanen, Global Intellectual Property Law, pp. 138-139 and 141-146.   
468  Fishner, Theories of Intellectual Property, p. 169, Geroski, Markets for Technology, p. 97, Drahos, The 
Universality of Intellectual Property Rights, p. 13, and Intellectual Property and Human Rights, p. 350, Lea, 
Property Rights, Indigenous Peoples and the Developing World, pp. 220 and 227, and Dutfield and Suthersanen, 
Global Intellectual Property Law, pp. 48, 51-53, 75 and 110     
469  Cohen, Copyright, Commodification and Culture, p. 138 
470  Sterling, World Copyright Law, pp. 193-194.  For instance, once the work has been disclosed to a wider 
public, copyright protection is normally awarded for 50-70 years following the death of the author.  See Lucas-
Schloetter, Folklore, pp. 389, and Dutfield and Suthersanen, Global Intellectual Property Law, pp. 79-80 and 97.  
Design protection is often described as a particular form of copyright.  Design protection, however, has an even 
shorter life-span, than copyrights.  It is normally valid for 10-25 years.  See Dutfield and Suthersanen, Global 
Intellectual Property Law, pp. 169-174.  Patent protection is normally valid for 20 years, from the filing for 
registration.  See Dutfield and Suthersanen, Global Intellectual Property Law, pp. 112-113 and 128.  A particular 
form of patent-similar protection has been extended to plant varieties.  But as a specific form of patents, plant 
variety protection is subject to the same time-limitations as patents.  See Dutfield and Suthersanen, Global 
Intellectual Property Law, pp. 187-191.  Trademarks, on the other hand, differ from copyrights and patents in 
that protection can last in perpetuity, once the trademark has been duly registered. 
471  Chander and Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, p. 1340 
472  For instance, for a work to be eligible for copyright protection, it must meet what is normally labelled the 
originality criterion.  For a work to be considered original, it must sufficiently distinguish itself from already 
existing works.  There is no universal definition of the originality criterion.  Generally speaking, however, the 
threshold is not set particularly high.  When it is clear that the creator has made some form of personal input 
beyond existing works, and it is unlikely that another creator independently would have come up with the same 
creation, the work is normally eligible for copyright protection.  The originality criterion does not demand that 
the work be of certain quality, or useful.  See Carpenter, Intellectual Property Law and Indigenous Peoples, p. 
69, and Dutfield and Suthersanen, Global Intellectual Property Law, pp. 79-80.  Similarly, for an invention to be 
eligible for patent protection, it needs to meet a novelty criterion.  For two reasons, however, the novelty 
criterion under patent law is more demanding compared with the originality criterion applying to copyrights.  
First, a greater degree of novelty is necessary to achieve a patent, compared with copyrights.  An inventor can be 
inspired by, but must not unduly build on, previous inventions for the invention to be patentable.  Still, the test is 
not too demanding.  It is sufficient that the invention is not obvious to a person skilled in the particular field.  
Second, unlike the originality criterion, the novelty criterion demands that an invention be of a certain quality.  
The invention must have at least some kind of use.  See Cullet et al, Intellectual Property Rights, Plant Genetic 
Resources and Traditional Knowledge, pp. 125-126, and Dutfield and Suthersanen, Global Intellectual Property 
Law, pp. 120-123.  Trademarks, on the other hand, need not include any level of originality.  Any kind of mark 
can be trademarked, as long as it cannot be confused with previously existing marks.  But a trademark must 
normally be a commercial purpose.  See Carpenter, Intellectual Property Law and Indigenous Peoples, p. 76. 
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creator of a work must normally be known for the work to be eligible for IP-protection.  That 
is not to say that the creation cannot be a collective effort.  Artists, inventors etc. collaborating 
to create a work does not per se deprive the work of its protectability.  But even if many, the 
creators behind a work must be identifiable.473  If not, the work is normally not eligible for IP-
protection. 
 
5.4.3 Moral rights and liability regimes 
 
Moral rights 
In particular in jurisdictions based on the Roman law tradition474, it has been traditional to 
bestow a creator of a work with, in addition to economic rights, certain non-monetary moral 
rights.  The basic idea behind these rights is to protect the author beyond her mere economic 
interests, and also see to her identity, personality and reputation.475  The most commonly 
recognized moral rights are the rights of the creator to (i) determine when, if at all, a work 
should be made public, (ii) e associated with her work, and (iii) protection against distortions 
of the work.  The latter right awards the creator a right to object to mutilations or other 
modifications of the work, or to derogatory action with regard to the work that would be 
prejudicial to the creator’s honour or reputation.476  Whether something constitutes a 
distortion or derogatory action must be determined based on the subjective opinion of the 
creator of the work.477   
 
Due to their nature, moral rights distinguish themselves from the economic rights in certain 
respects.  For instance, moral rights are generally inalienable from the creator of a work and 
                                                 
473  Lea, Property Rights, Indigenous People and the Developing World, p. 263.  For instance, copyright 
protection can only be awarded to an identified creator (or creators).  The work cannot be anonymous.  
Copyright protection need not, however, be awarded to the creator of a work.  If the creator of a work is 
unknown, and the work has not been disclosed to the general public, copyright protection can be achieved by 
anyone who finds the work, and makes it available to the public.  Also with regard to patents, for a work to be 
eligible for protection the creator (or creators) of the work must be identifiable.  Again, however, trademark 
protection deviates from copyrights and patents.  Trademarks need not be identified to a particular creator.  
Anyone can file for trademark-registration, as long as the general criteria are met.  See Brown, Who Owns 
Native Culture?, p. 76. 
474  Common law jurisdictions have traditionally been more sceptical, or even outright hostile, towards the notion 
of moral rights.  See Dutfield and Suthersanen, Global Intellectual Property Law, p. 27.  Graham and McJohn 
notes, however, with reference to Brown, that with time, moral rights have become increasingly acknowledged 
also in jurisdictions such as the one of United States.  See Indigenous Peoples and Intellectual Property.   
475  von Lewinski, International Copyright Law and Policy, p. 50  
476  Lucas-Schloetter, Folklore, pp. 390-391, von Lewinski, International Copyright Law and Policy, pp. 51-52 
and 133-137 and Carpenter, Intellectual Property Law and Indigenous Peoples, p. 73.   
477  von Lewinski, International Copyright Law and Policy, pp. 134 
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can hence not be transferred.  Further, moral rights tend to last in perpetuity.478  This also 
implies that moral rights can continue to pertain to the creator even if the economic rights in a 
work have been transferred to a person other than the creator of the work.479   
 
At least at first blush, it would appear that moral rights can offer certain protection to cultural 
elements springing from indigenous cultures.  Certainly, the focus on protection of the 
identity of the author and the indefinite term of protection should appeal to indigenous 
peoples.480  At the same time, one should note that a limitation in conventional moral rights 
protection is that, for moral rights to apply at all, the cultural element must first meet the 
regular criteria to be legible for IP-protection.481  As the next Section shall turn the doctoral 
thesis’ attention to, this is not always an easy task for elements of indigenous peoples’ 
collective creativity.  The thesis shall further discuss the potential relevance of moral rights to 
the protection of indigenous peoples’ collective creativity shortly below and in Chapter 9.   
 
Liability regimes 
The above has explained that generally speaking, IPRs are exclusive rights granting the 
creator of a work essentially complete control over the work.  This regular feature of IP-
protection is generally referred to as property regimes.  In certain instances, however, IPRs do 
not offer such an embracing protection.  In addition to property regimes, the IP-system 
sometimes operates with what has been labelled “liability regimes”.  Liability regimes do not 
offer a complete protection to the creator over her work.  Liability regimes allow others to use 
the work, but demand that the user in return pay a fee to the holder of the work.  A liability 
regime approach can hence be perceived as offering a compromise position between the 
public domain and absolute IPRs.  Translated into an indigenous context, a liability regime 
would hence deny an indigenous people the possibility to prevent use of its collective 
creativity.  In return, however, the liability regime ensures the indigenous people monetary 
compensation when cultural elements springing from its culture are used by non-members.482  
                                                 
478  Drahos, The Universality of Intellectual Property Rights, p. 8, Dutfield and Suthersanen, Global Intellectual 
Property Law, pp. 75-76 and 89-90, Cullet et al, Intellectual Property Rights, Plant Genetic Resources and 
Traditional Knowledge, pp. 113 and 128, Cottier and Panizzon, A New Generation of IPR for the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge, p. 227, von Lewinski, International Copyright Law and Policy, pp. 53, and Brown, Who 
Owns Native Culture?, p. 56 
479  von Lewinski, International Copyright Law and Policy, p. 133 
480  Compare Lucas-Schloetter, Folklore, pp. 390-392 
481  Lucas-Schloetter, Folklore, p. 392 
482  Chander and Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, pp. 1369-1370, and Dutfield and Suthersanen, 
Global Intellectual Property Law, p. 346 
140 
The doctoral thesis will return to the relevance of liability regimes to the protection of 
indigenous peoples’ collective creativity shortly too.   
 
5.4.4 How do the general features of the conventional IPR-system square 
with indigenous peoples’ collective creativity?  
 
Indigenous peoples’ creativity tends to be a result of continued reworking of already available 
and known material.  Elements of TK and TCEs normally build on a huge collective bulk of 
indigenous people’s cultural heritage.  Indigenous creativity is marked by a dynamic interplay 
between old and new, evolving at slow pace.  Indigenous peoples’ collective creativity 
regularly contains substantial elements of already existing works, with relatively little being 
added to the “existing” TK, TCEs etc.  Innovation is restricted, as faithful reproduction of the 
culture is often important.  Art can be viewed as a means to communicate history, culture etc. 
wherefore the artist is bound by respect for the tradition and is not given free rain for 
inspiration.  Not uncommonly, it is not even possible to discern a “new work” from the 
existing bulk of cultural elements springing from the indigenous people.  This characteristic 
of indigenous peoples’ creativity implies that they run an apparent risk of not being deemed 
sufficiently new for IP-purposes.  That is particularly so with regard to TK, which often fails 
to meet the novelty criteria embedded in patent legislation.483     
 
Further, indigenous cultures tend to place great emphasis on the collective.  Indigenous 
peoples generally view elements of their collective creativity to vest with the people.  Pre-
existing traditional culture is generally perceived to be collectively “owned” by the people or 
the community, inasmuch as the notion of authorship is relevant at all.484  The fact that 
authorship tends to be of little relevance in indigenous cultures also result in elements of 
indigenous creativity not uncommonly being of anonymous origin, i.e. the individual creator/s 
is/are unknown.  Creativity is often distinguished by being attributable to the community.  
                                                 
483  Kongolo, Unsettled International Intellectual Property Issues, p. 42, Taubman and Leistner, Analysis of 
Different Areas of Indigenous Resources, p. 72, Carpenter, Intellectual Property Law and Indigenous Peoples, 
pp. 54 and 69-70, Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights in International Law over the Last 10 years, Cottier and 
Panizzon, A New Generation of IPR for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, p. 216, Lucas-Schloetter, 
Folklore, pp. 384-385, and Biber-Klemm et al, Flanking Policies in National and International Law, pp 245-246.  
Lucas-Schloetter, illustrates that within the field of music, the singer often “is a collective voice whose objective 
is not to innovate but to conserve by preserving the heritage that has been transmitted to him”. 
484  Taubman and Leistner, Analysis of Different Areas of Indigenous Resources, p. 60, Biber-Klemm and 
Szmura Berglas, Problems and Goals, pp. 18-19, Stoll and von Hahn, Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous 
Knowledge and Indigenous Resources in International Law I, p. 14 
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This characteristic contributes to rendering elements of indigenous peoples’ cultures ineligible 
for IP-protection.485     
 
Finally, even when elements of indigenous peoples’ collective creativity meet/have met the 
novelty/originality criteria and have a known creator, the limited term of protection inherent 
in IPRs renders such mechanisms unsuited to protect the cultural heritage of indigenous 
peoples.  The major bulk of indigenous peoples’ collective creativity was of course created, 
and also disclosed to a wider public, some time ago.  Even though many indigenous people 
keep parts of their collective creativity secret, most elements of indigenous peoples’ cultures 
have by now been exposed to a wider public.  This implies that although these elements might 
have been eligible for IP-protection at some point, the time-limitation inherent in most IPR-
mechanisms has deprived these elements of their protectability.486  Moreover, even if an 
element of an indigenous people’s culture presently meets all criteria for being eligible for IP-
protection, and has not yet been disclosed to the public, it will still end up in the public 
domain within a foreseeable future, if the indigenous people seeks IP-protection.  This aspect 
of IPRs, sometimes referred to as “pyrrhic protection” often in itself renders IP-protection 
unattractive to indigenous peoples.487 
 
In conclusion, to a limited extent, indigenous peoples’ creativity can be eligible for IP-
protection.  For instance, indigenous peoples’ TK is at times sufficiently novel and has not 
been disclosed to a wider public, and is hence eligible for patent registration.  In the same 
vein, parts of contemporary artistic works springing from indigenous cultures can be original 
enough to qualify for copyrights.  Notwithstanding, the novelty/originality criteria and the 
demand that a creator must be known for a work to be eligible for IP-protection often render 
indigenous peoples’ collective creativity without IP-protection.  And the limited term of 
                                                 
485  Carpenter, Intellectual Property Law and Indigenous Peoples, pp. 54 and 67-68, Cottier and Panizzon, A 
New Generation of IPR for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, pp. 216-218, Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights 
in International Law over the Last 10 years, Kongolo Unsettled International Intellectual Property Issues, p. 43, 
Lucas-Schloetter, Folklore, pp. 386-388, and Biber-Klemm and Szmura Berglas, Problems and Goals, pp. 18-19.  
Lucas-Schloetter elaborates that TCEs are indeed in their very nature impersonal.  She further points to that the 
IP-element anonymous works do not apply well in the context of TCEs either.  Neither is the concept joint 
authorship helpful, since those jointly contributing to TCEs are often from different generations.  That said, to 
claim that traditional property rights are always collective in nature while IPRs are individual is an 
oversimplification.  Specific elements of indigenous peoples’ cultures can of course be held by individuals or 
smaller segments of the people.  See Dutfield and Suthersanen, Global Intellectual Property Law, p. 328, and 
Biber-Klemm and Szmura Berglas, Problems and Goals, pp. 18-19. 
486  Carpenter, Intellectual Property Law and Indigenous Peoples, p. 70, Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights in 
International Law over the Last 10 years, Lucas-Schloetter, Folklore, pp. 389, and Biber-Klemm, Origin and 
Allocation of Traditional Knowledge, pp. 159-160  
487  Taubman and Leistner, Analysis of Different Areas of Indigenous Resources, pp. 86 and 106 
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protection most IPRs offer implies that almost all elements of indigenous peoples’ collective 
creativity are already in the so called public domain, or will end up there soon.488  In short, (i) 
the inherent rationale built into the IP-system positing that works should eventually end up in 
the public domain, and (ii) the individualistic feature of the IP-system, combines to render 
most elements of indigenous peoples’ distinct collective creativity ineligible for IP-
protection.489     
 
Generally speaking, the conventional IP-system is hence inapt to protect the collective 
creativity of indigenous peoples.  That said, it is worth recalling that one aspect of IPRs might 
be more compatible with indigenous peoples’ aspirations.  Section 5.4.3 outlined how moral 
rights serve the purpose of protecting the identity of the creator.  For this reason, moral rights 
have the capacity to last in perpetuity, even when the economic rights once pertaining to the 
work have since long expired.  The moral rights aspects of IPRs could potentially be of 
significance for the protection of indigenous peoples’ collective creativity.  Still, as Section 
5.4.3 further explained, the moral rights embedded in conventional IPRs are rather limited in 
scope.  In addition, moral rights presuppose that the work as such is eligible for IP-protection, 
something, as seen, is not always the case with elements of indigenous peoples’ cultural 
elements.  Notwithstanding, it is worth bearing the moral rights aspects of IPRs in mind when 
the doctoral thesis embarks on the concluding analyses of to what extent indigenous peoples 
hold property rights to their collective creativity in Chapter 9.            
                                                 
488  Drahos, Intellectual Property and Human Rights, p. 357, Graham and McJohn, Indigenous Peoples and 
Intellectual Property.  Graham and McJohn point to that the structure of the IPR-system implies that indigenous 
traditional songs often do not enjoy copyright protection, at the same time as a modern recording of the song by 
a non-member does.  Graham and McJohn, with reference to Chandler and Sunder, further observe that the 
structure of conventional IPRs often result in knowledge generated in developed countries enjoying IP-
protection, while knowledge developed in indigenous societies is open for all to use.       
489  Some might argue that one exception to the general conclusions outlined above is that indigenous peoples’ 
signs, symbols etc. can often be trademarked.  That is particularly so, since certain possibilities exist for a 
collective association to file for trademark protection, an option which could fit indigenous peoples well.  See 
Kur and Knaak, Protection of Traditional Names and Designations, p. 301.  In this context, reference can also be 
made to geographical indicators.  Geographical indicators serve similar purposes and features as trademarks.  
Geographical indicators indicate that a product originates from a certain territory or region.  Protection for such a 
good can be achieved when a characteristic of that good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin.  See 
Dutfield and Suthersanen, Global Intellectual Property Law, p. 195.  In other words, under certain circumstances, 
indigenous products can achieve protection for a cultural element not because of the element being distinct to the 
people, but to the area from which the people spring.  One should note, however, that geographical indicators 
only concern the identification in the marketplace of products. They are hence only helpful to protect cultural 
elements when these are commodified as products.  See Taubman and Leistner, Analysis of Different Areas of 
Indigenous Resources, pp. 107-108, and Kur and Knaak, Protection of Traditional Names and Designations, pp. 
301, 307-308 and 328.  This limitation obviously lessens the value of geographical indicators to indigenous 
peoples.  Similarly, trademark protection must also serve a commercial purpose.  In addition, it might not always 
be possible for an indigenous people to register a sign, symbols for cultural or spiritual reasons, since registration 
exposes the sign or symbol to the public.      
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5.4.5 Comparison between property rights to land and to collective 
creativity continuously in indigenous peoples’ possession 
 
The right as such 
Section 5.2 inferred that the right to property is essentially a right to non-discrimination.  It 
embraces no right to be provided with property.  But the right to property provides that 
everyone must have the same opportunity to acquire property, and once property has been 
thus acquired, one must not be arbitrarily deprived of the same.  Section 5.3 described how 
international law conventionally did not endorse property rights to land of indigenous peoples.  
The land rights system was designed in a manner that resulted in it essentially by-passing 
indigenous forms of communal land use.  The Section further described, however, how – 
viewed through the prism of the general right to non-discrimination – the right to property has 
recently evolved and now awards indigenous peoples rights to their traditional territories.  
Sections 5.4.1-4 outlined how traditional IPRs in a similar fashion as conventional land rights 
law have been crafted in a manner so that they fail to extend protection to the major bulk of 
indigenous peoples’ collective creativity.  This Section surveys whether there – given that 
property rights to land and to creativity are both based on the same right to non-discrimination 
- is any rationale why property rights pertaining to human creativity should not undergo the 
same developments as property rights to land, in the particular context of indigenous peoples.          
 
When commencing to compare rights to land and rights to human creativity, one obviously 
immediately notes the difference in the matter subject to protection.  Indeed, from a factual 
point of view, it is difficult to imagine two matters as different as land and human creativity.  
The former is rock steady, while the latter need not even be in tangible form.  Certain forms 
of creativity can be reproduced in infinity,490 where each copy is equally representative of the 
creator’s production.  There is no original, no “mastercopy”, in that sense.  A real estate, on 
the other hand, is a unique piece of property.  Land cannot be reproduced.  There can be only 
one “version” of it. 
 
The outlined difference between land and human creativity is, however one of fact, and not 
law.  Again, it is pertinent to recall that the right to property is essentially a right to non-
                                                 
490  See also Cullet et al, Intellectual Property Rights, Plant Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge, pp. 
113-114. 
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discrimination.  It is up to domestic law to determine what subject matter deserves property 
rights protection.  Once that decision has been made, the right to property applies equally to 
all such subject matter, however different.  In other words, it is the role of domestic law to 
determine whether land, on one hand, and human creativity, on the other, are so different that 
one deserves property right protection and the other does not.  And when this call has been 
made, no authority can second-guess the decision.491  Clearly, almost all domestic 
jurisdictions today recognize property rights to both land and human creativity.  In both 
instances, holders of such rights can expect courts to uphold the rights and governmental 
authorities to enforce the rights.  Hence, the fact that human creativity factually distinguishes 
itself from land seems not in itself to warrant a differentiation in legal protection.492     
 
In addition, the doctoral thesis has on a few occasions - referring to the comparability between 
the terra nullius doctrine and the notion of the public domain - alluded to how the two rights 
have traditionally excluded indigenous peoples’ collective rights in similar fashions.  It has 
been described that the terra nullius doctrine was essentially a legal concept created by 
European legal scholars, taking land use typical to the European cultures as point of departure 
when determining what forms of occupation and use of land resulted in rights thereto.  As a 
consequence, a legal system was created in Europe holding that typical European land use 
resulted in property rights to land, whereas land use common to indigenous cultures did not.  
The result was that the Europeans could invoke the terra nullius doctrine to, in complete 
compliance with international law, appropriate indigenous peoples’ territories through 
occupation. 
 
In a comparable fashion, the doctoral thesis has further pointed to how the notion of the public 
domain is also a legal concept invented by European legal scholars.  It has its roots in the 
European culture and legal thinking.  Unlike the terra nullius doctrine, the public domain was 
perhaps not deliberately construed for the purposes of accommodating for “legal” European 
                                                 
491  Another matter is that the scope and term of property right protection can differ between various forms 
matter.  No property right is absolute, and as already touched upon, and to which we shall return below, the 
limitations can vary between e.g. land and human creativity.  But that does not impact on the question whether 
property rights as such pertain to the matter.   
492  Moreover, there might be greater similarities between land and human creativity than meet the eye at first 
blush.  If we limit our comparison to initial acquisition, which is the mean of acquisition that is most relevant for 
the purposes of this doctoral thesis, rights to the two matters are established in a comparable fashion.  IPRs are 
awarded to original creators, real estates to original users.  Both are awarded to identifiable individuals, group of 
individuals or legal entities.  With regard to real estate, primary rights are awarded due to individual and 
discernable use of land.  As to IPRs, rights follow from individual creativity.   
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acquisition of the belongings of other cultures.  Notwithstanding, the notion of the public 
domain has had an effect on indigenous peoples’ collective creativity very similar to that of 
the terra nullius doctrine on their collective lands.  As real estate law, framing IPRs with the 
structure and social patterns of the European society in mind resulted in conventional IPRs 
offering only a limited protection to forms of human creativity common to indigenous 
cultures.  As a consequence, the invention of the public domain has catered for the 
appropriation of indigenous peoples’ collective creativity, in a fashion similar to how the 
notion of terra nullius allowed Westerners to occupy indigenous lands.  Indeed, as Dutfield 
has observed, indigenous peoples viewing TK as vesting in the collective has led non-
members to treat TK as “res nullius” before it being “discovered” by scientists, corporations 
etc.493  The similarities between the terra nullius doctrine and the public domain is further 
underlined by the fact that the term “public domain” in fact originates from U.S. land laws.494  
Both real estate law and IPRs have hence conventionally been designed in ways resulting in 
them by-passing indigenous patterns of association, albeit perhaps less deliberately so with 
regard to IPRs.  As further indicated, the elements that have been built into the two sets of 
laws to give this effect are similar too. 
 
Sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.4 explained how indigenous peoples’ creativeness tends to be 
collective in nature.  Indigenous art, knowledge etc. evolve gradually and are not 
uncommonly a result of a communal effort.  The Sections further described how this 
characteristic of indigenous creativeness results in a major bulk of their collective creativity 
failing to meet the originality/novelty criterion and the criterion demanding that a work not be 
anonymous, both inherent in the IPR-system.  Section 5.3 outlined how similar criteria have 
until very recently prevented indigenous peoples from acquiring property rights to land.  Like 
creativeness, indigenous peoples’ land use tends to be communal in nature.  Often, it is not 
possible to attribute a particular individual’s use to a particular land-patch.  And as with 
creativity, indigenous cultures generally perceive land to vest with the collective.  
Conventional real estate law, on the other hand, submits that property must be individually 
held.  The criterion that IPRs demand an identifiable creator is hence directly translatable into 
conventional real estate law.  But also the originality/novelty criterion can be said to have a 
                                                 
493  Dutfield, The Public and Private Domains 
494  Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture, pp. 124 and 127-128.  In the same vein, analyzing to what 
extent Australian property rights law protects the collective creativity of the Aboriginal peoples, Carpenter draws 
a direct parallel between jurisprudence pertaining to property rights to land and jurisprudence relating to IPRs.  
See Intellectual Property Law and Indigenous Peoples, pp. 64-66. 
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counterpart in conventional real estate legislation.  As seen, for someone to acquire property 
rights to land based on occupation, conventional real estate law demands that the use has been 
sufficiently intense and exclusive.  In other words, the use must result in the particular land-
patch being significantly distinguishable – or significantly “original” - compared with the 
same land-patch prior to use.  A comparison can here be made with IPRs, where a work too 
must be significantly distinguishable from matter existing prior to the work.  The comparison 
limps in the sense that in real estate law the measurement of whether the work is sufficiently 
“original” is based on a comparison with a particular object, i.e. that particular land-patch 
prior to use.  In the context of IPRs, on the other hand, the measurement is with all previously 
existing matter, i.e. all previously exiting creativity.  But the comparison is on the mark in the 
sense that in both instances, it is the indigenous people’s work that is deemed not sufficiently 
original to result in rights.  In the context of real estate law, the indigenous people’s work 
does not render the land-patch sufficiently original compared with the land-patch prior to the 
indigenous people working on it.  In the context of IPRs, the work is not sufficiently original 
compared with the indigenous peoples’ previous “works”.  In conclusion, two of the three 
criteria contributing to indigenous peoples’ collective creativity normally being ineligible for 
IPR protection – i.e. that a work must not be anonymous and must be sufficiently new/original 
– can be readily translated into real estate law.  In a comparable manner, rights to land too 
were traditionally denied indigenous peoples because of a notion that individual utilizers of 
the land could not be identified and that the use did not sufficiently distinguish the land from 
the same land prior to use.  
 
In sum, the most salient difference between intellectual property and real estate is the 
intangible nature of IPRs.495  But this difference is not relevant in the sense that it justifies a 
different legal treatment of indigenous peoples’ traditional creativity, compared with their 
traditional land use.  On the contrary, the reasons having conventionally kept indigenous 
peoples from acquiring property rights to land are strikingly present also in the context of 
their collective creativity.  
 
Limitations in the right 
Hence, a comparative analysis between conventional real estate law and IPRs seems to result 
in the conclusion that there are no relevant rationales for indigenous peoples not holding 
                                                 
495  Carpenter, Intellectual Property Law and Indigenous Peoples, pp. 56-57 
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property rights to their collective creativity.  What remains to survey is the content and scope 
of the right.  In other words, is the right absolute, or must indigenous peoples endure certain 
limitations in the right?  After all, it seems to follow from Section 5.3 that indigenous 
peoples’ collective property rights to land have emerged as a direct counterpart to 
conventional individual real estate rights, the only significant difference being precisely the 
collective nature of indigenous peoples’ rights.  There is no evidence of indigenous peoples 
being exempted from limitations normally applying to property rights to real estate.  Since a 
potential property right of indigenous peoples to their collective creativity is based on an 
analogy with land rights, it would seem to follow that indigenous peoples have to accept 
limitations generally applying to IPRs.   
 
Section 5.4.2 outlined how the aspiration to balance the interest of the creator of a work, and 
those wanting to build on the same, constitutes an inherent feature of IPRs.  For this reason, 
IPRs are rarely absolute.  Various forms of limitations normally apply.496  Some of these can 
surely be of considerable relevance in certain instances.  But relatively speaking, they do not 
seriously impact on the scope and content of a potential property right, particularly if one can 
expect cultural rights to prevent uses that are derogatory or otherwise culturally problematic.  
One can further note that property rights to land too, a rarely absolute.  Also land rights 
holders must generally accept certain limitations in their right.  Hence, IPRs do not deviate 
from other property rights in this context.  Moreover, the doctoral thesis would loose its focus 
if embarking on a detailed survey of these limitations.  For these reasons, the Section will not 
embark on an analysis of the potential impact of limitations normally applying to IPRs, or on 
their relevance to property rights to collective creativity.  As seen, however, one limitation 
applies to IPRs that is not present in almost any other property right.  And this limitation must 
be addressed, since, if applying to collective creativity too, it would seriously impact on the 
scope of the right.   
 
As discussed in depth above, IPRs are with few exceptions limited in time.  Given that the 
property rights the doctoral thesis is considering derives from IPRs, it would seem to follow 
that potential property rights of indigenous peoples to their collective creativity should be 
                                                 
496  Exceptions from copyright protection often apply with regard to use for teaching purposes or news reporting.  
However, such expectations must regularly not conflict with normal economic expectations of the holder of the 
work nor unreasonably prejudice her legitimate interests.  The fact that the author may find the borrowing 
misleading or offensive does not necessarily prevent the use, however.  Trademarks too, can be subject to similar 
limitations as copyrights.  In the same vein, states are free to determine that certain products shall not be eligible 
for patents.  See Dutfield and Suthersanen, Global Intellectual Property Law, pp. 79, 92-95, 115 and 151-152.   
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subject to the same limited term of protection as IPRs in general.  But on the other hand, it 
could be argued that not only the applicability of the right to property as such, but also the 
scope of protection, should be accustomed to the particular cultural context in which the right 
is being applied.  As seen, indigenous peoples seeking property rights to their collective 
creativity are chiefly motivated by an interest in preserving their cultural identity, rather than 
in monetary gain.  In this context, one should note that an analogy with the conventional IP-
system does not rule out protection in perpetuity.  Section 5.4.3 described how conventional 
IPRs embed, in addition to economic rights, also moral rights, aiming at protecting the 
identity of the author.  And these rights can last indefinitely.  In conventional IPRs, the moral 
rights aspects are downplayed, since it is inherent in the IPR-system that the main motivator 
behind creativity is monetary gain.  But if considering property rights applying in a context 
where the main motivator is not financial benefit, but protection of cultural identity, one could 
perhaps argue that in the comparison with IPRs, greater focus shall be on the moral rights 
aspect of such rights?  That would seem to argue for a protection that perhaps does not last in 
perpetuity, but as long as a cultural element remains culturally significant to the indigenous 
people in question.  The doctoral thesis shall return to this question in the concluding analyses 
of indigenous peoples’ property rights over their collective creativity in Chapter 9.               
 
5.4.6 Restitution - collective creativity already in the public domain 
 
Section 5.3.3 observed that a number of international legal sources coherently assert that 
indigenous peoples hold property rights also to territories traditionally used, but which have 
subsequently been unduly taken without consent.  However, due mainly to an absence of 
evidence of acceptance of the right on a regional and domestic level, the Section nonetheless 
refrained from concluding that international law has fully embraced a right to restitution 
pertaining to territories traditionally occupied and/or used, but which are no longer under the 
indigenous people’s control.  Instead, the Section noted that a right to restitution is emerging.  
This conclusion was drawn both with regard to “full restitution”, i.e. return of lands lost, and 
“partial restitution”, i.e. rights to share in profits from resource extraction on indigenous 
peoples’ traditional territories by non-members. 
 
Naturally, the just inferred implies that it is not possible, based solely on an analogy with land 
rights, to conclude that indigenous peoples hold property rights to collective creativity 
created, but no longer controlled, by them.  This conclusion applies both to cultural elements 
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(i) in the public domain, and (ii) to which third party rights pertain.  When a right to 
restitution of lands has crystallized into law, it obviously immediately becomes relevant to 
conduct an analogous analysis between lands and collective creativity also with regard to 
subject matter no longer controlled by indigenous peoples.  But today, as the right to 
restitution is merely emerging, such an analysis falls outside of the scope of the doctoral 
thesis.       
 
5.4.7 International legal sources on indigenous peoples’ property rights to 
their collective creativity and conclusions 
 
Section 4.7 outlined how CESC General Comments No. 17 and 21 have interpreted CESCR 
Article 15.1 (c) to imply that the right to benefit from the protection of the moral and material 
interests resulting from creativity shall apply to, in addition to of individuals, also to groups. 
Making this observation, the CESC has particularly noted the situation of indigenous peoples.  
The Section further explained that albeit CESCR Article 15.1 (c) appears in a treaty 
proclaiming only economic, social and cultural rights, and not property rights, General 
Comments No. 17 and 21 also noted that the right enshrined in CESCR Article 15.1 is at least 
akin to a property right, or more precisely, an IPR.  The observation is pertinent.  A right to 
benefit from one’s creativity encompasses a right to prevent others from utilizing the same 
work.  As Section 5.4.2 explained, the right to control access to a work is a basic features of 
IPRs.  General Comments No. 17 and 21 in addition observed that the reference in CESCR 
Article 15.1 (a) to everyone’s right to take part in cultural life further highlights the 
resemblance between CESCR Article 15.1 and IPRs.  As Section 5.4.2 elaborated, the same 
balancing between those creating culture, and those wishing to access the same, is inherent in 
IPRs.  In sum, it is not suggested here that CESCR Article 15.1 is not relevant when analyzing 
cultural rights.  But the doctoral thesis do conclude that CESCR Article 15.1 (c) (and for the 
same reason also the parallel UDHR Article 27) in addition presents features that are so 
similar to IPRs that the provision is relevant also when analyzing property rights to human 
creativity.  This conclusion also finds support in the legal doctrine.497   
                                                 
497  Both Drahos and Dutfield and Suthersanen have noted the striking similarity in structure between CESCR 
Article 15.1 and IPRs.  See Drahos, Intellectual Property and Human Rights, p. 354, and Dutfield and 
Suthersanen, Global Intellectual Property Law, p. 218.  And Green, who has studied the drafting history of both 
UDHR Article 27 and CESCR Article 15.1, concludes that the crafters of these provisions did view UDHR 
Article 27 and CESCR Article 15.1 (c) as protecting intellectual property rights.  See Drafting History of the 
Article 15 (1) (c) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Background Paper 
submitted by M. Green, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/15.  See paras. 4-7 for UDHR Article 27 and paras. 8-43 for the 
CESCR Article 15. 
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Hence, CESC General Comments No. 17 and 21 support the conclusion following from an 
analogy with land rights that indigenous peoples hold property rights to their collective 
creativity.   In that sense, one can draw a parallel between CESC General Comments No. 17 
and 21 and the CERD Committee’s General Recommendation No. 23.  Where the latter 
submits that the right to property enshrines a collective right of indigenous peoples to lands 
traditionally used, the former Comments assert that indigenous peoples enjoy the same right 
with regard to their collective creativity.  Indigenous peoples have not (yet) taken cases 
pertaining to their collective creativity to international tribunals in the way they have done 
with regard to land.  Consequently, no case law addressing property rights to creativity exists, 
comparable to the one that has been developed within the land rights discourse.  Neither has 
CESC’s findings been matched by similar conclusions by other treaty bodies.  General 
Comments No. 17 and 21 are hence relatively isolated as legal sources explicitly proclaiming 
that indigenous peoples hold property rights to their collective creativity.  Still, these sources 
receive substantive support from a cotemporary understanding of the fundamental right to 
non-discrimination, enshrined first and foremost in the analogy with land rights carried out in 
Section 5.4.5.  Notwithstanding, the doctoral thesis refrains at this point from drawing any 
definitive conclusions as to indigenous peoples’ property rights to collective creativity still 
controlled by them.  This conclusion is saved for Chapter 9.         
 
With regard to cultural elements no longer in indigenous peoples’ control, there is no explicit 
support in international human rights sources for the existence of such a right.  That said, one 
can note CESC General Comment No. 17’s proclamation that indigenous peoples’ moral 
rights continue to apply also when the economic rights have expired.  But again, the general 
support for a right to restitution with regard to collective creativity that an indigenous people 
has unduly lost remains limited.           
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6. THE RELEVANCE OF THE UN DECLARATION ON 
THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 described how during the last two decades or so, rights that are formally 
individual in nature have been “collectivized” to extend a protection to the cultural identity 
and practices also of indigenous groups as such.  Moreover, international law has accepted 
group rights sui generis to indigenous populations.  But most importantly, the Chapters 
described how the two decades produced a number of international legal sources within the 
spheres of culture, self-determination, non-discrimination and property, all asserting that 
indigenous peoples are the beneficiaries of peoples’ rights proper.  Chapters 4 and 5 inferred 
that the developments within these different spheres of law point in one direction; that 
indigenous peoples hold rights to their collective creativity, under both the rights to 
culture/self-determination and the right to property, viewed in the light of the right to non-
discrimination.  The Chapters further noted that the fact that all surveyed areas of law have 
progressed in tandem implies that the conclusions drawn within each field of law are mutually 
supportive.         
 
At the same time, Chapters 4 and 5 have, with one or two exceptions, consciously refrained 
from drawing definite conclusions as to what extent international law has affirmed that 
indigenous peoples hold rights to their collective creativity.  Before embarking on the 
concluding analyses, the doctoral thesis devotes this entire Chapter to the most important 
legal source within the indigenous rights discourse; the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples - DRIP.  As Section 4.1 indicated, the reason why the thesis opted not to 
address the DRIP together with other relevant legal sources is that the elaboration on the 
DRIP commenced roughly simultaneously with the developments in international law 
Chapters 4 and 5 have surveyed.  As these Chapters noted on a few occasions, the surveyed 
sources mainly emanate from expert bodies and international tribunals. For this reason, i.e. 
because of lack of evidence of state response, Chapters 4 and 5 with few exceptions refrained 
from drawing definitive conclusions as to the content of the law.  DRIP offered states an 
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excellent opportunity to provide the previously lacking response.498  The DRIP-process was 
ongoing during essentially the same time as the expert body/international tribunal 
jurisprudence was elaborated, and it focused on the core issues within the indigenous rights 
discourse.  In many instances, states actually avoided giving their response to the law on 
indigenous peoples’ rights emerging through the sources surveyed in Chapters 4 and 5 
precisely because they viewed that the matters would be finally solved in the DRIP.  Due to 
Drip’s cardinal importance as the main source where states could offer a concerted view on 
the recent developments within the indigenous rights discourse, the thesis has essentially499 
divided its analyses into a pre-DRIP and a post-DRIP part.      
 
6.2 Background  
 
6.2.1 The adoption of the DRIP 
 
Section 4.3 covered the history of the DRIP up and until the UN Commission HR established 
and passed the draft DRIP onto the WGDD.  The WGDD’s first seven sessions generated 
little progress. But the 8th and 9th sessions saw an embryo of progress, and during the 10th 
session, the DRIP process gained momentum.  At the 10th session, a few states tabled a 
revised version of the draft DRIP500, which addressed some key state concern at the same time 
as it in large parts was acceptable to indigenous peoples’ representatives.  The new, more 
workable draft, spurred participants to engage in concrete text negotiations, resulting in 
agreements on several of the DRIP provisions and a general understanding on many more.  
Still, the 10th session ended the WGDD’s mandate.  But having demonstrated progress, the 
WGDD was mandated to hold one extra session.501  Prior to the extra session, the WGDD 
Chairman circulated a Chair’s text, setting forth a complete DRIP proposal.502  At its 11th 
session, the WGDD did reach an agreement on almost all DRIP provisions, including on most 
of the articles of direct relevance to the doctoral thesis.  These included Articles 3 and 4 on 
self-determination, Articles 1 and 2 and 22 bis on collective human rights and Article 31 on 
indigenous peoples’ collective creativity.  Still, the 11th session ended without complete 
                                                 
498  Barelli too, notes that the DRIP represents the culmination of a political and legal process that commenced in 
the early 1980s.  See The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System, p. 969. 
499  As previously mentioned, Chapters 4 and 5 do refer to some legal sources emanating from the period after 
the adoption of the DRIP. 
500  E/CN.4/2004/WG.15/CRP.1 and E/CN.4/2004/WG.15/CRP.2 
501  Commission on Human Rights  Resolution 2005/50 
502 UN Document E/CN.4/2005/89/Add. 2 
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agreement on a DRIP.503  Notwithstanding, the general sentiment was that the WGDD had 
come as far as it possibly could, in particular since it appeared unlikely that the WGDD would 
receive an additional extend mandate.  Consequently, at the end of the 11th session, the 
WGDD Chairman was unofficially authorized to fill in the few remaining blanks and present 
a Chair’s text that he would recommend to the UN for adoption.504      
 
Shortly after that the WGDD had concluded its work, the UN Human Rights Council (HR-
Council) replaced the Commission HR.  Prior to the HR-Council’s 1st session, the 
Chairperson of the WGDD presented his Chair’s text.505  In June 2006, the HR-Council 
adopted the DRIP with 30 votes for, 2 against, 12 abstentions and 3 absentees,506 and passed it 
on to the UNGA for final approval.  However, prior to the UNGA taking action on the DRIP, 
the African Group of States (AGS), who had largely been absent during the WGDD process, 
had discovered certain issues in the DRIP they needed to see clarified.  Consequently, when in 
November 2006, the UNGA’s 3rd Committee moved towards adoption of the DRIP, the AGS 
called for the decision to be deferred one year.  Following a vote, the 3rd Committee decided 
in line with the AGS’s position, and postponed action on the Declaration.507   
 
The months prior to the 2007 UNGA session saw intense negotiations between the AGS and 
Latin American and European states working for an adoption of the DRIP.  These 
deliberations revealed that most of the AGS’s concern could be allayed by African states 
being further enlightened about the more precise meaning of some of the rights enshrined in 
the DRIP.  But the AGS also needed two material amendments to DRIP, as adopted by the 
HR-Council.  First, a reference to the principle of territorial integrity of states was included in 
Article 46.508  Second, a preambular paragraph was added to the DRIP, addressing the fact 
that the Declaration includes no definition of what groups constitute “indigenous peoples”.509  
                                                 
503  The main outstanding issue was the land-rights provisions.  Albeit there was a general agreement also on 
these, no concrete provisions enjoying complete support existed. 
504  UN Document E/CN.4/2006/79, paras. 28 and 30 
505  UN Document E/CN.4/2006/79  
506  HRC Resolution 2006/2  
507  Resolution A/C.3/61/L.57/Rev. 1.  On 20 December 2006, the UNGA plenary affirmed the 3rd Committee’s 
decision.   
508  The addition read: ”Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group 
or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations 
or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair totally or in part, 
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states”. [Addition in bold.] 
509  The preambular paragraph seems to simply underline the obvious, namely that the situation of indigenous 
peoples differ from region to region.  It reads; ”Recognizing that the situation of indigenous peoples varies from 
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In addition, a few amendments of mere editorial character were introduced.  Neither the 
material nor the editorial amendments are of direct relevance to the doctoral thesis.  With 
these amendments, the UNGA could move towards adoption of the DRIP.  The Declaration 
was adopted by a vote, with 143 votes in favour, 4 against, 11 abstentions, and the remaining 
UN member states being absent.510  As clear from the overwhelming majority in favour, all 
geographical regions strongly supported the adoption of the DRIP.  The four states voting 
against the Declaration were Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States of 
America.511  Since then, Australia and New Zealand have changed their position, and have 
officially endorsed the DRIP.   
 
6.2.2 Interpretative statements 
 
In total, 38 states took the floor in connection with the vote on the DRIP in the UNGA to 
explain their position on the Declaration.  Some of the interpretative statements are of direct 
relevance to the doctoral thesis.  Australia expressed dissatisfaction with DRIP’s reference to 
self-determination, claiming that this right applies only in a decolonization and secession 
context.  The United States suggested that the right to self-determination enshrined in DRIP is 
not the general right to self-determination applying to all peoples, but rather a sui generis 
right, a comment that was echoed by the United Kingdom.  India, on the other hand, opined 
that the right to self-determination applies only to colonies and not to segments of sovereign 
independent states, placing emphasis on the principle of territorial integrity.  Iran made a 
comment of similar content.  Liechtenstein, for its part, expressed its support for innovative 
approaches to the right to self-determination and noted with satisfaction the DRIP provisions 
indicating new steps in the UN dealing with this right.  It stressed that the DRIP’s emphasis 
on the right to autonomy and self-government offered a promising approach which would 
genuinely address the aspirations and needs of many peoples.  The United States, Canada, 
New Zealand and Nigeria expressed dissatisfaction with the land and resource rights 
provisions.  Nigeria added a general dissatisfaction also with the self-determination 
provisions.  The United States – with reference to preambular paragraph 22 – opined that the 
DRIP could not be understood as recognizing the existence of collective human rights proper, 
                                                                                                                                                        
region to region, country to country, and from community to community and that each State should observe this 
Declaration in the light of its national circumstances […]”.  
510  UNGA Resolution 61/295 
511  For an extensive outline of the DRIP process and an in depth analysis of what resulted in its adoption, see 
Åhrén, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
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a position supported by the United Kingdom.  The United Kingdom underlined that beyond 
the right to self-determination, it does not accept the existence of any collective human rights.  
In the same vein, Sweden declared that it recognizes the existence of collective rights only to 
the extent that such rights are not regarded as human rights, and expressed the opinion that 
individual human rights prevail over the collective rights enshrined in the DRIP. 
 
If briefly summarizing the outlined interpretative statements, one notes that only a limited 
number of states commented on the rights directly relevant to the doctoral thesis, such as self-
determination512, rights to lands and natural resources and the existence of collective human 
rights proper.  In no instance was a presented position shared by more than a few states.513  At 
the same time, the DRIP was adopted with an overwhelming majority and has gained 
increased support in the period after the adoption. Against this background, one cannot 
reasonably hold that the relatively few interpretative statements with incoherent content 
significantly impact on the understanding of the DRIP.  On the contrary, the absence of 
coherent resistance against any of the rights enshrined in the DRIP strengthens the legal 
relevance of the Declaration.514 
 
6.3 The content of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples 
 
6.3.1 Introduction  
 
The Chapters above have identified (i), indigenous peoples’ right to culture/self-
determination, and (ii) the right to property (understood through the prism of the right to non-
discrimination) as the spheres of human rights law of particular relevance when analyzing to 
what extent indigenous peoples’ have the right to own and/or determine over their collective 
creativity.  In addition, the doctoral thesis has observed that international law’s position on (i) 
the existence of collective human rights proper in general, and (ii) rights to lands and 
resources, is of significant relevance for a proper understanding of the existence, scope and 
                                                 
512  That said, it should be noted that a large number of states commented on the relationship between the right to 
self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity of states, enshrined in DRIP Article 46.  But again, the 
issue of territorial integrity is not relevant to the doctoral thesis. 
513  In this context, recall further that Australia and New Zealand, since delivering their respective interpretative 
statements, have reversed their position on DRIP. 
514  For a similar opinion, see also Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty, p. 1162. 
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content of the material rights subject to study in the thesis.  DRIP addresses all these spheres 
of law.   
 
6.3.2 Collective human rights proper generally 
 
Chapter 4 illustrated how the question of whether indigenous peoples can be the beneficiaries 
of collective human rights proper has constituted a cornerstone in the indigenous rights 
discourse.  Consequently, it is only natural that this was one of the most controversial issues 
also in the DRIP process.  Early in that process, many states expressed concern with the 
notion that indigenous peoples could be the bearers of human rights proper.  But as the 
process progressed, increasingly fewer states objected to the existence of such rights.  At the 
final sessions of the WGDD, only the United Kingdom openly argued for DRIP taking a 
cautious attitude towards the idea that indigenous peoples enjoy human rights proper.515  And 
the UK’s concerns were allayed at the final session of the WGDD, implying that the DRIP 
language on collective rights represent a consensus position.516   
 
At the final session of the WGDD, it was agreed that the issue of collective rights be dealt 
with through amendments to Articles 1 and 2, and the addition of a preambular paragraph that 
in the final version of the DRIP ended up having number 22.517  Article 1, in its final version, 
reads: “Indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as 
individuals, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the Charter of the 
United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human rights 
law”.  Article 2, in pertinent parts, proceeds to stipulate; “Indigenous peoples and individuals 
are free and equal to all other peoples and individuals…”  And pursuant to relevant parts of 
pp 22, “… indigenous individuals are entitled without discrimination to all human rights 
recognized in international law, and that indigenous peoples possess collective rights…”.  
Certainly, the quoted provisions could have been crafted in a more precise manner.  They are 
marked by an attempt to accommodate for a few dissenting views within the WGDD, at the 
same time as reflecting the position of the vast majority.  Notwithstanding, studying the 
provisions carefully, the conclusion with regard to their content is clear.  
                                                 
515  That said, most certainly a few silent states shared the concern of the United Kingdom, if not necessarily to 
the same extent.  As reflected in their interpretative statements, the United States and Sweden were two such 
states, and the UK sentiment was surely shared also by a few other EU states. 
516  In other words, Sweden’s, the UK’s and the US’s interventions in connection with the adoption of the DRIP 
must be understood as interpretations of, and not objections to, relevant DRIP provisions.   
517  During most of the WGDD-deliberations, this provision was generally referred to as pp 18 bis. 
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Article 1 hence unambiguously proclaims that “indigenous peoples have the right to full 
enjoyment … of all human rights”.  In between, however, the provision adds that indigenous 
peoples enjoy this right “as a collective or as individuals”.  This language certainly adds an 
amount of ambiguity to the DRIP’s understanding of the term “peoples”.  If a “people” can 
enjoy rights “as individuals”, are we really talking of “peoples” in the normal understanding 
of the concept?  One could argue that such is probably not the case.  But on the other hand, 
despite its reference to individuals, Article 1 does in clear language affirm that also 
indigenous peoples are bearer of human rights.  Even if the notion that these rights can be 
enjoyed also by individuals is confusing, this is necessarily not enough to nullify the 
implication of the unambiguous proclamation in the provision’s first part.  Further, if 
momentarily setting aside the issue of human rights, and just focusing on the suggestion that a 
people can enjoy rights as individuals, one must reasonably conclude that this makes no sense 
- regardless of whether the right is a human right or not.  As Chapter 7 will explain further, 
provisions in international instruments shall, in case of doubt, be interpreted in a manner that 
gives the provision a reasonable understanding, in the context of the instrument as a whole.  
Consequently, since the language suggesting that peoples enjoy rights as individuals makes 
little sense, the reasonable understanding is not to allow it to nullify the unambiguous 
language holding that indigenous peoples enjoy human rights.  Rather, one should essentially 
disregard the language as incoherent and illogical.     
 
In the same vein as DRIP Article 1, pp 22 first unambiguously declares that “indigenous 
peoples possess collective rights”.  In the same breath, however, the provision goes on to 
explicitly refer to individual rights as human rights, something it omits to do with regard to 
peoples’ rights.  It could therefore be argued that an e contrario interpretation of the provision 
must result in the conclusion that indigenous peoples’ collective rights do not constitute 
human rights.  But pp 22 does proclaim that indigenous peoples are bearer of rights.  Given 
that these rights do occur in a human rights instrument, it appears pertinent to presume that at 
least most of these rights are in fact also human rights.518  Hence, similar to the ambiguity 
built into DRIP Article 1, it is somewhat confusing that pp 22 explicitly confirms that 
individual rights are human rights, at the same time as it fails to do so with regard to 
collective rights.  But as stated, nothing precludes a reading of pp 22 implying that collective 
                                                 
518  See also Anaya, The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination in the Post-Declaration Era, p. 187. 
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rights are also human rights.  And given that the alternative interpretation gives the 
implausible conclusion that a vast majority of rights enshrined in a human rights instrument 
are in fact not human rights, the only reasonable conclusion is that pp 22 confirms, rather than 
precludes, the existence of indigenous peoples’ collective human rights.  The DRIP 
encompasses a number of material provisions proclaiming collective rights of indigenous 
peoples.  In fact, the majority of its provisions envelope rights where the beneficiary of the 
right is the indigenous people as such, rather than individual members of the group.519  
Despite the ambiguity built into DRIP Article 1 and pp 22, these provisions cannot be 
understood as rebutting what seems clearly to follow from the material provisions of the 
DRIP, namely that indigenous peoples enjoy collective human rights.       
 
It can be added that this conclusion gains further support from DRIP Articles 2 and 3, read in 
conjunction.  Article 2 univocally proclaims that “indigenous peoples are equal to all other 
peoples”.  Notably, the provision does not explicitly stipulate that indigenous peoples have 
equal rights with other peoples.  Nonetheless, a people can hardly be equal with other peoples 
if it does not enjoy the same rights as other peoples do.  A reasonable interpretation of Article 
2 hence suggests that inasmuch “peoples” in general enjoy rights – including human rights – 
so do “indigenous peoples”.  But this is in itself no conclusive evidence of the existence of 
human rights of peoples.  Those maintaining that the DRIP does not support the notion of 
collective human rights proper question exactly whether peoples in general, indigenous or not, 
can be the beneficiaries of human rights.  If one’s position is that no people enjoy human 
rights, DRIP Article 2 proclaiming that indigenous peoples are equal with other peoples is not 
a valid argument for the existence of human rights of peoples.       
 
But the claim that DRIP Article 2 confirms the existence of collective human rights becomes 
more convincing if reading the provision in conjunction with Article 3.  Pursuant to DRIP 
Article 3, “Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination.”  Section 6.3.4 analyzes 
the specific content of this provision in more depth.  For the present purposes, it is sufficient 
to note that Article 3 appears to affirm that indigenous peoples do enjoy collective human 
rights, at least to the same extent as other peoples.  That is so, since the few states that are still 
inhospitable to the notion of collective human rights in normally agree that the right to self-
determination constitutes the one exception to the general rule.   
                                                 




In conclusion, DRIP Articles 2 and 3 confirm that indigenous peoples do enjoy collective 
human rights at least to the same extent as other peoples.  Still, these provisions read in 
isolation say little about to what extent international law in general recognizes collective 
human rights proper, beyond the right to self-determination.  However, in addition, the above 
has demonstrated that a reasonable understanding of Article 1 and pp 22, read in conjunction, 
strongly suggests that the DRIP enshrines collective human rights, also beyond the right to 
self-determination.  And if reading Articles 1 and pp 22 together with Articles 2 and 3, the 
conclusion must be that the DRIP does confirm that indigenous peoples are the beneficiaries 
of collective rights in general.  That is particularly so if analyzing these provisions against the 
background of the Declaration as a whole and in light of the international legal sources 
surveyed in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 concluded that there was overwhelming support in both 
global and regional international legal sources for international law having affirmed that 
indigenous peoples enjoy rights proper.  Notwithstanding, Section 4.9 abstained from 
determinatively concluding that international law had embraced this position, because of lack 
of evidence of state support.  Now one can note, however, that DRIP Articles 1-3 and pp 22, 
read in conjunction with the Declaration as a whole, undoubtedly affirm the position taken by 
UN treaty bodies, regional human rights bodies and other international legal sources.      
 
6.3.3 Cultural rights 
 
The outline and analyses above have illustrated that the line between cultural rights and 
property rights is not always crystal clear.  The rights are interwoven and mutually supportive.  
This is also the case with the DRIP provisions addressing these subject matters.  Nonetheless, 
the doctoral thesis continues to distinguish between cultural rights on one hand, and property 
rights, on the other.  Hence, this section addresses indigenous peoples’ rights to their 
collective creativity as a cultural right and Section 6.3.4 the right to self-determination.  
Subsequently, Section 6.3.5 proceeds to surveying indigenous peoples’ property rights to their 
collective creativity.  It is underlined, however, that due to the overlap of the rights, certain 
DRIP provisions has to be examined under multiple sections.     
 
Pursuant to DRIP Article 8.1, indigenous peoples’ have the right not to be subjected to 
destruction of their cultures.  Further, Article 8.2 (a) proclaims that states shall provide 
effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for, any action with the aim or effect of 
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depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples or of their ethnic identities.  In the same 
vein, pursuant to DRIP Article 7.2, indigenous peoples have the collective right to live in 
freedom as distinct peoples.  Clearly, Article 8 foresees a fairly extensive protection for 
indigenous peoples’ collective identity.  Read together, Articles 7 and 8 reaffirm that 
indigenous peoples have a right to their collective cultural identity, and further that states have 
a positive duty to protect this right.  As Chapter 4 has demonstrated, this right had been 
enshrined in numerous international legal sources also prior to the adoption of DRIP.    
 
More specifically, pursuant to Article 5, indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and 
strengthen their distinct cultural institutions.  And Article 11.1 proclaims that indigenous 
peoples have the right to practice and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs.  Further, 
pursuant to Article 12.1, indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practice, develop and 
teach their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies.  And Article 13 
underlines that indigenous peoples have the right to revitalize, use, develop and transmit to 
future generations their histories, languages, oral traditions, philosophies, writing systems and 
literatures.  Article 15 proclaims that indigenous peoples have the right to the dignity and 
diversity of their cultures, traditions and histories.  Clearly, these provisions do not speak of 
elements normally associated with property rights.  Rather, they stipulate that indigenous 
peoples have the right to practice, develop and revitalize cultural traditions and practices such 
as languages, philosophies and spiritual ceremonies because doing so is presumed important 
to the cultural identity of the indigenous people.  These provisions can hence be viewed as 
fleshing out the general provisions on cultural identity in Articles 7 and 8.  One should note, 
however, that none of the provisions demands that it can be demonstrated that the practice etc. 
is important to the cultural identity of the indigenous people for the right to apply.      
 
Pursuant to Article 31 “indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and 
develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, as 
well as the manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including … genetic 
resources … knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral traditions, literatures, 
designs ... and … visual and performing arts.  They also have the right to, maintain, control 
[and] protect … their intellectual property over such cultural heritage… ”.520  The right to 
“control and protect” cultural elements is more a property right element than a cultural right, 
                                                 
520  In addition, Article 24 clarifies that indigenous peoples have rights also to their traditional medicines. 
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wherefore this aspect of Article 31 is dealt with in Section 6.3.5.  But Article 31 further 
underlines that indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and develop their cultural 
heritage.  In that respect, Article 31 can be viewed as complementing the provisions outlined 
above, extending a similar protection to elements of indigenous peoples’ collective creativity.   
 
But are the fairly sweeping rights to a cultural identity and to practice maintain and develop 
cultural elements and practices relevant for an analysis of specific concrete rights to elements 
of indigenous peoples’ cultures?  Admittedly, the link is neither immediate nor obvious.  But 
non-members utilization of and/or access to elements of indigenous peoples’ distinct cultures 
can in fact sometimes be of great harm to the cultural identity of the indigenous people in 
question.  If so, such utilization can violate the rights enshrined in DRIP Articles 7 and 8, as 
elaborated on in e.g. Article 31.  Again, the example of the traditional Saami dress is useful 
here.  As mentioned, the traditional dress is a very important cultural denominator for the 
Saami people.  If the non-Saami population starts using the Saami dress, this blurs the 
distinction between the Saami and the majority culture, wherefore such use can constitute a 
violation of Articles 8 and 31, read in conjunction.  In the same vein, under certain 
circumstances, copying and/or reproduction by non-members of a cultural practice or custom 
might prevent the indigenous people from maintaining and developing the same.  For 
instance, non-members performing a spiritual ritual might deplore the practice of its spiritual 
and cultural value for the indigenous people the ritual springs from.  Under such 
circumstances, copying of the ritual by the non-member can constitute a violation of DRIP 
Articles 11 and 12.521  Similarly, for indigenous peoples’ histories, philosophies, literatures 
etc. to remain culturally significant, it may be necessary not to reveal these to non-members.  
Indeed, they may not even be openly shared within the group.  If use by non-members of such 
oral traditions deprives the tradition of its cultural value, it may violate DRIP Article 13.     
 
Also the cultural rights provisions in the DRIP essentially reaffirm the position taken by the 
legal sources Chapter 4 has outlined.  Section 4.5 demonstrated how the HRC has interpreted 
CCPR Article 27 to encompass a positive duty on states to protect indigenous peoples’ 
cultures and cultural identities, prohibiting competing activities that seriously threaten the 
cultural identity and cultural practices of members of an indigenous population (directly) and 
                                                 
521  Taubman and Leistner agree that the DRIP provides basic protection for indigenous peoples’ cultural identity 
and “collective personality.  See Analysis of Different Areas of Indigenous Resources, p. 172.  In the same vein, 
Lucas-Schloetter points to that the use of a non-member of a sign, symbol etc. of an indigenous people that is of 
sacred nature can cause serious cultural offense and harm to the people.  See Folklore, p. 344. 
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of the group as such (indirectly).  True, the HRC jurisprudence more or less exclusively 
pertains to land based activities.  But there is no apparent reason why the principle should not 
apply also to cultural practices relating to collective creativity.  The underlying principle 
enshrined in the HRC’s interpretation of CCPR Article 27 coincides with the outlined DRIP 
provisions.522  Further, Section 4.6 showed that the DRIP provisions on cultural rights find 
further support in Articles 2.2 (b) and 5 (a) of ILO 169, which also call for protection of 
indigenous peoples’ cultural rights as well as of their cultural practices.  Section 4.9 
concluded that the ILO 169’s position outlined above and the concurring interpretation of 
CCPR Article 27 by the HRC have already been accepted by international law in general.  
These positions are hence reaffirmed by the DRIP.  In addition, one can recall that CESC 
General Comment No. 21 proclaims that indigenous peoples – as peoples - have the right to 
protection of their collective cultural identity.  As Section 6.3.2 has already concluded, also 
this position finds strong support in the DRIP.   
 
6.3.4 The right to self-determination 
 
As mentioned, DRIP Article 3 proclaims that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to self-
determination.”  Since the right to self-determination constitutes the keystone of peoples’ 
rights, it is of obvious importance to determine what is embedded in the right to self-
determination as enshrined in DRIP.523  There seems to be three basic possible alternatives. 
 
First, Chapter 2 outlined how according to the conventional understanding of the internal 
aspect of the right to self-determination, all citizens of the state – regardless of ethnic and 
cultural background – have the right to participate in the political life of the state, on an equal 
basis.  Hence, an interpretation of DRIP Article 3 in line with the conventional understanding 
of the internal aspect of the right to self-determination would entail nothing more than 
indigenous individuals being entitled to participate in the political life of the state, on the 
same basis as other citizens.  In other words, indigenous peoples would have the right to 
determine over their collective creativity to the extent they could achieve this end through 
                                                 
522  In addition, Section 4.7 described how the HRC’s interpretation of CCPR Article 27 receives support from 
the CERD Committee’s General Recommendation No. 23 and the draft OAS Declaration Article 13.1, 
underlining indigenous peoples’ right to preserve and use their collective creativity.  The Section also noted that 
the latter provision has been agreed on in the negotiations on the OAS Declaration. 
523  It is underlined that for the present purposes, only the internal aspect of self-determination is relevant.  
Moreover, Section 4.10 has explained that the DRIP could hardly impact on the applicability of the external 
aspect of self-determination, at least as far as secession is concerned, something DRIP Article 46.1 also 
explicitly affirms.     
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individual members running for office in general elections of the country or through other 
political processes open to all citizens.   
 
Such an interpretation of Article 3 is implausible, however.  As thoroughly outlined above, it 
is a defining characteristic of indigenous rights that indigenous peoples are entitled to 
preserve their own distinct societies, side-by-side with the majority society.  Since emerging 
in the 1980s, the contemporary indigenous rights discourse has focused on protecting 
autonomous functions of indigenous peoples’ societies, rather than on integrating indigenous 
individuals into the majority society.  As Chapter 4 outlined, this focus in international law 
has only become increasingly entrenched in recent years.  The DRIP echoes these general 
developments in international law, firmly underlining that indigenous peoples’ right to self-
determination is primarily to be exercised through autonomous and self-governing functions.  
For instance, following DRIP Article 3’s general proclamation that indigenous peoples are the 
beneficiaries of the right to self-determination, Article 4 proceeds to stipulate that “Indigenous 
peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-
government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs...”  That indigenous peoples’ 
right to self-determination is primarily a right to govern their societies through their own 
autonomous decision-making mechanisms is further emphasized by Article 5, proclaiming 
that “Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, 
legal … and cultural institutions…” and that they participate “… if they so choose, in the 
political … and cultural life of the state”.  Article 5 hence underlines that only as a second 
alternative, and merely to the extent the indigenous people so choose, shall matters pertaining 
to the people’s political, legal and cultural interest be administered by state institutions. 
 
It is hence clear that indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination is, first and foremost, not 
a political right in the conventional sense, but a right to make decisions through the people’s 
own autonomous institutions.  What remains to be answered, however, is whether the right to 
self-determination DRIP enshrines suggests that international law no longer knows peoples in 
the meaning the sum of the population of a state.  Alternatively, does DRIP entail that 
international law now recognizes two categories of people?  The latter would imply that both 
peoples in the conventional understanding, i.e. the aggregate of the population of the state, 
and peoples defined in terms of ethnicity and culture (at least in the context of indigenous 
peoples), are entitled to the right to self-determination.  This further begs the question; how 
does indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination relate to the right enjoyed by the majority 
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people?  Is the right to self-determination enshrined in DRIP the same right to self-
determination enjoyed by all peoples?  Or is alternatively the right to self-determination 
Article 3 puts forward a sui generis right, particular to indigenous peoples (and possibly also 
to other non-state forming peoples)?  If the latter is correct, one can assume that the right to 
self-determination of indigenous peoples is sub-ordinated to the general right to self-
determination proclaimed by e.g. the common Article 1 of the 1966 Covenants.       
 
If trying to address the posed questions, one can first note that the wording of DRIP Article 3 
support the conclusion that the right enshrined is the general right to self-determination, 
enjoyed by all peoples.  Article 3 reproduces verbatim, except for the insertion of 
“indigenous” before peoples, the common Article 1.1 of the 1966 Covenants.  Article 3 hence 
submits that the right to self-determination indigenous peoples enjoy is the – and not a - right 
to self-determination.  The reference to “the right” posits that the right proclaimed is the 
already existing, and not a new, right.  This conclusion is further supported by a contextual 
interpretation of the DRIP.  No international legal source suggests that there exists more than 
one form of self-determination.  On the contrary, as Section 4.7 outlined, sources addressing 
indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination, such as the HRC’s interpretation of the 
common Article 1 of the 1966 Covenants, suggest that indigenous peoples do enjoy the 
general right to self-determination.  Further, the WGDD Chairperson-Rapporteur declared 
that he understood the right to self-determination enshrined in DRIP to be the general right 
enjoyed by all peoples, and not as a sui generis right.524  This interpretation of the DRIP has 
also found support in the legal doctrine.525 
 
If the understanding of DRIP Article 3 outlined above is correct, this presumably implies that 
“peoples” in the meaning the aggregate of the population of the state no longer exists in 
international law.  This understanding has then been replaced by an interpretation submitting 
that peoples only exist as defined by ethnic/cultural terms.  But one could also imagine an 
alternative position where international law has room for two categories of peoples.  The first 
category would then continuously be the entire population of the state.  The second category 
                                                 
524  In addition, also the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the WGIP, i.e. the chief drafter of the original draft DRIP, 
noted in an explanatory note when the WGIP handed over the draft to the Commission HR that indigenous 
peoples are peoples enjoying the general right to sell-determination.  See UN Document 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/26/Add. 1, paras. 2, 7, 11, 17 and 19.   
525  Anaya, Divergent Discourses About International Law, p. 242, and The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-
Determination in the Post-Declaration Era, pp. 185 and 191, and Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights in International 
Law over the Last 10 Years 
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of peoples would then be ethnically/culturally defined.  But importantly, under such 
circumstances, the second category of peoples would include both the indigenous people and 
the majority people.526  And equally important, the indigenous people and the majority people 
would be equally self-determining in matters of their respective internal affairs.  In issues of 
joint interest, such as the foreign policy of the state, they would presumably exercise joint 
decision-making in a system akin to a federation. 
 
For the purposes of the doctoral thesis, if the alternative is correct suggesting that DRIP 
Article 3 submits that indigenous peoples enjoy the right to self-determination, applying to all 
peoples, it is not necessary to dwell on whether this entails (i) that peoples in the meaning the 
aggregate population of the state no longer exist or, alternatively (ii) that this category of 
people still exists, but only to make decisions in matter of common interest to the two peoples 
in the state defined in terms of ethnicity/culture (i.e. the majority people and the indigenous 
people).  What is relevant is that in both instances, indigenous peoples’ right to self-
determination in internal affairs – e.g. in matters pertaining to their creativity – is equal to the 
right to self-determination enjoyed by the majority people.  In other words, if this alternative 
is correct, indigenous peoples are the beneficiaries of a right to self-determination which is 
not subordinated to the right of self-determination of the majority people.  Clearly, the 
implications of this conclusion are vast.  In principle, indigenous peoples’ decision-making 
institutions then have the same right to decide in cultural affairs as do the (national) 
parliament, government etc. on behalf of the majority population.  There is no legal reason 
why decisions taken by the former should carry less weight than those by the latter.  
Obviously, such an understanding of the right to self-determination calls for substantial 
redistribution of decision-making power, or sovereignty if one wishes, within states hosting 
indigenous peoples. 
 
Despite the vast implication of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination being the 
general right enjoyed by all peoples, only two states objected to this conclusion at the time of 
the adoption of the DRIP.527  In addition, it is difficult to determine whether Liechtenstein 
applause of the DRIP’s innovative approach to the right to self-determination intended to 
                                                 
526  For the benefit of simplicity, we presume here that there exist only one indigenous people in the state used as 
an example. 
527  In addition, Germany did a similar statement in connection with the vote on the DRIP in the HR-Council, but 
did not repeat this position in the UNGA.  As Section 6.2 described, two more states suggested that the right to 
self-determination does not apply beyond a decolonization context.  However, as concluded immediately above, 
such an interpretation of the DRIP is implausible, and the comments should therefore be disregarded. 
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voice a position on the general right/sui generis right issue.  In any event, the small number of 
states positing that indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination is not the general right is 
not sufficient reason to depart from the reasonable interpretation of DRIP Article 3, as 
outlined above.           
  
Hence, an interpretation of both the wording of DRIP Article 3 and other relevant 
international legal sources supports the conclusion that the right to self-determination DRIP 
enshrines is the general right enjoyed by all peoples.  The interpretative statements delivered 
in connection with the adoption of the DRIP give no reason to deviate from this conclusion.  
In fact, the vast implications associated with understanding DRIP as awarding indigenous 
peoples the general right to self-determination seem to be the one argument against such a 
conclusion.  But it is a relevant one.  Have states, the primary creators of international law, 
truly accepted a development in international law implying that a vast amount of their 
decision-making power has been transferred to indigenous peoples?  Have they genuinely 
agreed to place indigenous peoples on par with other peoples?  There doctoral thesis take no 
definite position on this issue at this point.  It shall return to which of the two options might 
be correct in Chapter 8. 
 
Regardless of whether indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination is the general right or a 
sui generis right, what the thesis can safely conclude is that DRIP affirms that the right to 
self-determination has evolved to apply beyond a colonial context.  What is more, DRIP 
further confirms that irrespective of whether indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination is 
the general right or a sui generis right, the internal aspect of the right goes beyond a mere 
right to political participation of members of the indigenous population on an equal basis with 
other citizens.  Rather, the DRIP underscores the position taken in the sources outlined in 
Chapter 4 that the right to self-determination shall first and foremost be exercised through 
self-governing and/or autonomy arrangements.  As to the content and scope of such a right, 
the doctoral thesis will predominantly address this issue in Chapter 8.  Already here, however, 
it is noted that guidance can be derived from DRIP provisions fleshing out the general right to 
self-determination proclaimed by Article 3.  The right to autonomy/self-government in 
matters relating to their internal and local affairs enshrined in DRIP Article 4 must reasonably 
embrace cultural matters.  In addition, further guidance can be obtained from the DRIP 
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provisions pertaining to cultural elements, whereof most have been discussed in Section 6.3.3, 
immediately above.528 
 
Again, we see how the DRIP reaffirms developments in international law enshrined in other 
international legal sources.  Despite substantive evidence in e.g. treaty body jurisprudence529 
and the positions taken by regional human rights institutions, Section 4.7 abstained from 
concluding that international law has firmly established a right to self-determination of 
indigenous peoples.  The reason was the absence of concrete evidence of state support for 
such a position.  Through DRIP, states offers the previously lacking political support for the 
right to self-determination applying also to indigenous peoples in a form where the right is 
chiefly to be exercised through autonomy/self-government.   
 
6.3.5 Indigenous peoples’ property rights to their collective creativity 
 
Section 6.3.3 described that pursuant to DRIP Article 31, indigenous peoples have the right to 
control their distinct cultural heritage.  The examplatory list in the provision following the 
general proclamation is so extensive that it is clear that Article 31 intends to cover essentially 
all forms of collective creativity.  In addition, Article 31 also stipulates that indigenous 
peoples have the right to maintain and control their intellectual property pertaining to such 
collective creativity.530  As mentioned, Article 31 does not declare that indigenous peoples 
have the right to own their distinct cultural heritages.  Rather, Article 31 uses the verb 
“control”.  One could question what the use of the verb “control” implies for Article 31 as a 
property rights provision.  Normally, the term “own” is used to denote a property right.  On 
the other hand, as further mentioned, Article 31 does proceed to proclaim that indigenous 
peoples have the right to maintain and control intellectual property over their cultural 
heritage.   
 
                                                 
528  This is in line with the doctoral thesis’s general observation that indigenous peoples’ collective right to 
culture and their right to self-determination, as the latter right pertains to culture, interlink to a large degree. 
529  Most important in this context is of course the HRC’s and CESC’s application the right to self-determination 
to indigenous peoples.  But the right to self-determination applying to indigenous peoples also finds support in 
CERD General Recommendation No. 23, proclaiming that decisions relating to indigenous peoples’ rights or 
interests must only be taken with their consent.  Barelli too, concludes that DRIP Article 3 is in line with recent 
jurisprudence from treaty bodies.  See The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System, p. 976. 
530  As further mentioned, DRIP Article 24, probably somewhat redundantly, given the wide scope of Article 31, 
underscores that indigenous peoples have rights also to their traditional medicines. 
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The structure of and the verb use DRIP Article 31 opts for are somewhat puzzling.  As 
follows also from the outline in Chapter 5, it is questionable whether the concept “intellectual 
property” has any meaning in itself.  As seen, as with all forms of property, international 
property rights law takes a positivist approach towards IPRs.  An IPR is essentially a right to 
an element of human creativity that a domestic jurisdiction at any given time deems eligible 
for IPR-protection.531  DRIP Article 31’s reference to “intellectual property” could hence be 
understood as simply a reference to domestic law.  Thus understood, the wording lacks self-
standing meaning.  It only comes into play to the extent domestic law recognizes IPRs over 
collective creativity.532  In short, DRIP Article 31’s reference to intellectual property would 
seem to be redundant.   
 
One need not, however, necessarily understand the reference to intellectual property in DRIP 
Article 31 in such a restrictive manner.  Section 5.4 concluded that an analogy with land 
rights law reveals that indigenous peoples’ collective creativity should also enjoy property 
rights protection.  The Section further noted that there is at least a trend in international legal 
sources to extend property rights protection to collective creativity, as enshrined first and 
foremost in CESC General Comments No. 17 and 21.  The reference to intellectual property 
in Article 31 could be interpreted as affirming this development in international law.  
Interpreted in this manner, the provision proclaims that states are obligated to extend IP 
protection also to indigenous peoples’ collective creativity.  Indeed, this is a more plausible 
understanding of Article 31 since, in doubt, preference should be given to an interpretation 
giving the provision a meaning, rather than rendering it redundant.533  Thus understood, DRIP 
Article 31 offers support to the development in international law asserting that indigenous 
peoples hold property rights to their collective creativity.        
 
In any event, as mentioned, Article 31 does explicitly proclaim that indigenous peoples have 
the right to control their collective creativity.  This is in other words a right following directly 
from DRIP, and is not contingent on domestic law.  Section 5.4.2 outlined how, as property 
                                                 
531  Drahos, The Universality of Intellectual Property Rights, p. 1, and Dutfield and Suthersanen, Global 
Intellectual Property Law, pp. 12-14 and 68 
532  This is true also when domestic IP-law is instructed by international IPR-agreements outside the sphere of 
human rights.  The reference to intellectual property is still a reference to another legal system, and does not 
proclaim an independent right. 
533  See further Section 7.4 on interpretation of international legal instruments.  Carpenter, Katyal and Riley 
agree that the DRIP awards indigenous peoples collective property rights to both tangible and intangible 
resources.  See In Defence of Property, p. 1025.  In the same vein, Xanthaki asserts that DRIP calls on states to 
create sui generis IP-systems of protection.  See Indigenous Rights in International Law over the 10 Last Years.  
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rights in general, IPRs envelope a catalogue of “sub-rights” such as right to possession, right 
to use, right to control access by others and rights to transmit/disseminate.  Clearly, a right of 
indigenous peoples to “control” their collective creativity embraces many of the listed sub-
rights, if perhaps not all of them entirely.534  In particular, the right to control must reasonably 
be understood as encompassing a right to prevent non-members from accessing and/or 
illegitimately using elements of the indigenous people’s culture.  In conclusion, DRIP Article 
31 proclaims that indigenous peoples have the right to control their collective creativity, or at 
least cultural elements still held by them.  The provision calls on states to effectuate these 
rights through IP–laws.  Albeit it is probably more likely that the rights will be 
operationalized through IP-neighbouring rights, rather than IP-rights proper, the DRIP once 
again confirms recent developments in other international legal sources.      
 
As mentioned, the applicability of DRIP Article 31 might be limited to cultural elements 
continuously under indigenous peoples’ control.  Present tense formulations such as “control” 
and “maintain” suggest that the provision is not intended to have restitutionary effects.  If so, 
Article 31 does not apply to cultural elements in the public domain or elements to which third 
party rights pertain.  On the other hand, the wording of Article 31 does not rule out that the 
provision applies also to such subject matter either.  The provision proclaims that indigenous 
peoples have the right to control “their” creativity.  The question is hence what is understood 
with “their”.  It might, at least under certain circumstances, be far-fetched to claim that a 
cultural element falls under the category “their” if a third party hold rights to the element, i.e. 
own it.  But if there are no competing rights, i.e. if the element is in the public domain, it is 
perhaps more reasonable than indigenous peoples submit that the cultural element is “their”, 
if the people in question maintain a cultural connection to the element.  The doctoral thesis 
shall return to this question in Chapters 8 and 9.   
 
6.3.6 Property rights to land 
 
In a manner similarly to ILO 169 Article 13, DRIP Article 25 underscores indigenous 
peoples’ right to maintain and strengthen their distinct spiritual relationship with traditional 
lands, waters and territories.  Following this affirmation of the underpinning rationale for why 
indigenous peoples hold cultural rights to lands, DRIP Articles 26 sets forth what rights, more 
                                                 
534  Recall also Waldron’s definition of property rights as norms that govern access to and control of material 
resources.  See The Right to Private Property, p. 31. 
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specifically, indigenous peoples hold to lands and natural resources traditionally used and 
continuously occupied.  Article 28 then proceeds to address what rights indigenous peoples 
hold to territories traditionally used but which have subsequently been lost or taken without 
their consent.  In comparison, the rights contained in DRIP Article 26 are expressed with 
greater clarity compared with ILO 169 Article 14 and 15.  Moreover, as Section 5.3.3 
explained, the ILO 169 contains no provision comparable to DRIP Article 28.      
 
Article 26.1 generally proclaims that “Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, 
territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or 
acquired”.  The language in the initial paragraph of Article seems open-ended enough to 
embrace both cultural and property rights.  For the present purposes, however, the property 
right aspect of DRIP Article 26 is most interesting.  DRIP Article 26.2 explicitly confirms that 
indigenous peoples hold property rights to lands and natural resources, declaring that 
“Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and 
resources that they possess by reason of … traditional occupation or use…”.  Hence, pursuant 
to Article 26.2, indigenous peoples have ownership rights to lands and natural resources 
traditional occupied or used, irrespective of whether the lands or resources are of culture 
importance to the indigenous people in question.  Moreover, the state need not have 
acknowledged these rights.  What is required is that the indigenous people continuously 
“possess” the concerned territories, irrespective of state recognition.   
 
There is no universally applicable definition of “possess”.  But Black’s Legal Dictionary’s 
broadly defines “possess” in a manner probably fairly accurately describing a general 
understanding of the term in most jurisdictions.  According to Black’s, to “possess” 
something is “to have in one’s actual control; to have possession of” a subject matter.  
Further, “possession” is: (i) The fact of having or holding property in one’s power, the 
exercise of dominion over property; and (ii) the right under which one may exercise control 
over something to the exclusion of others.  Against the background of this definition, some 
might argue that indigenous land utilization is not sufficiently exclusive and intense to qualify 
as “possession”.  At least, this argument can be made against nomadic indigenous land use, or 
uses that in other ways are more fluctuating than what is common in non-indigenous cultures.  
However, the reference to “possession” in DRIP Article 26.2 can hardly be understood in 
such a restrictive manner.   
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Interpreting the reference to “possession” in DRIP Article 26.2 in the suggested manner could 
in fact be described as reverting back to the terra nullius doctrine.  Section 5.3 described how 
international law has recently reinterpreted the notion of property rights so not to discriminate 
against land and natural resource utilization common to indigenous cultures.  It would be 
unreasonable not to interpret the term “possess” in DRIP Article 26.2 against the background 
of these developments.  It would be a contradiction in terms to first in principle recognize that 
indigenous peoples’ traditional use of land results in property rights thereto, only to 
immediately thereafter make such rights contingent on a conventional understanding of the 
term “possess”.  Such an interpretation would render Article 26.2 essentially without effect.  
That could hardly have been the intention, particularly when noting the proximity between the 
concepts “property rights” and “possession”.  If comparing Black Law Dictionary’s definition 
of “possession” with the definitions of “property rights” discussed in Section 5.2, one 
immediately notes that the definitions are very similar.  This is natural, as property rights are 
essentially rights to legal protection of possessions.  Hence, as the understanding of property 
rights have recently evolved, the understanding of the term “possession” in DRIP Article 26.2 
shall also be customized to land use common to indigenous cultures. It follows that pursuant 
to DRIP Article 26.2, indigenous peoples hold property rights to territories and natural 
resources traditionally and continuously used, irrespective of how disperse and irregular the 
traditional land use of the particular indigenous peoples might be.  This interpretation of DRIP 
Article 26.2 further finds support in doctrine and jurisprudence.535  Notably, DRIP Article 
26.2 does not employ the two-tire approach used by ILO 169 Article 14.  In other words, 
pursuant to the provision, indigenous peoples hold property rights to land irrespective of 
whether the land area in question is today to some extent shared with the majority population, 
as long as the indigenous people continuously use the territory.  In conclusion, Section 5.3.2 
inferred that international law that indigenous peoples’ property rights to lands, waters 
territories and natural resources traditionally and continuously used has crystallized into 
international law.  DRIP Article 26.2 clearly mirrors and reaffirms this development.  
Indirectly, therefore, DRIP Article 26.2 also lends support to the analogy between property 
rights to land and property rights to human creativity, as outlined in Section 5.4.   
      
                                                 
535  McNeil has underlined that “possession” in the context of indigenous peoples must be understood to mean 
“possession in fact”, in turn giving rice to a presumption of that the indigenous people also has “possession in 
law”.  See Emerging Justice?, p. 141.  Similarly, in the Delgamuukw Case, the Canadian Supreme Court 
affirmed that physical occupation by an indigenous people is evidence of possession in law.  See Delgamuukw v. 
British Columbia, p. 1101.  Xanthaki too, notes that indigenous peoples’ own customary land tenure system 
results in “possession” under the DRIP.  See Indigenous Rights in International Law over the Last 10 Years. 
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As to the right to restitution, Article 28.1 proclaims that “Indigenous peoples have the right to 
… restitution or, when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation, for the 
lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally … occupied or used, and which 
have been … taken … without their free, prior and informed consent”.  As in Article 26.2, the 
key criterion is hence traditional use and/or occupation, rather than state recognition of rights.  
The phrase “traditional use and occupation” must reasonably given the same meaning in 
DRIP Article 28.1 as in 26.2, i.e. it must be understood in a cultural context of the particular 
indigenous people.  In other words, pursuant to Article 28.1, territories that an indigenous 
people has traditionally used and/or occupied in a manner significant for its culture, but which 
have subsequently been taken without its consent, shall be returned.  Once returned, the 
indigenous people hold property rights to the territory in question.  Only when restitution is at 
all not feasible is other forms of compensation a relevant option.   
 
As DRIP Article 28 calls for full restitution in all instances, it is natural that the DRIP 
contains no provision on the right to benefit-sharing.  One can note, however that DRIP 
Article 28 does proclaim that when restitution of land is not at all possible, there can be 
monetary compensation instead.  Perhaps one can also imagine situations where restitution is 
not impossible, but still highly unpractical, also from the point of view of the indigenous 
people.  The land area in question might for example today already be full of extractive 
industries.  In such instances, it is reasonable to interpret DRIP Article 28 as, although full 
restitution is not technically speaking impossible, offering benefit-sharing arrangements as a 
more practical alternative, provided that the indigenous people agrees.  
 
In conclusion, Section 5.3.3 noted the clear and discernable trend in international law towards 
recognition of a right to restitution of indigenous peoples.536  Notwithstanding, the Section did 
not infer that a right to restitution has been clearly affirmed in international law.  The reason 
for not drawing that conclusion was lack of evidence of support for such a position in regional 
and national processes.  In addition, the legal doctrine has failed to identify a right to 
restitution in international law.  Clearly, through DRIP Article 28.1, states have now provided 
support for the development towards a right to restitution as outlined in Section 5.3.3.  The 
DRIP offers no support, however, with regard to partial restitution, as it embeds no benefit-
                                                 
536  For instance, the Section observed that all relevant UN treaty bodies have discussed in terms of a right to 
restitution of indigenous peoples with regard to lands taken without consent.  The CERD and CESC Committees 
have most clearly underlined this right in General Recommendation No. 23 and General Comment No. 21, 
respectively.  
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sharing provision.  Chapter 9 will return to the question of whether DRIP Article 28 entails 
that a right to restitution has been firmly established in international law. 
 
6.3.7 The right to non-discrimination        
 
Section 6.3.2 concluded that DRIP Articles 1, 2 and 3 and pp 22, read in conjunction with 
DRIP as a whole and the international legal sources surveyed in Chapter 4, confirm that 
indigenous peoples are the beneficiaries of peoples’ rights proper, to the same extent as other 
peoples.  In addition to underscoring that indigenous peoples enjoy collective human rights, 
this conclusion also has implications for the right to non-discrimination.  The inferment 
confirms not only the conclusion drawn in Sections 4.8.4 and 4.9, namely that the right to 
non-discrimination indirectly protects also indigenous peoples as such.537  In fact, DRIP 
Articles 1, 2, and 3 and pp 22 further supports an inferment Section 4.9 abstained from 
drawing, i.e. that indigenous peoples enjoy a right proper to non-discrimination, in line with 
the CERD Committee’s General Recommendation No. 23.          
 
6.3.8 Article 46 
 
DRIP Article 46 groups together certain issues pertaining to how the rights enshrined in the 
Declaration impact on matters of great interest to society as a whole as well as on rights and 
interests of other segments of society.  Pursuant to DRIP Article 46.1, nothing in the 
Declaration may be construed as authorizing any action constituting a threat to the territorial 
integrity of the state.  As Sections 4.10 and 6.3.4 explained, this provision merely reaffirms 
well established international law.538  As further mentioned, the issue of secession lacks 
relevance to the doctoral thesis, wherefore Article 46.1 is not discussed further.  Potentially 
more interesting are DRIP Article 46.2 and 3.  
 
                                                 
537  Anaya too, posits that the right to non-discrimination enshrined in DRIP applies to indigenous peoples.  See 
The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination in the Post-Declaration Era, p. 185.  In the same vein, 
Kymlicka notes that DRIP is a response to claims that conventional individual liberalism renders cultural 
minorities vulnerable to injustices by the majority.  See The Rights of Minority Cultures, p. 18. 
538  It is repeated that indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination not enveloping a right to secession does not 
bar the possibility that indigenous peoples enjoy the general right to self-determination, applying to all peoples.  
As Section 4.10 explained, no people are entitled to a general right to secession, indigenous and non-indigenous 
peoples alike.  See also Fromherz, Indigenous Peoples’ Courts, pp. 1346-1347, where he observes that Article 
46.1 prohibiting secession does not prohibit indigenous peoples from enjoying all other aspects of the right to 
self-determination. 
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Pursuant to Article 46.2, when exercising the rights enshrined in the DRIP, “the human rights 
… of all should be respected”.  Further, the rights the DRIP sets forth may be subject to such 
limitations that are determined by law and “are in accordance with international human 
rights obligations.”  However, any such limitation must be “non-discriminatory and strictly 
necessary solely for the purpose of securing due … respect for the rights … of others… and 
for meeting the just and most compelling requirements of a democratic society”.  Article 46.3 
stipulates that the rights DRIP proclaims shall be “interpreted in accordance with the 
principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, equality, non-discrimination, good 
governance and good faith”. 
 
Some might argue that the general limitations DRIP Article 46.2 and 3 set forth can be 
invoked by states to significantly curb the applicability of the material rights enshrined in the 
DRIP.  Still, it is doubtful whether an interpretation allowing the rather sweeping formulations 
in Article 46.2 and 3 to a large degree set aside the concrete formulations in the material 
provisions of the DRIP is plausible.  The intention can hardly be that, as a general rule, third 
party rights and the interest of society at large take precedent over the material DRIP 
provisions.  With respect to the interest of society as a whole, this conclusion follows 
explicitly from the wording of DRIP Article 46.2, underlining that the provision applies only 
when there is a need to meet the most “compelling requirements of a democratic society”, a 
situation that is unlikely to occur often.  But also with regard to third party rights, Article 46.2 
and 3 can reasonably not be understood as stipulating anything more than that the rights 
enshrined in DRIP cannot always be exercised without the consideration of the rights of third 
parties.  Thus interpreted, Article 46.2 and 3 merely underlines a well-known feature of the 
human rights-system, namely that the patch-work of human rights is not perfect.  Sometimes, 
human rights contradict.  In such instances, one has to find ways to reconcile the contradicting 
rights, without unduly violating either of them.  In certain circumstances, doing so might 
require the state to shoulder some of the burdens, e.g. by compensating one of the parties for 
having to accept the rights of the other.  Article 46.2 and 3 point to that such reconciliation 
might sometimes also be necessary with regard to human rights of indigenous peoples, on one 
hand, and those of other members of the society, on the other.  This being the only reasonable 
interpretation of Articles 46.2 and 3 follows also from Article 46.3 underlining that the DRIP 
provisions shall be interpreted in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination.  It 
would simply be discriminatory to argue that indigenous peoples’ human rights should be 
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subject to more severe limitations in case of conflicts between rights, than rights of other 
segments of society. 
 
With such an interpretation of Article 46.2 and 3, the provisions’ impact on the material rights 
relevant to this doctoral thesis is limited.  For instance, the question of whether DRIP supports 
the notion that indigenous peoples do enjoy human rights proper in general can only be 
determined by a thorough and contextual analysis of all relevant DRIP provisions.  Section 
6.3.2 has conducted such an analysis and has answered the question in the affirmative.  A 
provision in sweeping terms pointing to the relevance of third party rights and the interest of 
society as a whole cannot rebut the conclusion drawn that indigenous peoples enjoy peoples’ 
rights, without discrimination.   
 
In the same vein, Section 6.3.4 described how DRIP confirms that indigenous peoples are the 
beneficiaries of the right to self-determination, and that this right shall chiefly be implemented 
through autonomy and self-governance.  What remains to be determined is whether the right 
enjoyed is the general right to self-determination enjoyed by all peoples, or rather a right sui 
generis to indigenous peoples.  If the former alternative is correct, Article 46.2 and 3 have 
little relevance.  Under such circumstances, indigenous peoples enjoy the same right to self-
determination as other peoples.  This right will surely often have to be reconciled with the 
right to self-determination of the majority people.  But Article 46.2 and 3 can hardly be 
invoked to argue for the balancing as a general rule being tilted in favour of the majority 
people, since that would be discriminatory.  Should, on the other hand, the right to self-
determination DRIP Article 3 proclaims be a right sui generis to indigenous peoples, the 
situation is perhaps somewhat less straight-forward.  Under such circumstances, indigenous 
peoples’ right to self-determination is presumably subordinated to the right to self-
determination enjoyed by the majority people.  This might give wider room for consideration 
of the interest of other segments of the society, when determining the scope and content of 
indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination.  Notwithstanding, also in such an instance, a 
general provision calling for respect for third party rights and the interest of society as a 
whole cannot reasonably be understood as setting aside the general structure for how the right 
to self-determination is to be operationalized.  In other words, DRIP Article 46 cannot 
obliterate the concrete provision in Article 4, affirming that indigenous peoples’ right to self-
determination is first and foremost a right to autonomy/self-government in internal and local 
affairs.  Neither can Article 46 reasonably be understood as impacting on the fact that the 
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reference to “internal and local affairs” in Article 4 embraces indigenous peoples’ collective 
creativity, as e.g. defined by the very concrete DRIP Article 31.     
 
But even if having little relevance to the general structure of the right, Article 46.2 and 3 
might potentially partly impact on the scope and content of a right to self-determination sui 
generis to indigenous peoples.  The word “partly” is used, since the provisions’ relevance 
with regard to cultural elements still controlled by indigenous peoples must reasonably be 
limited.  As mentioned, DRIP Article 31 guides us as to the scope and content of the right to 
self-determination enshrined in Articles 3 and 4.  Article 31 explicitly and unambiguously 
confirms that indigenous peoples have the right to “control” elements of their collective 
creativity still held by them.  Again, such a concrete right can hardly be set aside by Article 
46’s general reference to the interest of society as a whole.  And the reference to third party 
rights is of course irrelevant in this context, since no third party rights exist to cultural 
elements controlled by indigenous people.  However, the situation might be different with 
regard to cultural elements to which third parties hold rights, or which are already in the 
public domain.  Cleary, if third party rights have been established to cultural elements having 
escaped the control of indigenous peoples, such rights cannot be simply disregarded.  But it 
might be that the cost for respecting these rights shall be borne, wholly or partly, by the 
government, rather than by the indigenous people.  Moreover, it can be that under certain 
circumstances, a fair balancing of the rights implies that continued use by the third party is not 
all together prohibited, but that there shall be benefit-sharing with the indigenous people that 
has created the cultural element.  With regard to cultural elements already in the public 
domain, this might constitute an instance when the interest of society as a whole provided for 
by DRIP Article 46.2 and 3 does come into play.  As Section 5.4 explained, the IPR-system, 
including the notion of the public domain, has been constructed exactly for the purpose of 
maximizing creativity, believed to benefit society as a whole.  At the same time, one should 
recall DRIP Article 46.3’s call for a non-discriminatory implementation of the Declaration.  
And as Section 5.4 explained, the arguments calling for a reconsideration of the public 
domain in the context of indigenous peoples’ collective creativity are precisely arguments 
rooted in the right to non-discrimination.  Consequently, if a careful evaluation of the rights to 
property/non-discrimination has resulted in the conclusion that the public domain needs to be 
reformulated, the applicability of DRIP Article 46 might be limited.539  The doctoral thesis 
                                                 
539  Also with regard to cultural elements to which third party rights pertain or that are in the public domain, one 
should further recall DRIP Articles 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13 and 15, outlined above.  As explained, these provisions 
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shall return to these issues in Chapters 8, 9 and 12.  With regard to cultural elements in the 
public domain, again, the reference to third party rights does not come into play.  Of course, 
per definition no third party rights pertain to subject matter in the public domain.     
 
For the reasons just mentioned, DRIP Article 46.2 and 3 must have limited relevance also 
with regard to indigenous peoples’ property rights to their collective creativity.  As seen, the 
right to property is essentially a right to non-discrimination.  Section 5.4 explained how recent 
developments in international law seek to accustom the property rights concept to the 
situation of indigenous peoples, precisely because doing so is perceived to be in line with 
evolved understandings of the right to non-discrimination.  Section 6.3.5 inferred that DRIP 
Article 31 is line with this development.  For the same reasons, Article 46.2 and 3 is of little 
relevance to indigenous peoples’ property rights to land and natural resources pursuant to 
DRIP Article 26.2.  But the interest of society as a whole, and not least concern for third party 
rights, might be of relevance in the context of indigenous peoples’ right to restitution 
proclaimed by Article 28, for the same reasons that applied to elements of indigenous 
peoples’ collective creativity already in the public domain, described above.  However, a 
difference between creativity and lands is precisely that in the case of the latter, a DRIP 
provision (Article 28) explicitly, in concrete language, calls for restitution.  Again, this must 
be perceived to limit the applicability of Article 46’s reference to the interest of the society as 
a whole.  With regard to third party rights, however, such rights can certainly not be 
disregarded.  But the presence of an explicit provision on restitution in the DRIP reasonably 
increase the onus on the state to facilitate reconciliation between indigenous and third party 
rights, also by providing compensation if necessary. 
  
6.3.9 Endorsement of DRIP by the UN system and beyond 
 
In the relatively short time-period that has passed since the UNGA adopted the DRIP, several 
international bodies have endorsed the Declaration, indicating the DRIP’s conformity with 
international law in general.  In General Comment No. 21, the CESC underlines that several 
of the rights DRIP enshrines are also reflected in CESCR Article 15, as understood in the light 
of recent developments in international law.  Further, with reference to DRIP Articles 20 and 
33, the CESC interprets CESCR Article 15 to embrace a protection of indigenous peoples’ 
                                                                                                                                                        
protect indigenous peoples’ from use by non-members of their cultural heritage that is culturally insensitive or 
otherwise harmful to the people’s cultural identity.  These are fundamental human rights, which reasonably 
limits the applicability of DRIP Article 46.2 and 3.   
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way of life, means and subsistence and cultural identity.  Other DRIP provisions referred to 
by the CESC in General Comment No. 21 include 1, 11-13 and 19.540  Also other UN treaty 
bodies have commenced taking DRIP into account when interpreting their respective 
instruments in the context of indigenous peoples.541  Further, the UN Special Rapporteur on 
the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people has stated that 
“[The DRIP] represents an authoritative common understanding, at the global level, of the 
minimum content of the rights of indigenous peoples, upon a foundation of various sources of 
international human rights law”.  He further added his intention to measure state conduct vis-
à-vis indigenous peoples by the yardstick of the DRIP542  The UN Office of the High 
Commissioner on Human Rights has underlined that its work is to assist states and indigenous 
peoples in implementing the DRIP.543  Further, the UN Development Group, composed of all 
UN system organizations and programs working with development, has acknowledged that 
DRIP provides the relevant legal framework for their work towards indigenous peoples.544 
 
Also regional organizations of states have embraced the DRIP.  The OAS uses the Declaration 
as “the baseline for negotiations and … a minimum standard” for the draft OAS DRIP, 
discussed in Section 4.7.3.545  Further, the IACHR relied in part on DRIP in the Saramaka 
Case,546 as did the AfCommHPR in the Endorois Case.547 
 
                                                 
540  The CESC has also made similar observations in country specific observations with regard to Nicaragua.  
See Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Nicaragua, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/NIC/CO/4 (28 November 2008), para. 35. 
541  Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment No. 11, CRC/C/GC/11, para. 82, and 
CRC/C/BOL/CO/4 (Bolivia), para. 3 (c), and CERD Committee CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (United States), para. 29, 
CERD/C/FJI/CO/17 (Fiji), para. 13, and CERD/C/CAN/CO/18 (Canada) para. 27. 
542  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous 
people to the Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/9/9 (11 August 2008), para. 85   
543  Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, “Statement by Ms. Kyung-wha Kang, Deputy High 
Commissioner for Human Rights”, 1st sess., Geneva (1 October 2008), pp. 4-5 
544  UN Development Group, Guidelines on Indigenous Peoples’ Issues (1 February 2008).  In the same vein, the 
31 UN specialized agencies making up the Inter-Agency Support Group on Indigenous Issues have pledged to 
advance the spirit and letter of the DRIP, and to contribute to DRIP remaining a living document.  See Statement 
on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted at Annual Meeting in September 2007. 
545  Organization of American States (Working Group to Prepare the Draft American Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples), Report of the Chair on the Meetings for Reflection on the Meetings of Negotiations in 
the Quest for Points of Consensus (Washington, D.C., United States – November 26-28, 2007),OEA/Ser.K/XVI, 
GT/DADIN/doc.321/08 (14 January 2008), p. 3 
546  Saramaka People v. Suriname), Series C No. 172, paras. 131 and 214 
547  Endorois People v Kenya, Case 276/2003, para. 232.  The AfCommHPR has also officially welcomed the 
adoption of the DRIP, noting that the Declaration is in line with the position and work of the Commission.  See 
Communiqué on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Doc No ACHPR/Res. 121 (XXXXII, 
of 28 November 2007).  The Commission has also made specific references to the DRIP when discussing 
indigenous peoples’ rights to lands and natural resources.  See “Draft Principles and Guidelines on Economic, 





The DRIP deliberations commenced essentially at the same time as UN expert bodies, 
international courts etc. gradually started to view indigenous rights through a new prism.  
Chapters 4 and 5 outlined how the new take on indigenous rights resulted in the indigenous 
rights discourse challenging some of conventional international law’s most fundamental 
building blocks.  These Chapters surveyed a vast amount of international legal sources 
asserting that indigenous peoples constitute peoples proper, and as such are the beneficiaries 
e.g. of the right to self-determination.  Up and until that point, the right to self-determination 
had only been contemplated in the context of the aggregate of the population of a state or 
territory aspiring to become a state.  In addition, the sources surveyed in Chapter 4 posited 
that indigenous peoples – as collectives – are bearers of human rights in general, rights that 
previously had been reserved for individuals.  The sources outlined in Chapter 5 asserted that 
the terra nullius doctrine has been abolished and that indigenous peoples hold property rights 
to their traditional lands, as well as possibly to their collective creativity.  Underpinning many 
of the mentioned rights, Chapters 4 and 5 observed that the indigenous rights discourse also 
calls for an evolved understanding of the right to non-discrimination, implying that the right 
protects, at least indirectly, also indigenous peoples as such.  Finally, the Chapters concluded 
that the developments within the various areas of law are mutually supportive.    
 
Notwithstanding, Chapters 4 and 5 with one or two exceptions refrained from drawing 
definitive conclusions as to the status of the various set of rights, mainly because of a lack of 
evidence of acceptance on a national level.  The introduction noted that while the outlined 
development in international law progressed, many states deliberately abstained to taking an 
official position on indigenous rights, holding that states’ political position on indigenous 
rights would be determined in the WGDD process.  Having now surveyed the content of 
DRIP in depth, the doctoral thesis concludes that states - through adopting the DRIP – appears 
to have given their political consent to the developments outlined in Chapters 4 and 5.  This 
Chapter 6 demonstrates that DRIP reaffirms essentially all the positions taken by the 
international legal sources outlined in Chapters 4 and 5.548  Still, before concluding that states 
have given their support to the outlined developments, the doctoral thesis has to consider the 
legal status of the DRIP.  As a declaration, the DRIP is in itself not a legally binding 
                                                 
548  Xanthaki too notes that the DRIP can be perceived as an agreed interpretation of various relevant 
pre-existing international legal sources.  See Indigenous Rights in International Law over the 10 Last 
Years. 
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instrument.  What does this mean for the relevance of the conclusions outlined above?  This 
question – obviously of fundamental importance to the thesis - is addressed in the following 
Chapter on international law on international legal sources.  
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7. INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL 




The survey of international legal sources in Chapters 4-6 paid limited attention to the fact that 
the various sources might carry different weight under international law.  In addition, the 
Chapters only incidentally considered international legal norms for interpreting international 
legal sources.  Before the doctoral thesis can move to conclude to what extent indigenous 
peoples have the right to own and/or determine over their collective creativity under 
international law, the doctoral thesis has to address international law on international legal 
sources.  This is the purpose of this Chapter.   
 
Section 7.2 initially outlines the various categories of legal sources generally acknowledged 
by international law, as well as describes the relative authority normally attributed to them.  
Section 7.3 then proceeds to discuss to what extent the formally relatively strict hierarchy of 
sources – in particular the distinction between so called hard and soft law – constitutes an 
accurate description of the international legal system, in reality.  Section 7.4 outlines 
international law on treaty interpretation and further discusses to what extent such norms are 
analogously applicable also to the interpretation of other international legal instruments, such 
as declarations.       
 




Chapter 2 described how from the outset, international law came to rest on the assumption 
that states pre-date the law, wherefore, as a direct consequence, no law can exist above the 
states.  Rather, resting on such a presumption, states must, per definition, be the ultimate 
creators of international law.  We further saw that this position got entrenched during the 
League of Nation epoch, as reflected e.g. in the Lotus Case.  As seen, in the Lotus Case, the 
PCIJ confirmed that the surface of an international norm presupposes state consent, wherefore 
182 
the main sources in international law are treaties and customary law.549  Even though written 
already in 1908, an article of Oppenheim, one of the most prominent legal scholars of the 
era550, describes the sentiment of the time well:  “[I]nternational law is a law not above but 
between states” … “there is no central authority above the sovereign states which could 
compel them to comply with the rules of international law…” and “existing recognized rules 
of international law … are … found in customary practice of states or in law-making 
conventions”.  Oppenheim foresaw that these conventions would never change.551  That said, 
one should note that some legal scholars of the post-Word War I era argued against a strict 
application of legal positivism.  For instance, Lauterpacht defended the continued role of 
natural law ideals in the international legal system, and not only in legal theory.552  This 
doctoral thesis will not probe deeper into the positivist-natural law debate of the early 1900s.  
It is merely noted that the legal practice and mainstream doctrine clearly favoured 
positivism.553  Notwithstanding, throughout the analyses in this Chapter, it might be worth 
bearing in mind that the positivism-natural law debate, here represented by Oppenheim and 
Lauterpacht, did continue into the 1900s.  
 
If after these initial comments embarking on the analyze of the nature and status of 
international legal sources, one can initially note that Oppenheim’s prediction proved correct 
at least in the sense that in the wake of World War II, the world community attempted to 
formalize what constitute legal sources under international law.  The UN Charter established 
the ICJ and the ICJ Statute Article 38 lays out what are relevant sources of international law 
for the purposes of the Court.  Pursuant to Article 38.1, the ICJ shall in its rulings primarily 
apply (a) international conventions establishing rules expressly recognized by contracting 
states, (b) international customary law, and (c) general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations.  In addition, Article 38.1 (d) provides that the ICJ shall apply judicial 
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified international legal scholars as 
                                                 
549  The Case of the S.S. “Lotus”, PJIC, Ser. A. No. 10, 1927, Section III, para. 4 
550  Kingsbury, Legal Positivism as Normative Politics, p. 402 
551  Oppenheim, The Science of International Law, pp. 321-322 and 333.  Parts of Oppenheim’s article is actually 
written as a response to natural law theories, which can be understood as suggesting that these still played a role 
at the first half of the 1900s.  However, it is further clear that Oppenheim’s criticism is directed towards natural 
law proponents among legal scholars and not within international law as such.  Oppenheim submits that natural 
law theories have served the law in the past, but is now passé.  He hence argues that to be useful to international 
law, the legal doctrine too, should focus on positive law.  See pp. 329-330 and 333.  In other words, Oppenheim 
seems to confirm Chapter 2’s description of the difference between international law proper and international 
legal theory during the Peace of Westphalia-Word War II era.  International law as such rested firmly on state 
consensus, while legal scholars had not necessary given up the mission to discern a law above the sovereign.      
552  Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law   
553  Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, pp. 295 and 302 
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secondary sources when primary sources offer insufficient guidance.  The ICJ Statute Article 
59 clarifies that judicial decisions, including by the Court itself, formally constitute no 
primary source, as they have binding force only between the parties to the dispute.  The ICJ 
Statute Article 38.1 does not rank the primary sources of international law, but it is clear that 
treaties and customary law make up the most important sources.  Treaties and custom ensures, 
at least in principle, complete compliance between those that make the law and those bound 
by it.554  In other words, the ICJ Statute essentially confirmed the PCIJ’s and Oppenheim’s 
assertions as to what constitute relevant international legal sources.  The applicability of 
Article 38 has not been confined to the ICJ.  The ICJ Statue Article 38 is generally held to 
reflect customary international law on international legal sources.555   
 
The short and concrete list of sources might give the impression that the system of 
international legal sources is precisely and clearly defined.  In practice, however, things might 
be somewhat more complicated.  The doctrine of international legal sources following from 
the ICJ Statute Article 38 has been criticized both for at all formally listing what constitutes 
relevant sources of law and for failing to list enough sources.  If starting with the first 
argument, the formal list of sources has been criticized for contradicting the underlying 
principle that an international norm, to constitute law proper, must ultimately be linked to 
state behaviour.556  Therefore, it has been asserted, a doctrine of international legal sources 
can at best be an attempt to describe how state behaviour might be manifested.557  Ross 
asserts; “[t]he basis of the doctrine of legal sources is in all cases actual acceptance and that 
alone.”558  If taking this position, clearly, there can be no meaningful doctrine on legal 
sources.  That is so since states, as the ultimate creators of international law, can always at 
any given time decide what constitute relevant sources or not, irrespective of any “existing” 
normative system.   
 
At the same time, the ICJ Statute Article 38 has been criticized for failing to accept as legally 
relevant certain instruments, decisions etc. that, it is argued, are relevant to international law 
making albeit not necessarily deducible from state consensus.  Examples of such sources 
                                                 
554  Chinkin, Normative Development in the International Legal System, p. 21 
555  Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, p. 4 
556  Orakhelashvili, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public International Law, pp. 51-60, and Cassese, 
International Law, p. 153 
557  Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, pp. 165-166 
558  Ross, A Text-book of International Law, p. 195.  For a similar argument, see also Weil, Towards Relative 
Normativity in International Law? 
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might be decision by international organizations intended to be binding559, UN Declarations 
and other resolutions adopted by the UNGA.  Further, although pursuant to ICJ Statute Article 
59 formally binding only on the involved parties, rulings by the ICJ and other authoritative 
international tribunals are generally also perceived to be relevant when establishing what 
constitutes international law.560  Section 7.3 shall return to the criticism directed against 
presenting the international normative order as a formalized system from which it follows 
exactly what constitutes and not constitutes law.  But before embarking on this analysis, the 
following Section briefly introduces the sources most commonly referred to as relevant 
sources of international law.  The outline takes ICJ Statute Article 38.1 as point of departure, 
but also addresses certain instruments etc. not listed in the ICJ Statute, but that nonetheless are 
often discussed in the context of international norms.                  
 
7.2.2 Peremptory norms 
 
Albeit not listed in the ICJ Statute Article 38, so called peremptory norms – or jus cogens – 
are generally held to rank first among international legal norms.561  Pursuant to VCLT Article 
53, a treaty is void if conflicting with a peremptory norm.  Even if Article 53 only refers to 
treaties, it is widely accepted that international customary norms and unilateral state practice 
too, must not violate peremptory norms.  Also these sources are void if not in conformity with 
norms constituting jus cogens.562  Peremptory norms are hence be describe as a superior 
category of law, ranking above, and taking precedent over, other legal sources.  Further to 
VCLT Article 53, a peremptory norm can only be modified by a subsequent international 
norm with the same legal status.   
 
When it comes to how it is formed, jus cogens can be said to constitute a particular form of 
international customary law.563  Consequently, as Section 7.2.4 will elaborate further, a 
peremptory norm emerges when there is coherent customary state practice, coupled with 
opinio juris, i.e. states must also subjectively perceive that their actions constitute a reflection 
of law.  Additionally compared with customary laws in general, however, for a norm to 
                                                 
559  Cassese, International Law, p. 183 
560  Crawford, the Right to Self-determination in International Law, p. 32, Brownlie, Principles of Public 
International Law, pp. 19-21, Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, p. 268, and Cassese, 
International Law, pp. 194-195 
561  Cassese, International Law, p. 199 
562  Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, p. 5, Crawford, The Creation of States, p. 107, and Raic, 
Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, p. 143  
563  Cassese, International Law, pp. 199-202 
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acquire the status of jus cogens, there must also be opinio juris holding that the norm is of an 
absolute nature.564  Similar to customary norms in general it is sufficient that a significant 
number, but not necessarily all, states are of the opinion that a norm constitutes jus cogens for 
the norm to acquire such status.565   
 
Against the background of the basic structure of the international legal system outlined in 
Chapter 2, there should come as no surprise that the notion of jus cogens is not 
uncontroversial.  Obviously, the idea of international norms of superior nature squares badly 
with the principle of state sovereignty.  Indeed, it might seem like a contradiction in terms that 
norms exist above those agreed to by the ultimate creators of law.566  Consequently, some 
positivist legal scholars have heavily criticized the notion of peremptory norms.567  
Proponents of natural law, on the other hand, suggest that the concept of jus cogens is in fact a 
reflection of the continued relevance of natural law ideals to the contemporary legal 
system.568  And at the time of adoption of VCLT Article 53, several states also declared the 
view that the provision is an expression of natural law.569  Others, wishing to defend the 
peremptory norm institute while still not give in to natural law ideas, have pointed to that 
Article 53 stipulates that for a norm to acquire the status of jus cogens, it must be accepted as 
such by “the international community of States as a whole”.570  However, it has been retorted, 
one can seriously question what relevance this caveat has in practice.  Certainly, it must be a 
fiction that all states at one particular point in time have come together to give their consent to 
a norm acquiring the status of jus cogens.  In reality, equity and reason are presumably more 
relevant factors when an international customary norm is elevated to the status of jus cogens, 
it has been argued.571   
 
Given the problems associated with reconciling peremptory norms with the fundamental 
principle of state sovereignty, it is only natural that there has been little agreement on what 
international norms amount to jus cogens, beyond obvious examples such as prohibition of 
                                                 
564  Reuter, Introduction to the Law of Treaties, pp. 142-146 
565  Talmon, The Constitutive Versus the Declaratory Theory or Recognition, p. 131, Cassese, International Law, 
pp. 201-202 
566  Cassese, International Law, p. 171 
567  See e.g. Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, pp. 423-430, where he delivers a heated 
argument against the whole idea of the international legal system enveloping norms of unequal status. 
568  Evans and Capps, International Law (Volume I), p. xiv 
569  Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, p. 11 
570  Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, p. 301 
571  Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, pp. 322-325 and 391-392 
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slavery and genocide.  Peremptory norms have rarely been relied on in practice, including by 
the ICJ.572  Yet two rights of significant importance to the doctoral thesis are generally 
perceived to constitute peremptory norms; the rights to self-determination573 and non-
discrimination.574  One should recall, however, that both these rights, at their core, reflect 
fundamental values, and, as conventionally understood, only these values.  The right to self-
determination was first understood essentially as a right of peoples to be free from foreign 
domination.  And the traditional understanding of the right to non-discrimination was a right 
of individuals to be treated as equals.  Most certainly, it is these core concepts of the rights to 
self-determination and non-discrimination that have been considered jus cogens.  It appears 
unlikely – given the state practice/opinion juris requirements – that the aspects of the rights to 
self-determination and non-discrimination that have evolved more recently – and which are 
relevant to indigenous peoples - have already been elevated to the status of jus cogens575, 
albeit this is certainly a possible future development.  In any event, given the uncertain role 
the jus cogens institute plays in the international legal system, there seems to be little need to 
pursue this discussion any further for the purposes of the doctoral thesis.           
 
7.2.3 International treaties 
 
A treaty has been defined as “any international agreement in written form … and whatever its 
particular designation (treaty, convention, protocol, covenant, charter, statute, act…) 
concluded between two or more States or other subjects of international law and governed by 
international law”.576  The term “other subjects” refers to subjects of international law beyond 
                                                 
572  International Law Association (ILA): Final Report on the Impact of International Human Rights Law on 
General International Law (2008), Section 1.2, and Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, p. 17.  
Shelton notes that while the concept of jus cogens might be much discussed in the legal doctrine, there is less 
support for such norms in state practice and judicial opinions.  See Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 
pp. 292 and 297.  Similarly, the ILA observes that even if the existence of jus cogens norms in principle is 
beyond doubt, examples of them being applied in practice are still rare.  
573  Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law I, p. 75, Cassese, Self-determination of Peoples, pp. 169-
170, and International Law, pp. 65-66,  Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, p. 489, Crawford, The 
Creation of States, p 101, and Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, p. 145 and 203.  Further, in 
the East Timor Case, the ICJ stated that the right to self-determination is one of the essential principles of 
international law.   
574  International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/56/10, p. 284, Cassese, International Law, pp. 65 and 203, 
Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination, pp. 20 and 117, and Brownlie, Principles of Public 
International Law, p. 489.  It should be noted that Hannum only stretches as far as agreeing that the right to non-
discrimination possibly constitutes jus cogens.  This observation was, however, made as early as in the 1990s.   
575  Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, pp. 146-147 and 219, Weller, Towards a General 
Comment on Self-Determination and Autonomy, p. 8, and Makkonen, Equal in Law, Unequal in Fact, p. 83 
576  International Law Commission Yrbk. ILC (1962), ii. 161, and Brownlie, Principles of Public International 
Law, p. 580.  For an extensive discussion on all criteria present in the definition of treaties, see Aust, Modern 
Treaty Law and Practice, pp 16-23.   
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states with the capacity to be parties to international treaties.577  In this particular context, 
however, the concerned is only with treaties between states.     
 
In one sense, treaties are the most uncomplicated of the international legal sources.  Treaty 
provisions are normally comparatively straight-forward in both content and reach.  Further, 
treaties are binding only on the parties to the treaty, bringing the advantage of legal certainty.  
At the same time, however, this feature of treaties can also be said to be their greatest 
disadvantage, since it deprives treaties of the universal applicability denoting e.g. customary 
law.  Different mixes of states being parties to various treaties results in a fragmented legal 
structure, ultimately breaking down to a network of binary state relationships.  True, treaties 
tend to influence state practice in general.  To the extent such practice is matched by opinio 
juris, treaty provisions come to coincide with customary international law, and the rights 
enshrined in the treaty becomes binding also on non-parties.578  But to the extent such a 
development does not occur, treaties result in a complicated patchwork of rights and duties 
where different states are bound to varying degrees.579   
  
7.2.4 Customary international law 
 
As Section 7.2.2 indicated, international customary law is made up of one objective and one 
subjective criterion.  For a customary norm to emerge there must be both an observable 
general practice among states and opinio juris, i.e. states must subjectively agree that they are 
legally bound to act in conformity with the discernable practice.580  That said, as Section 7.2.2 
further indicated, it is generally held that substantial, but not complete, uniformity in state 
practice is required for a customary norm to materialize.  And consent can be tacit and/or 
implied.  There is no need for states to explicitly give their support to the norm.581  Further, 
                                                 
577  Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, p. 580  
578  Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, p. 13   
579  That said, as a general rule, the doctoral thesis will not denote how many UN member states have ratified a 
particular treaty.  If nothing is stated to the contrary, a treaty referred to has been widely ratified, and is treated as 
binding international law for the purposes of the thesis.   
580  North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgement, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3, paras. 73-74, Cassese, International Law, 
p. 156, Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, pp. 6-8, and Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 
pp. 394-395 
581  Charney, Universal International Law, p. 536, and Orakhelashvili, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in 
Public International Law, pp. 71-75 
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evidence of non-compliance, or even explicit rejection of the norm, by a few states does not 
necessarily preclude the existence of a customary norm.582   
 
Sources evidencing the existence of a customary norm include essentially all acts and 
documents demonstrating state practice and intent.583  Customary international can often be 
deduced from rulings by international tribunals, in particular the ICJ.  But also regional 
human rights courts contribute to the making of customary law.584  Obviously, treaty making 
is a particularly important form of state practice.  Indeed, under certain circumstances, the 
adoption of a treaty by enough sufficiently representative states can result in a norm instantly 
becoming customary international law.585  More often, however, treaties are a source of 
evidence for the existence of a customary international norm.586  Naturally, if the same or 
similar treaty provision occurs in a number of treaties, this strongly indicates that the 
provision reflects a customary norm.  That is particularly so if states not formally bound by 
the treaty act in conformity with, or do not object to, the norm enshrined in the treaty 
provisions.587  Also a treaty that has not yet entered into force can be indicative of a 
customary norm.588  Similarly, treaties with only a limited number of ratifying states can -
contribute to the emergence of customary international law.589   
 
In the same vein, non-binding instruments, such as UN declarations adopted by the UNGA, 
often evidence both state practice and opinio juris, and consequently customary law.590  The 
fact that an instrument is non-binding is often of little relevance in international customary 
law-making.  Treaties do not enshrine opinio juris because of their legally binding nature.  
States opinion can be equally evidenced by voting on a non-binding instrument.591  Indeed, as 
                                                 
582  ICJ Reports (1986), (Case of Nicaragua v. United States), Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 
p. 7, Cassese, International Law, p. 157, and Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law, pp. 434 
and 437 
583  Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, p. 6 
584  Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, pp. 299 
585  North Sea Continental Shelf Case, paras. 73 and 74, and the Barcelona Traction Case, Barcelona Traction, 
Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgement, I.C.J. Report 1970, p. 3, para. 32 
586  Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, p. 13 
587  Reuter, Introduction to the Law of Treaties, pp. 108-109 and 139.     
588  Namibia Case I.C.J. Reports (1971), para. 47, and Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, p. 14 
589  Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, p. 234 
590  Nuclear Test Case. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J., Reports 
1996, p. 226, para. 70. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, pp. 14-15 and 663, Shelton, Law, Non-
Law and the Problem of “Soft Law”, p. 1, and Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, pp. 77 and 
212 
591  Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, pp. 292-293 and 320-321, and Boyle and 
Chinkin, The Making of International Law, p. 215 
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treaties, also non-binding UNGA resolutions can under certain circumstances create instant 
customary law.  In the Nicaragua Case, the ICJ inferred the existence of opinio juris 
primarily out of a non-binding UNGA resolution592, albeit some other sources contributed to 
the Court’s conclusions.  Moreover, the ICJ started its deliberations by investigating whether 
there was opinio juris.  Only subsequently did the Court survey if there was state practice to 
support the opinio juris.593  Doing so, the ICJ stated that it “does not consider that, for a rule 
to be established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous 
conformity with the rule. … [T]he Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of states should, 
in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of state conduct inconsistent with 
a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule.”594  The ICJ’s ruling 
in the Nicaragua Case implied a fairly dramatic down-grading of the importance of state-
practice, vis-à-vis opinio juris.  Prior to the Nicaragua Case, it was generally thought that if 
one was more important than the other, practice had priority over opinio juris.595  Now, the 
ICJ deduced opinio juris basically from states’ votes on a non-binding UNGA Resolution.  
Having thus established the existence of opinio juris, the ICJ presumed the existence of a 
customary norm that then needed to be rebutted by contradicting state practice.  Holding that 
opinio juris constituted a presumption for a customary norm resulted in the ICJ concluding 
that such a norm had indeed materialized, despite the limited evidence of supporting state 
practice.  In fact, there was not insignificant evidence of state-practice contradicting the 
existence of the norm, something that the Court also explicitly acknowledged.596   
 
The ICJ’s ruling in the Nicaragua Case has significant implications for the understanding of 
how international law is created, for two interrelated reasons.  First, the case submits that the 
UNGA has transcended its traditional recommendary role and can in fact create instant 
international law by adopting declarations and other formally non-binding resolutions with 
overwhelming majority.597  As Morrison has noted, the Nicaragua Case appears to change 
                                                 
592  UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV) (The Friendly Relations Resolution)  
593 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 
Merits, Judgement, I.C.J. Reports, 1986, p. 14, in particular paras. 184-206.  See also Orakhelashvili, The 
Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public International Law, pp. 75-76. 
594  Nicaragua Case, para. 186 
595  Simma and Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law, p. 88 
596  Nicaragua Case, para. 186.  See also Charney, Universal International Law, pp. 537-538, and Boyle 
and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, pp. 234-235  
597  Tasioulas, In Defence of Relative Normativity, pp. 96-100 and 114, Charney, Universal International Law, p. 
546-547, and Simma and Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law, pp. 96-97.  See also Crawford, The 
Criteria for Statehood in International Law, p. 152, where he notes that UNGA resolutions can have “quasi-
legislative effect”.  Charney underlines, however, that formally speaking the UNGA of course does not have 
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UNGA Resolutions from a part of formation of international customary law to “the end result 
of that process”, transforming such resolutions from “soft law principles” to “hard law 
prescriptions”.598  Second, not only does the Nicaragua Case confirm that UNGA 
Declarations etc. can create instant customary law.  In addition, the UNGA’s power is further 
enhanced by the ICJ’s findings that if opinio juris can be demonstrated, the existence of a 
customary norm shall be presumed.  As demonstrated by the Nicaragua Case, this implies 
that evidence of sufficient coherent contradicting state practice is needed to deprive the 
declaration of its legal implications.599  Having underlined the significance of the Nicaragua 
Case, it is worth recalling Section 2.5.4’s observation that the ICJ already in the 1970s relied 
heavily on a non-binding UNGA Resolution when ruling in the Namibia and Western Sahara 
Cases. 
 
The Nicaragua Case further illustrates that although the constitutive elements of customary 
law are clear in principle, ascertaining what constitutes concerted state practice, and in 
particular the collective subjective opinion of states, is often associated with great practical 
difficulties.  Evidence of both state practice and opinio juris might be disperse, and difficult to 
assess and evaluate.  As a result, one must often take recourse to secondary sources.600  
Koskenniemi goes as far as submitting that custom-ascertainment is often not at all a process 
where pre-existing rules are deduced.  Rather, due to the difficulties associated with 
establishing state practice and opinio juris in an objective manner, international tribunals, 
including the ICJ, tend to resort to equity arguments, he posits.601  In principle, the opinio 
juris criterion embedded in customary norms implies that customary law creation, as the 
making of treaties, respects the notion that international law emerge only as a result of state 
consent.  But in practice, one can, particularly if Koskenniemi’s observation is correct, 
question how well international law-making through customary norms complies with the 
principle of state sovereignty.  As seen, opinio juris, and hence the presumption of a 
customary norm, can be deduced from a few, also non-legally binding, instruments.  The 
                                                                                                                                                        
independent legislative authority.  And Simma and Alston are critical to the ruling by the ICJ in the Nicaragua 
Case. 
598  Morrison, Legal Issues in the Nicaragua Opinion, pp. 161-162.  Morrison also adds, however, that “Whether 
states are willing to accept this expanded view of the binding effect of resolutions remains to be seen.”  
599  International Law Association: Final Report on the Impact of International Human Rights Law on General 
International Law (2008), Section 2 
600  Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, pp. 163 and 190 
601  Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, pp. 396-397, 409-411 and 467-471.  Similarly, Boyle and Chinkin 
agree that establishing what constitutes customary international law is no scientific process, and involve political 
choices.  See The Making of International Law, pp. 278-279.   
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norm then materializes despite the objection and/or contradicting practices of a few states.  A 
customary norm can hence emerge despite lack of consent, and then binds also objecting 
states.602  True, customary norms can probably emerge only with great difficulty in instances 
of a number of persistent objectors.  Still, customary law-making appears to constitute an 
exception from a rigid application of the principle of state-sovereignty.  Obviously, one has 
strayed away even further from the principle of state consent if customary norms can be 
deemed to exist based on equity.  The doctoral thesis shall return to this issue in Section 7.3     
 
7.2.5 General principles of law recognized by civilized nations 
 
As Section 7.2.1 mentioned, the ICJ Statute Article 38.1 groups general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations together with treaties and customary law as the primary 
sources in international law.  In principle, such principles are supposed to be norms common 
to a vast majority of domestic legal systems.  In other words, one should be able to deduce 
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations by identifying common patterns in 
national laws.603  Not surprisingly, however, this imprecise definition has resulted in questions 
as to what practical role, if any, such principles serve in the international legal system.604  It 
has been suggested that general principles of law recognized by civilized nations are difficult 
to discern from customary law and peremptory norms.605  In sum, it appears clear that even 
though formally speaking a primary legal source, in practice, general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations play a limited, if any, role in the international legal system.606   
                                                 
602  The Asylum Case. Columbian-Peruvian asylum case, Judgement of November 20th, 1950: I.C.J. Reports 
1950, p. 266, para 276 and 277, The Nicaragua Case, para. 186, The North Sea Continental Shelf Case, para. 74, 
Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, p. 395, Cassese, International Law, pp. 157 and 162-163, and Brownlie, 
Principles of Public International Law, p. 7   
603  Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, pp. 16-17.  Principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations should not be confused with general principles of international law.  As stated, the former are deduced 
from domestic legal systems.  The latter category, on the other hand, is made up of general legal principles that 
can be deduced from international legal sources such as treaties and customary law, by crystallizing their core 
features.  General principles of international law are not legal sources proper, but rather enhance the 
understanding of the international legal system.  Examples of such principles are state sovereignty and respect 
for human rights.  See Cassese, International Law, p. 188.   
604  Koskenniemi observes that the ICJ has never explicitly applied or even referred to general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations in its rulings.  See From Apology to Utopia, p. 402.  Others concur that the ICJ 
has only occasionally used general principles of law as a source of international law.  See Carney, Universal 
International Law, p. 536, Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, pp. 16-17, and Chinkin, Normative 
Development in the International Legal System, p. 21. 
605  Reuter, Introduction to the Law of Treaties, pp. 141-142 and 145, and Brownlie, Principles of Public 
International Law, pp. 18-19 
606  On a principal level, it can be added that Koskenniemi submits that general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations challenge the principle of state sovereignty to an even larger degree than customary laws.  He 
asserts that normally it is not possible to discern a general principle of law that supports one state’s position over 
another.  As a consequence, international tribunals etc. will in practice have to take rescue to reason or equity to 
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7.2.6 “Soft law” etc.  
 
The term “soft law” is used to distinguish a certain category of legal sources from “hard law”.  
If maintaining this distinction, the latter category refers to sources that are formally legally 
binding, i.e. sources listed as primary sources in the ICJ Statute Article 38.1 plus peremptory 
norms.  Soft law then is simply a label placed on a variety of legal sources perceived to have 
some relevance in the international legal system, but which are formally speaking not legally 
binding on their own/as such.607  As Section 7.2.1 indicated, the use of the term “soft law” has 
been criticized from two opposite angles.  Some assert that it is wrong to talk about soft law 
because a source is either law or not law.  There are no intermediates.608  Others might agree 
that formally speaking, the distinction between hard and soft law is valid.  But they 
nonetheless question whether such a formalistic approach can be maintained in practice.  With 
these observations in mind, the doctoral thesis will continuously use the term “soft law”, but 
will come back to the issue as to whether it is appropriate to differentiate between hard and 
soft law sources.    
 
Sources commonly referred to as soft law are e.g. UN Declarations and other resolutions 
adopted by the UNGA or other bodies of international cooperation.  Other examples include 
standards, principles, joint statements etc. adopted by intergovernmental meetings or 
organizations.609  As mentioned, rulings by international tribunals such as the ICJ are formally 
binding only on the parties.  The ICJ has no formal power to make law.  Similarly, UN treaty 
body jurisprudence formally speaking also lacks universal applicability.  As a consequence, 
these sources too are sometimes referred to as soft law.610  However, it is probably incorrect 
to use “soft law”, even in the laxest understanding of the term, to describe these sources.  
Rather, jurisprudence from international tribunals and treaty bodies are sources interpreting 
                                                                                                                                                        
settle the dispute, meaning that as a general rule, invoking general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations as a legal source most often implies holding states bound to “norms” to which they have never 
consented.  See From Apology to Utopia, pp. 258-270 and 402-405.  In a similar vein, see also Boyle and 
Chinkin, The Making of International Law, p. 286.   
607  Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, p. 319, Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International 
Law, pp. 212-213 
608  Carney, Compliance With International Soft Law, p. 115 
609  Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, pp. 212-213 
610  Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, p. 213 
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“hard law” sources, thus informing us of their content.611  As seen, rulings of the ICJ and 
other authoritative international tribunals are generally perceived to be of great importance 
when determining what constitutes international law.  Indeed, it is often precisely through a 
ruling by the ICJ that we become aware of an international norm.  And we have further seen 
that the findings of treaty bodies too, play an important role in international law-making.612  In 
the same vein, pursuant to ICJ Statute Article 38.1 (d), the legal doctrine constitutes only a 
secondary international legal source.  Still, the writings of leading legal scholars fulfil many 
of the same purposes as jurisprudence.  The legal doctrine too, is a source for determining 
what constitutes relevant international law613, as are the findings of the ILC. 
 
In conclusion, it is clear that formally speaking (i) “soft law” sources proper, such as UN 
Declarations, (ii) international legal sources interpreting hard law sources, such as rulings by 
the ICJ and regional human rights courts and treaty body jurisprudence, and (iii) secondary 
sources such as the legal doctrine, do not constitute “hard law”.  In fact, some posit that these 
“sources” do not constitute law at all. They maintain that there exist no such thing as degrees 
of international law.  At the same time, plenty of evidence suggests that all three categories of 
“sources of law” play some kind of role in the international normative system.  If so, is it 
correct to claim that they have no legal implications?  The next session addresses this 
question, of cardinal importance to the doctoral thesis.                
 
7.3 Conclusions on the relative status of various international legal 
sources  
 
7.3.1 The inherent tension between the notion of binding international 
norms and the principle of state sovereignty 
 
Throughout, the doctoral thesis has underlined how the international legal system rests on the 
liberal premise that international law emerges from those it governs.  No law exists above the 
state.  Rather, state sovereignty provides that states are the ultimate creators of law.  But as 
further seen, liberalism also rests on a second premise, intrinsically connected to the first.  It 
holds that once the sovereigns have duly created a norm, the norm must be obeyed, including 
                                                 
611  For a different opinion, see, however, Shelton, Commentary and Conclusions, pp. 451-452.  At the same time 
though, Shelton notes that treaty body jurisprudence can be more important for the formulation of international 
law than “primary soft law sources”. See p. 461. 
612  For a similar opinion, see Boyle and Chinkin, the Making of International Law, pp. 156-157. 
613  Talmon, The Constitutive Versus the Declaratory Theory of Recognition, p. 165 
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by the sovereigns themselves.  In international law, this precept is mirrored in the equally 
fundamental notion that once the law-making state has agreed to be bound by international 
law, it cannot opt out of the law at will.  When established, international law is perceived as 
objective and external to state behaviour, will or interest.  At first glance, this second premise 
seems straight-forward, providing the foundation for a complete and coherent theory of law.  
But if considering it more closely, is not the second precept, to be operational in practice, 
dependent on the first?  It would seem like an illusion to talk about objective and external law 
at the time when the law is applied, if one can not objectively determine how the law became 
law at the time of emancipation.  And at the time of emancipation, the law is, it would appear, 
only what those it is supposed to govern say it is.  This “definition of law” perhaps does not 
provide the same foundation for a complete and coherent theory of law, as did the definition 
at the time of application?   
 
To elaborate further on what seems to be an inherent contradiction in the international legal 
system, the doctoral thesis will rely heavily on Koskenniemi’s analyses in From Apology to 
Utopia.  Koskenniemi observes that liberalism’s first precept - the notion that international 
law is to be deduced from the actions and intent of the same polities that the law is supposed 
to govern - embeds a juxtaposition that international lawyers have wrestled with since the 
surface of the international legal system.  Koskenniemi points to that a legal theory assuming 
not only that the law always can – but should – be deduced from state behaviour and intent is 
problematic, since it implies an assumption that state behaviour is correct.  And a theory of 
law that seems to hold that state behaviour equals the law – i.e. that action/intent and the law, 
per definition, coincide - is easily accused of be in want of a meaning.  Because is not under 
such circumstances an exercise aiming at deducing the law from state behaviour redundant?  
For all practical purposes, it would appear that it is the conduct, and not “the law”, that binds.  
And if that is the case, is it correct to refer to international law as a legal system?    
 
Koskenniemi notes that liberal lawyers have been aware of that a rigid application of the 
principle of state sovereignty may render the international legal system vulnerable to attacks 
suggesting that it is not a legal system at all.  Liberals accept that in order to constitute a legal 
system proper, international law should reasonably be binding upon states.  Clearly, a legal 
system that fails to bind its subjects seems rather pointless.  It would appear that if one wish to 
label international law “law”, in any meaningful understanding of the term, state action/intent 
cannot define the law.  But the problem is that the alternative is troublesome to liberals too.  If 
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one is not to derive the law from state consent, this would seem to imply that international law 
has at some point acquired an autonomous status.  It has somehow got disconnected from the 
sovereign.  And that, in turn, would seem to mean that we are back to some form of ideas of 
natural justice, a notion inherently contradictory to liberalism.  And therein lays, Koskenniemi 
observes, the inherent juxtaposition of an international legal system rooted firmly in the 
liberal premise of state sovereignty.  A liberal international legal system cannot abandon the 
notion that the law is the result of the exercise of state sovereignty.  At the same time, one 
cannot simply ignore the question whether a legal system completely in hands of those it is 
supposed to govern is a legal system at all.   
 
Koskenniemi further observes that attempting to rebut the outlined criticism resulting in the 
conclusion that the international “legal system” is in fact not a legal system at all, liberals 
have pointed to both the most concrete form of international law-making, i.e. treaties, and the 
most sweeping, i.e. general principles of law.  It has been argued that treaties create law in the 
way liberals imagine.  One can objectively determine when and how treaties have come into 
being.  And once in force, a state bound by a treaty cannot opt out at will.  This is surely 
correct.  But Koskenniemi notes, treaties emerge slowly, if at all, even, or perhaps 
particularly, in areas where they are mostly needed.  And they only bind those states that have 
explicitly agreed to be bound.  In other words, as Section 7.2.3 noted, an international legal 
system relying heavily on treaties will be a very fragmented one.  It ultimately boils down to a 
network of binary state relationships, with an apparent risk of failing to bind many states to 
the most needed and basic norms.  Some states will not be bound by any international norms 
at all.  Moreover, these states will often be the states whose behaviour the international 
community is most keen to influence.  It is questionable if one can label such a system a legal 
system.    
 
Liberals have further sought to the identified potential flaw in the international legal system 
by referring to ideas that go beyond state practice and will.  These attempts have been 
successful, Koskenniemi concedes, in the sense that such ideas have sometimes been accepted 
as international law.  But, he further argues, the success is an illusion.  It can be explained by 
these principles being of a general and obvious character, and self-evident to the degree that 
there is no risk of states differing in opinion on them. (Koskenniemi mentions as example 
“respect for humanity”).  The price paid for such self-evidentness, however, is that it is not 
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possible to concretize such principles so that they regulate state behaviour in any meaningful 
manner.  In other words, these ideal norms are rather unhelpful as law.       
 
Koskenniemi concludes that strictly upholding the principle of state sovereignty without 
risking that the international legal system is accused of being no legal system at all is a futile 
project.  He calls for a pragmatic approach.  According to Koskenniemi, the solution is neither 
to resort to extreme formalism, nor to treat international law as politics – or natural law.  One 
shall respect that the law is to be found in recognized legal sources, evaluated through 
methods lawyers have been trained to practice.  But one should not, Koskenniemi posits, 
except such processes to come up with clear-cut solutions to each and every dispute.  Often, 
the international lawyer will to some extent have to rely on reason and equity.614  The 
conclusion seems to be that the international legal system is a legal system, albeit not a perfect 
one.   
 
The doctoral thesis will not constructively evaluate Koskenniemi’s analyses in any detail.  It 
is merely noted that generally speaking, he seems to be describing a reality.  As Section 7.2.2 
described, Koskenniemi is not alone in pointing to the apparent contradiction between a 
concept such as peremptory norms and the principle of state sovereignty.  And as Section 
7.2.4 outlined, others too have noted that it is often a fiction that a customary norm is 
identified through evidence of state practice and opinio juris.  Rather, what Sections 7.2.2 and 
7.2.4 outlined with regard to customary norms being found to exist also absent explicit 
evidence of state practice/opinio juris shall probably be viewed as practical adjustments to the 
reality Koskenniemi pictures.  In short, Sections 7.2’s description of the nature of the system 
of international legal sources supports Koskenniemi’s assertion that the international legal 
system is not a perfect system.  Further, for it to remain even an imperfect system, the 
principle of state sovereignty cannot be - and has not been - strictly upheld.  Boyle and 
Chinkin concur that no international legal theory offers a complete scientific answer to 
international law-making.615  In the same vein, Evans and Capps note that today, most 
international lawyers agree that there has been a substantial shift away from the positivist 
                                                 
614  Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, pp. 63, 85, 142, 158-167, 396-411, 467-471, 513-561, 568-569, 573-
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See also Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, pp. 502-517. 
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view of international law, towards a view of an international legal system “which has a 
greater claim to be called a genuine system of “public” international law”.616   
 
The question is then, what implications do these characteristics of the international legal 
system have for the doctrine on international legal sources?  As seen, the traditional firm 
distinction between hard law and soft law sources (or, some would argue, the distinction 
between legal sources/sources of something else) is a direct implication of a strict reliance on 
the principle of state sovereignty.  But if, as shown, the principle of state sovereignty in reality 
is not - and cannot be - strictly upheld, does not this imply that there need not be, perhaps 
cannot be, a strict distinction between hard and soft law sources either?   
 
7.3.2 Hard law and soft law – like hard boiled and soft boiled eggs?    
 
There seems to be wide support for the position outlined above in the legal doctrine.  Chinkin 
notes that many legal scholars agree that if international law does not, and cannot, strictly 
uphold the principle of state consent in international law making, it makes little sense to 
firmly categorize international legal sources into binding and non-binding law either.617  At 
the same time it is posited that neither must one retort to politics.  For instance, Boyle and 
Chinkin, referring to Simma and Paulus, submit that an “enlighten positivist” should recall the 
centrality of formal sources at the same time as recognizing wider methods of determining 
state consent. In an “enlightened positivist” legal system, it is a fallacy to dismiss soft law as 
non-law.618  Haas notes that hard law and soft law share the same objective, namely a need of 
states to signal their commitment to other states to create a world order.619  Charney has made 
a similar observation.620  Brownlie too, has noted that the normative impact of an international 
instrument does not necessarily depend solely on its formal legal status.621  Or as Van Dijk 
has fittingly observed with regard to the Helsinki Final Act; “The conclusion that the Final 
Act is not a legally binding agreement does not mean that the matters agreed upon between 
                                                 
616  Evans and Capps, International Law (Volume I), p. xiii 
617  Chinkin, Normative Development in the International Legal System, p. 23 
618  Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, pp. 12 and 212.  See also Barelli, The Role of Soft 
Law in the International Legal System, p. 959, where he makes a similar observation. 
619  Haas, Choosing to Comply, p. 43.  See also Brown Weiss, Understanding Compliance with Soft Law, p. 535 
620  Charney, Compliance with International Soft Law, p. 116 
621  Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, pp. 3-4 and 534 
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the participating states … should not be binding.”622  Reinicke and Witte conclude that today, 
almost all legal scholars see a role for soft law.623  
 
Hence, the fact that the principle of state sovereignty is not strictly upheld implies that it is for 
principal reasons not rationale to dismiss soft law sources as non-law.  In addition, practical 
reasons render a distinction between hard law and soft law difficult too.  The sections above 
have demonstrated the inadequacies of treaties and custom as sole sources of law.  Treaty law 
has the advantage of clarity, but suffers from gaps and fragmentation.  Customary law 
benefits from universality.  But at the same time, it is normally associated with great difficulty 
to identify such norms.  Hence, relying solely on formal hard law sources, one will often 
receive only limited guidance as to what constitutes the more precise scope and content of 
international law within a specific area.   
 
With regard to (i) “soft law” sources proper, (ii) international legal sources interpreting hard 
law sources, and (iii) secondary sources, the situation is often the opposite, compared with 
hard law.  These sources are formally not legally binding, but often concrete and capable of 
forming a coherent pattern of law.  As Chapter 6 elaborated, DRIP spells out precisely 
formulated rights of indigenous peoples over a broad spectrum.  Rulings by the ICJ and UN 
treaty body jurisprudence are often clear and exact in their content.  And the legal doctrine of 
course aspires both to systemize the law and explain its details.  In that sense, these sources 
are often more indicative to the content of relevant international law than the comparatively 
obscure hard law sources.  In fact, Sections 7.2.4 and 7.2.6 explained how state practice and 
opinio juris can often, indeed sometimes only, be deduced from soft law sources, rulings by 
the ICJ and the legal doctrine624.  In addition, it is often through treaty body jurisprudence one 
is informed of evolved interpretation of a treaty provision having emerged into customary 
law.  Against this background, it seems almost like a chimera to speak of soft law sources as 
“soft law”.  If the law can only be read out of soft law sources, do not these sources for all 
practical purposes constitute the law?  
 
That there is no clear distinction between “soft” and “hard” law sources has of course also 
been confirmed by the ICJ’s ruling in the Nicaragua Case, discussed in Section 7.2.4.  The 
                                                 
622  van Dijk, The Implementation of the Final Act of Helsinki, pp. 110 and 114 
623  Reinicke and Witte, Independence, Globalization, and Sovereignty, p. 94 
624  Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, pp. 23-24 
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Nicaragua Case demonstrates that under certain circumstances, non-binding UN resolutions 
are not only indicative of, but instantly create, customary international law.  Kirgis submits 
that the UNGA might in particular have this capacity in vital areas such as human rights.  He 
further suggests that the more pressing the human rights issue, the less state practice is needed 
to substantiate opinio juris.625  Boyle and Chinkin agree that less evidence of state practice 
seems to be needed to establish customary law within the area of human rights.626  To this 
assertion, however, Simma and Alston retort that such reasoning “seems to be a case of 
arriving at the wrong conclusion for the right reason”.627  It could be that Simma and Alston 
are correct in pointing out that Kirgis has not substantiated his claim sufficiently, and that his 
submission is too sweeping.  But nonetheless, the fact remains that the Nicaragua Case do 
evidence that UN declarations can constitute instant evidence of opinio juris and hence of a 
customary norm, even in the presence of evidence of a certain amount of contradicting state 
practice.628  And since the UNGA has the capacity to create instant customary law, it makes 
sense that UNGA particularly can do so within areas of law where the need is most urgent, of 
which human rights is surely one.          
 
It hence appears inappropriate to label sources “soft law”, since all evidence points to that 
there is no clear distinction between “soft” and “hard” law sources.  Indeed, as the Nicaragua 
Case illustrates, “soft law” sources can at times create instant law by themselves.  More 
common is probably however, that “soft” law sources – as sources of law - do not create law 
in isolation, but through interplaying with “hard” law source.629  For instance, provisions in 
UN declarations can of course reflect, indeed sometimes essentially clone, provisions from 
formally legally binding treaties.  UN declarations interacting with treaties in this manner 
indicates that the declaration provision reflects legally binding law, or at least that the right 
reflected in the provision is emerging into hard law.630  In a similar fashion, soft law sources 
                                                 
625  Kirgis, Custom on a Sliding Scale, pp. 147-149 
626  Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, p. 285 
627  Simma and Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law, p. 96.  See also ILA: Final Report on the Impact of 
International Human Rights Law on General International Law (2008), where the ILA refers to a letter from the 
US Department of state.  In the letter, the Department criticizes the development towards relying, in its opinion, 
too heavily on UN documents etc. and too little on actual state practice, when establishing customary law.  
628  Recall further in this context that the ICJ relied heavily on a non-binding UNGA Resolution also in the 
Western Sahara and Namibia Cases.  On this particular issue, these cases hence confirms the ICJ’s finding in the 
Nicaragua Case. 
629  Barelli, The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System, p. 959, Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of 
International Law, p. 220, Bilder, Beyond Compliance, pp. 70-72, Charney, Compliance with International Soft 
Law, p. 115, and Chinkin, Normative Development in the International Legal System, pp. 36-37 
630  Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, p. 213 
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are often an important device for attribution of meaning of international norms as well as for 
perceiving changes in international law.631 
 
Having noted the broad support for the position that international law has moved away from 
formal positivism and a strict upholdance of state consent, it should be mentioned that this 
development has not occurred without criticism.  One of the most recognized representatives 
of this line of criticism is Weil, who already in 1983 vehemently criticized international law 
straying away from formal positivism.  He maintained that law is either law or not law and 
that no law exist above the state.  Consequently, he therefore both launched an attack on the 
jus cogens institute and heavily criticized the ICJ’s trend to demand less evidence of the 
existence of a customary norm, at the same time as disregarding consistent objections to the 
norm by states.632 A number of legal scholars maintain this position still today.633  
Notwithstanding, it must be concluded that the above has overwhelmingly demonstrated that 
it is neither principally correct, nor practically feasible, to maintain a strict line between 
“hard” and “soft” law.  Weil and others might have put forward arguments against the notion 
of soft law and in defence of a formal positivism that attracted considerable attention.  Still, it 
is clear that international law has opted for a different path. 
   
Whether it is correct, as Lauterpacht suggested, that natural law theories are still influencing 
international law today, the doctoral thesis takes no opinion on.634   But the thesis does 
conclude that factual evidence show that in the end, Oppenheim’s prediction that the principle 
of formal positivism would never be challenged has not been proven correct.  Nor has 
international law responded to Weil’s concerns.635  International law has moved beyond a 
strict reliance on treaties and customary law as sole legal sources.  It has further strayed away 
                                                 
631  Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, p. 12 
632  Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law, pp. 417-418, 423-442 
633  Chinkin, Normative Development in the International Legal System, pp. 23-24.  Chinkin makes this 
observation with regard to certain colleagues.  As clear from the above, he himself takes a different position.  
Similarly, Bilder, having underlined that international normative arrangements often blend hard and soft law 
elements, still points to that states have found it useful to draw a line between binding and non-binding norms.  
See, Beyond Compliance, p. 71. 
634  For a principled discussion on natural law’s relevance in international law today, see further Orakhelashvili, 
The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public International Law, pp. 60-66.  Again, the doctoral thesis refrains 
from labelling certain aspects of international law “natural law”.  But it can be noted that Orakhelashvili’s 
conclusion that international law has a dualistic composition where positive law and natural law coexist, seems 
to be in line with the findings of this thesis.  Orakhelashvili submits that international law today is in the first 
place positive law, but that there is also sometimes necessary to fill gaps and complement positive law with 
arguments that goes beyond state consent and take account of reason, perceptions of justice etc.  Whether one 
labels this aspect of the international legal system “natural law” or something else is less important.  What 
matters is that it appears to be an accurate description of international law today.     
635 Tasioulas, In Defence of Relative Normativity, pp. 337-346 
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from a strict division of law into hard and soft law.  Hence, the doctoral thesis will not use this 
categorisation in subsequent chapters.  In line with the conclusions above, the thesis will 
consider sources such as UN declarations and the jurisprudence from international tribunals 
and UN treaty bodies as international legal sources proper.  At the same time, the thesis will 
also be mindful of the formal hierarchy of international legal sources.  It will be respectful of 
that in most instances, for a formally non-binding source to be considered as reflecting law its 
content should be backed up by treaties, customs and in general of state acceptance.  
International law, it is also concluded, is not politics.  The approach taken might be illustrated 
by comparing hard and soft law with hard and soft boiled eggs.  One can certainly determine 
that some eggs are harder than others, but it is not always possible to classify eggs as hard or 
soft boiled.  Further, as a soft boiled egg can evolve into a hard boiled egg, but not to anything 
less than an egg, soft law has the capacity to develop into hard law, but it will rarely 
disintegrate into something less than law.636    
 





The VCLT contains norms on interpretation of treaties between state-parties.637  VCLT 
Article 31.1 stipulates that when interpreting an international treaty, the primary source is the 
text of the instrument.  A treaty provision shall normally be given the content that an ordinary 
understanding of its wording suggests, in light of the context, object and purpose of the treaty 
as a whole.638  That is not to say that the understanding of a treaty provision is static.  
Pursuant to Article 31.3 (b), when interpreting a treaty, one shall take into account subsequent 
explicit agreements between the parties as to the understanding of the treaty, but also 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which demonstrates an evolved 
understanding of the provision.639  The important role given to subsequent practice reflects 
that international law is an evolving body of law.  Pursuant to the VCLT Article 32, when a 
                                                 
636  Compare Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, p. 212 
637  Two other Vienna conventions regulate treaty making between states and international organizations and 
treaties in the context of state succession, respectively.  These instruments have, however, not yet 
entered into force and are in any event without interest for the purposes of the doctoral thesis. 
638  See also Reuter, Introduction to the Law of Treaties, p. 96, and Brownlie, Principles of Public 
International Law, p. 602. 
639  See also Reuter, Introduction to the Law of Treaties, p. 96. 
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treaty-provision is unclear one may take recourse to preparatory work and other 
documentation that demonstrate the intent of the parties at the time of the adoption of the 
instrument.640  But the wording of Articles 31 and 32 makes it explicit that preparatory works 
in connection with the preparation of the treaty are secondary sources, compared to 
subsequent practice.641  The VCLT places emphasis on interpretation of treaties promoting 
efficiency and progressive development, and do not offer unlimited support to state 
sovereignty.642  In other words, treaties shall be given a fair and equitable understanding, in 
line with the progressive development of international law, even if a few states are not fully 
supporting this development.  It is generally held that VCLT Articles 31 and 32 reflects 
customary international law.643   
 
The evolving nature of treaties is not least present in human rights instruments, which, it has 
been observed, must be particularly responsive to changed social conditions and evolved 
perceptions of rights.644  In fact, human right treaties shall probably respond to subsequent 
practice beyond what follows from the wording of VCLT Articles 31 and 32.  The VCLT, 
including its Articles 31 and 32, was designed with bilateral state treaties first and foremost in 
mind.  As a consequence, albeit the VCLT reflects international customary law, it is also 
generally agreed that the VCLT Articles 31 and 32 do not adequately take into account the 
specific nature of human rights treaties.  Clearly, there is a significant difference between a 
bilateral state treaty, which can be compared with a contract between two parties, and a treaty 
aiming at ensuring human rights on a global level.  Even though individuals and groups are 
not formal parties to the latter, obviously such a treaty has been designed with their, and not 
states’, interest in mind.  When interpreting human rights treaties, one should therefore place 
even more emphasis on subsequent practice than the VCLT suggests.645  In other words, 
human rights treaties have a greater capacity to more quickly evolve over time to take on new 
and additional meanings than do other treaties.            
                                                 
640  See also Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, pp. 605-606. 
641  See also Cassese, International Law, p. 179, and Reuter, Introduction to the Law of Treaties, pp. 97-98. 
642  Cassese, International Law, p. 171         
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645  ECHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 14038/88, Judgement of 7 July 1989, para. 87, ECHR Ireland 
v. UK, Appl. No. 5310/71, Judgement of 18 January 1978, para. 239, Makkonen, Equal in Law, Unequal in Fact, 
pp. 76-77, Scheinin, Impact on the Law of Treaties, ILA, Final Report on the Impact of International Human 
Rights Law on General International Law, 73rd Conference of the ILA, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 17-21 August 




Chapters 4-6 made numerous references to evolved understandings of treaty provisions in 
support for existence of rights.  This Section has hence established that doing so is completely 
in line with the law of treaties.  The emphasis placed on subsequent practice when interpreting 
treaties is of particular relevant for the legal status of treaty body jurisprudence.  Treaty body 
jurisprudence constitutes a particular from of subsequent practice pursuant to the VCLT 
Article 31.3 (b).  Notably, the provision does not refer explicitly to state practice.  Rather, it 
generically mentions any subsequent practice in the application of a treaty provision 
establishing an agreement among the parties regarding its interpretation.  Treaty bodies are set 
up by the treaty they are supposed to monitor.  In other words, they are, through an agreement 
among the state-parties to the treaty, explicitly authorized to contribute to subsequent practice 
leading to an evolving understanding of a treaty provision.  The state-parties have accepted to 
adhere to the findings of treaty bodies, and have hence recognized the role of these bodies in 
developing the understanding of treaty provisions as living instruments.646  Hence, treaty body 
jurisprudence constitutes an important source of international law “that a lawyer would be 
foolish to ignore”.647   
 
Treaty bodies are not the only interpreters of international law contributing to evolved 
understandings of treaty provisions.  Anaya points to how the IACHR, when ruling in the 
Awas Tingni Case, “was not deterred by the absence of any specific reference in the American 
Convention on Human Rights to indigenous peoples or collective rights [or] by the 
individualistic terms in which the right to property is expressed in the American 
Convention...”.  He notes that rather than finding itself bound by the mere wording of the 
property rights provision, the Court looked at the core values of the right to property as 
expressed in the Convention and matched these values with trends in the indigenous rights 
discourse.  Anaya further observes that the IACommHR took a very similar adaptive 
approach to the right to property in the Dann Sisters Case, where the Commission too, relied 
on trends and developments in the international indigenous rights discourse.648  Anaya’s is a 
pertinent observation.  As a common thread, the doctoral thesis has demonstrated how the 
indigenous rights discourse is to a large degree about adapting the conventional international 
normative framework to the particular context of indigenous peoples.  Chapter 5 and Sections 
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4.8 and 4.9 demonstrated that a contemporary understanding of the right to non-
discrimination not only supports, but calls for such adaptation.  The Chapter above has 
concluded that the principle of positivism in international law is not so rigid as to preclude 
adaptive understandings of international law.  Hence, it is not only acceptable and 
understandable, but expected, that international institutions interpreting treaties takes this 
approach.  Courts do, and so should treaty bodies.  It can be presumed that treaty body 
jurisprudence reflects the relevant understanding of a treaty provision, unless concerted state 
objection to the jurisprudence speaks in favour of the original understanding of the provision.  
In other words, also tacit state-approval qualifies the treaty-body jurisprudence as subsequent 
practice relevant for the interpretation of the provision.649      
 
In conclusion, treaty body jurisprudence constitutes subsequent practice highly relevant to a 
correct understanding of human rights treaty provisions.  Absent coherent state objection, one 
can presume that findings of treaty bodies reflect international law.  The same is true for 
progressive interpretations of treaty provisions by international tribunals, including human 
rights courts.  Finally, it can be added that Section 7.3 described how non-binding instruments 
such as UN declarations and treaties interplay to establish international law.  If a UN 
declaration is adopted subsequent to a treaty and includes provisions addressing the same 
issue as an earlier treaty provision, the declaration provision too can indicate an evolved 
understanding of the treaty provision.  Clearly, a subsequent vote on a declaration in the 
UNGA constitutes subsequent practice relevant to the interpretation of the treaty, to the extent 
the parties to the treaty also participated in the vote on the declaration.650  
 
7.4.2 Other international instruments 
 
The VCLT is directly applicable only to legally binding treaties, and does not formally apply 
to UN declarations and other non-binding instruments.  However, Section 7.4.1 described that 
VCLT Articles 31 and 32 are widely regarded to form part of international customary law.  As 
these are universally accepted principles for interpretation of international legal texts, it is 
difficult to see why these principles should not guide interpretations also of treaty similar 
                                                 
649  For similar opinions, see Scheinin, Impact on the Law of Treaties, p. 33, Makkonen, Equal in Law, Unequal 
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instruments.  That is particularly so since Section 7.3 has concluded that there is no relevant 
reason to draw a strict line between formally binding and non-binding legal instruments.  
Reasonably therefore, the norms enshrined in VCLT Articles 31 and 32 are relevant also for 
the interpretation of also formally non-binding international instruments, not least when such 
instruments are formulated in concrete and legalistic language, and hence do not deviate in 




The Chapter has noted that formally, treaties and customary law (and also general principles 
of law recognized by civilized nations) constitute the primary sources of international law, or, 
if one wants, hard law.  But the Chapter further concluded that in practice, the doctrine on 
international legal sources has not upheld the clear distinction between hard and soft law 
sources.  The reasons, the Chapter observed, are mainly two; one principal and one practical.  
First, to remain a legal system at all, the international legal system has not strictly upheld the 
principle of state sovereignty in international law making.  This in turn resulted in there being 
no principal reason to maintain a clear distinction between hard and soft law, either.  Second, 
formal primary sources of law often offer insufficient guidance as to what constitute relevant 
international law.  The practicing lawyer therefore simply has to take recourse to secondary 
sources.  The alternative would be to rely on subjective values.  That said, the Chapter also 
inferred that one must still recognize that different legal sources carry different legal status.  
One cannot simply treat non-legally binding sources as binding.  But to the extent the content 
of a non-legally binding source finds certain support in other sources, it is relevant when 
determining what constitutes law.   
 
For the purposes of the doctoral thesis, this conclusion is of particular relevance with regard 
to the DRIP.  Clearly, the DRIP is as such a formally non-legally binding source.  But it 
follows from this Chapter that the DRIP provisions can still be highly indicative as to what 
constitutes law proper.  If a DRIP provision is sufficiently mirrored in other legal sources, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the provision reflects international law proper.  Chapter 6 
demonstrated how essentially all DRIP provisions reflects previously adopted international 
legal sources.  As Barelli has observed, “the strong relationship between the content of the 
Declaration and existing law should be recognized.”  He further notes that this fact underlines 
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the legal significance of the DRIP.651  The fact that the DRIP was adopted with such 
overwhelming support gives it particular authority652, and comparing the Declaration with 
existing sources is rendered easier by the fact that the DRIP is crafted in a concrete, treaty-
style, fashion.  In sum, the subsequent chapters analyzing to what extent indigenous peoples 
have the right to own and/or determine over their culture will give significant prominence to 
the DRIP.   
 
The Chapter has further inferred that subsequent practices are a most relevant source when 
interpreting treaty provisions.  That is particularly so with regard to human rights treaties, 
which, the Chapter observed, must be capable of responding to developments in the society 
and evolved perceptions of rights.  The Chapter noted that treaty body jurisprudence is a 
specific form of subsequent practice, which states have agreed to respect when establishing 
the treaty body through the instrument the body is set up to monitor.  The Chapter concluded 
that one should be able to presume that the findings of a treaty body adequately reflect law, in 
the absence of coherent state objections to the treaty body’s interpretation of a treaty 
provision.  The Chapter further observed that in a similar fashion, international tribunals 
contribute to evolved understandings of treaty provisions, not least within the field of human 
rights.  As to subsequent state practice, it was noted that states voting on human rights 
instruments in the UNGA is of particular relevance for determining evolved understandings of 
treaty provisions.  The Chapter observed that the law of treaties formally applies only to 
legally binding instruments, but concluded that the same principles must apply also to non-
binding instruments.  Finally, the Chapter inferred that the outlined understanding of the law 
of treaties is in complete harmony with the contemporary understanding of the right to non-
discrimination, as outlined in Section 4.8.     
 
For the purposes of the doctoral thesis, the prominent role the law of treaties gives to treaty 
body jurisprudence is of particular relevance.  It is clear from Chapters 4 and 5 that UN treaty 
bodies have been very active in advancing indigenous rights.  Also significant is the fact that 
if a DRIP provision resemblances a previously adopted treaty provision, the DRIP version of 
the provision can constitute such subsequent state practice that evidences an evolved 
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understanding also of the treaty provision.653  It follows from this Chapter that the subsequent 
chapters, analyzing to what extent indigenous peoples have the right to own and/or determine 
over their culture, should give treaty body jurisprudence due weight.  In interpreting treaty 
provisions, the subsequent chapters will further pay close attention to similarities between 
such provisions and DRIP articles.   
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8. CONCLUSIONS - CULTURAL RIGHTS AND THE 




Having concluded the analyses in Chapters 4-7, the doctoral thesis is ready to survey to what 
extent indigenous peoples have the right to own and/or determine over their distinct collective 
creativity.  This Chapter considers whether indigenous peoples hold such rights based on the 
rights to culture and self-determination, where after Chapter 9 turns to the right to property.   
The analysis of this Chapter consists of two parts.  Section 8.2 surveys the more precise legal 
status of indigenous peoples under international law.  Section 8.3 subsequently establishes the 
scope and content of the rights to culture/self-determination.     
 
8.2 Indigenous peoples’ legal status under international law 
 
8.2.1 Indigenous peoples as international legal subjects in general 
 
Chapter 4 described how when the UN and its member states commenced seriously 
addressing indigenous rights in the 1980s, they from the outset acknowledged that the 
particular situation of indigenous populations warranted treating them as distinct societies, 
existing side-by-side with the majority society.  Chapter 4 concluded that international law 
has firmly established that “collectivized” individual cultural rights indirectly protect also 
indigenous groups as such.  It further inferred that indigenous populations enjoy collective 
rights sui generis to them, as enshrined in ILO 169.   
 
But for the purposes of the doctoral thesis, collectivized individual rights and sui generis 
rights of indigenous populations are mostly important for having paved way for later 
developments.  Chapter 4 further outlined how during the last decade or so, the indigenous 
rights discourse has evolved to posit that indigenous peoples enjoy rights as peoples.  The 
Chapter also inferred that these developments have been matched by the right to non-
discrimination taking on a second facet, implying that the right applies at least indirectly also 
to indigenous peoples as such.  The fact that the rights to culture, self-determination and non-
discrimination have gone through corresponding developments during the same time-period 
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implies, Chapter 4 concluded, that the Chapter’s conclusions within the sphere of each right 
are mutually supportive.  In conclusion, already prior to the adoption of the DRIP, relevant 
international legal sources strongly suggested that international law had evolved to recognize 
rights proper of indigenous peoples.  This position was also generally favoured by the legal 
doctrine.  Still, other legal scholars suggested that these rights were merely emerging and 
some outright dismissed the suggestion that indigenous peoples could enjoy rights proper.  
Since it was further uncertain to what extent the outlined developments had been accepted on 
a national level, Chapter 4 opted not to determinatively conclude that indigenous peoples’ 
rights proper had been firmly accepted by international law.    
 
Chapter 6 described how the UN member states in 2007 adopted the DRIP with 
overwhelming majority.  The Chapter noted that the Declaration confirmed the position taken 
by the international legal sources outlined in Chapter 4 within essentially all relevant areas of 
law, suggesting that states have lent their political support to positions taken by e.g. UN treaty 
bodies and international courts.  Still, the doctoral thesis did also recognize that the DRIP, as 
well as several of the sources surveyed in Chapter 4, are formally non-legally binding.  
Having analyzed international law on international legal sources, Chapter 7 concluded, 
however, that international law no longer maintains a sharp distinction between “hard” and 
“soft” law sources.  The Chapter hence inferred that to the extent a DRIP provision finds 
support in other legal sources, this indicates that the provision reflects law proper.  Chapter 7 
further concluded that under the law of treaties, subsequent practice – including treaty body 
jurisprudence - is a significant factor in any treaty interpretation, but in particular when 
interpreting human rights treaties.  Chapter 7 inferred that in absence of coherent state 
objections, one should normally be able to rely on treaty body jurisprudence as reflecting law 
proper.   
 
As noted above, there was considerable support in the legal doctrine for the notion that 
indigenous peoples constitute peoples proper already prior to UNGA’s adoption of the DRIP.  
Naturally, this support has only increased following the overwhelming endorsement of the 
Declaration.  Quite a few legal scholars have found time to comment on the DRIP following 
its adoption.  And the chorus is clear.  There is general agreement that the Declaration affirms 
indigenous peoples’ status as international legal subjects, enjoying e.g. the right to self-
determination.  Legal scholars further concur that the right to self-determination is first and 
foremost to be implemented through autonomy and self-government.   
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The doctoral thesis noted that Weller prior to the adoption of the DRIP had concluded that 
indigenous peoples are the beneficiaries of the right to self-determination.  Naturally, he has 
not changed his position subsequent to the adoption of the Declaration.654  Kymlicka too, had 
already prior to the adoption of the DRIP concluded that indigenous peoples’ right to the 
internal aspect of self-determination has been widely endorsed by states.  Following the 
adoption of the DRIP, he simply notes that the Declaration affirms that the right to self-
determination applies also to indigenous peoples.655  In the same vein, Wiessner notes that a 
survey of state practice and opinio juris reveals that international law has recognized a right to 
self-determination of indigenous peoples in political, economic and social affairs to be 
exercised through autonomy and self-governing functions.656  Xanthaki too, interprets the 
DRIP as affirming that indigenous peoples are entitled to the right to self-determination.657  
Barelli observes that the DRIP is the first international legal instrument that proclaims a right 
to autonomy.658  Similarly, al Attar, Aylwin and Coombe observe that indigenous peoples’ 
right to autonomy has emerged quicker than anyone could have expected only a decade 
ago.659  Fromherz submits that the internal aspect of indigenous peoples’ right to self-
determination is to be exercised through self-governing and autonomous functions.660  In the 
same vein, Scheinin affirms his previous observations that the trend within international law 
the last two decades or so has been to stray away from reducing individuals to formally equal 
                                                 
654  Weller, Settling Self-Determination Conflicts 
655  In line with what has been outlined is Section 4.7.3, Kymlicka observes that essentially all Western countries 
with indigenous peoples have accepted that these enjoy rights to various forms of self-government.  He further 
notes that most Latin America countries too, have introduced systems for cultural autonomy for their indigenous 
peoples and that other Latin American countries are moving in the same direction.  See Multicultural Odysseys, 
pp. 80-81, 103-104, 108 and 249, and American Multiculturalism and the “Nations Within”, pp. 225-227.  
Kymlicka makes no similar observations with regard to Africa and Asia.  But as Section 4.7.3 further narrated, 
this is probably a result of the whole indigenous peoples issue being more complex in these Continents, due to 
many states either not recognizing that they host indigenous populations or, alternatively, maintaining that the 
entire population of the state is indigenous.  Still, as further seen, regional African human rights institutions have 
recognized self-governing rights of ethnically/culturally defined peoples of Africa.   
656  Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty, pp. 1156-1157 
657  Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights in International Law over the Last 10 Years 
658  Barelli, The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System, p. 961.  Some might argue that if it is 
correct, as Barelli suggests, that the DRIP is the only international legal source speaking of a right to autonomy, 
this seems to indicate that the right is not firmly established in international law, given that the DRIP is formally 
a non-legally binding instrument.  But such arguments shoot beside the point.  The question here is not whether 
international law recognizes a right to autonomy as such.  Rather, the analysis is of whether a right to self-
determination exists which can only be meaningfully exercised through autonomy and self-governance. 
659  al Attar, Aylwin and Coombe, Indigenous Cultural Heritage Rights in International Human Rights Law, p. 
323 
660  Fromherz, Indigenous Peoples’ Courts, pp. 1370-1371.  Others that conclude that indigenous peoples have a 
right to autonomy include Loukacheva.  See On Autonomy and Law.   
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and atomistic citizens of the state.661  Against the background of the adoption of the DRIP, 
one can perhaps expect also previously sceptical legal scholars to reverse their position on 
indigenous peoples’ rights when having an opportunity to address the topic again.  That is 
particularly so, since a couple of these have already opined that international law should head 
in the direction DRIP submits.662 
 
Reading all these sources in conjunction, the doctoral thesis concludes that international law 
has affirmed that indigenous peoples are the beneficiaries of collective rights proper, 
including of the right to self-determination.  The HRC and CESC have interpreted the 
common Article 1 to apply also to indigenous peoples.  The lack of concerted state objection 
to these observations in itself suggests that indigenous peoples do enjoy the right to self-
determination.  But states have not only tacitly agreed to the evolved understanding of CCPR 
and CESCR Article 1.  They have actively supported this development by endorsing the 
DRIP, including its Article 3.663  Conversely, HRC/CESC interpretation of the common 
Article 1 and other legal sources with similar content supports the notion that DRIP Article 3 
reflects law proper.  Further, DRIP Articles 4 and 5 reaffirm international law’s general 
approach towards indigenous peoples since the inception of the indigenous rights discourse, 
when underscoring that the right to self-determination shall be implemented within state 
borders through autonomy and self-government.  Here too, the argument also works the other 
way around.  The fact that the right to self-determination shall be first and foremost 
implemented through self-government/autonomy has been endorsed in other legal sources and 
state practice in turn confirms that DRIP Article 4 and 5 reflect binding law.  In a similar 
fashion, the DRIP and treaty body jurisprudence have collaborated to establish – beyond 
doubt – that indigenous peoples enjoy collective human rights proper in general.   
 
                                                 
661  Scheinin, The Right of a People to Enjoy its Culture, pp. 151-152 
662  For instance, Cassese noted already in 1995 the tendency in international law towards recognizing that the 
internal aspect of self-determination should apply also to minority groups, and that many states had agreed to 
discuss the right in relation to sub-segments of the state.  Based on these observations, Cassese recommended 
that the concept of self-determination be remodelled so to better apply to ethnic groups.  He asserted that the 
right to self-determination for such groups should encompass a right to autonomy and a broad measure of self-
government.  See Self-determination of Peoples, pp. 104, 107, 330, 339, 349-351, 354-355 and 362.  Similarly, 
Hannum observed a trend in international law aspiring to provide for creative attempts catering for autonomy 
and self-determination of e.g. indigenous peoples.  Doing so, he submitted that in many instances, only true 
group rights can adequately promote the interests of e.g. indigenous peoples.  See Autonomy, Sovereignty, and 
Self-Determination II, pp. 473-475  
663  In addition, as noted by Kymlicka and Wiessner, states have supported a right to self-determination of 
indigenous peoples to be implemented through autonomy arrangements through domestic recognition and action. 
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In sum, the DRIP closes a debate that has gone on for decades, namely what is understood 
with the term “peoples” in the phrase “all peoples have the right to self-determination”.  The 
term “peoples” can no longer be understood, or at least not exclusively understood, as 
referring to the aggregate of the inhabitants of a state.  Rather, a people is to be defined, or in 
any event can also be defined, in terms of a population with certain distinct cultural and ethnic 
characteristics.  There can be more than one people in a state, and a territory of a people can 
also stretch across state borders.  At least this is true for indigenous peoples.664 
 
As indicated above, the described development must be categorized as nothing less than a 
paradigm shift in international law.  Since 1648, international law has ensured the state’s 
unchallenged political position by equalling the sum of the inhabitants of a state with a 
people.  This position implied that there could be no peoples’ rights in any meaningful 
understanding of the term, since a people in practice, if not formally, coincided with the state.  
The political map changes rather dramatically when peoples become political entities other 
than the state, also for practical purposes.  The existence of peoples proper challenges the 
state in unprecedented ways.  As Sections 4.10 and 6.3.4 explained, the challenge is not 
against the territorial integrity of the state.  Rather, within the state, indigenous peoples, on 
one hand, and state representative institutions, on the other, are now competing for 
jurisdiction.  International law must now define people-state relationship in manners 
previously unknown.665  As Section 6.3.4 indicated, how this competition for jurisdiction 
plays out in practice will to a significant degree depend on whether indigenous peoples are 
peoples in general for international legal purposes, or whether they rather make up a sui 
generis category of peoples.  Or in other words, are indigenous peoples the beneficiaries of 
the right to self-determination, or is rather their right a sui generis right? 
 
                                                 
664   From a purely legal perspective, it would be logical for international law pertaining to non-indigenous non-
state forming peoples to follow in the footsteps of the indigenous peoples’ rights discourse, as noted by 
Kymlicka above.  He asserts that it makes little sense to deny national minorities with ancient roots to their 
territories autonomous rights when such rights have been recognized for indigenous peoples.  (For a view similar 
to Kymlicka’s, see also Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights in International Law over the Last 10 years.)  It is repeated 
that it lies outside the scope of the doctoral thesis to analyze what impacts the DRIP might have beyond the 
scope of indigenous peoples.          
665  Kymlicka, having concluded that indigenous peoples are entitled to the right to self-determination, added that 
this development fundamentally reshapes the notions of state sovereignty and nationhood in international law.  
That is so, since self-governing arrangements of indigenous peoples do include genuine transfer of power, i.e. 
transfer of sovereignty from the state to the indigenous people.  See Multicultural Odysseys, pp. 3-5, 33 and 206-
211, and American Multiculturalism and the “Nations Within”, pp. 225-227. 
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8.2.2 Do indigenous peoples constitute peoples in general or a sui generis 
category of peoples? 
 
Section 6.3.4 inferred that a text interpretation of the DRIP submits that indigenous peoples 
do enjoy the general right to self-determination.  The Section further noted that this 
conclusion also follows from a contextual interpretation of the DRIP.  All other international 
legal sources - such as the HRC and CESC jurisprudence - speak only of one – of “the” - right 
to self-determination.  In the same breath, however, Section 6.3.4 acknowledged that 
international law affirming that indigenous peoples enjoy the general right to self-
determination might have vast implications for the internal structure of the state.  Hence, 
although conventional interpretations of relevant international legal sources suggest that 
indigenous peoples are the beneficiaries of the right to self-determination, the Section 
questioned whether it is realistic that states have intended to consent to such a potentially 
extensive right.  True, the vast majority of states found no reason to explicitly declare their 
opposition against the notion that the DRIP enshrines the general right to self-determination, 
enjoyed by all peoples, in connection with the UNGA vote.  This speaks for a tacit support for 
what seems to follow from the wording of DRIP Article 3.  But at the same time, states have 
not explicitly consented to this interpretation.  And it could be argued that the potential vast 
implications of such an understanding of Article 3 might be so far-fetched to certain states 
that they have not even considered this alternative.   
 
It is difficult to get any further guidance on which alternative is correct, beyond these general 
observations.  The legal doctrine too, offers limited guidance.  This could be a result of legal 
scholars simply taking for granted that there exist only one right to self-determination under 
international law, wherefore it is this one right that applies also to indigenous peoples.  But 
again, an alternative option might be that legal scholars too, hold it unimaginable that states 
would ever accept a right to self-determination of indigenous peoples demanding transfer of 
jurisdiction placing these peoples on par with the majority people.  Other legal scholars might 
not have seen the same need as this doctoral thesis to define the legal status of indigenous 
peoples in detail.  That said, a few legal scholars have commented on the relative legal status 
of indigenous peoples, vis-à-vis the majority people.   
 
Kohen appears to hold the opinion that indigenous peoples constitute sui generis legal 
entities, asserting that indigenous peoples constitute a distinct category of legal subjects in 
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international law.666  Scheinin, on the other hand, submits that indigenous peoples’ right to 
self-determination is the general right enshrined e.g. in the common Article 1 of the 1966 
Covenants.667  Anaya concurs, arguing that when the right to self-determination has evolved 
to apply beyond the colonial situation, “peoples” must not be defined in terms of population 
of a state, but by spheres of ethnographic cohesion and historically exercised territorial 
sovereignty.668  In the same vein, Crawford, having observed that the right to self-
determination is about to emerge as right of peoples in the ethnic/cultural meaning of the 
term, posits that the right must then apply equally to state-forming peoples, colonial 
populations, and to non-state forming peoples.669  Xanthaki interprets the DRIP as affirming 
that indigenous peoples are entitled to the general right to self-determination.670  Prior to the 
adoption of the DRIP, Weller submitted that the right to self-determination indigenous 
peoples enjoy is distinct to them.671  Following the adoption of the DRIP, however, Weller 
appears to have changed his opinion, now holding that the right enjoyed is the general right.672   
 
In conclusion, an analysis of relevant international legal sources posits that indigenous 
peoples constitute peoples like all other peoples for international legal purposes, consequently 
enjoying the general right to self-determination.  This is also the position generally favoured 
in the legal doctrine.  Notwithstanding, it remains uncertain to what extent states have 
accepted this understanding of the right to self-determination.  Consequently, when now 
turning to surveying the scope and content of indigenous peoples’ rights to their collective 
creativity, the doctoral thesis will remain open also to the possibility that indigenous peoples’ 
right to self-determination is in fact a sui generis right. 
                                                 
666  Kohen, Secession: International Law Perspectives, pp. 1-20 
667  Scheinin, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pp. 4 
and 11, and How to Resolve Conflicts Between Individual and Collective Rights?, pp. 236-237   
668  Anaya, The Capacity of International Law to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Claims, p. 78   
669  Crawford, The Right to Self-Determination in International Law, pp. 39-40 and 64 
670  Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights in International Law over the Last 10 Years 
671  Weller, Towards a General Comment on Self-Determination and Autonomy, pp. 12 and 16 
672  Weller, Settling Self-Determination Conflicts 
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8.3 The content and scope of indigenous peoples’ right to culture and 




It is hence clear that indigenous peoples constitute international legal subjects, enjoying 
peoples’ rights to culture and self-determination.  The doctoral thesis has further established 
that the right to self-determination shall be effectuated through autonomy and self-
governance.  This is true regardless of whether indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination 
is the general or a sui generis right.  Following this general conclusion, this Section seeks to 
determine the content and scope of the right to autonomy/self-governance.  Section 8.3.2 
surveys two common features of autonomy arrangements present regardless of which of the 
two alternatives are correct.  Section 8.3.3 subsequently specifically addresses indigenous 
peoples’ rights to their collective creativity based on the assumption that their right to self-
determination is the general right.  Section 8.3.4 finally considers the scope and content of 
indigenous peoples’ rights if their right to self-determination is rather a sui generis right. 
 
8.3.2 Common features  
 
8.3.2.1 Competing activities threatening the cultural identity or preventing 
practices of indigenous peoples 
 
Regardless of whether indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination is the general or a sui 
generis right, one must take their cultural rights as outlined in Chapter 4 and Section 6.3.3 
into account.  Chapter 4 established that international law clearly embraces a general right of 
indigenous peoples to continuously pursue their cultural practices and to maintain and 
develop their distinct cultural identity.  It was further inferred that this right has been mirrored 
in parallel developments within the sphere of the right to non-discrimination.  Although not 
reflecting a collective right proper, the HRC’s interpretation of CCPR Article 27 can be said 
to elaborate on and concreticize the general right to cultural identity.  Section 4.5 described 
how the HRC has posited that CCPR Article 27 places a positive obligation on states to 
prevent any competing activity that renders it impossible or considerably more difficult for an 
indigenous group to continuously pursue its cultural practices.  In other words, albeit formally 
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an individual right, the right to culture enshrined in CCPR Article 27 has been understood as 
protecting also indigenous groups as such.  Section 4.6 elaborated that this acceptance is 
reflected e.g. in ILO 169 Articles 2 (2) and 5 (a), proclaiming that states have an obligation to 
protect e.g. the cultural practices of indigenous peoples.  The CERD Committee too, has 
concurred with the HRC, e.g. in General Recommendation No. 23.673   
 
Section 6.3.3 demonstrated that the DRIP has reaffirmed the outlined right to culture, in 
particular through its Articles 1-2 and 7-8.  Further, Section 6.3.3 inferred that albeit the HRC 
jurisprudence essentially pertains to land-based cultural activities, there is no reason why the 
underpinning principles behind the right should not apply also to collective creativity.  
Reading (i) the HRC’s jurisprudence on CCPR Article 27, (ii) other international legal 
sources such as the ILO 169 and the CERD Committee’s General Recommendation No. 23, 
(iii) the contemporary understanding of the right to non-discrimination as outlined in Section 
4.8, and (iv) the DRIP, in conjunction, the doctoral thesis concludes that the described right to 
culture is firmly established in international law.  Consequently, indigenous peoples have the 
right to prevent access to their collective creativity pursuant to the right to culture to the 
extent non-members utilization of and/or access to elements of their cultures is harmful to the 
cultural identity of the people in question or renders it considerably more difficult for the 
people to practice its own culture.   
 
The test of whether a violation of a right has occurred envelopes a subjective element.  It must 
be based on the standards of the culture which allegedly has been harmed.  When determining 
whether an indigenous peoples’ cultural identity is harmed by non-members’ use of its 
cultural elements, one must consider the cultural and societal context of the people in 
question.  Generally speaking, indigenous cultures are vulnerable.  Many indigenous peoples 
struggle to maintain their distinct cultures and societies, and to not become engulfed by the 
majority society.  As Mercer has noted, identity becomes an issue when in crisis.674  Under 
such circumstances, unauthorized utilization of indigenous peoples’ cultural elements can 
quickly cause serious harm to a people’s cultural identity.  This might be the case, even when 
the utilization appears harmless to an outsider.  For instance, utilization of a cultural element 
distinguishing the indigenous people from the majority culture might further dilute already 
                                                 
673  As Section 4.7.3 observed, the IACHR and IACommHR have reached similar conclusions in their 
jurisprudence pertaining to indigenous peoples.  The outlined right to culture is further enshrined in OAS 
Declaration Articles 6.2, 10.1 and 13.1, on which there are agreement.     
674  Mercer, Welcome to the Jungle, p. 43 
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thin cultural borders preventing the indigenous people from being absorbed into the majority 
society.  Consequently, when determining whether a non-member’s use of a cultural element 
of an indigenous people violates the right to culture, one must consider the effects the use has 
on the people in question.  One cannot apply a fixed objective standard, in particular not a 
standard based on conventional Western notions of interchangabilities of cultures. 
 
8.3.2.2 Territorial and cultural autonomy in internal and local affairs 
 
Chapter 4 described how it is a defining characteristic of indigenous peoples that their 
cultures are continuously intrinsically linked to a fairly definable traditional territory.  The 
specific forms of indigenous peoples’ autonomy/self-governance will certainly have to vary 
depending on cultural/geographical/legal contexts.  Still, given indigenous peoples’ intrinsic 
connection to their traditional territories, their autonomous arrangements will always have a 
certain degree of territorial base.  At the same time, no legal source suggests that indigenous 
peoples’ right to autonomy is purely territorial.  On the contrary, it is clear that indigenous 
peoples also have a right to cultural autonomy, i.e. an autonomy applying to all members of 
the people, irrespective of their physical residence.  In other words, indigenous peoples’ 
autonomous/self-governing arrangements embrace elements of their culture also beyond the 
borders of their traditional territory.675  Regardless of whether indigenous peoples’ right to 
self-determination is the general or a sui generis right, the right is essentially a right to a 
combination of cultural and territorial autonomy to be exercised within state borders, adapted 
to the factual circumstances.   
 
It is further clear that indigenous peoples’ right to autonomy/self-government embraces their 
collective creativity.  Section 6.3.4 described how DRIP Article 3, mirroring other 
international legal sources on the right to self-determination, affirms that indigenous peoples’ 
right to self-determination envelopes a right of these peoples to determine their cultural 
development.  Section 4.7.2 also described how the HRC on a number of occasions has 
explicitly confirmed that indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination embraces a right to 
control their cultural development.  Further, pursuant to DRIP Article 4, in exercising their 
                                                 
675  See Weller, Towards a General Comment on Self-Determination and Autonomy, pp. 5-7.  Weller 
distinguishes between cultural (non-territorial) and territorial autonomy, where cultural autonomy awards the 
autonomous people the right to foster the preservation and further development of its cultural identity.  
Territorial autonomy, on the other hand, as the title suggests refers to autonomy within a distinct territorial area 
within the state.  
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right to self-determination, indigenous peoples have the right to autonomy and self-
government in their internal and local affairs.  The terms “cultural development” and 
“internal and local affairs” must reasonably envelope indigenous peoples’ collective 
creativity.  Indigenous peoples’ collective creativity constitutes a central element of their 
cultures, and the creation of cultural elements is an integral part of the developments of their 
cultures.  Consequently, there can be no doubt that indigenous peoples’ right to 
autonomy/self-government embraces their collective creativity, including elements situated 
outside their traditional territories.676           
 
8.3.3 Further on indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination as the 
general right 
 
Section 6.3.4 noted that if the right to self-determination indigenous peoples enjoy is the 
general right enjoyed by all peoples, the right is not subordinated to the right to self-
determination of the majority people.  On the contrary, under such circumstances, the 
indigenous people and the majority people – per definition – have an equal right to self-
determination.  Indigenous people’s right to self-determination being equal to the right 
enjoyed by the majority people sets the basic parameters for the scope and content of the 
right.  Under such circumstances, indigenous peoples have the same right to determine over 
their creativity as do the majority people.  To determine the more precise scope of and content 
of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination as the general right, it might be helpful to 
divide their collective creativity into three categories; (i) creativity still controlled by the 
indigenous people in the sense that it has not been disclosed to a wider public, (ii) creativity in 
the public domain, and (iii) creativity to which third party rights pertain.   
 
With regard to collective creativity still in indigenous peoples’ control, there can be no doubt 
that indigenous peoples have the right to continuously determine over such cultural elements.  
If their right to self-determination is equal to that of the majority people, clearly indigenous 
peoples have the right to determine whether they want to disseminate elements of their culture 
still under their immediate control to non-members.   
 
                                                 
676  Still, it can be recalled that Section 4.7.3 underlined that the agreed OAS Declaration Article 20.1 affirms 
that indigenous peoples have the right to self-government in e.g. cultural affairs.  Dutfield and Suthersanen too, 
underline that the right to self-determination has a great degree of relevance for indigenous peoples’ claims to 
control their traditional knowledge.  See Global Intellectual Property Law, p. 216. 
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As to collective creativity in the public domain, Section 5.4 explained that the public domain 
has been deliberately defined to encompass certain categories of creativity because the 
amount of protection, which follows in inversion from this definition, is perceived to result in 
maximum amount of creativity.  This in turn, is perceived to benefit society as a whole.  In 
other words, there is no doubt that there exists a clear, and at least from certain perspectives 
legitimate, interest competing with indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination when 
addressing indigenous peoples’ cultural elements in the public domain.  Notwithstanding, it is 
doubtful whether this competing interest can limit the applicability of indigenous peoples’ 
right to self-determination.  Section 6.3.8 concluded that interest of society as a whole carries 
little weight when determining the scope of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination as 
the general right.  That is so because if the indigenous people and the majority people enjoy 
equal rights to self-determination, there is no apparent reason why the state/the majority 
people should continuously determine access to a cultural element created by the indigenous 
people simply because the laws of the state have at one point rendered the element publicly 
available.  As mentioned, the public domain has been carefully calculated to maximize certain 
values identified by the majority people.  A fundamental rationale behind recognizing a right 
to self-determination of indigenous peoples is precisely to correct past policies perceived to be 
flawed.  An equal right to self-determination must thus imply that indigenous peoples should 
be allowed to determine their own values.  If they do not value the rationales behind the 
public domain, they should not be bound by it.  Hence, as a general rule, indigenous peoples 
have the right to determine over all cultural elements in the public domain.     
 
The situation might be somewhat more complicated when third party rights pertain to the 
cultural element.  This category of cultural elements will of course gradually disappear, as 
third party IPRs expire.  One by one, these elements will end up in what was previously the 
public domain, but what is now a sphere of creativity to which, in line with the just 
concluded, indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination applies.677  But while third party 
rights reaming valid, as Section 5.2 described, the state is obliged to respect such rights.  It is 
untested waters what obligations the state has vis-à-vis indigenous peoples with regard to 
elements to their creativity to which third parties hold rights.  One can imagine everything 
from a duty to expropriate such third party rights in order to bring them back under the control 
of the indigenous people, to no obligations at all.  Still, again, indigenous peoples’ rights to 
                                                 
677  The exception is IPRs, most notably trademarks, who can potentially last in perpetuity. 
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self-determination as the general right in principle implies that these peoples shall be brought 
to level with the majority people when it comes to the possibility to control their culture.  This 
argues for an obligation of the state to expropriate at least cultural elements of particular 
importance to the indigenous people.  In addition, with regard to cultural elements not 
expropriated, it appears reasonable that the indigenous people can prevent not only use by 
non-members that directly threatens the cultural identity of the indigenous people and/or 
prevent it from continuously pursuing its cultural practices, but also other uses that are 
derogatory, offensive and/or culturally insensitive.  This category of cultural elements will of 
course gradually disappear.   
 
Section 5.4 explained that the field of IPRs is subject to extensive international regulation.  
Consequently, states with indigenous populations are likely to have entered into multiple 
international IP-treaties embracing also creativity of indigenous people.  In other words, 
indigenous peoples’ rights outlined above might to a not insignificant degree have been 
prejudiced by previous IP-treaties.  But again, it is underlined that the indigenous rights 
discourse aims at amending structures in the international legal system.  Existing international 
obligations are therefore not a defence for ignoring indigenous peoples’ rights, in particular 
not if the competing right is not a human right.  Rather, shall amend the present IP-system, 
bringing it in conformity with indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination.  Amending 
basic structures of the international IP-system might come across as a rather dramatic 
enterprise.  But in fact, as Chapter 11 will elaborate, states are already engaged in standard-
setting activities with this precise purpose and capacity.   
 





As seen, indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination as the general right is fairly straight-
forward.  If the right is instead a sui generis right, a more careful analysis might be needed to 
establish its scope and content.  Still, some parameters for the analysis have been set.  Also as 
a sui generis right, the right to self-determination is still a right to autonomy/self-government 
within existing state borders.  Further, the right to autonomy/self-government is presumably 
subordinated to the general right to self-determination enjoyed by peoples in the meaning the 
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entire population of the state.  Before specifically surveying the scope and content of the right 
to self-determination as a sui generis right, the Section immediately below considers, in 
general terms, what limitations are embedded in the notion that the right is sub-ordinated to 
right to self-determination enjoyed by the population as a whole. 
 
8.3.4.2 Is indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination as a sui generis right 
limited to issues completely internal to the indigenous people? 
 
Some states have been quick to suggest that indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination 
being subordinated to that of the entire population of the state implies that indigenous peoples 
lack decision-making power in all matters that are also relevant to the majority population.  In 
other words, this position suggests that DRIP Article 4’s reference to “internal and local 
affairs” envelopes only entirely internal and local affairs, i.e. issues that have no relevance 
whatsoever to the majority population and/or the state.  Inversely, these states also submit that 
in matters of concern to the majority population/the state, indigenous peoples enjoy a mere 
right to consultation.  Further, in instances where consultation leads to no agreement, the 
position of the state prevails.678  This is, however, not a plausible interpretation of the right to 
self-determination, even as a right sui generis to indigenous peoples.  Suggesting that the right 
applies only when there is no conflict is a contradiction in terms, rendering the right 
meaningless.  And positing that the right to self-determination amounts to no more than a 
right to consultation confuses two different rights.   
 
Suggesting that indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination is only a genuine right self to 
determine in instances where there are no competing interests in effect limits the applicability 
of the right to situations where it has no meaning.  If there are no conflicting interests, there is 
no situation to regulate, because there is only one legal subject is involved in the matter.  
Under such circumstances, the indigenous people will organize matters its own way 
irrespective of the law.  In other words, it is a contradiction in terms to claim that the right to 
self-determination applies only in instances where there are no conflicts of interest.  A right 
can – per definition - exist only in a relationship between two or more legal subjects.  When 
there is no conflict, there is no relationship, only one subject minding its own business.  Under 
such circumstances, there is no need for, and cannot exist, any right, including no right to self-
                                                 
678  Notably, this position is rather similar to Thornberry’s interpretation of the right to consent enshrined in the 
CERD Committee’s General Recommendation No. 23, as presented in Section 4.7. 
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determination.  Conversely, it is only in areas where there is a risk of divergence of opinion 
between the majority people and the indigenous people that rights, such as the right to self-
determination, is needed.  It is in these situations that the right to self-determination must 
offer guidance as to how to settle the conflict.679  In conclusion, indigenous peoples managing 
affairs of no interest to the majority population/the state is – per definition – not an example 
of them exercising a right to self-determination.  In other words, suggesting that the right to 
self-determination applies only in such instances equals saying that the right does not exist at 
all, a position the doctoral thesis has demonstrated is not correct.       
 
But what about the inverted argument?  It has not only been submitted that a true right to self-
determination of indigenous peoples exists only in matters of sole concern to them.  States 
have further posited that the right to self-determination does apply also in cases where 
interests conflict, however as a right of indigenous peoples to be involved in decision-making 
processes impacting them.  But, it is further submitted, in instances where no agreement is 
reached, the position of the state prevails.  But this cannot be a correct understanding of the 
right to self-determination either.  Giving the right to self-determination such a narrow 
interpretation does violence to the right.  It (i) has no support in international legal sources on 
the rights to self-determination and consultation, (ii) is discriminatory, (iii) contradicts the law 
of treaties, and (iv) is out of line with the legal doctrine.   
 
Even if it should be correct that the right to self-determination indigenous peoples enjoy is not 
the general, but a sui generis, right, it is still a right to self-determination, not a right to 
consultation.  Indigenous populations’ right to consultation is well established in international 
law, e.g. in ILO 169 where the right is considered a cornerstone.680  Also the HRC has 
systematically interpreted CCPR Article 27 to embrace not only material cultural rights, but 
also procedural rights demanding that indigenous groups be duly consulted before competing 
                                                 
679  The outlined argument is well illustrated also by this doctoral thesis.  There is no example of the preceding 
Chapters addressing a situation where an element of collective creativity of an indigenous people is of interest 
solely to that people.  The Chapters have only sought to determine whose will prevails in instances of competing 
interests with regard to elements of indigenous peoples’ collective creativity.  The reason is of course precisely 
that there is no need to talk about rights in situations where there exist only one interest and opinion.  A 
comparison can also be made with the conventional understanding of the right to self-determination, applying to 
peoples in the meaning the aggregate of the population of the state.  We have seen that this right is directed 
precisely against other states, demanding that they do not interfere in the internal affairs of the sovereign.  And it 
is only when there exists an interest of another state to intervene the right has meaning.  No one would come up 
with the idea of suggesting that the right applies only to matters in which no other states have an interest.          
680  See in particular ILO 169 Article 6, and Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law II, pp. 153-154, and 
Tomei and Swepston, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples; a Guide to the ILO Convention No. 169, p. 8. 
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activities are initiated that impact on their cultures.681  Finally, the right to consultation has 
been recognized in the specific context of indigenous peoples too.682  It is hence clear that the 
right to consultation is well established in international law.683  It is, however, equally clear 
that the right to consultation is a right different from the more recently established right to 
self-determination, although there are connection points.  The two rights are enshrined in 
different legal sources.  For instance, the HRC has identified a right to consultation applying 
indirectly also to indigenous groups to be enshrined in CCPR Article 27.  Subsequently, it has 
held that the right to self-determination enshrined in CCPR Article 1 applies to indigenous 
peoples.  It is clear from the HRC jurisprudence that it views the right to self-determination as 
a different, and meatier, right compared with the right to consultation.  Other sources too, 
clearly distinguish between the rights to consultation and self-determination.  For instance, it 
was clear during the DRIP elaborations that Article 3 was to enshrine the right to self-
determination, and not a right to consultation.684  Naturally, this was also the reason why 
Article 3 was one of the most difficult provisions to reach an agreement on in the DRIP 
process.  Had DRIP Article 3 been understood as enshrining merely the already established, 
and fairly uncontroversial, right to consultation, it would not have taken a quarter of a century 
to reach an agreement on the provision.  It simply makes no sense that the only thing agreed 
on after 25 years of hard negotiations was an additional label for the right to consultation. 
 
Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination not being a mere right to consultation also 
follows from how the former right has conventionally been interpreted in a non-indigenous 
context, as outlined in Section 2.5.  Clearly, if indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination 
is a sui generis right, there must be some key differences between this aspect of the right and 
the right to self-determination applicable to the entire population of the state.  Still, it follows 
from Sections 2.5 and 6.3.4 that we are still talking about two aspects of one right, not of two 
different rights.  Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination as a sui generis right must be 
implemented within the framework of states.  But it is nonetheless a right to self-
determination.  This fact is underlined by the second part of DRIP Article 3 and the common 
Article 1 of the 1966 Covenants.  Having affirmed that “[All peoples/Indigenous peoples] 
have the right to self-determination”, the instruments proceed to add “By virtue of that right 
                                                 
681  See the sources emanating from the HRC discussed in Section 4.5. 
682  See e.g. CERD Committee General Recommendation No. 23, para. 4 (d). 
683  Indeed, Anaya submits that at least the core concepts of the right to consultation form part of international 
customary law.  See Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law II, pp. 155-156.   
684  This was of course also the reason for opting for the language ”Indigenous peoples have the right to self-
determination”.  See further immediately below. 
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they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.”   Section 2.5 described how this dimension of the right to self-
determination has been understood to mean that peoples have a right to define their 
relationship with other peoples (the external aspect)  and a right to be sovereign in internal 
affairs (the internal aspect).  As mentioned, this is the core, the essence, of the right to self-
determination.  As Section 6.3.8 explained, it follows explicitly from DRIP Article 46.2 that 
the rights enshrined in the DRIP shall be applied in a non-discriminatory manner.  If it should 
be correct that indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination is a sui generis right, it is 
reasonable that the right be accustomed to the fact that it applies to a segment of, and not to 
the entire, state.  A sui generis right to self-determination must be reconciled with the general 
right to self-determination applying to the entire population.  But to suggest that the very core, 
the essence that gives the right meaning, is not present at all in indigenous peoples’ right to 
self-determination, this is discriminatory.  That is the same thing as saying that indigenous 
peoples, unlike other peoples, are not entitled to the right to self-determination. 
 
That indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination cannot be understood as a mere right to 
consultation also follows from the law of treaties.  Section 7.4.1 outlined how under the law 
of treaties, a treaty provision shall, absent convincing evidence to the contrary, be given the 
meaning following from an ordinary understanding of the wording of the provision.  Section 
7.4.2 inferred that the same rule apply also to provisions contained in formally non-legally 
binding instruments.  The phrase “[All/Indigenous] peoples have the right to self-
determination” in the common Article 1/DRIP Article 3 cannot reasonably be understood as 
simply providing for a right to consultation.  The same is true for the wording “Indigenous 
peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-
government…” in DRIP Article 4.  It is simply impossible to understand the cited language as 
referring to a right to be consulted.685  This conclusion finds further support in the fact that, as 
mentioned, a particular right to consultation already exists under international law.  If the 
intention was to refer to this right, language to that effect would presumably have been 
                                                 
685  For instance, the New Oxford Companion of Law defines self-governance (and indirectly autonomy) in the 
context of indigenous peoples as a claim that “could result in independent statehood or autonomous existence 
within existing state structures”.  As noted, the notion that a right to self-governance could result in statehood is 
generally speaking unfounded.  But the point here is that no suggestion is made that a right to self-governance 
(or autonomy) could be equated with a right to consultation.    
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used.686  The ordinary understanding of CCPR and CESCR Article 1 and DRIP Articles 3-5 
are hence clear.  There is no evidence supporting a different interpretation.  
      
As indicated, interpreting indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination as a right to 
consultation further contradicts the legal doctrine.  Above, the Chapter outlined how a number 
of legal scholars have opined that indigenous peoples are entitled to a right to self-
determination.  Several of these scholars have added that the right is to be effectuated through 
autonomy/self-government.687  No one has suggested that the content and scope of the right to 
self-determination amount to a mere right to consultation.688  The Chapter has further 
described how some legal scholars have not yet found enough evidence in international legal 
sources to conclude that a right to self-determination of indigenous peoples has been firmly 
established.  They have settled for the observation that such a right is/might be emerging.  It is 
worth noting, however, that also these scholars seem to note that once the right has 
crystallized, it must amount to a right to self-determination in the true meaning of the term, 
and not to a mere right to consultation.689     
                                                 
686  The right enshrined in DRIP Article 3 being a genuine right to self-determination also follows from the 
inclusion of the Friendly Declarations safeguard clause in DRIP Article 46.1.  Article 46.1 makes no explicit 
connection to the right to self-determination.  Still, as Chapter 6 narrated, states did understand DRIP Article 
46.1 as referring back to Article 3.  Had DRIP Article 3 been understood to proclaim a mere right to 
consultation, states presumably had seen no need to include a provision calling for respect for the territorial 
integrity of states in the Declaration. 
687  Scheinin, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pp. 4 
and 11, and How to Resolve Conflicts Between Individual and Collective Rights?, pp. 236-237, Xanthaki, 
Indigenous Rights in International Law over the Last 10 Years, Weller, Towards a General Comment on Self-
Determination and Autonomy, pp. 12 and 16, and Settling Self-Determination Conflicts, Wiessner, Indigenous 
Sovereignty, pp. 1156-1157, Barelli, The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System, p. 961, al Attar, 
Aylwin and Coombe, Indigenous Cultural Heritage Rights in International Human Rights Law, p. 323, 
Fromherz, Indigenous Peoples’ Courts, pp. 1370-1371, and Loukacheva, On Autonomy and Law.  Recall also 
Kymlicka’s submission that indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination fundamentally reshapes the notions 
of state sovereignty in international law, since self-governing arrangements of indigenous peoples do include 
genuine transfer of power.  See Multicultural Odysseys, pp. 3-5, 33 and 206-211, and American Multiculturalism 
and the “Nations Within”, pp. 225-227.  Recall further how Anaya has underscored that self-governance is the 
key feature of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination, to be implemented through their own political 
institutions.  See Indigenous Peoples in International Law I, p. 78, Indigenous Peoples in International Law II, p. 
150 and The Capacity of International Law to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Rights Claims, pp. 78 and 325-326.  
688  That said, Thornberry’s interpretation of the right to consent enshrined in CERD General Comment No. 23 
(See Section 4.7) could be viewed as a dissenting opinion.  According to Thornberry, indigenous peoples’ right 
to consent enshrined in the CERD amounts precisely to a veto-right in entirely internal affairs, and to a 
participatory right in matters pertaining to all citizens of the state.  But Thornberry’s interpretation pertains 
specifically to the right to consent as formulated in one particular legal source, not to the right to self-
determination as set forth by international law in general.  And more importantly, the observation was made 
prior to the adoption of the DRIP.  Perhaps Thornberry would concur with this conclusion above, if today 
commenting not on the right to consent in General Recommendation No. 23, but on the right to self-
determination in general. 
689  Crawford, The Right to Self-Determination in International Law, pp. 39-40 and 64, Cassese, Self-
determination of Peoples, pp. 104, 107, 330, 339, 349-351, 354-355 and 362, and Hannum, Autonomy, 
Sovereignty, and Self-Determination II, pp. 473-475 
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In conclusion, the Section had already inferred that the claim suggesting that indigenous 
peoples’ right to self-determination applies only in matters of no relevance to the majority 
population and/or the state cannot be correct.  We now see that the inverted argument cannot 
be substantiated either.  It is not possible to interpret indigenous peoples’ right to self-
determination as a mere right to consultation.  Consequently, indigenous peoples’ right to 
self-determination – also as a sui generis right – is a genuine right to self-determination also 
in instances where the indigenous people’s interests conflict with those of the state/the 
majority people.  At the same time, as the above and Section 6.3.8 have indicated, the right 
need not be absolute.  It must be reconciled with the right to self-determination of the 
population of the state as a whole.  Similarly, if the state as such and/or third parties hold 
legitimate and sufficient interests in the collective creativity of indigenous peoples, or even 
rights to such, one can not just ignore these rights and interests.   
 
This conclusion is fully in line with the general understanding of autonomy in the legal 
doctrine.  For instance, Hannum and Lillich have posited that autonomy amounts to 
“independence of action on the internal or domestic level.”690  But autonomy need not mean 
unlimited jurisdiction.  There is room for cooperative arrangements between the central 
government of the state and the autonomous people on issues of joint interest.691  Still, it is 
inherent in the concept of autonomy that the autonomous people enjoy considerable decision 
making powers, albeit within the framework of the state.692  Autonomy hence implies a 
formal division of political authority between the states decision-making institutions and those 
of the autonomous group. 
 
8.3.4.3 The material scope and content of indigenous peoples’ right to self-
determination as a sui generis right 
 
To establish an exact content and scope of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination as a 
sui generis right is not entirely easy.  This is mostly due to the self-determination discourse 
until recently having focused almost exclusively on whether the right to self-determination 
can apply to non-state forming peoples at all.  Limited attention has been given to the content 
                                                 
690  Hannum and Lillich, The Concept of Autonomy in International Law, p. 860 
691  Compare Hannum and Lillich, The Concept of Autonomy in International Law, p. 866-868. 
692  Weller, Towards a General Comment on Self-Determination and Autonomy, pp. 5-6.  Tully too notes that in 
affairs concerning both the indigenous people and the majority people, international law calls for shared 
jurisdiction between the two peoples.  See Tully, The Struggles of Indigenous Peoples for and of Freedom, p. 53. 
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of a potential right.  Notwithstanding, the legal sources the doctoral thesis has surveyed offer 
some guidance also as to the scope and content of the right.  To proceed with an analysis of 
the material content of the right to self-determination, it is probably helpful to advance in the 
manner Fromherz suggests.  This implies first surveying general principles, where after one 
gradually moves down towards more and more detailed provisions.693  For instance, in order 
to establish the content and scope of the right to self-determination enshrined in DRIP, it is 
natural to take the general proclamation of the right in Article 3 as point of departure.  
Thereafter, one proceeds via Article 4 underlining that the right is chiefly to be effectuated 
through autonomy/self-governance to material provisions such as Article 31.  To further ease 
the analysis, it is in addition again helpful to divide indigenous peoples’ collective creativity 
into cultural elements (i) still controlled by indigenous peoples, (ii) in the public domain, and 
(iii) to which third party rights pertain. 
 
Cultural elements still controlled by indigenous peoples 
Indigenous peoples must reasonably have the right to determine over collective creativity still 
controlled by them, in the sense that the cultural elements have not been disclosed to a wider 
public, also under the right to self-determination as a sui generis right.  Even if legal sources 
elaborating on the content of the right to self-determination are scarce, this follows essentially 
from the basic features of the right.  Section 8.3.2.2 inferred that indigenous peoples’ right to 
self-determination undoubtedly embraces these peoples’ collective creativity, as central 
elements of their respective cultures.  Section 8.3.4.2 concluded that also a sui generis right is 
a genuine right to self-determination, and not merely a right to be consulted.  And as Section 
8.3.3 noted in the context of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination as the general 
right, there are no significant competing interest pertaining to collective creativity still 
controlled by indigenous peoples.  These facts alone give the conclusion that indigenous 
peoples have the right to determine over collective creativity not yet shared with a wider 
public also under the right to self-determination as a sui generis right.  Still, it can be added 
that this further follows from DRIP Articles 3, 4 and 31, read in conjunction, where Article 31 
explicitly underlines that indigenous peoples have the right to “control” their collective 
creativity.  Support for this conclusion is also found in other legal sources the doctoral thesis 
has surveyed, such as CESC General Comments No. 17 and 21.    
 
                                                 
693  Fromherz, Indigenous Peoples’ Courts, pp. 1371-1372 
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Cultural elements in the public domain 
The above established that to determine the content of the right to self-determination, one 
should seek guidance in legal sources fleshing out indigenous peoples’ material rights to their 
collective creativity.  As further indicated, however, such sources are scarce.  Still, when 
affirming that the right to self-determination enshrined in CCPR Article 1 applies also to 
indigenous peoples, the HRC has particularly emphasized these peoples’ right to determine 
over their respective collective cultures.  More specifically, CESC General Comments No. 17 
and 21 affirm that indigenous peoples hold rights to their collective creativity, underlining 
that such creativity can only be accessed subject to their consent.  General Comment No. 17 
elaborates that indigenous peoples, where appropriate, have a right to collectively administer 
their cultural elements.  As mentioned repeatedly, these conclusions by the UN treaty bodies 
receive direct support from DRIP Article 31, proclaiming a right of indigenous peoples to 
control elements of their collective creativity.            
 
Still, these sources are not only relatively few.  The question is also what answers they offer 
specifically with regard to cultural elements already publicly available.  The HRC/CESC 
jurisprudence on CCPR/CESCR Article 1 is too generally formulated to give any guidance as 
to its applicability to the public domain.  Section 6.3.5 noted that DRIP Article 31, using the 
present tense formulations “control” and “maintain”, places certain question marks behind the 
provision’s applicability to creativity no longer under direct control of the indigenous people 
in question.  In the same breath, however, the Section inferred that it is plausible to interpret 
the reference to “their” creativity as enveloping also cultural elements in the public domain.  
To a work in the public domain, there exist - per definition - no competing claims, at least 
from an IP-perspective.  No one else can claim an objective particular attachment to the 
cultural element.  Therefore, if indigenous peoples have created elements, maintain cultural 
attachments to it, and perceive them as their own, the elements must at least be more “theirs” 
than anyone else’s.     
 
CESC General Comments No. 17 and 21 too, are somewhat ambiguous in their approach to 
the public domain.  As Section 4.7 described, General Comment No. 17 does explicitly 
proclaim that an indigenous people’s moral rights interest in a cultural element shall last as 
long as the element is culturally significant to the indigenous people.  Perhaps contradictory, 
however, the General Comment also submits that it is necessary to strike a balance between 
the producers of creativity, on one hand, and the users of the same, on the other.  Similarly, 
229 
the CESC also posits that creators’ rights must not impede the state’s obligation to allow 
everyone to take part in the cultural life and scientific progress of the society as a whole.  As 
further noted, however, the subsequent CESC General Comment No. 21 downplays the 
importance of striking a balance between those creating and those wishing to access culture.  
Rather, General Comment No. 21 focuses on e.g. indigenous peoples’ right to control their 
cultures.  In sum, the CESC General Comments seem to be in line with the general 
benchmarks outlined above, but offer little guidance beyond those.  Still, CESC General 
Comment No. 17 does explicitly proclaim that indigenous peoples’ moral rights interests 
pertain also to creativity in the public domain.  The contradictory proclamation that due 
consideration shall be given also to the interest of those wishing to access culture should 
probably therefore be understood as pertaining chiefly to the economic rights aspects.  Also 
with regard to the economic rights, one should note, however, that the subsequent General 
Comment No. 21 does not include the contradictory remarks of General Comment No. 17.   
All matters considered, CESC General Comments No. 17 and 21 appear to suggest that 
indigenous peoples’ moral rights apply to a fairly large bulk of their collective creativity in 
the public domain, whereas the scope of the economic rights is probably more limited. 
 
Hence, material legal sources are both few and relatively imprecise.  Moreover, the sources 
are formally non-legally binding.  It follows from the conclusions in Chapter 7 that both DRIP 
Article 31 and the CESC General Comments in principle are relevant legal sources when 
establishing what rights indigenous peoples hold to their collective creativity.  But the 
Chapter also inferred that for these sources to be relevant, they generally speaking need 
support from other legal sources and/or state (tacit) consent.  Here, explicit support from other 
legal sources is obviously lacking.  Still, the CESC General Comments and DRIP Article 31 
must be considered at least indicative as to the scope and content of indigenous peoples’ right 
to self-determination.  Moreover, further guidance can be found in the general rationale 
behind acknowledging indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination.   
 
The doctoral thesis has established how the acknowledgment of indigenous rights in general, 
and the right to self-determination in particular, is a result of a paradigm shift in the 
perception of some of the most fundamental building blocks in international law, most 
notably a shift in view of who constitute a people for legal purposes.  Recognizing indigenous 
peoples as beneficiaries of the right to self-determination is an acknowledgment of that they 
too, have the right to determine the course of their distinct societies.  As Section 8.3.3 
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indicated, to first conclude in principle that such a profound development has occurred in 
international law, only to immediately thereafter infer that the shift has little relevance in 
practice because of pre-existing laws, makes little sense.  But that would be the exact result if 
concluding that indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination does not pertain to cultural 
elements in the public domain, since almost all such elements are/will be in the public 
domain.  Section 5.4 explained that the rationale for re-evaluating the public domain in the 
context of indigenous peoples is precisely that the conventional IP-system has been designed 
to fit another culture, and hence for cultural reason are inapt to address indigenous peoples’ 
collective creativity.  Throughout, the doctoral thesis has explained that at one of the core 
elements of the contemporary indigenous peoples’ rights discourse is to correct structural 
discrimination between cultures.  More specifically, Section 6.3.8 pointed to that the scope 
and content of the right to self-determination, at least as enshrined in the DRIP694, shall be 
defined in a non-discriminatory manner.  As Section 8.3.3 concluded, against this 
background, it would appear strikingly discriminatory to assert that indigenous peoples’ right 
to self-determination, also as a sui generis right, would not apply to cultural elements in the 
public domain because of pre-established societal structures created by other peoples.  These 
arguments speak strongly for indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination – also as a sui 
generis right – in principle applying to elements of their culture in the public domain.   
 
At the same time, one cannot ignore that indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination as a 
sui generis right is subordinated the right to self-determination enjoyed by peoples defined as 
the aggregate of the population of the state.  Neither must one ignore that relevant legal 
sources coherently underline that the interest of society as a whole must be taken into 
consideration when determining the scope of the right.  Sections 6.3.8 and 8.3.3 noted that the 
public domain has been designed with the precise intention to benefit society as a whole, i.e. 
the people understood as the sum of the population of the state.  Hence, one could argue that 
the sui generis right – unlike indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination as the general 
right – should not award full control over cultural elements in the public domain.  Rather, the 
right should be reconciled with the rights and interest of society as a whole.   
 
                                                 
694  As seen, this follows explicitly from DRIP Article 46, particularly if read in conjunction with Articles 1 and 
2 and pp 22.  But it appears reasonable, in line with Sections 4.8’s and 4.9’s conclusions, that if indigenous 
peoples are indeed beneficiaries of a right to self-determination, the right to non-discrimination shall generally 
guide the implementation of the right.     
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The conclusion of the above appears to be a presumption that the right to self-determination – 
also as a sui generis right – do apply to cultural elements in the public domain.  Still, 
profound and genuine interest of the state/society as a whole can render it legitimate that a 
cultural element in the public domain remains free to use by non-members.  To determine 
when this exception to the general rule applies, one must presumably consider both the level 
of interest of society as a whole, and the impact of the use on the indigenous people.  To 
illustrate, two obvious examples can be used.  Use for teaching purposes by non-members of 
cultural elements in the public domain causing no harm to the indigenous people is 
presumably allowed.  On the other hand, again, cultural elements of particular cultural and/or 
spiritual value to the indigenous people in question shall be taken out of the public domain 
and be returned to the indigenous people.  Where exact to draw the line in between these two 
examples is more difficult to determine.  Probably, this is as close as one can define the scope 
and content of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination as a sui generis, until further 
guidance is provided by forthcoming international legal sources. 
 
Cultural elements to which third party rights pertain 
Sections 6.3.8 and 8.3.3 underlined that third party rights pertaining to elements of indigenous 
peoples’ collective creativity cannot simply be ignored.  At the same time, Section 6.3.8 
further observed that a third party right need not necessarily imply that the right to self-
determination – even as a sui generis right – does not at all apply to the element.  As with 
cultural elements in the public domain, competing legitimate rights and interests need to be 
reconciled.  Again, guidance beyond these basic benchmarks is essentially limited to DRIP 
Article 31 and CESC General Comments No. 17 and 21.  The above inferred that DRIP 
Article 31’s reference to “their” creativity can reasonably be interpreted as enveloping also 
collective creativity in the public domain, since no competing interests pertain to the 
creativity.  Obviously, such is not the case with regard to cultural elements to which third 
parties hold rights.  In addition, one must consider DRIP Article 46.2, pursuant to which 
Article 31 shall be implemented with respect for the human rights of all.  In this instance, the 
third party holds an explicitly property right to the cultural element in question.  Hence, the 
applicability of DRIP Article 31 to collective creativity to which third party rights pertain is 
limited.  As to CESC General Comments No. 17 and 21, the above described how General 
Comment No. 17 explicitly proclaims that indigenous peoples’ moral rights last as long as a 
cultural element is culturally significant to the indigenous people in question.  Section 5.4.4 
explained that moral rights in a work tend to survive even when the economic rights vest in 
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another legal subject.  General Comment No. 17’s reference to moral rights therefore seem to 
indicate that indigenous peoples’ moral rights in their collective creativity would apply also to 
cultural elements to which third parties hold rights.695  It is possible, but not necessary, to e 
contrario interpret General Comment No. 17 as implying that indigenous peoples hold no 
economic rights to their collective creativity when conflicting third party rights pertain to 
such.  
 
The general rationale behind indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination is less relevant in 
the context of cultural elements to which third parties hold rights, compared with cultural 
elements in the public domain.  As seen, the reason why the rationale behind the right to self-
determination so convincingly argued for the right embracing also cultural elements in the 
public domain was that otherwise, pre-existing law would largely nullify the right.  This is not 
the case with regard to third party rights.  As third party rights expire, the cultural elements 
enter the public domain where after indigenous peoples’ rights to such cultural elements 
instantly apply.  Third party rights are hence not a general obstacle to the applicability of the 
right to self-determination, and the rationale behind the right consequently not in itself 
sufficient to disregard a third party right.696  There must be a particular reason why it is 
important for the indigenous people to determine over that particular cultural element. 
 
In conclusion, it would appear that indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination as a sui 
generis right has almost the inverted applicability with regard to cultural elements to which 
third parties hold rights, compared with elements in the public domain.  Based on the limited 
sources available, the reasonable conclusion seems to be a presumption that the right to self-
determination as a sui generis right does not apply to cultural elements to which third party 
rights pertain.  In fact, it is probably difficult to claim that a third party right shall be 
completely revoked invoking the right to self-determination.  Rather, pursuant to the right to 
self-determination, indigenous peoples’ can probably decide that certain uses of the element 
be prohibited, in line with the moral rights argument set forth by CESC General Comment 
No. 17.  Already mentioned has been uses that threaten the cultural identity of the people 
and/or prevent it from continuously pursuing its cultural practices.  In addition, one can 
                                                 
695  CESC General Comment No. 17’s submission that a balance be struck between creating and those wishing to 
access culture clearly does not apply in this context.  This language refers to a situation where one party lacks 
any property rights interest in the work in question, but still wishes to in some way benefit from the same. Here, 
the conflict is between two competing rights. 
696  The exception is third party IP-rights with the potential of lasting in perpetuity, such as trademarks.   
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imagine that indigenous peoples should be entitled to prevent uses that, without falling under 
the mentioned categories, are still derogatory, offensive and/or culturally insensitive.  As with 
collective creativity in the public domain, it is probably difficult to draw any more concrete 




If summarizing the conclusions drawn from the limited sources available, one notes that the 
content and scope of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination seem not to be too 
dramatic, dependent on whether the right is (i) the general right, or (ii) a sui generis right.  In 
both instances, indigenous peoples are entitled to fully determine over cultural elements still 
under their control.  With regard to elements in the public domain, indigenous peoples again 
enjoy a full right to self-determination if the right to self-determination is the general right.  If 
the right is rather a sui generis right, the presumption is that the right applies, but compelling 
interests of society as a whole do limit the scope and content to some extent.  Finally, as to 
cultural elements to which third party rights pertain, the right to self-determination 
presumably has limited applicability, both as the general and as a sui generis right.  In both 
instances, the state might have certain obligations to expropriate cultural elements of 
particular importance to the indigenous people.  The obligation is presumably somewhat more 
extensive if the right to self-determination is the general right.  As Section 8.3.3 outlined, 
states have an obligation to amend present IP-law to accommodate for the conclusions above.  
As further mentioned, such amendments might indeed already be under way in the processes 
surveyed in Chapter 11. 
 
As a final observation in this context, it is pertinent to compare the contemporary 
understanding of the content and scope of the right to self-determination with the opinion of 
the Commission of Jurists in the Åland Islands Case, in a similar vein as Section 4.8.4 
compared the modern understanding of the right to non-discrimination with the Minority 
Schools in Albania Case.  Recall how Section 2.4 narrated that in the Åland Island Case, the 
Commission of Jurists placed emphasis on the relationship between the principle of self-
determination and rights of ethnic groups, noting the parallel objective to assure the group’s 
possibility to maintain and develop its cultural characteristics.  Recall also how the 
Commission further noted that when secession is not an option, the group’s right to preserve 
its cultural characteristics should be implemented through an extensive grant of liberty within 
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the state.  The Åland Island Case of course differ from the above in that the Commission of 
Jurists did not find that the Ålanders where entitled to the right to self-determination.  But 
setting the formal labelling of the right aside, the content and scope of the Ålanders right to 
autonomy the identified by the Commission matches well the content and scope of indigenous 
peoples’ right to self-determination, exercised through autonomy, outlined above. 
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9. CONCLUSIONS - PROPERTY RIGHTS  
 
9.1 Indigenous peoples’ property rights to cultural elements 
continuously held by them 
 
9.1.1 The existence of the right as such 
 
Chapter 5 explained how the right to property is essentially a right to non-discrimination.  
International law does not recognize a general right to be provided with property.  But 
domestic law must provide equal opportunity to acquire property rights.  In addition, the state 
must not arbitrarily deprive one of property duly acquired.  Chapter 5 recognized how 
indigenous peoples have traditionally been dispossessed of their lands and creativity in similar 
manners.  Both conventional real estate law and IPRs were designed to leave collective land 
utilization/collective creativeness common to indigenous cultures essentially ineligible for 
protection.  In directly comparable fashions, indigenous peoples’ lands were regarded as terra 
nullius, and indigenous peoples’ collective creativity as being in the public domain.  The 
Chapter noted that the public domain was probably less deliberately designed to render 
indigenous peoples’ material assets available to others.  Yet the effects of the terra nullius 
doctrine and the notion of the public domain on indigenous cultures have been strikingly 
similar.  Designing domestic property rights law in the outlined manner was perfectly in line 
with the conventional understanding of the right to non-discrimination, Chapter 5 observed.  
The Chapter further recalled, however, the evolved understanding of the right to non-
discrimination as outlined in Sections 4.8 and 4.9, implying that the right has come to extend 
an indirect protection also to indigenous peoples as such.  Given that the right to property is 
deeply rooted in the right to non-discrimination, Chapter 5 noted that the right to non-
discrimination acquiring a collective facet protecting cultural differences among groups 
should have consequences also for property rights.   
 
Hence, Chapter 5 demonstrated, viewed through the prism of the contemporary understanding 
of the right to non-discrimination, international property rights law has evolved to hold that 
inasmuch domestic law recognizes property rights to land in general, such law must be 
neutral, not only in law but in fact.  The law must not disadvantage land use common to the 
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indigenous people when it comes to the opportunity to establish property rights to land.  For 
instance, it is discriminatory to design a domestic legal system so to award property rights to 
land based on stationary use common to the non-indigenous population, but not to the more 
fluctuating land use common to the indigenous people.  Based on this general recognition, 
international law has recently established that indigenous peoples hold property rights to 
lands, territories and natural resources traditionally and continuously used and/or occupied.   
 
Having drawn these conclusions, Chapter 5 proceeded to conduct an analogy between 
property rights to land, on one hand, and to creativity, on the other.  The aim was to establish 
whether any differences exist between the two categories of subject matter/rights that justify 
different treatment in terms of property rights.  In other words, it was surveyed whether, when 
the terra nullius doctrine has been rejected in the context of indigenous peoples’ land rights, 
there is any relevant reason why the notion of the public domain must not be considered 
equally revoked in the context of indigenous peoples’ collective creativity.  Embarking on the 
analogous analysis, Chapter 5 immediately noted that factually, it is difficult to find two 
subject matters less alike than real estate and creativity.  However, the Chapter concluded that 
such factual differences lack legal relevance.  Chapter 5 again recalled that the right to 
property essentially is a right to non-discrimination.  Therefore, it is up to domestic law to 
determine what subject matter shall be eligible for property rights protection.  If domestic law 
has decided that both land and creativity can be subject to property rights, land and creativity 
are equally protected as property rights, notwithstanding from a factual point of view being 
very different.  There is no second-guessing the domestic law-makers decision, as long as the 
law conforms with the right to non-discrimination, including its collective facet.     
 
Chapter 5 proceeded to conclude that the terra nullius doctrine and the notion of the public 
domain have had similar effects on indigenous cultures for directly comparable reasons.  It 
was noted that both indigenous peoples’ creativeness and land utilization tend to be collective 
in nature.  The Chapter observed how this characteristic of indigenous cultures have resulted 
in rights to land traditionally being denied indigenous peoples because of a notion that 
individual utilizers of the land could not be sufficiently identified, and rights to creativeness 
being denied because of the creator being anonymous.  In the same vein, indigenous peoples’ 
creativity has often been deemed ineligible for IP-protection because of not being sufficiently 
new/original.  In other words, the creativity does not distinguish itself enough from the bulk 
of cultural elements already created by the people.  Similarly, indigenous peoples’ land use 
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was traditionally deemed not to result in rights thereto because of not sufficiently 
distinguishing the particular land area from what the land looked like prior to utilization.  The 
Chapter concluded that the criteria that have conventionally rendered indigenous peoples’ 
collective creativity ineligible for IPR protection – i.e. that a work must not be anonymous 
and sufficiently new/original – are readily translated into real estate law.   
 
Finally, Chapter 5 noted that a few recently adopted international legal sources submit that 
indigenous peoples hold property rights to their collective creativity, most notably CESC 
General Comments No. 17 and 21 and DRIP Article 31.  It is underlined that following the 
conclusions in Chapter 7, these sources are relevant indicators of law proper.  Nonetheless, 
read in isolation these sources clearly do not provide sufficient evidence of a right to property 
of indigenous peoples over their collective creativity having crystallized into international 
law.  Still, the doctoral thesis infers that indigenous peoples do hold property rights to their 
collective creativity under established international law.  The thesis bases this conclusion on 
the right to non-discrimination.  It has clearly been demonstrated that indigenous peoples hold 
property rights to their traditional lands.  The above has shown that there are no relevant 
reason why indigenous peoples’ collective creativity should enjoy less property rights 
protection than lands.  On the contrary, the traditional justifications for denying the two 
categories of subject matter protection appear to have been more or less the same.  As the 
conventional legal approach towards indigenous peoples’ lands has been held discriminatory, 
and hence revoked, the same approach must apply to indigenous peoples’ creativity.  Given 
that the underlying reasons for not awarding indigenous peoples property rights over their 
creativity have essentially been the same that have denied them property rights to land, the 
conclusion can only be that indigenous peoples hold property rights also to their collective 
creativity.  It is underlined that what is inferred is not that this right is about to emerge.  It is 
concluded that indigenous peoples’ property rights to their collective creativity has already 
crystallized into law, since it follows from a correct understanding of the right to property, as 
a particular aspect of the right to non-discrimination.697       
                                                 
697  Of course, the conclusion receives certain additional support from the mentioned recently adopted 
international legal sources.  But it is underscored that this support is not needed.  The conclusion drawn follows 
directly from the right to non-discrimination. 
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9.1.2 The content and scope of the right   
           
Section 5.4 identified one particular limitation embedded in IPRs to be of critical importance 
when analyzing the scope of indigenous peoples’ property rights to their collective creativity.  
Section 5.4 posed the question; since indigenous peoples’ property rights to their collective 
creativity is based on an analogy with conventional IPRs, does it follow that property rights to 
collective creativity are subject to the same time-limitations as IPRs?  The Section further 
noted, however, that it could be argued that not only the applicability of the right to property 
as such, but also the scope of protection, should be accustomed to the particular cultural 
context in which the right is applied.  Section 5.4 observed that property rights to collective 
creativity are more about cultural identity than monetary gain.  Moreover, the Section recalled 
that conventional IPRs envelope certain aspects - moral rights - aiming precisely at protecting 
the identity of a creator of a work, and that these rights can last in perpetuity.   
 
As Section 5.4 further described, moral rights have received limited attention in conventional 
IPRs.  The scope and content of IPRs have been designed almost exclusively based on law 
and economics calculations.  In other words, it is the economic rights aspects that have shaped 
the more precise forms of conventional IPRs.    Notwithstanding, as seen, moral rights are an 
accepted feature of conventional IPRs.  What is more, the doctoral thesis is now considering 
property rights applying in a context where the main motivator is not financial benefit or 
development, but precisely protection of cultural identity.  And again, it should be recalled 
that the right to property is essentially a right to non-discrimination, and that non-
discrimination implies not only formal equality, but equality in practice.  Hence, since IPRs 
embed two recognized aspects, economic and moral rights, and since the right to non-
discrimination calls on the right to property to be applied in a culturally sensitive manner, the 
reasonable conclusion is that an analogy with IPRs in an indigenous peoples’ context shall 
place particular emphasis on a comparison with the moral rights aspects of IPRs.  Hence, 
Paterson and Karjala note that the moral rights approach could be useful for the protection of 
indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage, but at the same time underline that this takes some 
accustomization of conventional moral rights to the particular context of collective 
creativity.698  This suggests that indigenous peoples’ property rights to their collective 
                                                 
698  See Paterson and Karjala, Looking beyond intellectual property, pp. 644-645.  In a similar vein, Taubman 
and Leistner, having noted that the main motivator behind indigenous peoples wishing to protect their TK is not 
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creativity should last as long as a cultural element remains culturally relevant to the 
indigenous people in question.  Albeit an isolated source, it is worth recalling that CESC 
General Comment No. 17 asserts that indigenous peoples’ rights to their creativity under 
CESCR Article 15.1 (c) envelopes a moral right which shall not disappear even when the 
work has, under conventional IP-law, entered the public domain.   
 
A conclusion holding that protection should last as long as creativity is relevant to the culture 
from which it originates gains further support from the fact that, as Section 5.4 also noted, 
applying conventional IPR-terms of protection to indigenous peoples’ collective creativity 
would render the property right essentially meaningless to the beneficiaries of the right.  As 
Section 5.4 explained, the major bulk of indigenous peoples’ collective creativity is already in 
public domain.  And as the Section furher noted, with regard to cultural elements yet to be 
created, indigenous peoples would in most instances not seek property rights protection 
knowing that the cultural element would end up in the public domain following a relatively 
short period of protection.  Hence, holding that regular IPR-terms of protection apply also to 
indigenous peoples’ property rights over collective creativity is basically the same thing as 
nullifying a right the doctoral thesis has just concluded exist.  Such an understanding of the 
scope of the right appears both unreasonable and contradictory to the demand that the right to 
property/non-discrimination be applied in a manner catering for cultural differences.   
 
Consequently, the legal doctrine has strongly argued for indigenous peoples’ property rights 
to their collective creativity not being time-limited.  For instance, Brown observes that if 
native knowledge is collective rather than an invention of a single person, it follows that time-
limitations keyed to the human life-span should be replaced by some form of perpetual 
protection.699  Lucas-Schloetter too, asserts that if protection of TCEs is to be effective, it 
must be without time-limit.  She notes that this is not simply a technical issue, as it is when 
determining term of protection of conventional IPRs.  Rather, she posits, it follows from the 
different raison d’être behind copyright and TCEs.  As seen, the main motivation behind 
copyrights is to permit exploitation of the work under best possible conditions.  TCEs, on the 
other hand, Lucas-Schloetter observes, are not created to reach a broad public.  They were 
                                                                                                                                                        
commercial gain, argue that acknowledging a form of moral rights over TK is perfectly in line with the “emic” 
perspective behind IPRs.  They submit that it is reasonable to highlight the moral rights aspects since protection 
is first and foremost aiming at protecting the cultural identity of the community.  See Analysis of Different Areas 
of Indigenous Resources, pp. 84-85. 
699  Can Culture Be Copyrighted?, pp. 202-203 
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originally intended for the sole use of the community.700  In the same vein, Graham and 
McJohn point to that non-indigenous authors, composers, inventors etc. to a significant degree 
rely on the public domain.  Their creativity is often a result of inspirations drawn from 
cultures other than their own.  As non-indigenous artists, scientists etc. tend to rely on the 
public domain for their creativity, it is only fair that they in turn have to accept that others 
build on their work.  But this aspect of the public domain does not apply in the context of 
indigenous peoples’ collective creativity.  As outlined, indigenous peoples’ collective 
creativity predominantly builds on previous creations within the indigenous people’s own 
culture.  Indeed, as Section 1.5 explained, this is precisely the reason why certain knowledge 
qualifies as “traditional knowledge” and some cultural expressions are defined as “traditional 
cultural expressions”.  True, indigenous peoples too, are sometimes to a certain degree 
influenced by other cultures.  But again, such borrowing from other cultures is – per definition 
– minimal in the context of cultural elements this doctoral thesis surveys.  If it was not, the 
element would not qualify as TK/TCEs.  The fact that indigenous peoples, for their tradition-
based creativity, only to a minimal degree have borrowed from the public domain leads 
Graham and McJohn to infer that it is reasonable that indigenous peoples’ cultures are in turn 
shielded from non-members.701  Similarly, Cohen notes that the conventional IP-system is 
essentially rooted in law and economics theories and underlines that this “is not a discipline 
well suited to the task of modelling creativity itself.”  She further concludes that, with 
reference to Chander and Sunder, the design given to the public domain by the law and 
economics theories can be viewed as discriminatory, as the public domain, thus shaped, might 
be viewed as an instrument created by the West to subordinate non-Western cultures.702  
Chander and Sunder elaborates that the current construction of the public domain 
disadvantages and subordinates indigenous peoples.703  And Carpenter notes, referring to 
Moran, protection lasting as long as the element remains in use in a customary, traditional or 
sacred context within the people that created it, is not incompatible with IP-rationales.704   
                                                 
700 Lucas-Schloetter, Folklore, p. 390       
701  Graham and McJohn, Indigenous Peoples and Intellectual Property 
702   Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture, pp. 140 and 165.  Cohen’s observations again underline 
the similarity between the terra nullius doctrine and the notion of the public domain.  Notably, her description of 
the public domain could have passed as a reference to the terra nullius doctrine, if delivered in a land rights 
context. 
703  Chander and Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, p. 1335.  To illustrate, Chander and Sunder further 
quotes Boyle:  “Curare, batik, myths, and the dance “lambada” flow out of developing countries … while 
Prozac, Levis, Grisham and the movie Lambada! flow in...”  The former examples are unprotected by IPRs, 
while the latter is protected.  See The Romance of the Public Domain, p. 1353.  The example clearly refers to the 
relationship developing-developed countries, but illustrates well also the situation of indigenous peoples. 
704  Carpenter, Intellectual Property Law and Indigenous Peoples, pp. 70-71 
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In sum, the legal doctrine too concludes that adaptation of conventional IPRs to an indigenous 
context demands protection as long as the cultural element remains culturally relevant to the 
indigenous people in question.  It makes sense that works protected by conventional IPRs 
eventually end up in the public domain, since the public domain is an inherent part of that 
system, and since creators seeking IP-protection generally in turn at least partly rely on the 
public domain for their creativity.  On the other hand, indigenous peoples – almost per 
definition – do not rely on the public domain when creating TK/TCEs.  Further, the law and 
economics calculations underpinning the public domain do not apply to collective creativity 
of indigenous peoples.  IPRs are designed to maximize creativity through sufficient (but no 
more) incentives.  These incentives are essentially calculated in monetary terms.  When the 
calculation is almost exclusively based on financial inputs, it is natural that the result is 
protection that has a limited term.  If, on the other hand, the rationale behind protection is 
preservation of cultures and cultural identities, it appears less relevant to calculate the term of 
protection on the basis of financial input.  Rather, it would appear that the term should be 
decided essentially based on the significance of the cultural element to the culture from which 
it springs.  If rights are motivated by preserving a distinct culture to future generations, a term 
of protection of merely 20 or 70 years appears almost irrelevant.  Cultural expressions of 
spiritual, sacred and/or cultural value to a people need not loose their value over time.705 
 
Based on the above, the doctoral thesis concludes that contemporary international law submits 
that indigenous peoples’ property rights over their collective creativity last as long as a 
cultural element remains culturally significant to the indigenous people in question.  As 
Chapter 11 will elaborate, this is also the direction in which the negotiations within the UN-
system considering IP-neighbouring rights are heading.  As indicated, from the fact that the 
right to property is rooted in the right to non-discrimination, it further follows that the scope 
of the right embraces not only collective creativity still controlled by the indigenous people, 
but also creativity created by them but presently regarded to be in the public domain.  This 
follows again from a direct comparison with land rights.  What is required for indigenous 
peoples to hold property rights to land is that the indigenous people has traditionally used 
and/or occupied the land area in question, and continues to do so.  Official recognition of a 
right is not necessary, but third parties must not have established subsequent rights to the area 
                                                 
705  Brown, Who Owns Native Culture?, pp. 62-63 
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in dispute.  Translated into the sphere of creativity, this implies that for a right to apply, the 
indigenous people must have created the cultural element, and still “use” it.  “Use” in this 
context must be understood as a song, ritual, knowledge etc. continuously being culturally 
relevant to the indigenous people in question, in the sense that it is still part of its cultural life.  
That being the case, official recognition of a right is not necessary.  In other words, it is 
irrelevant if the state perceives the cultural element to be in the public domain, and not held 
by the indigenous people.  But third parties must not have established right to the cultural 
element.  If so, one must take recourse to the right to restitution.                  
  
9.2 The right to restitution 
 
9.2.1 The existence of the right as such 
 
Chapter 5 recognized that a number of international legal sources submit that indigenous 
peoples have a right to restitution with regard to lands, territories and natural resources 
traditionally used and/or occupied by them, but which have subsequently been lost.  Section 
6.3.6 observed that these sources find support in DRIP Article 28.  Chapter 7 inferred that 
both treaty body jurisprudence and the DRIP are relevant sources when determining what 
constitutes international law proper.  It seems to follow that the right to restitution has 
crystallized into international law.  However, there is essentially no evidence of support in 
regional or national processes, nor in the legal doctrine, for the right to restitution having been 
firmly established in international law.  Absent any reactions of these kinds, it is difficult to 
conclude that law proper has been established.  Consequently, albeit the concerted view in 
e.g. treaty bodies and the DRIP predicts an immediate development towards restitution 
processes, the thesis refrains from drawing such a conclusion today.  This further implies that 
it is not possible to base a right of indigenous peoples to restitution of cultural elements 
traditionally created, but no longer held, by them on an analogy with land rights.   
 
If a right to restitution of collective creativity does not follow from an analogy with land 
rights, it must derive from legal sources specifically addressing cultural elements.  Chapter 5 
did note, however, that such sources are scarce.  CESC General Comment No. 17 asserts that 
moral rights continue to apply to collective creativity also when economic rights have 
expired.  Moral rights continuously applying to a cultural element is of course not a restitution 
situation proper, since it does not bring the cultural element back under the indigenous 
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peoples’ control.  Still, moral rights imply that indigenous peoples’ regain certain ties to 
cultural elements previously completely lost.  In addition, Chapter 6 noted that DRIP Article 
31 could be interpreted as extending rights also to collective creativity in the public domain, 
which, if so, would imply a right to restitution in the fuller meaning of the term.  Even if, as 
stated, CESC General Comment No. 17 and DRIP Article 31 are relevant sources of law, they 
also need support in other sources shall one be ablo to conclude that they reflect law proper.  
As seen, such support is lacking.  Consequently, indigenous peoples do not yet hold a right to 
restitution with regard to collective creativity traditionally created by them but to which 
subsequently third party rights have been established.    
 
9.2.2 The content and scope of the right to restitution – once established  
 
Chapter 1 underlined that the doctoral thesis does not engage in discussions on what the law 
should be.  Neither does the thesis – generally speaking – concern itself with emerging law.  
In the particular context of restitution, it is pertinent, however, to slightly divert from the 
general rule.  As noted above, it appears to be a question of time before a right to restitution of 
indigenous peoples with regard to lands, territories and natural resources traditionally 
occupied and/or used, but which have subsequently been lost, have been confirmed in 
international law.  The above has concluded that there are no reasons why principles 
underlying indigenous peoples’ property rights to land should not apply in the context of 
property rights to creativity.  Consequently, once a right to restitution within the land rights 
discourse has been affirmed, one can analogously assert that a right to restitution should apply 
also with regard to collective creativity.  Still, as such a right is yet to be established, the 
doctoral thesis will not probe deep into the potential content and scope of the right.  That said, 
a few general observations are pertinent.  
 
Similar to the observations made in Chapter 8, a right restitution with regard to cultural 
elements to which third party rights pertain will surely not be unrestricted, at least when it 
comes to full restitution.  Again, third party rights cannot be ignored.  Further in line with 
Chapter 8, a right to complete restitution will presumably pertain to cultural elements of 
particular spiritual or cultural significance.  But in most instances, compromises in forms of 
partial restitution are probably more likely.  And a central element in many such compromises 
will most likely be benefit-sharing arrangements.  Section 5.3.3 outlined how international 
law has increasingly acknowledged that indigenous peoples are entitled to benefit-sharing 
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with regard to industrial activities undertaken on their traditional territories.  The Section 
further concluded that such benefit-sharing arrangements could be viewed as forms of partial 
restitution.  That is so, since benefit-sharing implies that proceeds from resource extraction on 
territories traditionally used by the indigenous peoples, but which the indigenous peoples no 
longer fully control, are returned to the people.  It is further worth recalling Section 5.4.3’s 
observation that benefit-sharing arrangements can be viewed as having a match in the liability 
regimes embedded in the IPR-system.  As liability regimes constitute a compromise between 
absolute rights and the public domain, benefit-sharing constitute a middle-ground between 
absolute rights and no control over a land area.  As benefit-sharing is emerging as a right 
within the land-rights discourse, and as the IPR-system is no stranger to such arrangements, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that in instances when the future right to restitution does not 
amount to a full right, indigenous peoples will still be entitled to benefit-sharing.  In other 
words, when it is not possible and/or rationale for the right to restitution to imply that third 
party rights be terminated and the cultural element fully brought back under the control of the 
indigenous people, the third party shall at least – as long as the right remains valid - share 
proceeds from utilization of the cultural element with the indigenous people from which it 
originates.   
 
9.2.3 Further on benefit-sharing      
 
Structure-wise, it hence make sense to treat benefit-sharing as partial restitution, wherefore it 
conceptually falls under property rights.  But as further seen, indigenous peoples’ right to self-
determination to a large degree applies also to cultural elements in the public domain, and 
even to some extent to cultural elements to which third party rights pertain.  At the same time, 
it might sometimes not be feasible, or in any event not a reasonable option, to completely 
return creativity, even if such a right exists.  In many instances, elements of indigenous 
peoples’ cultural elements are already so widely spread that bringing the element completely 
back under the control of the indigenous people is simply not a practical option.  In such 
situations, one can imagine that even if a right to full return of creativity exist, the right might 
for practical reasons be replaced by benefit-sharing arrangements.  This also means that even 
in instances when a right to benefit-sharing do not necessarily follow from property rights, 
benefit-sharing arrangements might still be applied, because it follows from a practical 




10. FURTHER ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, PEOPLES, OTHER 




The Chapters above have hence concluded that indigenous peoples hold fairly extensive rights 
to their culture.  Clearly, these rights have been established despite the general concerns 
outlined in Chapter 1 that group rights should not be recognized because of (i) the difficulties 
associated with establishing what constitutes relevant groups, and (ii) the potential negative 
impacts on vulnerable individual members of the group.  Albeit it is clear that indigenous 
peoples’ rights have been established despite these concerns, it is pertinent to briefly touch 
upon why international law has not been overly concerned with these lines of argument.  That 
is the purpose of this Chapter.  Doing so, the Chapter will discuss more in detail what is the 
definitions of indigenous peoples and peoples under international law.  The Chapter will also 
explain why indigenous peoples are free to consume Japanese sushi and French wine, at the 
same time as they are entitled to shield their own cultures from Japanese and French people.     
 
10.2 The concepts ”indigenous peoples” and “peoples” under 
international law 
 
Naturally, at the same moment as acknowledging that group hold rights, one must define who 
those groups are.  As mentioned, some have denounced the notion of group rights arguing that 
collectives are not fixed entities and that it is not possible to define what groups constitute 
collectives worthy of protection.  Kukathas, for instance, argues that ethnic identity has a 
contextual character.  An ethnic group is defined based on its relationship with other groups.  
It can form and dissolve responding to changes in their surrounding environment.  He points 
to that not only ethnic and cultural minorities face inequalities, and criticizes Kymlicka for 
failing to explain how groups entitled to protection distinguish themselves from other 
collectives.706  And certainly, it is correct that, generally speaking, defining groups can be 
                                                 
706  Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, pp. 232 and 244-245.  For similar arguments, see also Phillips, 
Democracy and Difference, p. 297, and Van Dyke, Collective Entities and Moral Rights, p. 32.  Phillips submits 
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associated with great difficulties.  Similarly, the point is well made that it might sometimes be 
difficult to justify why certain groupings shall enjoy rights while others, seemingly equally 
disadvantaged, do not.   
 
The outlined general complexity does not, however, materialize itself in the specific context 
of indigenous peoples.  The developments within political philosophy outlined in Chapter 3 
have been important to the indigenous rights discourse, as they sparked and ignited similar 
developments within international law.  Notwithstanding, as the subsequent Chapters have 
highlighted throughout, international law has not primarily treated indigenous peoples’ rights 
as group rights in general.  Indigenous peoples’ rights have chiefly evolved not because of a 
comparison with minorities and other groups, but because of a comparison with peoples’ 
rights in general.  Consequently, it is conceptually incorrect to argue against the existence of 
indigenous peoples’ rights by invoking difficulties associated with identifying groups in 
general.707  Further supporting this conclusion is that, as Section 4.3 indicated, “indigenous 
peoples” is a fairly well understood concept in international law.    
 
International law includes no formally adopted definition of “indigenous peoples”.  Still, 
several working-definitions have been elaborated in various contexts, collaborating to 
providing a relatively precise understanding of what groups constitute indigenous peoples, for 
international legal purposes.  The definitions differ somewhat in the details, but are coherent 
in their core elements.  Probably, the working-definition most often relied on is the so called 
Cobo-definition, introduced by UN Special Rapporteur Martinez Cobo in his report outlined 
in Section 4.3.  The Cobo-definition of indigenous peoples is reproduced here in its entirety.  
 
”Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with 
pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct 
from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at 
present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to 
future generations existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social 
institutions and legal systems. 
 
The historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an extended period reaching into the 
present, of one or more of the following factors: 
 
(a) Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them; 
                                                                                                                                                        
that arguments in favour of recognizing rights for ethnic minorities could also be made with regard to religious, 
sexual and class groups. 
707  See also Ivison, Patton and Sanders, Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, pp. 20-21, who 
make a similar argument.   
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(b) Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands; 
(c) Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion, living under a tribal 
system, membership of an indigenous community, dress, means of livelihood, life-style, etc); 
(d) Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, as the habitual means 
of communication at home or in the family, or as the main, preferred, habitual, general or normal 
language); 
(e) Residence in certain parts of the country, or in certain regions of the world; 
Other relevant factors.” 708 
 
Clearly, the Cobo-definition embeds certain key elements.  In short, indigenous peoples are 
groups that inhabited a fairly definable territory prior to invasion and/or colonization.  They 
continue to have a firm attachment to that territory, at the same time as being marginalized in 
the state(s) they today reside in.  Indigenous peoples have common distinct cultural 
characteristics, including language, traditional livelihoods and spiritual believes, that 
distinguish them from the majority population.  Finally, an indigenous people, as a collective, 
self-identify as a people.  Other working definitions of indigenous peoples include those used 
by the World Bank709 and the AfCommHPR.710  As indicated, these definitions essentially 
repeat the central elements of the Cobo-definition.  For instance, the African Commission’s 
definition submits that the concept of indigenous peoples embodies the elements (i) self-
identification, (ii) a special attachment to a traditional territory, and (iii) a state of subjugation, 
marginalization and dispossession.  In conclusion, international law has a fairly clear 
understanding of what groups constitute indigenous peoples.  As mentioned, this is a result of 
indigenous peoples’ rights deriving more from peoples’ rights than group rights.  Indigenous 
peoples’ legal proximity to peoples in general rather than to minorities711 and other groups, is 
further highlighted when comparing the working definitions of indigenous peoples with the 
corresponding definitions of peoples.        
                                                 
708 Paras. 379 – 382 of the Cobo-report 
709 The World Bank Operational Manual, Operational Policy (OP) 4.10, Indigenous Peoples 
710  Assembly/AU/Dec.56 (IV), p. 93.  The ILO 169 defines what groups constitute indigenous and tribal peoples 
for the purposes of the Convention.  Since, as Section 4.6 explained, the ILO 169 does not aspire to identify 
indigenous peoples proper, this definition is not directly relevant in this context, however. 
711  International law does not define minorities.  In one way, this is natural.  As minorities do not enjoy rights as 
such, there is no direct need for a definition.  Still, individual members of minority groups derive their rights 
from the group.  For that purpose, a definition might be helpful, since it indirectly identifies what individuals can 
claim minority rights.  Hence, certain attempts have been made to define minorities.  The UN Sub-Commission 
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities attempted to define minorities as follows:  “A 
group of citizens of a State, constituting a numerical minority and in non-dominant position in that State, 
endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the majority of the 
population, having a sense of solidarity with one another…”  See UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/31 & Corr. 1 
(1985).  The definition was, however, never adopted.  Notably, the attempted definition of minorities shares 
several of the elements with the working-definitions of indigenous peoples.  But the definition differ in that the 
tresh-hold criteria in the definition of indigenous peoples – the connection to a specific and fairly definable 
territory – is absent in the definition of minorities.  In addition, the minority definition do not emphasize 
preservation of societal institutions to the extent definitions of indigenous peoples do.     
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There are natural reasons for international law traditionally not formally defining “peoples”.  
When “peoples”, for legal purposes, where understood as the population of a territory, there 
were no need for further definitions.  As international law commenced considering peoples in 
terms of ethnicity/culture, certain working-definitions emerged.  Of these, the “Kirby-
definition” is probably most commonly used.712  The Kirby-definition is strikingly similar to 
the working-definitions of indigenous peoples.  It too, focuses on common cultural 
characteristics and adds a connection to a certain specific territory.  The major difference 
between the Kirby-definition and the working-definitions of indigenous peoples is that the 
latter, rather naturally, includes no reference to subjugation by another population.  
Notwithstanding, the similarity between the definitions of peoples – when not understood as 
the sum of the inhabitants of the state – and indigenous peoples underlines both indigenous 
peoples’ legal status under international law and their distinction from groups in general.       
 
10.3 Do indigenous peoples’ rights pose a threat to the well-being of 
individual members of the group? 
 
Chapter 1 underscored that the doctoral thesis only addresses rights of indigenous peoples per 
se.  The focus is on the legal relationship between the indigenous people and the outside 
world.  The internal relationship within an indigenous people is as such of no interest to the 
thesis.713  Still, the thesis needs to addresses the general claim – outlined in Chapter 1 and 
touched upon by Chapter 3 – that collective rights in general can pose a threat to the well-
being of individual members of the group.  If substantiated, the assertion could greatly impact 
on the scope and content of the rights analyzed in previous Chapters.   
 
As mentioned, some fear that accommodating for group rights often caters for systematic 
maltreatment of vulnerable sub-segments of the group, such as women and the girl-child.  To 
recognize collective cultural rights, it is argued, is to accept the majority within the minority’s 
                                                 
712  For instance, UNESCO endorses the Kirby-definition.  See UNESCO International Meeting of Experts on 
Further Study of the Concept of the Rights of Peoples, UNESCO HQ, Paris, November 27-30, 1989.  Other 
working definitions of peoples include the same basic elements as the Kirby-definition.  See e.g. Christescu’s 
definition in a more recent UN study; UN ESCOR, 137 UN doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/404 (vo. 1). 
713  That is not to say that all cultural element to which the indigenous people hold rights vis-à-vis non-members 
ultimately vest with the people as a whole.  Under internal norms and practices, often customary, cultural 
elements might – in the internal relationship between the indigenous people and its members - vest with a 
segment of the indigenous society, or with an individual member of the group.  See Stoll and von Hahn, 
Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Knowledge and Indigenous Resources in International Law II, p. 18.  But these 
internal relationships are outside the scope of the thesis. 
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right to dominate vulnerable elements of the group.  In other words, a right to cultural privacy 
could potentially be used to shield the culture in question from needed scrutiny.  As further 
touched upon, some add to this line of argument that acceptance of group rights tends to 
freeze cultures in a stage where cultural practices offensive, or even barbaric, to most 
outsiders are nonetheless accepted by the group.  It denies the minority within the minority 
the possibility to reshape the rules and culture of the group.714  The concerns have led some to 
infer either that there can be no such thing as group rights, or, alternatively, that group rights 
must always yield in conflict with human rights of the individual.  For instance, Section 3.6.3 
described how Kymlicka distinguishes between group rights (i) directed against members of 
the group, and (ii) protecting the group from the larger society.  He submits that only the latter 
set of rights shall be accepted. In case of conflict, Kymlicka posits, human rights of the 
individual always take precedent over collective rights.  One can, however, question to what 
extent holding that individual rights always trump collective rights conforms with liberalism.   
Chapters 2 and 3 outlined how a collective – the state – is the keystone in liberal theory.  The 
state too, can with authority impose decisions on its members, i.e. its citizens.  Also within a 
state, actions undertaken by the majority (or other authority) can cause great harm to 
marginalized segments of the state.  In other words, the same concerns raised with regard to 
rights of groups could be raised against the powers exercised by a state.  Liberalism fails to 
explain why action taken by state authorities is more acceptable than authority exercised 
within an indigenous group.  Why should indigenous peoples, unlike state-forming peoples, 
not have the right to determine the course of their societies just because all members of the 
group might not look favourably upon a particular action?  To take such a position seems to 
contradict the very core of indigenous peoples’ rights.  As the doctoral thesis has underlined 
throughout, the indigenous rights discourse is essentially about allowing indigenous peoples 
the possibility to form and control their own societies.  Until multiculturalism – and other 
liberal theories - has responded to the posed question, their concern over vulnerable segments 
of the society is less convincing.715 
                                                 
714  Weinstock, Liberalism, multiculturalism, and internal minorities, pp. 246-247, Shachar, Feminism and 
multiculturalism, pp.  115-147 and Multicultural Jurisdictions, pp. 2-3, 19 and 28-29, Spinner-Halev, 
Multiculturalism and its Critics, p. 549, Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights, p. 236, Okin, Is 
Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, p. 26, and Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards, p. 20 
715  In this context, see Scheinin, How to Resolve Conflicts Between Individual and Collective Rights?, pp. 222 
and 238.  Scheinin points to that Kymlicka, and liberal political theory in general, is less convincing when 
arguing for the constant precedent of individual rights over collective rights, at the same time as failing to ask the 
question why minority groups shall be prevented from restricting individual behaviour while at the same time 
multiculturalism takes for granted that the state has the same power, in some countries to the extent that it can 
execute its own citizens.  Scheinin asserts that one should uphold the same conditions for restrictions of rights, 
irrespective if administered by a state or a community.  In the same vein, Young asserts that the collective’s and 
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Here, multiculturalists might argue that individual human rights have been elaborated exactly 
to place checks and balances on states when exercising their authority.  States are bound to 
respect all individual human rights.  Is it not reasonable to expect indigenous peoples to do the 
same, in exercising their authority?716  But this argument misses the point that indigenous 
peoples’ rights is partly a reaction against the conventional state-individual dichotomy failing 
to adequately address the needs and concerns of groups, and, as an indirect result, of its 
members.  Indigenous rights have to a certain degree emerged because individual rights could 
not sufficiently protect either the indigenous group or its members.  That is why the former 
political and legal structures have been fundamentally reconsidered.  Under such 
circumstances, it makes no sense to place an entire pre-existing set of rights on indigenous 
peoples that was developed at a time when international law was blind to indigenous societal 
structures.  Rather, a more flexible approach appears motivated.  This is not to say that all 
sorts of cultural practices are accepted.  Clearly, certain individual human rights can never be 
encroached upon for the benefit of protecting group rights.717  But setting these fundamental 
rights aside, which right prevails in instances of conflict between collective and individual 
rights should be determined on a case to case basis, not through a fixed formula saying that 
however insignificant individual right always take precedent over collective rights 
fundamental to the survival of the group.718   
 
International law concurs that individual rights do not always take precedent over conflicting 
collective rights.  Rather, the interests and rights of the collective need to be balanced against 
those of the individual.  For instance, the HRC has on several occasions held actions normally 
                                                                                                                                                        
the individual’s interests need to be balanced against each other regardless of whether the collective is a state or 
an indigenous people.  See Two concepts of self-determination, pp. 187-189 and 192-193.         
716  For instance, Shachar indirectly acknowledges that multiculturalism is vulnerable to arguments that there are 
no major principal differences between a state and an indigenous authority imposing their will on its subjects.  
Still, she prefers the state-individual dichotomy over group rights, precisely because states are obliged to respect 
human rights.  See Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions, pp. 2-3, 19 and 28-29.  
717  Scheinin lists as examples of such rights the right to life, the prohibition against torture and inhuman, 
degrading or cruel treatment, the prohibition of slavery, the prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of liberty 
and the prohibition of grave forms of discrimination.  See How to Resolve Conflicts Between Individual and 
Collective Rights?, pp. 233-234. 
718  This approach further allows e.g. indigenous peoples to take responsibility over their own cultures.  As 
Makkonen points out, probably all cultures have had and have elements of which they are less proud.  But no 
people is slave to its culture.  They are likely to grind out dysfunctional cultural practices, if offered the 
opportunity.  See Makkonen, Minorities’ Rights to Maintain and Develop Their Cultures, p. 205, and also 
Scheinin, How to Resolve Conflicts Between Individual and Collective Rights, pp. 223-224.  Kymlicka concurs 
with this observation, and adds that it would be rather hypocritical of states to deny indigenous peoples self-
governing rights allowing their cultural practices to evolve, at the same time as the state labels the same practices 
barbaric.  See Multicultural Odysseys, pp. 151-153. 
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amounting to a violation of an individual right to conform with CCPR Article 27, when the 
action was deemed necessary to protect the collective cultural identity of the group.719  In 
other instances, the HRC has found that the interest of the group could not outweigh the 
interest of the individual.  In short, the Committee has sought to weigh the rights of the 
indigenous people and those of the individual members against each other.  At the same time, 
the HRC has declared that certain individual rights are absolute, such as fundamental rights of 
women.720  In the same vein, the CERD has concluded that collective and individual rights 
must be balanced against each other, at the same time as fundamental individual human rights 
must not be violated.721  Similarly, ILO 169 Article 8.1 calls for respect for indigenous 
peoples’ cultural practices.  In the same breath, however, Article 8.2 clarifies that such respect 
should prevail only when not incompatible with fundamental individual human rights.722  
Finally, Section 6.3.8 explained how the DRIP takes the exact same approach to conflict of 
rights.  In conclusion, international law does not support the argument that individual rights 
always prevail in conflicts with the rights of the group.  It has taken a more flexible approach, 
where only fundamental individual rights as a rule take precedent over collective rights.723  
One can safely assume that individual rights to creativity do not constitute such fundamental 
individual human rights that as a rule take precedent over indigenous peoples’ right to 
collective creativity.  Consequently, generally speaking, potential conflicts between individual 
and collective rights do not impact on the conclusions of the doctoral thesis.  Another matter 
is that in instances, as mentioned, creativity springing from an indigenous culture vest with 
individuals, rather than with the people as such.  But again, these relationships are outside the 
scope of the thesis.     
 
                                                 
719 Lovelace v. Canada, Comm. No. R.6/24, views adopted 30 July 1981, para. 83, Kitok v. Sweden, and Apirana 
Mahuika v. New Zealand 
720  General Comment No. 28: Equality of rights between men and women (article 3) : . 29.03.2000. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10, para. 5.  See also Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards, p. 36, 
Kontos, Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada, pp. 211-215, Anaya, On justifying Special Ethnic Group 
Rights, pp. 224-227, and Scheinin, How to Resolve Conflicts Between Individual and Collective Rights, pp. 232-
233. 
721  CERD/C/62/CO/6, 21 March 2003, and Thornberry, The Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, pp. 23-24 
722  See also Freeman, Are there Collective Human Rights?, p. 29, and compare also Kingsbury, Reconciling 
Five Competing Conceptual Structures, p. 84.   
723 Rights not being absolute but rather balanced against each other is nothing new to the human rights system. 
Human rights doe not form a perfect patch-work.  Individual rights too, sometimes contradict.  When this occurs, 
also individual human rights must be weighed against each other, on a case to case basis.  There is nothing 
dramatic about undertaking the same exercise also with regard to collective rights.  Freeman too, notes that 
balancing indigenous peoples’ right against the human rights of individual members constitutes an act similar to 
balancing conflicting individual rights.  See Are there Collective Human Rights?, p. 29.  
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10.4 Overlapping groups and blending cultures 
 
10.4.1 Rights to culture in general 
 
Section 10.2 addressed criticism direct against group rights based on perceived difficulties 
associated with defining what groups deserve protection.  In addition, group rights have been 
challenged based on the submission that groups overlap, in two senses.  First, it has been 
pointed to that an individual can feel affinity to more than one group.  In addition, as Section 
1.2 outlined, groups blend in the meaning that they borrow elements from each other.  From a 
factual point of view, these observations are of course correct.  Again using the Saami as an 
example, a person of Saami origin residing in Sweden can certainly define herself as 
belonging to the Saami people in relation to the Swedish majority population at the same time 
as rooting for the Swedish national ice-hockey team.  On a collective level, it is equally true 
that cultures have always borrowed elements from each other.  For as long as different 
societies have been in contact, cultures have blended to reinvent their various cultural 
expressions.  Culture is, Brown argues, an abstract concept.  Its boundaries are evasive.  It is 
not always easy to exactly define where one culture ends and another begins.724 
 
At the same time, although persons and groups are inspired by each other, cultures often still 
have certain core features that continue to identify the members of the group, and the group as 
such.  Indeed, that is arguably what makes a culture a culture.725  The preservation of such a 
core cultural identity is not necessarily precluded by incorporation of elements from other 
cultures.  Rather, it is possible for a group to use and be open to influences by other cultures, 
at the same time as the group preserves and develop the essential parts of its own culture.  Just 
because indigenous individuals eat sushi and enjoy opera, the peoples do not abandon its 
defining characteristics, such as language, livelihoods, cultural community and spiritual 
systems.726  To argue differently flirts with assimilation theories of the past.  Section 3.3 
narrated how not long ago, assimilation theories directed against indigenous peoples were to 
some extent justified by the perception that indigenous cultures were destined to physically 
                                                 
724  Brown, Who Owns Native Culture, p. 219.  See also Spinner-Halev, Multiculturalism and its Critics, pp. 
551-552. 
725 In fact, as Young points to, a group of individuals define themselves as a collective predominantly as a 
response to surrounding cultures.  See Together in Difference, p. 165. 
726  Thornberry notes that albeit indigenous peoples too, borrow elements of and are influenced by other cultures, 
such elements tend to be incorporated and absorbed into the indigenous people’s culture, rather than obliterating 
the same.  See The Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, p. 17. 
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die out.  Tully notes that there is again a trend within majority societies to hold that 
indigenous peoples will disappear.  The prediction this time, however, is not that indigenous 
peoples are physically threatened.  Rather, they will evaporate due to intermarriages and 
urbanisation.727   
 
In any event, from an international legal perspective, the arguments above are not particularly 
relevant.  As seen, indigenous peoples have emerged as legal subjects under international law.  
Today, “indigenous peoples” is almost a term of art.  Hence, for legal purposes it is irrelevant 
whether an indigenous people to some extent has allowed itself to be influenced by other 
civilizations.  As long as a group continues to meet the legal definition of “indigenous 
peoples”, it enjoys indigenous peoples’ rights.  If the group allow its culture to be diluted to 
the extent that it no longer qualifies as an indigenous people, it no longer holds rights as such.       
 
10.4.2 Why indigenous peoples are free to consume Japanese sushi and 
French wine, at the same time as shielding their own cultures  
 
The Sections above have hence concluded that potential problems associated with defining 
legally relevant groups in general is no reason to reject rights of indigenous peoples 
specifically, including to their distinct collective creativity.  Still, the doctoral thesis has only 
implicitly answered why indigenous peoples accessing other peoples’ cultures does not 
preclude them from shielding their own collective creativity from non-members.  The 
Chapters above have repeatedly underlined how indigenous peoples’ claims to rights over 
their collective creativity rest heavily on the principle of non-discrimination.  Against this 
background, how can indigenous peoples consume sushi and French wines, at the same time 
as they expect Japanese and French to stay away from their cultures?  As Brown has pointed 
to, any proposal suggesting that Americans are not allowed to borrow from or study Japanese 
or French cultures would be dismissed by legal experts and ordinary citizens alike.728  Why 
should indigenous peoples be entitled to greater protection of their cultures than the French?  
The answer is simply that they do not.  Indigenous peoples have the same, and not more, 
rights compared with the French people.  But if so, should not elements of indigenous 
peoples’ collective creativity be available to the French, as elements of the French culture are 
                                                 
727  Tully, The Struggles of Indigenous Peoples for and of Freedoms, p. 40 
728  Brown, Who Owns Native Culture?, p. 37 
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available to indigenous peoples?  The answer is no.  This follows both from a proper 
understanding of the right to self-determination and the right to property.   
 
If starting with the former right, the French culture is available to Americans because of the 
French people’s own deliberate decisions.  The French, like other peoples, are free to 
determine that no elements of its culture should exit its jurisdiction.  The French people has 
consciously not opted for this alternative.  Instead, it has freely made most aspects of its 
culture open to others, e.g. though becoming party to international IP-agreements.  
Noteworthy, however, the French people has at the same time decided that certain aspects of 
its culture, e.g. champagne and certain cheeses, shall be protected.729  Chapter 8 concluded 
that indigenous peoples constitute peoples too, enjoying a right to self-determination.  Hence, 
indigenous peoples should have the opportunity to make the same deliberate choices as the 
French people has already done as to what aspects of its culture to share, and under what 
terms.       
 
As to the right to property, the relevant comparison is not with the French people, but with 
Frenchmen.  Of course, individual French artists, composer, scientists etc. hold property rights 
to their creativity.  They can expect the French state (and other states) to respect and uphold 
these rights.  Similarly, as Chapter 9 concluded, indigenous peoples too hold property rights 
to their creativity which states are bound to uphold.  The only difference is that the right-
holder is a collective.  But this difference does not change the fact that the right is held vis-à-
vis the state, wherefore the state is under an obligation to uphold the right, including when 
Frenchmen seek access to the indigenous people’s culture.     
 
In conclusion, the question “If French culture is readily available to an indigenous people, 
why should not the indigenous people’s culture be readily available to the French?” might at 
first glance appear like a convincing argument against the recognition of indigenous peoples’ 
rights to their creativity.  But a closer look reveals that the question shoots between two 
targets.  First, under the right to self-determination, indigenous peoples have the same right as 
other peoples to render their culture non-available to non-members.  The fact that most state-
forming peoples have made most aspects of their cultures readily available to others is no 
relevant argument for indigenous peoples having to do the same.  Second, under the right to 
                                                 
729  Dutfield and Suthersanen, Global Intellectual Property Law, p. 192.  Compare also Taubman and Leistner, 
Analysis of Different Areas of Indigenous Resources, pp. 107-108. 
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property the relevant comparison is with non-indigenous individual property rights owners.  
Indigenous peoples hold civil rights to their creativity that the state must recognize and 
uphold to the same extent as it upholds property rights of other legal subjects within the state.  








The doctoral thesis has hence concluded that the human rights system awards indigenous 
peoples fairly extensive rights over their collective creativity.  Section 5.4 inferred that 
conventional IPRs, on the other hand, offer negligible protection to indigenous peoples’ 
cultural heritage.  At the same time, the thesis has indicated that processes are ongoing with 
the potential of establishing what can be labelled IP-neighbouring rights over collective 
creativity.  These processes are subject to study in this Chapter.    
 
The major bulk of the Chapter (Sections 11.2-6) outlines relevant processes and discusses 
what conclusions can be drawn with regard to the material content of the law based on these.  
The final section of the Chapter returns to a theme present throughout the doctoral thesis.  The 
Chapters above have on numerous occasions explicitly studied how various areas of law 
relevant to indigenous peoples’ rights have evolved in tandem.  Based on these analyses, the 
thesis has inferred that the conclusions drawn within the different spheres of law are mutually 
supportive.  As a final analysis before the doctoral thesis proceeds to conclude, Section 11.7 
surveys whether the common trend of mutually supportive areas of law is also present in the 
interface between human rights and IP-neighbouring rights.     
 
11.2 The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)    
 
11.2.1 Background of the WIPO IGC 
 
Already in 1982, WIPO jointly with UNESCO adopted Model Provisions for National Laws 
on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore730 against Illicit Exploitation and Other 
Prejudicial Actions.  Still, WIPO’s more intense involvement in these issues is more recent.  
Its standard-setting activities within the field ensued with the establishment of the 
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional 
Knowledge and Folklore (the WIPO IGC), which convened for the first time in 2001.  The 
                                                 
730  The term “Expressions of folklore” is essentially synonymous with “TCEs”.  The term folklore is 
increasingly less used due to the perception by some that it has a derogatory undertone. 
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WIPO IGC’s mandate is to investigate to what extent existing IP-mechanisms do/can protect 
TK and TCEs, and, to the extent such is not the case, whether IP-similar protection should be 
elaborated.731  As part of this mandate, the WIPO IGC has embarked on elaborating two draft 
instruments on the protection of TCEs and TK, respectively.  By the 7th session, two 
comprehensive draft instruments, labelled “Policy Objectives and Core Principles”, had been 
crafted (The TK and TCEs Instruments).  The title might give the association that the TK and 
TCEs Instruments contain merely generally formulated principles and objectives.  But this is 
misleading.  Both instruments set forth an elaborate protection-system spelled out in detailed 
articles generally speaking crafted in the style giving the impression that they are intended to 
be legally binding.   
 
Not long after the first drafts of the TK and TCEs instruments had been produced, political 
disagreements brought the WIPO IGC into a deadlock.  But in September 2009, the WIPO 
General Assembly reached an agreement on a new and concrete mandate for the WIPO IGC.  
The WIPO GA decision outlines an ambitious roadmap of meetings which shall result in a 
proposal for one or more legally binding instruments ensuring the effective protection of 
TCEs and TK, to be presented to the WIPO GA in 2011.732  Since the renewal of its mandate, 
the WIPO IGC has convened twice (the 15th and 16th sessions).  Since the report from the 16th 
session is not yet available, the analysis of the TK and TCEs Instruments below are based on 
the outcome from the 15th session.733    
 
11.2.2 The legal status and content of the TK and TCEs Instruments  
 
Obviously, the legal status of draft instruments is limited.  Yet, the WIPO GA has given the 
draft TK and TCEs Instruments certain value when proclaiming that these shall constitute the 
basis for negotiations on legally binding instruments.  This seems to indicate that the WIPO 
member states consider that, although further deliberations are necessary, the draft 
Instruments broadly speaking reflect what IP-neighboring rights on TCEs and TK look/should 
                                                 
731  As clear from the title, the WIPO IGC also addresses genetic resources.  But since rights to such are outside 
the scope of this doctoral thesis, these parts of the WIPO IGC deliberations are omitted here. 
732  For the WIPO GA Decision, see WIPO/GRTKF/IC/15/4, Annex. 
733  This outcome is reflected in the annexes to WIPO Documents WIPO/GRTKF/IC/16/4 (TCEs) and 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/16/5 (TK). 
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look like.734  Hence, albeit remaining drafts, the TK and TCEs Instruments are indicative of in 
which direction international IP-neighboringg rights might be heading.       
 
Both the draft TK and TCE Instruments rest on the assumption that TK and TCEs, 
respectively, vest with indigenous peoples to the extent they have created such subject matter.  
The TK Instrument Policy Objective (xiii) proclaims that the rights of traditional and local 
communities735 over their TK shall be recognized.  Further, pursuant to Articles 7.1 and 7.2, 
“[t]he principle of prior informed consent should govern any access of traditional knowledge 
from its traditional holders, subject to these principles and applicable national laws…. [T]he 
holder of traditional knowledge shall be entitled to grant prior and informed consent for 
access to traditional knowledge, or to approve the grant of such consent by an appropriate 
national authority, as provided by applicable national legislation.”736  The reference to “as 
provided by applicable national legislation” could be understood as suggesting that the TK 
Instrument renders right to FPIC subject to national legislation.  That this is not the intention 
follows, however, from the Commentary to the TK Instrument, which clarifies that the “TK 
holders … should consent to … proposed use, as a condition for fresh access to TK” and that 
the reference to national law merely “leaves flexibility to adapt the application of the 
principle to national legal systems”.737  The TCE Instrument uses a different structure, but its 
position on who holds TCEs is the same as in the TK Instrument.  Pursuant to Article 2, 
protection of TCEs should benefit those to which a TCE is specific and who maintain and use 
the TCE.  The provision further mentions indigenous peoples and communities as typical such 
groups.  From this provision, it clearly follows that TCE-protection should benefit the holders 
of TCEs.  But it is not explicit that TCEs also vest with the holder, in the sense that it is the 
holder that grants access to the TCE.  Article 4 proclaims, however that “Prior authorization 
to use [TCEs], when required in these provisions, should be obtained either directly from the 
                                                 
734  This is natural, since the draft Instruments have been drafted reflecting input from member states during the 
WIPO IGC’s first seven sessions.  Taubman and Leistner note that the TK Instrument constitutes a widely-
consulted synthesis of normative elements and policy debate.  See Analysis of Different Areas of Indigenous 
Resources, p. 156. 
735  The TK and TCEs Instruments refer interchangeably to “traditional and local communities”, “indigenous 
and local communities” and “indigenous peoples”.  The doctoral thesis will not analyze this choice of language 
any further.  It is clear that the phrases “traditional and local communities” and “indigenous and local 
communities” encompass indigenous peoples.     
736  That rights of TK-holders shall be recognized is further underlined by the Commentary to the TK Instrument.  
See WIPO/IGC/GRTKF/IC/16/5, Annex, p. 9. 
737  WIPO/IGC/GRTKF/IC/16/5, Annex, p. 42 
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indigenous peoples and communities … or from a designated national authority acting at the 
request, and on behalf, of the indigenous people and community…”. 738   
 
Indigenous peoples being the holders of TK and TCEs they have created also follows 
indirectly from the term of protection prescribed by the TK and TCE Instruments.  Pursuant to 
Article 9 of the TK Instrument, “Protection of [TK] … should last as long as the [TK] fulfils 
the criteria of eligibility for protection.”  Article 4 defines TK as knowledge that is “(i) 
generated, preserved … and transmitted in a traditional and intergenerational context; or (ii) 
customarily recognized as belonging to a traditional indigenous community [or] people … 
which preserves and transmits it between generations; or (iii) integral to the cultural identity 
of … an indigenous or traditional community [or] people…”.  Similarly, the TCEs Instrument 
Article 6 links the term of protection to the definition of the subject matter of protection, as 
defined by Article 1.  Pursuant to Article 1, an expression of culture qualifies as TCEs if “… 
genuine of the cultural and social identity and cultural heritage of indigenous peoples and 
communities… [and which are] … maintained, used or developed by indigenous peoples…”.  
Notably, to at all qualify as TK/TCEs, knowledge and expressions, respectively, must have a 
distinct cultural connection to a particular indigenous people.  Moreover, to remain TK/TCEs, 
the element must maintain this connection with its originator.  If the connection is broken, the 
knowledge/expression instantly ceases to constitute TK/TCE.  This definition of TK/TCEs 
indirectly underlines that TK/TCEs vest with those that created the element.  Because if the 
element looses its connection with its creator, it no longer constitutes TK/TCEs.  Rather it 
becomes an ordinary work, protectable only through conventional IPRs.  In other words, it is 
only the group that has created knowledge/cultural expressions that can determine how long 
such subject matter shall remain TK/TCEs.  The Commentary to the TK Instrument Article 4 
underlines that although variations in the details are possible, generally speaking, TK must – 
per definition - somehow be defined through its cultural relevance to a specific group.739 
 
Notably, the outlined definition of TK/TCEs also determines the term of protection.  From 
TK/TCEs being defined essentially through their continuous connection to a particular group, 
it follows that rights to the subject matter are valid as long as this connection remains.  This 
position is also explicitly stated in the TK Instrument Article 9 and the TCEs Instrument 
                                                 
738  The Commentary to the TCEs Instrument further underlines that state authorities have a role in FPIC-
processes only if the indigenous people so requests.  See WIPO/IGC/GRTKF/IC/16/4, Annex, p. 29. 
739  WIPO/IGC/GRTKF/IC/16/5, Annex, p. 32  
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Article 6.  In this context, it is worth recalling the discussion on the scope of indigenous 
peoples’ property rights to their collective creativity in Section 9.2.2.  Section 9.2.2’s 
conclusion that protection shall last as long as a cultural element remains culturally relevant to 
the indigenous people in question receives firm support from WIPO’s deliberations on 
TK/TCEs.  As noted immediately above, the draft WIPO Instruments do not only submit that 
protection shall last as long as the element remains culturally relevant.  The Instruments 
further infer that this conclusion logically follows from how TK and TCEs must reasonably 
be defined.740  TK and TCEs as a principle belonging to the indigenous people having created 
such subject matter is hence clear from the TK and TCEs Instrument.  From these 
Instruments, it further unambiguously follows that protection shall last as long as a cultural 
element remains culturally relevant to the indigenous people in question.  But although the 
basic principal rights are clear, protection is not unlimited.  Both the TK and the TCEs 
Instrument limits the scope of protection, albeit in different ways.   
 
The TCEs Instrument takes a multi-layered approach to the scope of protection.  Pursuant to 
Article 3 (c), secret TCEs enjoy full protection, without any formalities applying.  With regard 
to non-secret TCEs, the TCE Instrument distinguishes between registered and unregistered 
such.741  If an indigenous people has formally registered a TCE of particular cultural and 
spiritual value or significance742, Article 3 (a) (i) proclaims that indigenous peoples have the 
right to consent before third parties utilize such elements.743  From this extensive protection of 
registered TCEs, Article 3 (a) (ii) excepts signs, symbols etc.  With regard to such subject 
matter, indigenous peoples only enjoy protection from use that disparages, offends or falsely 
                                                 
740  Taubman and Leistner concur with and elaborate on the position taken by the TK Instrument (and, one must 
assume, with the TCEs Instrument).  They point to that TK cannot be dealt with simply as information.  TK has, 
they observe, in addition an inherent normative and social component.  As information, TK can easily be 
transmitted beyond its traditional context.  But the norms, social practices and values that define the knowledge 
as TK are much less readily transmitted, due to their intrinsic link with the culture from which the TK springs.  
The inherent qualities that distinguish TK from knowledge in general starts to break down at the same time as 
the TK is alienated from its traditional context, they conclude.  See Analysis of Different Areas of Indigenous 
Resources, p. 60. 
741  The TCEs Instrument Article 7 (b) introduces a system under which indigenous peoples can register non-
secret TCEs with a designated authority for the purposes of protection. 
742  The reference “of particular cultural or spiritual value or significance” has a strike-through in Document 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/16/4.  This is due to a comment made by one delegation at the WIPO IGC’s 15th session.  As 
stated above, as a general rule, the doctoral thesis has accepted such alterations to the TK and TCEs Instrument, 
hence using the most recent version of the Instruments as a basis for its analyses.  In this particular context, 
however, the alteration amends the entire structure of a provision that has otherwise been consciously designed 
to have a specific and elaborate structure.  Hence, it is unlikely that the modification will be accepted in the end.  
If so, the entire provision has to be restructured.  For these reasons, the thesis makes an exception, and disregards 
this specific alteration to the TCEs Instrument.    
743  To be precise, Article 3 (a) (i) lists a number of uses to which the right to consent applies.  The list is, 
however, so elaborate that it encompasses essentially all uses imaginable. 
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suggests a connection with the indigenous people, or bring it into contempt.744  With regard to 
non-secret TCEs that (i) is not of particular cultural and spiritual value or significance, or (ii) 
is of particular cultural and spiritual value or significance, but which the indigenous people 
nonetheless opts not to register, the TCEs Instrument Article 3 (b) offers a more limited 
protection.  Such TCEs are only protected against uses that (i) fail to identify the indigenous 
people as the source of the work, (ii) distort or mutilate the work or that are in other ways 
derogatory, or (iii) falsely or misleadingly indicate a linkage between a product/service of the 
third party and the indigenous people.  In addition, Article 5 (a) (iii) provides for certain 
exceptions from protection, common to conventional IPRs.  These are e.g. uses for teaching 
purposes and non-commercial research. 
 
Unlike the TCEs Instrument, the TK Instrument does not operate with different layers of 
protection.  Rather, it offers the same level of protection to all forms of TK.  Articles 1.1 and 
1.2 of the TK Instrument limit TK protection to protection against any acquisition, 
appropriation or utilization by unfair and illicit means.745  Articles 1.3 and 1.4 proceed to 
amplify uses that are particularly unfair or illicit.  The scope of protection the TK Instrument 
awards is clearly dependent on the understanding of what constitutes “unfair and illicit 
means”.  And judging by the exemplifying list in Article 1.3, “unfair and illicit” must be 
given a fairly restrictive interpretation.  Clearly, no right to consent exists when TK has been 
acquired in good faith.  Moreover, it appears that acquiring knowledge fully aware of that the 
knowledge constitutes TK and originates from a particular indigenous people does not amount 
to unfair or illicit acquisition either.  Article 1.3 (i) seems to suggest that for an acquisition to 
be illicit, the acquirer must essentially have deceived the TK holder, or be guilty of a similar 
act.  This conclusion also follows from Article 8.2, which proclaims that no FPIC requirement 
applies to TK already in the public domain.  That said, one can note that pursuant to Article 
1.4, TK holders shall be protected against false and misleading representation that a product 
or service is produced or provided with the involvement of or endorsement by the TK holder.   
 
In addition to providing absolute rights to TK and TCEs, the TK and TCEs Instruments also 
prescribe benefit-sharing arrangements in certain instances where indigenous peoples do not 
                                                 
744  The justification the Commentary to Article 3 offers for treating signs, symbols etc. different from other 
forms of TCEs is that doing so is in conformity with the structure of conventional IPR-regimes.  See 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/16/4, Annex, pp. 25-26. 
745  In addition, the provisions protect indigenous peoples against subsequent uses if the acquirer of the TK 
derives commercial benefits from its use, and knew, or was negligent in not knowing, that the TK had originally 
been acquired by unfair means. 
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enjoy a right to consent.  In other words, with regard to some forms of use, the TK and TCEs 
Instruments take an approach similar to the liability regimes in conventional IP-systems.746  
Again, the approaches taken by the two instruments differ quite significantly, which to a large 
extent is a result of the shifting approaches taken towards the scope of full protection.  As 
noted above, the TK Instrument offers a very limited scope of complete protection.  Instead, 
Article 6.1 proclaims that in all instances when indigenous peoples do not enjoy a right to 
consent, but they nonetheless are the holders/custodians of TK, they are entitled to benefit-
sharing with regard to proceeds arising out of commercial use of their TK.747  Article 8.2 
underlines that the right to benefit-sharing applies also to TK in the public domain.  In the 
TCEs Instrument, on the other hand, which provides for a broader scope of absolute 
protection, the right to benefit-sharing is more limited.  As a complement to complete 
protection, The TCEs Instrument Article 3 (b) (iv) calls for benefit-sharing when a use is not 
prohibited, but utilization is still for gainful intent. 
 
If summarizing, it is clear that the TK and TCEs Instrument will affirm that indigenous 
peoples are the owners of their collective creativity.748  It is further evident that the 
Instruments will award protection as long as a cultural element remains culturally relevant to 
the indigenous people in question.  But the protection will also, it seems, be limited in scope.  
On the other hand, the draft Instruments foresee that when no complete protection applies, 
there shall in most instances be benefit-sharing.       
     
11.3 The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
 
Pursuant to CBD Article 1, the objectives of the Convention are “the preservation of 
biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing 
of the benefits arising out of the use of genetic resources”.  The objective, speaking only of 
GR, could give the impression that the CBD does not pertain to TK.  Still, a few provisions in 
the CBD relate the Convention to such knowledge, even if not explicitly referring to the term.  
                                                 
746  This approach is to some extent logical.  Dutfield and Suthersanen have noted that liability regimes might be 
particularly useful with regard to cultural elements that are already widely spread. See Global Intellectual 
Property Law, pp. 346-347.  Brown too, points to that reclaiming all cultural elements already in the public 
domain is almost an insurmountable task.  See Who Owns Native Culture, p. 67.   With regard to liability 
regimes, see Section 5.4.3.   
747  See also the TK Instrument’s General Guiding Principles, para. (e) and the Commentary to these, 
WIPO/IGC/GRTKF/IC/16/5, Annex, pp. 8 and 10.  The TK Instrument Article 6.2-4 provides for benefit-sharing 
also for non-commercial uses. 
748 Kongolo notes that the WIPO member states have generally supported this position in comments made so far 
on the TCEs Instrument.  See, Unsettled International Intellectual Property Issues, p. 56. 
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Article 8 (j) calls on states to, subject to national legislation, respect and preserve knowledge 
of indigenous and local communities749 embodying traditional lifestyles.  Further, pursuant to 
Article 10 (c), states should protect and encourage customary use of biological resources, in 
accordance with traditional cultural practices.  Notably, these provisions connect to two of the 
objectives of the CBD (preservation of biodiversity and the sustainable use of its components) 
rather than address rights to TK.750  Further, judging by the wording, the objectives indicate 
that the CBD aims to conserve biodiversity for the benefit of all, rather than award rights to 
particular forms of biodiversity to specific groups.  Moreover, a preambular paragraph to the 
CBD proclaims that states hold sovereign rights over their biological resources.  Parties have 
tended to interpret this provision as suggesting that rights not only to GR, but also TK, vest 
with the state, wherefore the state is, it has been held, free to regulate such subject matter also 
vis-à-vis sub-groups of the state.751  Hence, at first glance, the CBD appears to be of limited 
relevance to the doctoral thesis. 
 
However, notwithstanding the relatively restrictive wording of the Convention text, and 
despite the erroneous interpretation of the reference to state sovereignty in the CBD preamble, 
the parties to the CBD have recently come to address rights to TK.  The CBD is a framework 
convention.  Its relatively general and principled provisions are supposed to be fleshed out 
and concreticized in subsequent processes.  One such process attempts to implement the third 
objective of the Convention; fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the use of 
                                                 
749  The CBD uses the term “indigenous and local communities” throughout, as do essentially all relevant 
subsequent instruments adopted under the auspices of the Convention.  The sweeping term “indigenous and 
local communities” was used since at the time of the adoption of the CBD in 1992, there was no agreement on 
the term “indigenous peoples”.  One could have expected that when the parties to the CBD started to elaborate 
instruments addressing rights to genetic resources and TK, the term “communities” would become problematic.  
The term lacks meaning under international law, and no attempts have been made to define what groups qualify 
as “communities”.  Consequently, it would appear difficult to endow them with rights.  Still, this uncertainty has 
so far generated little concern in the CBD deliberations.  In any event the phrase, “indigenous and local 
communities” clearly envelopes indigenous peoples. 
750  True, CBD Article 10 (c) appears to assume certain rights for the custodians of biological resources to 
control and manage such resources, since this presumably follows from their customary norms.  Similarly, 
Article 8 (j) refers to knowledge “of” indigenous and local communities, thus indicating that TK vest with such 
communities.  Hence, Stoll and von Hahn argue that Article 8 (j) envisages some sort of proprietary position of 
TK holders.  See Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Knowledge and Indigenous Resources in International Law II, 
p. 35.  But the plain reference to TK of indigenous and local communities could also be interpreted as merely 
referring to TK to which indigenous peoples hold recognized rights.  Such an interpretation gains further support 
from Article 8 (j)’s reference to “subject to national legislation”.     
751  As Section 4.10 has explained, this is not a tenable position.  In this context, see also Taubman, Genetic 
Resources, p. 200, who also notes that states’ claim to sovereignty over GR under the CBD might conflict with 
indigenous rights. 
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genetic resources.752  In 2002, the parties to the CBD adopted voluntary Guidelines on Access 
to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their 
Utilization, the so-called Bonn Guidelines.  Almost immediately following the adoption of the 
Bonn Guidelines, work ensued aiming at replacing the Guidelines with a legally binding 
access and benefit sharing regime (the ABS-regime).  In 2004, a working group (the ABS 
WG) was established to produce an ABS-regime,753 by October 2010.754  The ABS WG most 
recently convened in March 2010.755  As the WIPO IGC, the negotiations on the ABS-regime 
have been loaded with difficulties.  To facilitate the process, the co-chairs of the ABS WG, 
prior to the 9th session of the ABS WG, produced a Chairs’ text (the draft ABS-protocol), 
which was further elaborated on at the session.756  Clearly, as the TK and TCEs Instruments 
produced under the auspices of the WIPO IGC, the draft ABS-protocol remains a draft.  
Moreover, unlike the WIPO Instruments the draft ABS-protocol is generally formulated, and 
contains essentially no detailed provisions.  Still, it is indicative as to where the negotiations 
on the ABS-regime are heading, and hence also of IP-neighbouring rights.757   
 
A preambular paragraph of the draft ABS-protocol proclaims that rights of indigenous and 
local communities to their TK shall be taken into account.  Article 5 bis sets forth that states 
shall take measures with the aim of ensuring that TK held by indigenous and local 
communities is accessed only subject to their “consent/approval and involvement”.  Pursuant 
to Article 4.1, indigenous and local communities are, when applicable, entitled to benefit-
sharing when their TK is being used.  Article 9.5 stipulates, however, that states shall merely 
encourage benefit-sharing when the TK used is situated in the public domain.  If briefly 
analyzing the draft ABS-protocol, it clearly involves the central elements analyzed throughout 
the doctoral thesis.  The protocol affirms that indigenous peoples hold rights to TK, and that 
these rights can be both complete rights and rights to benefit-sharing.  As to the more precise 
scope of the rights, as indicated above, the draft ABS-protocol is rather vague.  Its draft 
provisions are not at all as concrete as the WIPO draft TK and TCEs Instruments.  But if 
                                                 
752  CBD Article 1 only explicitly refers to benefit-sharing in the context of the utilization of GR.  Still, the 
parties to the Convention have read CBD Article 1 in conjunction with Article 8 (j), thus concluding that benefits 
shall be shared also with regard to use of TK associated with such resources. 
753  UNEP/CBD/COP/7, decision VII/19 
754  UNEP/CBD/COP/9/, decision IX/12 
755  As the ABS WG, again, failed to deliver the expected result at its 9th session, the ABS WG is reconvening for 
a resumed session as this doctoral thesis is delivered in early July, 2010. 
756  UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/9/3, Annex I 
757  The focus in the negotiations on the ABS-regime is clearly on GR, which is also mirrored in the Chairs’ text.  
As the doctoral thesis does not address GR, however, in this context are only outlined provisions in the Chairs’ 
text relevant to TK.   
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speculating, the ABS-protocol will reaffirm that indigenous peoples’ TK still under their 
control can only be accessed with the relevant people’s consent.  With regard to TK in the 




UNESCO promotes international cooperation within the fields of education, science, culture 
and communication for the purposes of promoting peace and security.  UNESCO was 
established in 1945, when memories of the atrocities committed in the name of theories on 
racial superiority were vivid.  One main task entrusted to UNESCO was therefore to promote 
the notion that there are not several - but one - human race.  This focus also impacted on 
UNESCO’s approach to culture.  Under its Constitution, UNESCO shall address cultural 
heritage with the aim of preserving it for the benefit of humankind.  UNESCO shall assure the 
conservation and protection of the world’s cultural and scientific heritage.  Persons of all 
cultures should have ready access to scientific and cultural progress of all peoples.  In other 
words, the UNESCO Constitution foresees no rights of particular segments of the world 
community to particular segments of culture.  The first instruments UNESCO adopted 
mirrored the approach taken by the Constitution.  They aimed at protecting culture as a 
common heritage of humankind.  The instruments did not envision segments of society 
having particular rights to “their” culture.  For instance, Article 1 of the Declaration on the 
Principles of International Cultural Cooperation758 (1966) proclaims that every people has the 
right and duty to develop its culture.  It submits that all cultures are worthy of respect, but at 
the same time underlines that all cultures form part of the common heritage of mankind.  One 
can hence draw a clear parallel between the objectives of UNESCO and the CBD.  As the 
CBD was crafted to preserve biological diversity, for the benefit of humankind, UNESCO 
was established to maintain cultural heritage for the purposes of the entire mankind.   
 
More recent UNESCO instruments have, however, not remained unaffected by the general 
trends in international law the doctoral thesis has outlined.  Already the Declaration on Race 
and Racial Prejudice759 (1978) proclaimed that states have a responsibility to ensure respect 
for human rights also of groups.  Articles 1 (2) and 6 (1) underlined groups’ right to be 
different.  Around this time, UNESCO further called on states to guarantee the recognition of 
                                                 
758 Proclaimed by the general conference of UNESCO at its 14th session, 4 November 1966 
759  Adopted by UNESCO General Conference, 24 October – 28 November 1978 
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the equality of cultures and allow minorities to preserve their cultural identity,760 and 
acknowledged that recognized ethnocide as the denial of an ethnic group to enjoy, develop 
and transmit its culture, whether collectively or individually.761  When adopting its 
Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore762 (1989) and its 
Declaration on Cultural Diversity763 (2001), UNESCO had clearly picked up on the 
international trend to recognize group rights.  The Recommendation on Traditional Culture 
and Folklore proclaims that each people has the right to own its culture.  The Declaration on 
Cultural Diversity held that the defence of cultural diversity is inseparable from respect for 
human dignity, and linked respect for the group to the effective enjoyment of individual 
human rights.  That said, the Declaration further submitted that in case of conflict between 
collective and individual rights, the rights of the individual must prevail.  Moreover, the 
Declaration followed the UNESCO tradition and added emphasis on culture as the common 
heritage of humanity. 
 
It has been suggested that the UNESCO International Convention on the Safeguarding of 
Intangible Cultural Heritage764 (2003) brings this development further.  Article 1 (b) 
proclaims as one of the purposes of the Convention to ensure respect for the intangible 
cultural heritage of communities, groups and individuals.  Still, as the title of the Convention 
suggests, the material provisions appears to chiefly aspire to safeguard cultural heritage for 
the benefit of humankind.765  The Convention does not explicitly acknowledge that particular 
groups hold rights to their specific culture.  Nonetheless, Francioni maintains that the focus of 
the Convention is on groups.766  Mezey goes further, positing that under the Convention, 
“cultural heritage is always specific to a particular group”.767  Further, the Convention for 
the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions768 (2005) promotes 
everyone’s access to culture, suggesting that such access enhances cultural diversity and 
encourages mutual cultural understanding.  But in addition, the Convention undertakes to 
                                                 
760  UNESCO Recommendation, adopted by UNESCO General Conference on 26 November 1976, Article 4.  
That said, it is unclear what the Recommendation meant with “minorities”.  Comments by the UNESCO 
Secretariat suggest that the term embraced diffuse groups such as migrant workers.  See UNESCO Doc. 
SHC/MD/31, Final Report, Annex II, p. 7. 
761  Declaration of San José, December 1981, F82/2F.32, preambular para. 2 
762  Adopted by UNESCO General Conference 17 October – 16 November 1989 
763  Adopted by UNESCO General Conference on 2 November 2001 
764  Adopted by UNESCO General Conference on 17 October 2003 
765  See in particular Article 2 (3). 
766  Francioni, Culture, Heritage and Human Rights, p. 15 
767  Mezey, The Paradox of Cultural Property, pp. 7-8.  Doing so, Mezey also notes how UNESCO has moved 
from viewing culture as something belonging to everyone or states towards a group orientation. 
768  Adopted by UNESCO General Conference 20 October 2005 
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cater for an environment where individuals and groups can create and have access to their 
own cultural expressions.  In this context, the Convention underlines that particular attention 
shall be given to the situation of indigenous peoples.769  The Convention does, however, stop 
short of protecting the cultural identity of distinct peoples.770     
 
In conclusion, UNESCO has partly remained true to the spirit of its Constitution.  It continues 
to aspire to preserve cultural heritage for the benefit of humankind and to encourage the 
sharing of cultural elements between cultures.  At the same time, the trend in the UNESCO 
instruments is clear.  As the CBD, UNESCO too has moved beyond its objectives.  The 
World Cultural Organization has increasingly underlined that particular groups, including 
indigenous peoples, do enjoy rights to their particular cultures.  In other words, an analysis of 
the relevant UNESCO instruments essentially confirms, or at least do not contradict, the 
doctoral thesis’ conclusions above.           
 
11.5 The UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) 
 
The FAO has elaborated the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Foods and 
Agriculture771 (ITPGRFA).  ITPGRFA Article 1 outlines an objective of the treaty very 
similar to the objective of the CBD.  The objectives are “… the conservation and sustainable 
use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture and the fair and equitable sharing of 
the benefits arising out of their use…”  As to relevant substantive provisions, ITPGRFA 
Article 5 (1) (d) calls on states to “…[p]romote in situ conservation of wild crop relatives and 
wild plants for food production, including in protected areas, by supporting, inter alia, the 
efforts of indigenous and local communities; …”  Further, Article 9 (2) (a) includes protection 
for “traditional knowledge relevant to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture”.  As 
the CBD, the ITPGRFA is a framework convention.  Clearly, ITPGRFA Articles 5 (1) (d) and 
9 (2) (a) address similar issues as CBD Article 8 (j), even though the provisions naturally only 
apply to knowledge pertaining to food protection.  Also in other ways, the provisions are less 
far-reaching than the corresponding CBD provisions.772  And unlike the CBD, FAO is yet to 
engage in standard-setting activities relating to the rights of indigenous peoples.  In 
                                                 
769  Articles 1 (b-d and h), 2 (2 and 7), 5 (1)  and 7 (1) (a) and (b) 
770  Lenzerini, Cultural Rights, p. 130, and Donders, A Right to Cultural Identity in UNESCO, p. 337 
771  FAO Resolution 3/2001 
772  Stoll and von Hahn, Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Knowledge and Indigenous Resources in International 
Law II, p. 42 
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conclusion, the FAO activities offer little guidance as to the existence and scope of the rights 
subject to study in the doctoral thesis. 
 
11.6  Conclusions on the scope and content of IP-neighbouring rights 




It is clear from the above that it is not possible to draw any definitive conclusions with regard 
to the existence, scope and content of potential IP-neighbouring rights pertaining to collective 
creativity.  The instruments setting forth relatively concrete provisions, i.e. the draft ABS-
protocol and in particular the WIPO IGC draft TK and TCEs Instruments, remain drafts.  
UNESCO has adopted a number of conventions etc. already in force.  But these are rather 
generally formulated and, in addition, to some extent contradictory.  The FAO and its 
activities offer little guidance on what rights indigenous peoples hold over their collective 
creativity.  Notwithstanding, the Chapter will draw certain conclusions as to the scope and 
content of IP-neighbouring rights, albeit these conclusions necessarily have to be more about 
clearly discernable trends than about crystallized law.   
 
11.6.2 Beneficiaries of protection 
 
WIPO, of course, addresses creativity from an IPR-perspective.  Consequently, the point of 
departure for essentially all WIPO’s activities is that the creator of a work holds rights to the 
subject matter.  Further, the state has a duty to enforce such right.  Against this background, it 
is only natural that the draft TK and TCEs Instruments affirm that indigenous peoples hold 
rights over their collective creativity.  One can safely assume that this principle will be 
enshrined in the finalized instruments, once agreed upon.   
 
As seen, however, the other fora surveyed have a quite different approach to culture.  
Generally speaking, at least at first glance, the CBD aims at preserving biodiversity and TK 
for the benefit of humankind773, and UNESCO takes a similar view with regard to cultural 
elements.  In addition, the reference to state sovereignty over biological diversity in the CBD 
preamble has resulted in CBD activities traditionally having had a fairly state-centred 
                                                 
773  As further seen, the FAO ITPGRFA takes a similar approach. 
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approach.  Notwithstanding, recent activities undertaken under the auspices of these fora have 
not been oblivious to the general trends in international law.  Hence, the draft ABS-protocol 
suggests that indigenous peoples are the holders of TK developed by them, submitting that 
TK can only be accessed subject to their consent.  It can be expected that the finalized ABS-
protocol, once agreed upon, affirms this principle.  Similarly, more recently adopted 
UNESCO instruments go beyond the UNESCO Constitution, and entertain the idea that 
groups, including indigenous peoples, can enjoy rights to their particular culture.  In 
conclusion, although processes are still ongoing, one can safely infer that international bodies 
addressing IP-neighbouring rights will reaffirm recent developments within international 
human rights law.  These fora too, assert/will assert that indigenous peoples are the 
owners/holders of cultural elements developed by them.774  
 
11.6.3 Term of protection 
 
Section 11.2.2 explained how the WIPO IGC’s TK and TCEs Instruments take the position 
that protection of TK and TCEs shall last as long as a cultural element remains culturally 
relevant to the indigenous people in question.  Moreover, the TK and TCEs instruments seem 
to hold that this logically follows from how TK and TCEs necessarily have to be defined.  As 
one distinguishes TK and TCEs from knowledge/cultural expressions in general by their 
connection to a particular cultural environment, it is this environment that determines how 
long knowledge/cultural expressions shall remain TK/TCEs, for legal purposes.  In line with 
this conclusion, Kongolo notes that during the WIPO IGC deliberations, a majority of the 
WIPO member states have supported a protection of TCEs in perpetuity.775  As indicated 
above, unlike the WIPO IGC deliberations, the negotiations on the CBD draft ABS-protocol 
have so far focused on who hold rights to TK.  Limited attention has been paid to chiselling 
out the more precise scope and term of potential rights.  Hence, it is difficult to speculate on 
                                                 
774  In passing, one can note that this conclusion is in line with the African “Model Legislation for the 
Recognition and Protection of the Rights of Local Communities, Farmers and Breeders, and for the Regulation 
of Access to Biological Recourses” (1998).  The Model Legislation recognizes that local communities hold 
collective rights to TK.  The jurisprudence too, agrees that indigenous peoples are owners of TK and TCEs 
developed by them.  See Cottier, Introduction, p. xxvii, Kongolo, Unsettled International Intellectual Property 
Issues, p. 61, and Biber-Klemm and Szmura Berglas, Problems and Goals, pp. 18-19.  See also Taubman and 
Leistner, Analysis of Different Areas of Indigenous Resources, pp. 111 and 143, where the authors note the trend 
in international law to recognize that the principle of prior informed consent applies to TK.  The authors further 
survey existing TK laws, noting that these clearly recognize that TK protection shall benefit the traditional 
holders of such knowledge.  
775  Kongolo, Unsettled International Intellectual Property Issues, p. 59 
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what will be the more precise outcome of these deliberations.  The UNESCO instruments too, 
are silent on the term of protection of potential rights to cultural elements. 
 
In conclusion, although not yet agreed on, the WIPO IGC TK and TCEs Instruments have 
built into their very structure that rights to TK and TCEs shall last as long as the cultural 
element remains culturally relevant to the indigenous people in question.  It appears likely that 
this structure will be present also in the finalized instruments.  Albeit the CBD and UNESCO 
offer little guidance on the matter, it appears reasonable to conclude that IP-neighbouring 
rights are leaning towards a term of protection that is not limited in the way conventional 
IPRs are.  This position is also shared by Cottier and Panizzon.776  The conclusion is 
significant.  Section 5.4 and Chapter 9 analyzed in depth whether indigenous peoples’ 
property rights over their collective creativity – as they are rooted in the right to non-
discrimination – would be subject to the same time-limitations as conventional IPRs.  
Following careful deliberations, Chapter 9 concluded that such is not the case.  This inferment 
now gains support from the analysis of IP-neighbouring rights.        
 
11.6.4 Scope of protection and benefit-sharing 
 
Sections 11.6.2 and 11.6.3 demonstrated how, although negotiations in the most relevant 
processes are still ongoing, it appears clear that indigenous peoples’ hold/will hold IP-
neighbouring rights to their collective creativity and that such rights are valid as long as 
cultural elements remain culturally relevant.  With regard to scope of protection, predictions 
are more difficult.  Section 11.2 outlined how the WIPO IGC TK and TCEs Instruments take 
very different approaches to the scope of protection.  Whereas the draft TCEs Instrument 
offers a fairly broad scope of protection, the draft TK Instrument submits that complete 
protection shall be limited to apply only against acquisition and utilization through unfair and 
illicit means.  On the other hand, the TK Instrument asserts that when an indigenous people 
has created TK, and no complete protection applies, there should be benefit-sharing.  It is 
difficult to see why TK and TCEs should be subject to such different forms of protection.  
Perhaps, one can therefore expect the different approaches taken to converge as the 
negotiations progress.  If so, it remains to be seen which approach prevails.    
 
                                                 
776  Cottier and Panizzon, A New Generation of IPR for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, pp. 227 
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For the reasons Section 11.6.3 outlined, the draft ABS-protocol offers even less guidance as to 
the scope of IP-neighbouring rights.  Essentially, the only discussions entertained in the ABS 
WG pertaining to scope have been on whether rights should be extended also to TK already in 
the public domain.  As seen, the present indications are that indigenous peoples enjoy 
complete protection only with regard to TK still held by them.  Yet it is not possible at this 
point to definitively conclude that the ABS-protocol, once agreed on, will not award rights 
also to at least certain TK in the public domain.  Discussions are in addition ongoing as to 
what extent indigenous peoples have rights to benefit-sharing arrangements when rights to 
ownership/control does not apply, although a provision in the present draft suggests that states 
need only “encourage” benefit-sharing in instances when TK is in the public domain.  Again, 
the UNESCO instruments do not go into details on these issues. 
 
In sum, it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions as to what scope of protection IP-
neighbouring rights will offer indigenous peoples.  Still, some trends appear relatively clear.  
Most likely, IP-neighbouring rights will offer complete protection to cultural elements still 
under indigenous peoples’ control.  What protection will apply to cultural elements in the 
public domain is less clear.  It seems unlikely, however, that a system of protection will 
emerge awarding indigenous peoples complete rights to all cultural elements in the public 
domain.  Perhaps one can expect a protection system submitting that cultural elements that are 
sacred or in other ways of great cultural significance shall be under indigenous peoples’ 
control.  Further, it appears clear that complete protection will be complemented by benefit-
sharing rights.  But it is difficult to predict the more precise scope and content also of such 
emerging arrangements.  To wrap up, IP-neighbouring rights have not crystallized to an extent 
where one can draw any firm conclusions as to the scope of the rights.  Notwithstanding, one 
can nonetheless infer that the general trend within IP-neighbouring rights seems to, broadly 
speaking, support the conclusions drawn in Chapter 9.  IP-neighbouring rights too, will offer 
indigenous peoples a mix of complete rights and rights to benefit-sharing arrangements.          
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11.7 Interfaces between human rights and IP-neighbouring rights 
 
The issue of whether IPRs can constitute human rights has been subject to some debate.777  
Drahos submits that IPRs do not constitute human rights.  He points to the limited term of 
protection inherent in most IPRs, and that the continued existence of some IP-mechanisms is 
subject to registration.  Human rights, on the other hand, are of course valid as long as they 
are relevant to the human being, and remain in force irrespective of registration.  Drahos 
further notes that human rights are universal, applying equally to all.  IPRs, on the other hand, 
vary from country to country, subject to national legislation.  For these reasons, Drahos infers, 
IPRs cannot be human rights.778   
 
This doctoral thesis has pointed to that the rights enshrined in UDHR Article 27.2 and 
CESCR Article 15.1 appear to be at least akin to IPRs.  Consequently, it is only natural that 
when commenting on Article 15.1, the CESC addressed the relationship between IPRs are 
human rights.  In General Comment No. 17, the Committee draws a distinction between IPRs 
and human rights.  Human rights, CESC declares, derive from the inherent dignity and worth 
of all persons.  They are fundamental, inalienable and universal entitlements inherent to and 
belonging to individuals and sometimes groups.  IPRs, on the other hand, the Committee 
continues, are first and foremost means through which states seek to provide incentives for 
inventiveness and creativity, for the benefit of society as a whole.  In the same vein, CESC 
notes that while human rights to creativity protects the moral and material interest resulting 
from the link between persons, peoples and other groups and their creations, IPRs primarily 
protect business and corporate interests and investments.  As Drahos, the CESC further points 
to IPRs generally being of a temporary nature as yet another fact arguing for IPRs not 
constituting human rights.  CESC concludes by underlining the importance of not equalling 
IPRs with human rights.779  Surprisingly, the CESC manages to dodge the entire issue of the 
relationship between human rights and IPRs in its General Comment No. 21.    
 
                                                 
777  Dutfield and Suthersanen, Global Intellectual Property Law, p. 213.  When contemplating whether 
IPRs can constitute human rights, the discussion is limited to IPRs held by humans, either 
individually or as groups.  IPRs vesting in cooperations are not considered, since corporations are not, 
at least not directly, bearers of human rights. 
778  Drahos, The Universality of Intellectual Property Rights, pp. 21-22, and Intellectual Property and 
Human Rights, pp. 355-357 
779  General Comment No. 17, paras.1-3 
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Dutfield and Suthersanen, on the other hand, maintain that IPRs are, or at least can be, human 
rights.  They seem to base this conclusion mainly on the proximity between CESCR Article 
15.1 and IPRs.  Dutfield and Suthersanen argue that the wording of CESCR Article 15.1 
proves that IPRs are human rights.  They add that in the recent Anheuser-Busch v. Portugal780, 
the ECHR has confirmed that IPRs constitute human rights, positing that intellectual property 
“undeniably attracted the protection of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1” of the ECHR.  Dutfield 
and Suthersanen hence take issue with CESC General Comment No. 17.  They submit that the 
CESC overemphasizes the importance of IPRs for business, and undervalues the moral right 
aspects of IPRs.781     
 
So which of the two positions submitted is right?  Are IPRs human rights?  The answer is 
probably that the question is not sufficiently precise, resulting in the arguments put forth 
passing by one anther.  It is helpful to revisit the brief discussion on the theories behind 
general property rights outlined in Section 5.2.1.  It was explained that property rights theory 
distinguishes between general and special property rights.  Put simply, general property rights 
theories submit that everyone should have a positive right to own certain property.  Special 
property rights theories, on the other hand, assert that there should be no general right to have 
property.  There should only be a negative right not to be deprived of property, once one has 
acquired such.  The doctoral thesis did not pursue the theoretical discussion beyond the just 
stated.  But Section 5.2.2 concluded that from a legal perspective, it is clear that the right to 
property human rights law embraces is that professed by the special rights theories.  In other 
words, the human right to property merely envelopes a negative protection implying that one 
must not be arbitrarily deprived of property held.  Since IPRs is just one form of property 
among others, it seems to follow that IPRs are not human rights per se.  As noted, states are in 
principle free to design their own IPRs, or to have no IP-legislation at all.  Similarly, when the 
ECHR in Anheuser-Busch v. Portugal held that IPRs attract the protection of the property 
rights provision in the ECHRFF, the Court did not suggest that everyone has the right to own 
IPRs.  Rather, the ECHR concluded that when someone holds an IPR, the ECHRFF prevents 
the arbitrary deprivation of the same right.  Hence, if domestic legislation recognizes that 
certain forms of human creativity is worthy of IP-protection, the right must apply equally to 
all individuals and groups.  In other words, as soon as national law recognizes that certain 
forms of creativity are protected by IPRs, those rights become protected as human rights to 
                                                 
780  Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], Appl. No. 73049/1, Judgement of 11 January 2007 
781  Dutfield and Suthersanen, Global Intellectual Property Law, pp. 214-222 
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property.  But again, international law does not demand that human creativity be protected as 
a human right to property.  One is free to argue that it should be, but that is not the law today.  
Thus understood, these aspects of UDHR Article 27.2 and CESCR Article 15.1 (c) can be 
viewed as specialized property rights provisions, explicitly underlining that the general human 
right to property pertains also to IPRs.  In conclusion, depending on from what angle one 
views the matter, one can claim that there is either a complete interface between IPRs and 
human rights or almost no overlap at all.  In the sense that since IPRs, once established, are 
protected under the human right to property, there is in a way an exact match between IPRs 
and the human right to property.  But at the same time, one can argue that property rights 
embracing no obligation on what subject matter shall be protected as IPRs implies that there is 
no interface between IPRs and the human right to property.  But even if taking the latter 
position, this is not to say that there is no interface between IPRs and human rights in general.   
 
Chapters 4 and 8 noted that in addition to proclaim rights at least akin to property rights, 
CESCR Article 15.1 (c) and UDHR Article 27.2 also have cultural rights aspects.  Cultural 
rights are not subject to national legislation in the manner IPRs are.  Creators enjoy certain 
rights over their specific creativity as cultural rights, which domestic law must protect.782  In 
other words, albeit IPRs are not in themselves human rights, creativity enjoys human rights 
protection.  And to the extent IPRs have been extended to creativity, creativity is also 
protected under the human right to property.  Still, protection of creativity need not 
necessarily be achieved through IPRs.  Penal laws etc. can serve the same purpose.  Still, 
since IPRs are so often used to establish the protection cultural rights demand, cultural rights 
can be viewed as to some extent driving IPRs, and, by doing so, indirectly also property 
rights.  Cultural rights spark the development of IP-protection which in turn results in human 
creativity increasingly being protected as property rights.  Indeed, it is precisely such a 
development that is the subject of study in this doctoral thesis.  The thesis has to large extent 
focused on how the human right to property – deeply rooted in the right to non-discrimination 
– is driving the development of IP-similar rights embracing indigenous peoples’ collective 
creativity.  But at the same time, the search for IP-similar rights extending to collective 
creativity is also a result of developments within the area of cultural rights.  As described, 
previously the right to benefit from the moral and material interest of one’s creativity was 
                                                 
782  As Green observes, UDHR Article 27.1 and CESCR Article 15.1 raise the right to benefit from the “material 
and moral interest resulting from one’s work” to the level of human rights.  See Green, Drafting History of the 
CESCR; E/C.12/2000/15, para. 45.      
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understood purely as an individual right.  But when the right envelopes also collectives, states 
must somehow respond to this development.  One way to do so is through IP-neighbouring 
mechanisms.  In this sense, the search for such tools can be viewed as responding to evolved 
understandings of both the right to property and the right to culture.  This further implies that 
it is not only the various spheres of human rights law that are mutually supportive.  Also the 
area of IP-neighbouring law supports the conclusions drawn in the human rights chapters.  
The perceived need to renovate the IP-system to better apply to indigenous peoples’ collective 
creativity in itself lends support to the position that indigenous peoples hold human rights to 
their collective creativity. 
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12.  CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
12.1 Introduction  
 
As Chapter 1 explained, the doctoral thesis has two purposes.  In concrete terms, the Chapters 
above have tried to answer to what extent indigenous peoples have the right to own and/or 
determine over their collective creativity.  But in addition, in order to conduct these analyses, 
the thesis has surveyed essentially all areas of international law most central to the indigenous 
rights discource.  This implies that the thesis has also provided a general overview over 
indigenous peoples’ rights under contemporary international law.  With regard to the latter 
purpose, the specific survey of what rights indigenous peoples enjoy to their collective 
creativity can be viewed as illustrating examples over how the general principles within the 
indigenous rights discourse materialize into concrete law when applied to a specific subject 
matter. 
 
This final Chapter aspires to wrap up and summarize both the specific and general analyses of 
the thesis.  In other words, the Chapter offers some final conclusions as to (i) what rights 
indigenous peoples hold to their collective creativity, and (ii) what is the general status of 
indigenous peoples’ rights within the contemporary international legal system.  The first part 
of the Chapter returns to the concrete examples of appropriations of indigenous cultures 
outlined in the very first Section of the doctoral thesis.  Based on the conclusions drawn in 
previous Chapters, Section 12.2 answers to what extent the examples of non-members use of 
indigenous peoples’ cultures conform with international law.  Subsequently, Section 12.3 
offers some final observations, again based on the analyses above, as to what legal status and 
rights indigenous peoples have under contemporary international law.             
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12.2 Specific examples of potential acts of misappropriation 
 
12.2.1 Does Miss Finland have the right to wear the traditional Saami dress? 
 
The right to culture 
The doctoral thesis has concluded that indigenous peoples have a right to be free from 
utilization of their cultural elements that seriously harms their collective cultural identity.  
Whether a use causes harm or not must be judged against the cultural parameters of the 
people whose creativity is being used.  Use by non-members of the Saami peoples’ traditional 
dress can under certain circumstances cause considerable harm.  That is of course particularly 
so if the dress is used in a derogatory or otherwise offensive manner.  To illustrate, the 
Rovaniemi area in northern Finland hosts a large tourism industry which has incorporated 
many of the most prominent features of the Saami culture into its concept.  However, most 
often the Saami cultural elements are displayed in a non-authentic way.  Tourist guides 
regularly welcome visitors at the airport in costumes intended to resemble the Saami 
traditional dress.  Actors post as Saami in fake “Saami villages”.  The Saami individuals are 
generally cast as dirty, drunk and half-witted.  This practice has resulted in the Saami youth in 
the area avoiding using their traditional dress in an attempt not to be mistaken for tourist 
guides or stereotypes.  Also in other ways, they hide their cultural background.  It is easier to 
simply blend in with the Finnish population.  Clearly, such uses of the Saami culture 
constitute a threat to the collective Saami cultural identity. 
 
But utilization need not necessarily be objectively derogatory to cause damage.  Not all Saami 
persons physically distinguish themselves significantly from members of the majority 
population.  In addition, even though the Saami remain a dominating culture in central parts 
of their traditional territories, the Saami population blends with the majority population in 
most of the Saami people’s traditional territory.  Under such circumstances, if the non-Saami 
population in addition starts wearing the traditional Saami dress, the majority population 
might gradually stop thinking of the Saami as a distinct, separate, culture.  Rather, the 
majority will come to consider the Saami as a part of the majority culture.  Soon, the majority 
population will see no reason for policies aiming at creating an environment where the Saami 
can preserve their cultural identity.   
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The above would imply that not all uses of indigenous peoples’ traditional dresses by non-
members are prohibited.  The use must either be seriously culturally offensive or risk 
integrating members of the indigenous people into the majority population.  This would imply 
that uses of the traditional Saami dress that is respectful, and acknowledges the Saami 
people’s status as a distinct people, is allowed.  Examples of such use might be when 
members of the non-Saami royal families occasionally wear the traditional Saami dress to 
honour important occasions of the Saami people.  Examples that would clearly be disallowed 
would be common non-Saami persons starting to use the Saami traditional dress on a regular 
basis (which do not occur presently).  Also prohibited is use of the traditional Saami dress by 
non-Saami persons in the tourist industry, particularly in a derogatory manner.  Miss Finland 
using the Saami dress seems to be a middle-ground example.  Much would depend on how 
more precisely the dress is used.  But if used in a correct and respectful manner, 
acknowledging that the dress is “borrowed”, the use is probably legitimate.    
 
The right to self-determination 
The Saami traditional dress comes in many regional and local variations.  All have been 
widely disseminated to a general public for a longer period of time.  No third party rights 
would pertain to the Saami traditional dress (although a few non-Saami individuals 
presumably own a physical example of the dress).  The traditional Saami dress is, in other 
words, in the public domain.  Hence, if indigenous peoples enjoy the general right to self-
determination, they have the right to determine over the use of the traditional Saami dress783, 
and can hence preclude non-members from using the same.  But also if indigenous peoples’ 
right to self-determination is rather a sui generis right, the still have the right to determine 
over cultural elements in the public domain, if no profound and genuine interest of society as 
a whole exists arguing for it be allowed to take part in the decision making on the use of the 
cultural element.  No such genuine state interest can be said to pertain to the Saami traditional 
dress.  In addition, the above has pointed to how culturally important the traditional dress is to 
the Saami.  Consequently, also under a sui generis right to self-determination, the Saami 
people has the right to determine over the use of its traditional dress.       
                                                 
783  Obviously, since the Saami traditional dress varies between regions and communities, the decision on how 
each and every variation of the dress is to be used would be made on a regional/local level.  But again, the 




As mentioned, the Saami traditional dress is in the public domain.  Hence, the Saami people 
hold property rights to the dress. 
 
Benefit-sharing 
It is difficult to imagine situations where benefit-sharing situations would arise with regard to 
the traditional Saami dress. 
12.2.2 May multinational corporations patent indigenous peoples’ 
knowledge about flora and fauna absent their consent and/or 
remuneration being paid? 
 
Cultural rights 
The doctoral thesis has identified that in certain instances, use of TK by non-members can be 
seriously harmful to the collective identity of an indigenous people.  TK not uncommonly 
constitutes an integral part of the collective cultural identity of an indigenous people.  Use by 
non-members causing serious injury to the identity of the indigenous people is then 
prohibited.  In case of sacred TK, or TK that for other reasons is of particular cultural 
importance to the indigenous people, patenting – which includes both a commoditisation and 
disclosure of the TK – is prohibited.    
 
The right to self-determination 
Of course, indigenous peoples’ TK can be (i) still controlled by the indigenous people in the 
sense that it has not been shared with the outer world, (ii) widely known and hence in the 
public domain, and (iii) subject to patents or other third party rights held by non-members.  If 
indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination is the general right enjoyed by all peoples, 
indigenous peoples have the right to maintain control over TK already held by them.  They 
also, in principle, have the right to regain control over TK in the public domain.784  With 
regard to TK to which third party rights pertain, indigenous peoples have the right to have 
such returned which is of particular cultural relevance to the indigenous people in question.  
In addition, they have the right to prevent uses that are culturally offensive or for other 
                                                 
784  Sometimes, however, it is probably more or less impossible to bring TK already widely circulating 
completely back under the control of the indigenous people.  In such instances, benefit-sharing might be a viable 
option.  See below under Benefit sharing.  
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reasons inappropriate.  With regard to other forms of uses, benefit-sharing might be an 
option.785  As third-party rights expire, indigenous peoples of course regain control over such 
TK.  It does hence not re-enter the public domain. 
 
If indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination is rather a sui generis right, indigenous 
peoples still have the right to continuously determine over TK already under their control.  As 
to TK in the public domain, it might be a profound and genuine interest of the state, or 
perhaps rather of states, to preserve some of the functions of the public domain. Continued 
use for e.g. teaching purposes and non-commercial research might still hence be allowed.  But 
when such pressing needs of society as a whole is not present, the TK shall as a general rule 
be returned.786  When third party rights pertain, the indigenous people as a general rule does 
not have the right to have such TK returned until the right expires.  Until that time, however, 
the indigenous people can still prevent uses that are harmful to the indigenous people’s 
culture, or in other ways insensitive.  Further, benefit-sharing might again often be an option.            
 
Property rights  
Indigenous peoples hold property rights to TK still controlled by the indigenous people and in 




A couple of basic benefit-sharing situations arise in the present example.  Indigenous peoples 
hold rights to TK in the public domain under the right to property.  In addition, the right to 
self-determination too applies to most such TK.  Still, if the TK is widely spread, it might be 
essentially unfeasible to bring the TK back under the indigenous peoples’ control.  In such 
instances, it might be an option to allow benefit-sharing arrangements to “replace” full return 
of the TK.  In other instances, even if it would be possible for the indigenous people to regain 
control of the TK, the TK might not be of such cultural and/or spiritual importance that 
controlled and culturally respective use by non-members is harmful.  Under such 
circumstances, the indigenous people might voluntarily seek benefit-sharing agreements.  
 
                                                 
785  See further under Benefit sharing. 
786  Again, when this is not possible, benefit-sharing might be an option. 
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When third party rights pertain to the TK, the indigenous people hold no property rights to the 
TK in question.  However, at least in certain instances, a right to benefit-sharing might follow 
as a fair middle-ground position under the right to self-determination  
 
12.2.3 Are non-members allowed to copy indigenous art onto carpets, clothes 
and greeting cards, absent their consent and/or without remuneration 
being paid? 
 
The right to culture 
In certain circumstances, display of its traditional art can cause considerable harm to the 
collective cultural identity of an indigenous people.  That is so if the art is sacred, or for other 
reasons particularly culturally sensitive.  The art being exposed outside its cultural context to 
a wider public can in such instances deprive the art of its cultural/spiritual value.  Under such 
circumstances, the use is prohibited.  
 
The right to self-determination 
Since the art is being copied onto commercial objects, it is presumed that it has been widely 
disseminated prior to use by non-members.  Further, it is assumed that third party IPRs do not 
pertain to the subject matter (although of course numerous property rights can pertain to 
physical copies of the art).  The situation is hence quite similar with the Saami traditional 
dress, outlined under 12.2.1.  If indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination is the general 
right applying to all peoples, the people essentially enjoys a complete right to control the art.  
If the right is rather a sui generis right, indigenous peoples’ right to control its traditional art is 
still extensive, since in most instances it is difficult to imagine a genuine and pressing need 
calling for the right not to apply.  In sum, the indigenous people will in most instances be 
allowed to determine the use of its art on carpets, clothes etc. 
 
Property rights 
As it is presumed that the art is in the public domain, indigenous peoples hold property rights 
to the art.   
 
Benefit-sharing 
Essentially two benefit-sharing situations seem to be present in this example.  As the 
indigenous people hold rights to the art, it shall in principle be allowed to decide over its use.  
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But similar to Section 12.2.2, a lot of art might already have been so widely distributed that it 
is no longer possible to control its further use.  Then one can imagine benefit-sharing 
arrangements as a practical alternative for uses that are not culturally insensitive or 
inappropriate.  And again, also in instances where full control is feasible and practical, the 
indigenous people might be interested in benefit-sharing arrangements with regard to 
controlled and culturally respective use by non-members which are not harmful to the 
indigenous peoples 
   
12.2.4 Is the tourist industry allowed to freely use attributes of indigenous 
peoples’ cultures? 
 
The question is very generic, and hence difficult to answer concretely.  It will of course 
depend on the nature of the cultural element being used in each instance.  Still, generally 
speaking, one can presume that most attributes used by the tourist industry are in the public 
domain.  This implies that indigenous peoples hold both property rights to the cultural 
elements.  In most instances, the right to self-determination also applies.  Unauthorized use by 
the tourist industry is hence prohibited.  If the tourist industry wants to display the indigenous 
peoples’ culture in its activities, it needs to seek benefit-sharing arrangements.     
 
12.2.5 Are non-member artists allowed to copy indigenous handicraft and 
sell such copies as authentic? 
 
See Section 12.2.3. 
 
12.2.6 Are non-member musicians allowed to fuse indigenous songs into 
their own productions, without acknowledging the indigenous 
composer and without paying compensation? 
 
Cultural rights 
In most instances, indigenous peoples’ traditional songs being used outside their context is 
probably not so disturbing as to cause serious harm to the indigenous people’s culture.  Still, 
if the song e.g. forms part of a sacred ritual, use by non-members – particularly for 
commercial purposes and/or where the song is distorted - can deprive the song of its spiritual 
value and hence be seriously harmful to the collective identity of an indigenous people.  The 
use is then prohibited under the right to culture.   
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The right to self-determination 
Indigenous musical tunes are with few exceptions presumably in the public domain.  In 
addition, however, when such a tune is fused into a non-member musician’s production, that 
musician acquires copyright to that version of the song, provided of course that she adds 
sufficient new elements.  Both the legal situation of the original song in the public domain and 
the new version to which third party rights pertain must be addressed.  
 
With regard to the traditional song in the public domain, indigenous peoples have the right to 
determine over their traditional songs vis-à-vis non-member musicians irrespective of whether 
the right to self-determination is the general or a sui generis right.  In the first instance, this is 
obvious.  Further, as to the right to self-determination as a sui generis right, it is difficult to 
identify a pressing social need arguing for non-members being allowed to exploit indigenous 
peoples’ traditional songs without remuneration. 
 
With regard to new version of the traditional song, to which the non-member musician holds a 
third party right, the indigenous people can probably in most instances not determine that use 
of the song shall be discontinued.  The exception would be if the song is derogatory or in 
other ways culturally insensitive, but those instances are probably rare.  (In addition, as 
mentioned above, the indigenous people can determine that the use shall stop if it is seriously 
harmful to the cultural identity of the group.)  However, in line with what has been said about 
the relevance of a comparison with moral rights when determining the scope of the right to 
self-determination, the musician is presumably obliged to acknowledge the indigenous people 
as the originator of the tune.  With regard to remuneration, see below under Benefit-sharing. 
 
Property rights 
To the extent songs are in the public domain, indigenous peoples hold property rights to the 




As seen above, with regard to songs in the public domain, the indigenous people in principle 
can dedide that the song shall not be fused into the new production.  But again, it can 
sometimes be difficult to control a tune already widely disseminated.  In addition, if it does 
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not cause cultural concerns, the indigenous people might be interested in lending the tune 
against compensation.  In such instances, there shall hence be benefit-sharing.  The music-
industry has standards for use of other composers’ work.  But here one must add that the song 
might have specific cultural value to the indigenous people in question. 
 
With regard to songs to which the musician already hold a copyright, one can imagine that 
this is such a situation where it is deemed fair that benefit-sharing is provided as a 
compromise under the right to self-determination.   
 
12.2.7 Are corporations allowed to trade-mark indigenous patterns and signs 
for commercial purposes? 
 
Cultural rights 
Trademarking of indigenous peoples’ patterns and signs might be seriously harmful to an 
indigenous people’ collective cultural identity in the same manner as the patenting of their TK 
sometimes is.  To the extent such is the case, trademarking is prohibited for the same reasons 
outlined under Section 12.2.2. 
 
The right to self-determination  
From a legal perspective, the situation when a corporation seeks to trademark an indigenous 
people’s sign etc. is similar to when a people’s song is commercialized by non-member 
musicians, as outlined under 12.2.6.  Hence, two different situations must be addressed.  
When a sign etc. has not yet been trademarked, it “exists” solely in the public domain.  But 
when a corporation has already trademarked the sign, in addition, the corporation enjoys a 
third party right to the sign in its trademarked version.   
 
With regard to the sign, symbol etc. as such, similar to the situation of the fused song, the 
indigenous people has the right to determine over the sign etc. vis-à-vis the corporation 
regardless of whether the right to self-determination is the general or a sui generis right.  That 
such is the case if the right to self-determination is the general right is again self-evident.  But 
also if the right to self-determination is rather a sui generis right, it is difficult, indeed in this 
case impossible, to imagine a social need so pressing as justifying that an indigenous people’s 
sign etc. be trademark against the peoples will. 
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The situation when a sign etc. has already been trademarked is legally different from the 
borrowed musical tune, outlined under 12.2.6.  The reason is that the trademark potentially 
lasts in perpetuity.  This implies that, unlike the song, which will eventually end up in the 
public domain and hence be brought back under the control of the indigenous people, the 
people will, unless measures are taken, never regain control over the sign.  This speaks for the 
state having an obligation to expropriate the trademark and return it to the indigenous people.  
That is of course particularly so if the indigenous people perceives the use of the sign etc. as a 
trademark as offensive.     
 
Property rights 
If the sign is not already trademarked, the indigenous people hold property right to it and can 
prevent trademarking.  If the sign has already been trademarked, no property right pertains. 
 
Benefit-sharing 
If the sign is not already trade-marked, the company needs an agreement from the indigenous 
people to be able to trademark the sign.  Such an agreement will presumably include a 
benefit-sharing arrangement.  If the sign is already trademarked, the indigenous people holds 
no power under the right to property.  But as seen, the state might have an obligation to 
expropriate the sign under the right to self-determination.  However, if the trademark is well 
established and of great value, and continued use not intolerable to the indigenous people, a 
benefit-sharing arrangement might be a more relevant alternative.  In addition, a benefit-
sharing arrangement can also be a middle-ground alternative when it is held that a right to full 
control does not follows from the right to self-determination. 
 
12.2.8 Are non-members allowed to copy indigenous tattoos on themselves? 
 
Cultural rights 
Here, one must distinguish between two forms of tattoos.  Some indigenous peoples, for 
instance in the pacific, customarily tattoo themselves with patterns of cultural significance.  If 
non-members copy such patterns onto themselves, as in the case of pop star Robbie Williams, 
this can cause serious offense.  Indigenous tattoos are often perceived to form part of the 
identity of the person, and shall hence not be used at all by others, in particularly not by non-
members.  One could say that the situation resembles, but is probably in most instances more 
offensive, than the use of the traditional Saami dress (the Saami dress too involves a number 
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of details specific to the identity of the wearer).  It is probably difficult to imagine a situation 
where a non-member would be allowed to use a tattoo of an indigenous people that is 
culturally significant and forms part of the identity of the bearer. 
 
A quite different situation is when a non-member tattoos a sign, symbol or pattern from an 
indigenous culture not traditionally used as a tattoo by the people itself.  For instance, many 
indigenous sun symbols are popular objects for tattoos.  Under such circumstances, the 
situation more resembles when indigenous signs are copied onto greeting cards, carpets etc.  
Naturally, the copy of a traditional sign on a human being might sometimes be particularly 
culturally sensitive.  Notwithstanding, the test of whether the use is prohibited is the same as 
outlined in Sections 12.2.1 and 12.2.3. 
 
The right to self-determination       
In both the instances pictured, the sign is in the public domain.  Presumably, no pressing need 
exists that warrants that non-members are free to use indigenous peoples’ signs as tattoos 
against the people’s will.  That is of course particularly so with regard to tattoos forming part 
of the identity of members of the people.  The indigenous people hence has a right to 
determine over the sign, also in the environment of tattoo-shops. 
   
Property rights 
In both the above mentioned instances, indigenous peoples hold property right to the sign.  
Use of the sign, also by a private person on the human body, must be regarded as a violation 
of that property right. 
 
Benefit-sharing 
Benefit-sharing arrangements in the current context are presumably unlikely. 
 
12.3 General conclusions on indigenous peoples’ rights 
 
12.3.1 The conventional international legal and political system 
 
The doctoral thesis initially described how the nation-state and liberalism surfaced together in 
the aftermath of the Peace of Westphalia.  In collaboration, European sovereigns and liberal 
scholars gradually crafted an international legal system simultaneously confirming and 
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justifying the power of the state and liberal theories focusing on the individual.  Political 
theories and the state agreed that the state is the sole collective international legal subject, and 
the only creator of international law.  Liberalism and states further concurred that human 
rights could apply to individuals only.  In the thus defined state-individual dichotomy, there 
was no room for indigenous peoples.  They were stuck in a legal no-mans land.  In sum, 
indigenous peoples enjoyed no rights, since (i) states were the only recognized collective legal 
subjects under international law, and (ii) only individual legal subjects enjoyed human rights.  
The thesis further outlined how these basic features of the world order and the international 
legal system got entrenched over the centuries that followed. And when the young United 
Nations set out to craft the contemporary international legal system, it did not hesitate to 
adopt the fundamental premises of the liberal legal system.   
 
The decolonization process resulted in the freedom of the former colonies, but did nothing for 
the indigenous rights discourse.  On the contrary, decolonization was interpreted as implying 
freedom for territories with their populations, irrespective of the territory’s ethnic and cultural 
composition.  The population of the territory was subsequently dubbed a people.  In other 
words, the state-creation process furthered by the decolonization movement presented striking 
similarities with the creation of states in post-Westphalian Europe.  It entrenched a legal order 
where artificially created states were the collective international legal subjects, and where 
there was no room for peoples, ethnically and culturally defined.   
 
The doctoral thesis further observed how the “nation-states”, both in Europe and in the former 
colonial territories, upheld an illusion that the state could be, and was, neutral between 
cultures.  In the liberal nation-state, all cultures have the same opportunity to thrive, it was 
said.  But it has further been demonstrated that in practice, the idea of the nation-state is a 
self-fulfilling prophecy, because virtually all nation-states promote nationalism.  The nation-
state is not culturally homogenous.  But the population can be lured to believe it is, the ruling 
elite from the majority culture have realized in most so called nation-states. 
 
In conclusion, entering the 1980s, more than 300 years of international law had confirmed the 
state as the sole collective international legal subject.  Further, the state had human rights 
obligations to individuals only.  A human rights system focusing entirely on equal rights of 
individuals had been opted for, rather than a system also catering for indigenous peoples and 
minority groups as such.  Notably, an international legal system advocating a clinical state-
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individual dichotomy suited perfectly a domestic political system wanting to put cultural 
differences aside, and focus only on the relationship between the state and the individual.      
 
12.3.2 A spawning-ground for indigenous peoples’ rights is created 
 
The international legal and political order pictured above appeared rock-steady.  But in the 
1980s and early 1990s, two developments occurred somewhat shaking the picture.   
 
First, political theory increasingly challenged the basic premises of conventional individual 
liberalism.  In particular, political thinkers questioned whether (i) the state can be, and is, 
neutral between cultures, and (ii) individuals are able to disconnect themselves from their 
cultural and ethnical background in the way classical liberalism suggests.  More and more 
scholars came to agree that the state always indirectly, and most often deliberately, favours 
the culture of the majority.  Further, it was recognized, for many individuals, their cultural and 
ethnic background is an integral part of the person they are.  It is nothing they can change on a 
market-place of ideas, however lucrative the offer of an alternative culture might be.  Within a 
relative short time-period, a majority of liberal political thinkers joined around these basic 
premises, resulting in a new dominating wind within political philosophy.  This line of 
thought concluded that the only rationale way to address the facts that (i) the state, left to its 
own devices, will always favour the culture of the majority culture, and (ii) to certain 
individuals, leading a good and meaningful life presupposes an environment created by their 
specific cultural and ethnic background, is to recognize rights proper of the group as such.      
 
Second, around the same time period, the world community turned its attention to the 
situation of indigenous populations.  Doing so, the UN and its member states more or less 
immediately concluded that the situation of indigenous populations differ considerably from 
that of ethnic and cultural minorities.  It was perceived that indigenous populations, to a larger 
degree and minorities, had maintained their own distinct societal structures and ways of life.  
In other words, indigenous societal structures could be said to continuously exist side-by-side 
with the majority society, to an extent not present among most ethnic and cultural minorities.  
Also, generally speaking, the political aspirations differed.  While indigenous peoples were 
determined to continuously remain as distinct polities outside the majority society, many – if 
not all – ethnic and cultural minorities aspired for respect for their cultural and ethnic 
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distinctiveness within the majority society.787  The perceived difference between indigenous 
populations and minorities resulted in international law – basically from the outset – taking a 
different approach to the two categories of groups.     
 
The outlined two developments crystallized into law.  One legal response was the emergence 
of a minority rights system in the early 1990s, manifested both in specific legal instruments 
addressing the situation of members of minority groups and evolved interpretations of cultural 
rights provisions in already adopted legal instruments, first and foremost CCPR Article 27.  
Contributing to this development was the right to non-discrimination, which simultaneously 
took on a second facet. The right to non-discrimination progressed to not only imply that 
states must refrain from actively discriminate among individuals.  In addition, the right came 
to embrace a positive obligation on states to prevent discrimination.  In practice, the new 
minority rights, and the evolved understanding of the rights to culture and non-discrimination, 
extended an indirect protection also to the group as such.  Formally, however, minority rights 
were still rights of individual members of the group, and not of the group as such.    
 
Differently, when international law in parallel for the first time seriously addressed rights of 
indigenous populations, it focused on the collective aspects of these societies.  The rights of 
indigenous populations, enshrined first and foremost in ILO 169, at least arguably constituted 
the first example of international law recognizing collective human rights proper, beyond the 
right to self-determination.  In other words, these were rights also formally protecting e.g. the 
cultures of indigenous populations as such.  At the same time, it was clear that ILO 169 did 
not proclaim peoples’ rights.  This follows indirectly from the omission of the right to self-
determination in the Convention, and explicitly from ILO 169 Article 1 (3).     
 
In conclusion, the outlined legal sources confirmed that international law had broken with a 
clinical state-individual dichotomy.  International law too, had recognized that a complete 
focus on universal human rights cannot adequately cater for those wishing to remain 
culturally distinct.  Doing so demands protecting also the group as such, wherefore an indirect 
such protection was catered for.  But the outlined legal sources further confirmed the 
distinction made between indigenous populations, on one hand, and minority groups, on the 
                                                 
787  Not accounted for here is the situation and aspiration of non-indigenous non-state forming peoples.  As the 
doctoral thesis has touched upon on a few occasions, both the defining characteristics of such groups and their 
political aspirations are closer to those of indigenous peoples than of minorities.     
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other.  While minority rights were individual rights, ILO 169 enveloped a broad spectrum of 
rights applying also formally to indigenous populations per se.  Further underscoring the legal 
distinction made between indigenous populations and minority groups was the very different 
approaches taken in the two UN Declarations applying to the respective groups crafted around 
this time.  As seen, the Minority Declaration proclaimed only individual rights.  The draft 
DRIP, on the other hand, envisioned a number of peoples’ rights, including to self-
determination.  Hence, this era did not result in the establishment of any peoples’ rights of 
indigenous peoples.  But the outlined developments were still critical, as they sent the clinical 
state-individual dichotomy to the history of law books after more than 300 years of reign, and 
lay the foundation for future developments. 
 
12.3.3 The surface of indigenous peoples’ rights proper 
 
Surveying whether international law has taken a final step and recognized rights proper of 
indigenous peoples, it is helpful to study the rights to culture and self-determination jointly, 
viewed through the prism of the right to non-discrimination.  That is so since the questions (i) 
do indigenous peoples constitute “peoples” for the purposes of the right to self-determination, 
and (ii) do indigenous peoples enjoy collective rights to culture, must reasonably produce the 
same answer.  It is either “yes” or “no” in both instances, but not “yes/no” or “no/yes”.  
Moreover, the right to non-discrimination is likely to have followed suit, regardless of 
whether the path has been towards “yes” or “no”.   
 
The above has already demonstrated how the right to cultures and non-discrimination 
simultaneously took one step together, both taking on a facet indirectly protecting the cultural 
practices and identity of groups as such.  But a joint analysis of international legal sources 
pertaining to these two set of rights reveals a further parallel development towards a third 
facet.  And progressing towards the third facet, the two rights were joined by a simultaneous 
development within the right to self-determination.   
 
Since roughly the late 1990s, the UN treaty bodies authorized to take a position on the 
applicability on the right to self-determination have developed a coherent jurisprudence 
asserting that indigenous peoples constitute peoples proper for the purposes of the right to 
self-determination.  Simultaneously, all relevant treaty bodies, as well as other international 
legal sources, have concluded that indigenous peoples hold other peoples’ rights proper, 
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including to their cultural identity and practices.  These developments in globally applicable 
international legal sources have been matched by similar conclusions by regional human 
rights bodies on most continents.  Moreover, state practice has confirmed indigenous peoples’ 
rights in general, and their right to self-determination to be exercised through autonomy and 
self-government, in particular.      
 
As indicated, the developments within the rights to self-determination and culture have been 
mirrored by the right to non-discrimination too, taking on a third facet.  True, the third facet 
has been formulated somewhat differently by the various human rights institutions, including 
by the UN treaty bodies.  Notwithstanding, if looking closer at the various wordings, one 
discovers that the right formulated is essentially the same.  The right to non-discrimination 
too, has recently been interpreted to apply also to groups.  The protection is indirect, but 
nonetheless for all practical purposes implies that the right applies also to groups as such, not 
least in the context of indigenous peoples.  Indeed, certain legal sources hold that in the 
specific context of indigenous peoples, the right to non-discrimination applies also formally to 
the group.     
 
Also read isolated as pronouncing three distinct categories of rights, international legal 
sources emerging during the last decade or so present strong arguments for (i) indigenous 
peoples constituting “peoples” for self-determination purposes (ii) indigenous peoples being 
bearers of a collective right to culture, and (iii) the right to non-discrimination applying 
(indirectly) also indigenous peoples.  But if one in addition analyzes these sources together, 
based on the presumption that the core of each of the three rights is very similar, and has a 
very similar purpose, the argument that such a right has been established becomes truly 
convincing.  This core right could be formulated in line with:  
 
“Indigenous peoples have a right equal to other peoples to maintain and develop their distinct 
cultures, societies and way of life, and to determine over these societies.”     
 
The conclusions within different spheres of law are in other words mutually supportive.  What 
has been inferred above with regard to the contemporary understanding of the right to non-
discrimination supports the conclusions drawn in the contexts of the rights to culture and self-
determination, and vice versa.  A joint analyze of sources formally pertaining to the rights to 
self-determination, culture and non-discrimination seems to establish that a right formulated 
292 
as above has crystallized in international law.  Importantly, it further appears clear that the 
term “peoples” in the formulated right does not refer to peoples in the meaning the aggregate 
of the population of the state.  Rather, “peoples” shall be understood in its true meaning, i.e. 
in terms of culture/ethnicity.  Recent developments within international law have not only 
made history of the state-individual dichotomy.  They have also clarified that for international 
legal purposes the term “peoples” can no longer be understood, or at least not exclusively 
understood, as referring to the aggregate of the population of the state.    
 
Any lingering doubts about the conclusion above being correct were addressed by the DRIP.  
The DRIP process commenced essentially as the development in international law outlined 
above started.  States were fully aware that the DRIP was supposed to offer the political 
response to a progression in international law until that moment driven largely by expert 
bodies and international courts.  Thus informed, states adopted the DRIP with overwhelming 
support, a support that has increased during the few years that have passed since its adoption.  
Although not in itself a formally legally binding source, it is clear from a cotemporary 
understanding of the law on international legal sources, that DRIP interacting with the sources 
presented above constitutes concluding evidence of the development outlined above having 
crystallized into international law proper.    
 
Important recent developments within the indigenous rights discourse have not been confined 
to the sphere of culture/self-determination.  Also the conventional right to property has 
progressed to become highly relevant to indigenous peoples.  Analyzing this right to, it helps 
to adequately conceptualize relevant rights, and survey together rights that bring greater 
clarity to one another.  Indigenous peoples’ right to land, territories and natural resources has 
at least two foundations.  Trying to crystallize the law it helps to distinguish between the two.  
A division can be made between land rights based on the right to culture, on one hand, and 
rights rooted in the general right to property, on the other.  The former set of rights has been 
taken into account when analyzing the right to culture as described above.  Turning to the 
right to property, it assists, indeed is necessary, to analyze also this right through the prism of 
non-discrimination.     
 
In fact, the right to property is, at its core, an aspect of the right to non-discrimination.  
Unsurprisingly therefore, the right to property – as applied to indigenous peoples – has 
developed in the same path as the general right to non-discrimination.  Recently, international 
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law has come to hold that it is not sufficient that domestic real estate provides for formal 
equality.  It must also be culturally neutral in practice.  It is discriminatory to design the law 
so that land use common to the majority population results in property rights to land, whereas 
communal land use characteristic to the indigenous people does not.  In other words, 
inasmuch domestic law generally recognizes property rights to land, it must acknowledge that 
indigenous peoples use of its traditional territories also results in property rights thereto.  That 
is so irrespective of whether the indigenous people’s traditional way of using the land is 
considerably less intensive compared with land-utilization the law has conventionally 
acknowledged results in rights to land.   
 
The outlined contemporary understanding of indigenous peoples’ property rights to their 
traditional territories follows e.g. from UN treaty bodies.  But also regional human rights 
institution and domestic courts have developed a coherent jurisprudence confirming this right.  
Further, as with the rights to self-determination and culture, states have reaffirmed that 
indigenous peoples hold property rights to lands traditionally and continuously occupied 
and/or used when adopting the DRIP.         
 
The DRIP further supports the position taken in numerous international legal sources that 
indigenous peoples enjoy property rights not only to lands continuously used.  In addition, it 
is suggested, they hold property rights to lands traditionally used, but which have 
subsequently been lost through colonization or other means.  It appears clear that a right to 
restitution is at least emerging.  This is so with regard to both the full right to restitution and 
benefit-sharing.  Benefit-sharing could be labelled partial restitution since, albeit not bringing 
lost territories back under the control of indigenous peoples, it still implies that proceeds from 
the territory is channelled back to the indigenous people.  
 
As explained, the recent recognition of indigenous peoples’ property rights to their traditional 
territories is a direct result of a correct understanding of the right to non-discrimination.  The 
right to non-discrimination is of course not only underpinning property rights to land, but 
property rights in general.  The recognition of indigenous peoples’ property rights to land 
implies a dismissal of the terra nullius doctrine, traditional invoked to explain why 
indigenous peoples’ traditional territories could be legally colonized because of not being 
sufficiently inhabited and used.  If one examines the underlying rationales behind the terra 
nullius doctrine and the notion of the public domain, one notes that the two concepts have 
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denied indigenous peoples property rights to various forms of subject matter for very similar 
reasons.  As indicated, indigenous peoples were denied property rights to their traditional 
lands because their use did not, it was held, sufficiently distinguish the land area in question 
compared with the same area prior to use.  Comparably, indigenous creativity did not, it was 
deemed, result in property right because of not being sufficiently distinguishable compared 
with previous works of the people.  Further contributing to lack of recognition of property 
rights were the fact that both indigenous land use and creativity were communal in nature, 
where one could not – judged by Western standards – sufficiently distinguish individual right-
holders.   
 
In sum, the exact same right to non-discrimination underpins both property rights to land and 
creativity.  Indigenous peoples have conventionally been denied property rights to land and 
creativity for the same underlying reasons.  These reasons have been held discriminatory in 
the land rights context, wherefore it has been recognized that indigenous peoples hold 
property rights to lands traditionally used.  It follows that indigenous peoples hold property 
rights also to their collective creativity.      
 
12.3.4 Further on the material content and scope of the rights 
 
The rights to self-determination, culture and non-discrimination 
Indigenous peoples constitute “peoples” for the purposes of the right to self-determination.  
All relevant international legal sources point to that the right to self-determination indigenous 
peoples enjoy is the right to self-determination, applicable to all peoples.  This implies a right 
to self-determination of indigenous peoples on par with the right enjoyed by the majority 
people.  Indigenous peoples hence have no less right to determine over natural resources in 
their territories, over the teaching of their children or over how their elders should be catered 
for, than do the majority people.     
 
Still, it cannot be completely excluded that indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination is 
rather a right sui generis to them.  If so, this would imply that the right is subordinated to the 
right enjoyed by peoples in the meaning the aggregate of the population of the state.  The 
difference in scope and content between the two alternatives is not that dramatic, however.  
Even if indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination is a sui generis right, it follows 
explicitly from international legal sources and equally important from the underpinning 
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foundation of the right, that the right is to be implemented through autonomy and self-
governance, and not through the political channels of the state.  In particular from the 
foundation underlying the right to self-determination, it further follows that the right – also as 
a sui generis right - is still a genuine right to self-determination.  In other words, indigenous 
peoples have a right to be self-determining also in matters of importance not only to the 
indigenous people, but also to the majority people.  The right is not a mere right to 
consultation.  Of course, the right must be exercised with respect for the interests and rights of 
the state/the majority people.  But these rights/interest do not as a rule take precedent over the 
right to self-determination of the indigenous people.  Rather, one must on a case-to-case basis 
determine which people’s position prevails in instances of conflict.      
 
For an illustration of how the right plays out in practice, see Section 12.2’s illustration of the 
content and scope of the right to self-determination as a sui generis right in the context of 
collective creativity. 
 
The right to property  
Indigenous peoples hold property rights to lands traditionally used and/or occupied and 
continuously used by them. 
 
Indigenous peoples hold property rights also cultural elements created by and still controlled 
by them, as well as to cultural elements in the public domain.  These property rights are valid 
as long as the cultural element remains culturally relevant to the indigenous people in 
question. 
 
Restitution (including benefit-sharing) 
Indigenous peoples’ property rights to lands traditionally occupied and/or used, but which 
have subsequently been lost is at least about to emerge into law.  This is true for both full and 
partial (i.e. benefit-sharing) restitution.   
 
When indigenous peoples’ right to restitution pertaining to their traditional lands have 
crystallized into law, indigenous peoples also enjoy a right to restitution with regard to 
collective creativity traditionally created by them, but to which third party rights now pertain.  
This conclusion follows directly from what has been inferred above about the right to non-
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